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Abstract
The interstate slave trade grew from a haphazard and intermittent enterprise in 
the early years o f the nineteenth century to a central aspect of southern society. With 
the decline of the international trade and the decline o f white migration to the frontier, 
southerners turned to the trade to supply their labor needs. Farmers in the Chesapeake 
region increasingly sold their “excess” bondservants to slave traders. These speculators 
brought a measure o f systemization and regularity to the trade. As they did so, 
however, a significant number o f Upper South citizens questioned the trade’s efficacy. 
The wanton exploitation and naked cruelty of speculation caused many to wonder if the 
trade was worth the price. Evangelical Christians, moreover, tended to abhor the 
interstate slave trade since it undermined the Biblical basis of the family and violated 
the idea of Christian stewardship. Citizens of the Lower South, on the other hand, were 
worried that they imported the worst type of slaves, therefore increasing the risk of 
rebellion. The slave trade, in essence, caused southerners to question the justification 
for the peculiar institution.
Speculators modified their practices to make slave trading more palatable to 
southern citizens. They promoted the idea that they bought slaves in  family units, did 
not traffic in kidnapped slaves, and treated their purchases with a modicum o f dignity. 
Traders separated themselves from the more objectionable portions o f  the trade by 
employing agents and actively promoting the idea that there were “good” and “bad” 
traders. At the same time speculators worked to rehabilitate their image, northern 
abolitionists became more strident in their attacks on slavery. One o f  their favorite 
targets was the slave trade. Southerners could hardly admit to the charges without
v
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creating the opportunity for further criticism o f slavery. Their doubts about the trade’s 
efficacy disappeared as southerners began to blame abolitionists for slavery’s excesses 
while simultaneously believing in a negative stereotype o f the slave trader. In this 
manner, southerners effectively disregarded the abolitionist attacks while fashioning a 
justification for slavery that relied on blaming slave trader for the worst abuses o f  the 
peculiar institution.
vi
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Chapter One
On April 27,1846 Isaac Franklin died o f  “congestion o f the stomach” on his 
plantation in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. The family made arrangements to have 
the body preserved in alcohol and returned to his favorite plantation, Fairvue, in Sumner 
County, Tennessee. Franklin, fifty-seven years old at his death, owned six properties in 
Louisiana and the one in Tennessee. His entire estate, which included over 10,600 
acres and seven hundred slaves, was valued at over a half a million dollars.1 Franklin 
hoped to convert Fairvue into the ‘Tsaac Franklin Institute,” an academy that would 
educate his daughter, nieces, nephews, and the poor children o f the county.2 A New 
Orleans paper praised Franklin’s “munificent provision” and hoped his generosity 
would inspire others. It noted that he displayed “perserverance and steadiness o f 
purpose, and that address and tact, in the management of business, for which he became 
afterwards so remarkable.”3 Another memoriam praised Franklin as a “man of 
discerning mind, sound judgment, great worth, indomitable spirit, and vast enterprise.” 
Had Franklin and his wife Adelicia “lived in the remote times o f early Greece and 
Rome, their feme would have descended to us, in the genius o f the fer-famed lyric
1 Succession o f Isaac Franklin (n.p., n.d.), pp. 27-51, 293 (quotation), 482, 700- 
708. Franklin’s net worth was calculated by adding together the holdings o f the several 
properties. One o f Franklin’s plantations, Angola, is the present site o f the state 
penitentiary.
2 Ibid., pp. 3,16. Franklin’s widow foiled his plans. She originally surrendered 
her claim to the estate in fevor of a $10,000 annual annuity, but successfully sued for its 
possession three years later (Ibid., pp. 19,714-18).
3 New Orleans Daily Picayune, 1 Oct. 1846.
1
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poets.” The paper concluded that Franklin’s “tact, address, firmness, and intelligence” 
enabled him to succeed in his “peculiar calling.”4
Franklin’s “peculiar calling” was the interstate slave trade. Variously known as 
“speculators,” “nigger traders,” or “soul drivers,” Franklin and others like him bought 
slaves in one state, transported them to another state, and sold them.5 He teamed with 
John Armfield to build the largest slave trading firm on the continent. At its peak, the 
company sent ships from Alexandria, Virginia, to New Orleans and Natchez twice a 
month during the prime shipping season o f October through March. They speculated on 
a massive scale, having $250,000 in bills receivable after the 1831-32 trading season.6 
Armfield told a visitor that the firm had shipped about one thousand slaves in 1833, but 
expected the number to be “much greater” the next year. He expected “their house 
alone would ship at least eleven or twelve hundred” slaves to New Orleans and Natchez 
in 1834. Their slave jail in Natchez reputedly could hold between six hundred and eight 
hundred slaves at one time. In 1833 Franklin claimed he sold $100,000 worth o f slaves, 
which was “more negroes than all the other Traders together.”7 The firm was so large
4 New Orleans Daily Delta, 19 Dec. 1849.
5 Paul Jefferson, ed., The Travels o f William Wells Brown (New York, 1991), 
pp. 39-43; John Blassingame, ed., Slave Testimony: Two Centuries o f Letters, Speeches, 
Interviews, and Autobiographies (Baton Rouge, 1977), p. 504.
6 Washington Dar/j/ National Intelligencer, 6 Nov. 1835; Wendell Holmes 
Stephenson, Isaac Franklin: Slave Trader and Planter o f the Old South (Baton Rouge, 
1938), pp. 36-44; Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 8 June 1832, Rice C. Ballard 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina.
7 Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1834, p. 39 (first quotation, emphasis 
in original); Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 25 Dec. 1833, Ballard Papers (second
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that it weathered the radical swings of the slave market. Since most traders took out 
large loans to pay for bondservants at the beginning o f  the trading season, they could be 
especially vulnerable to economic slumps that caused defaults on credit. Franklin was 
not bragging when he told a  fellow speculator that “I can get money where no other 
Trader can obtain a Dollar.” The sheer size o f Franklin and Armfield’s operations 
enabled them to amass enough equity to cover expenses and reduce debt. During 
contractions in the slave market, they were in a position to expand their operations even 
as other traders faltered.8
Given the size and prominence o f  Franklin’s slave trading empire, it might seem 
unusual that neither o f  the newspaper stories mentioned his specific means o f making a 
living. They did not describe him as a slave trader or mention slavery, as if Franklin 
was able to make his fortune through the sheer force o f his personality. Even though 
slave trading was ubiquitous by the time o f  Franklin’s death, the men who speculated in 
slaves had become the subjects of a ridiculous stereotype, as had the trade itself. These 
stereotypes, however, served as a means o f  defense so that southerners did not have to 
face the brutal realization that slaves were everywhere in their society degraded, 
scorned, and oppressed. They were the means by which slaveholders separated 
themselves from the most objectionable portions o f slavery. Southerners came to 
assume that slave trading was rare despite evidence to the contrary. When trading
quotation); ‘Interview with Gen. W. T. Martin,” Frederic Bancroft Papers, Box 92, 
Southern Trip Notes (1902), vol. 3, p. 249, Butler Library, Columbia University, New 
York, New York. It is likely that in this and the previous contexts that Franklin and 
Armfield were speaking o f the sales involving themselves and their agents.
8 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 18 Mar. 1834, Ballard Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
occurred, southerners attributed it to circumstances beyond their control. They blamed 
the slaves for being unmanageable, debt for being remorseless, traders for being greedy, 
and abolitionists for corrupting slaves by meddling where they did not belong. Crude 
stereotypes o f speculators and the slave trade masked the feet that slaveholders 
themselves were primarily at feuh for the degradation o f bondservants.9
These stereotypes o f the evil slave trader developed over time, just as attitudes 
towards speculators, the slave trade, and slavery changed. In the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries there was no consensus on the place o f the slave trader in 
southern society because there was no agreement about the trade itself. There was 
much discussion o f  its efficacy, especially as it grew in scale and became more open in 
the years following the War o f  1812. The increased visibility o f traders who captured 
and sold free blacks or those slaves with a term of years to serve troubled many in the 
new republic. Others resented the notion that traders made money through speculation 
on slaves’ misery. The scenes o f bondservants upon the auction block clashed with the 
ideas o f those southerners who imagined slavery to be a benevolent institution. Just as 
bad were the sights and sounds o f traders’ coffles headed south and west, especially 
when whites knew that the trade broke apart slave families in order to facilitate 
speculation. The growth o f the interstate slave trade forced southerners to confront the
9 Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the 
Old South (Madison, 1989), pp. 184-92. For the purposes o f this study, a slave trader or 
speculator is a man who bought slaves in one state and sold them in another on a regular 
basis as the sole or principal source of his income. The terms slave trader, trader, and 
speculator will be used interchangeably. Obviously, others such as brokers, 
auctioneers, and commission merchants sold slaves, but were not primarily concerned 
with the interstate market. At times, slaveholders brought slaves into other states and 
sold them, but not as their principle or steady income.
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meaning of slavery itself. What began as a genuine concern over the growth o f slave 
trading, primarily in the Upper South and often found among evangelical Christians, 
eventually became the basis of the stereotype. Southerners, when confronted with 
evidence of the slave trade’s brutality, managed to convert this challenge to slavery into 
a bastion o f support for it.10
Perceptions o f  the slave trade, and reactions to it, varied over time and place. 
While coffles and family separations bothered many in the Upper South, those states 
that imported a significant number o f  slaves had other concerns. An increase in the 
number of slaves, citizens in these states believed, raised the specter o f a powerful and 
restive slave population that might one day repeat the experience of Haiti.11 Residents 
of the importing states complained that they received the castoffs and the worst slaves 
from the other states. They responded in various ways, such as trying to limit the 
importation of slaves, controlling the types of bondservants who crossed their borders, 
or creating strict rules for the conduct o f all slaves. A significant number o f masters in 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana went to Virginia or Maryland on their own slave 
buying expeditions. Although their activities were virtually the same as commerce in
10 Coffles were the means by which traders forced their slaves to walk overland. 
Speculators normally handcuffed the males together in pairs, giving the appearance o f a 
chain gang. Coffles are more fully described on pp. 29-30 o f this study.
11 Haiti, also called Santo D omingo or Saint Domingue, experienced a 
revolution in 1793. Free persons o f  color allied with slaves to overthrow the white 
aristocracy. Toussaint L’Overture emerged as the leader of the fledgling nation. 
Slaveholders in the southern states, for obvious reasons, did not want to duplicate the 
island’s experience and passed laws forbidding white Haitian refugees to bring their 
slaves with them. (C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L ’Overture and the 
San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. (New York, 1963).
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slaves, they drew a sharp distinction between themselves and speculators. Southerners 
in importing states used a stereotype to distance themselves from the trade and 
speculation. These stereotypes became a way to define the limits o f slavery. 12
Even as southern reactions to the slave trade varied, speculators changed their 
business practices in response to criticism. They distanced themselves from the seamier 
portions of their business, making both it and themselves more accepted in southern 
society. Speculators, in effect, created the idea that there were “good” and “bad” 
traders. All o f slavery’s abuses could be blamed on “bad” traders. Even as speculators 
changed their tactics to make their business more palatable, the trade became the basis 
o f repeated attacks by abolitionists, who tried to attack slavery at its weakest point. 
Speculators were a  convenient target since they often committed heinous offenses.
Beset from the outside, most southerners no longer questioned the interstate slave trade, 
but converted speculators into scapegoats as a  means to avoid responsibility for the 
worst of slavery’s abuses. Ultimately, the need for the trade conquered most 
southerners’ qualms about the negative consequences o f  slavery.
12 This separation of states into “importing” and “exporting” is not a pure 
description. The routes of the interstate slave trade changed over time, so that while 
South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee originally were net importers of 
slaves, they became net exporters once the areas o f  the Southwest opened up. Also, 
Tennessee and Georgia had areas that imported slaves and other areas that exported 
slaves in the 1850s. The main idea is that the division between exporting and importing 
states moved south and west with the flow o f migration (Frederic Bancroft, Slave 
Trading in the Old South (1931; reprint, Columbia, S.C., 1996), pp. 382-406; Tadman, 
Speculators and Slaves, pp. 11-12; Richard B. Lowe and Randolph B. Campbell, “The 
Slave-Breeding Hypothesis: A Demographic Comment on the ‘Buying’ and ‘Selling’ 
States,” Journal o f  Southern History, 42 (1976): 401-12).
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7
Initially, most southerners gave little thought to slave traders since there was no 
organized interstate slave trade in the colonies that became the United States. Most 
slave transactions involved either local sales or, more noticeably, the importation of 
Africans. While the first known entry o f Africans into Virginia occurred in 1619, a 
regular trade to mainland North America arose later that century. There were several 
reasons for this increase, including a high demand for labor, the difficulty in securing 
cheap and reliable white indentured servants, and the drop in the cost of imported 
Africans. Although it is not clear who initiated the practice, by the middle o f  the 
seventeenth century, merchants in Charleston virtually monopolized the trade, although 
regular shipments of slaves arrived in Savannah after the Seven Years’ War.13
The African trade tended to discourage all but the wealthy, since it was capital 
intensive. A trader had to purchase the slaves, gather supplies, pay the captain and 
crew, and cover port fees before making a  single sale. Men who wished to break into 
the trade normally needed access to a large sum of money before they began their
13 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries o f Slavery in 
North America (Camridge, Mass., 1998), p. 29; Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, 
American Freedom: The Ordeal o f  Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975); Winthrop D. 
Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel 
Hill, 1968); Russell Menard, “From Servant to Slaves: The Transformation o f  the 
Chesapeake Labor System,” Southern Studies, 16 (1977): 355-90; Stephen Deyle, “‘By 
farr the most profitable trade’: Slave Trading in British Colonial America,” Slavery & 
Abolition, 10 (1989): 107-25; Herbert S. Klein, “Slaves and Shipping in Eighteenth- 
Century Virginia,” Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History, 5 (1975): 383-412; Daniel C. 
Littlefield, Rice and Slaves: Ethnicity and the Slave Trade in Colonial South Carolina 
(Baton Rouge, 1981); David Richardson, “The British Slave Trade to Colonial South 
Carolina,” Slavery & Abolition, 12 (1991): 125-72; Darold D. Wax, ‘“New Negroes are 
always in Demand’: The Slave Trade in Eighteenth-Century Georgia,” Georgia 
Historical Quarterly, 68 (1984): 193-220; Susan Westbury, “Slaves of Colonial 
Virginia: Where They Came From,” William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (1985): 228-37.
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operations. Once established, they could immediately plow the money from their sales 
back into the purchase o f new slaves. Their activities often led to dividends for other 
citizens in port cities. The increased shipping trade provided employment for caulkers, 
mechanics, tradesmen, laborers, and clerical workers. Most colonists felt the trade was 
part o f normal commercial activity and participation in it seemed to trouble few 
consciences. The importers of slaves enjoyed a privileged position in colonial society, 
serving as judges, councilmen, governors, and congressmen. Henry Laurens, for 
example, served as president of the Continental Congress despite his earlier connection 
to the African slave trade.14
Perceptions o f  slavery and the international trade began to change during the 
struggle for American independence. The increasing belief in natural rights raised 
troubling questions about liberty and slavery. Natural rights, in describing mankind as 
naturally free, argued strongly for an end to slavery, since the institution was 
antithetical to personal liberty. The growth of slavery, and the slave population, 
bothered enough colonists that they took action against the importation o f Africans. 
Every colony with the exception o f South Carolina had outlawed the trade before the
14 Jay Coughtry, The Notorious Triangle: Rhode Island and the African Slave 
Trade, 1700-1807 (Philadelphia, 1981); James G. Lydon, “New York and the Slave 
Trade, 1700 to 1774,” William and Mary Quarterly, 35 (1978): 375-95; Darold D. Wax, 
“Negro Imports into Pennsylvania, 1720-1766,” Pennsylvania History, 32 (1965): 254- 
87; Lorenzo J. Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 1620-1776 (New York, 
1942), pp. 24-26,68-71; Deyle, “‘By farr the most profitable trade’,” pp. 118-19;
Daniel C. Littlefield, “Charleston and Internal Slave Redistribution,” South Carolina 
Historical Magazine, 87 (1986): 93-94. Laurens himself began to have doubts about 
importing Africans and eventually severed his involvement with the trade (Donald L. 
Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f American Politics 1765-1820 (New York, 1971), 
p. 70).
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war with England. These prohibitions came from a variety o f motives, most o f them 
unrelated to the interest of Africans. Ending the trade served as a  form of economic 
blackmail against England, in the hopes that Parliament would make political 
concessions. Slaves, along with imported goods, became subject to embargo in the 
hopes of hurting English commerce. More importantly, the hostilities disrupted 
commerce o f every sort, so formal prohibitions recognized the reality of a crippled 
trade. Pronouncements against the evil of the international trade were one way of 
seizing the moral high ground in order to win favor in European courts—but they had a 
hollow ring when few ships were sailing for any reason.15
The international slave trade resumed after 1783, but with less vigor than before. 
North American slaves were resilient enough to form communities and numerous 
enough to constitute a significant portion o f the population. Slave labor became the 
cornerstone o f southern agricultural production and proved important in the North as 
well. The presence of a slave community that grew through natural means meant less 
dependence on imports. Furthermore, enough revolutionary sentiment lingered in 1783 
to ensure the inclusion of a constitutional provision allowing the prohibition o f the 
international trade after twenty years. Congress then made it illegal for United States 
citizens to participate in such commerce. The ultimate goal, of course, was to abolish
15 Jordan, White over Black, pp. 269-311; David B. Davis, The Problem o f  
Slavery in the Age o f Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), pp. 164-342; 
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1961), pp. 33- 
50; Arthur Zilversmit, The First Freedom: The Abolition o f Slavery in the North 
(Chicago, 1967).
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the African slave trade to the United States.16 A mixture o f sometimes contradictory 
motives and circumstances led to these attacks on the African trade. Some found the 
paradox o f continuing to import slaves while championing the virtues o f freedom too 
much to bear. The trade became a convenient target for Americans who wished to limit 
or eliminate slavery. Its distance from the lives of most people made it a  perfect fit for 
those who desired to reign in slavery but were not willing to confront the institution 
directly. Others, who lived amid the slaves, hesitated to increase a population they did 
not trust and often feared. They trembled at the prospect o f bringing in more Africans 
who might create a powerful slave community that could rise in rebellion. Such men 
reasoned that they could protect slavery by keeping the slaves under even tighter 
control. They assumed that newly enslaved Africans were more likely to fight for 
freedom than those bom into bondage who were, presumably, accustomed to slavery. 
Finally, a number of Virginians realized that slave prices would probably rise upon the 
cessation o f the international trade. Any cost increase would greatly benefit 
slaveholders in the Old D ominion., who could then sell their slaves for a higher price 
and rid themselves o f what they perceived to be a potentially dangerous population. 
Whatever the motives, by the late eighteenth century, there is no doubt that most 
Americans opposed the African slave trade. This opposition, even if widespread, was 
shallow. The gradual decline of the international trade led to a change in the
16 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 223-25; Robinson, Slavery in the Structure 
o f American Politics, pp. 297-99; Merton L. Dillon, Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves 
and their Allies, 1619-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1990), pp. 55-73; Steven Deyle, “The Irony 
o f Liberty: Origins o f the Domestic Slave Trade,” Journal o f  the Early Republic, 12 
(1992): 38-39.
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perceptions o f  the men who continued to import Africans. They no longer had high 
political or social status, but inhabited the margins o f society.17
Although the importation o f Africans had generally fallen into disfavor by the 
beginning o f the nineteenth century, the international trade was hardly a  moribund 
institution. Approximately 93,000 slaves arrived in the United States between 1790 and 
1810. Masters and would-be masters in the developing areas o f the South and 
Southwest who wanted slaves for farming  operations in the backcountry could find 
Africans readily available for sale.18 The ban on participation in the trade by American 
citizens, though perhaps impressive on paper, was difficult to enforce. Individual states 
were hardly in a position to seal their coasts from fast sailing ships laden with slaves. 
The continual demand for laborers ensured that the African trade remained a fixture on 
southern coastlines. It was easier, and often cheaper, to buy Africans in Charleston and 
ship them to Savannah or New Orleans than to bring them from other regions of the 
United States. This market was so well developed that in 1803 South Carolina 
“shocked and outraged the rest of the nation” when it defiantly reopened its ports to the
17 David B. Davis, “American Slavery and the American Revolution,” in Ira 
Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., Slavery and Freedom in the Age o f the American 
Revolution (Charlottesville, 1983), pp. 262-80; Jordan, White Over Black, pp. 372-442; 
Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f American Politics, pp. 79-80. See Deyle, “Irony 
o f Liberty,”pp. 43-48; and Stephen Deyle, “The Domestic Slave Trade in America,” 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1995, pp. 33-44 for the assertion 
that some Virginians wanted to close the African trade in order to drive up the prices of 
domestic slaves.
18 Philip D. Morgan, “Black Society in the Lowcountry 1760-1810,” in Berlin 
and Hoffman, eds., Slavery and Freedom, pp. 83-91; Allan Kulikoff, The Agrarian 
Origins o f American Capitalism (Charlottesville, 1992), pp. 239-41; Allan Kulikoff, 
“Uprooted Peoples: Black Migrants in the Age of the American Revolution, 1790- 
1820,” in Berlin and Hoffman, eds., Slavery and Freedom, pp. 143-71.
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importation of Africans. When the state had prohibited the trade in 1787, the legislature 
fractured along sectional lines. The low country, which generally had as many slaves as 
it needed, voted for suspension, while the developing areas of the upcountry desired to 
continue the trade. The situation repeated itself in 1803, except that there were now 
enough votes to push through the legislation. Citizens who flocked to the upcountry 
and needed cheap labor combined with Charleston merchants who made profits from 
the reshipment of slaves.19 With the threat o f  a Congressional prohibition looming in 
1807, traders increased their importation o f slaves. Visitors to Charleston noticed the 
large numbers of Africans in the city and a glut of slaving vessels in the harbor. The 
sudden surge in slave labor drove down prices so much that at one point traders kept 
Africans on the ships in the hopes of creating an artificial shortage. At least 39,000 
slaves entered the state between 1803 and 1807, a number almost twice as great as any 
other five-year span in the colonial or post-revolutionary eras.20
In spite of this steady influx of Africans, the internal movement o f slaves within 
the United States increased. Over half o f  the nation’s slaves lived in Maryland and
19 Davis, “American Slavery and the American Revolution,” p. 267 (quotation); 
Morgan, “Black Society in the Lowcountry,” pp. 83-141; Patrick S. Brady, “The Slave 
Trade and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1787-1808,” Journal o f Southern History, 38 
(1972): 601-20.
20 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 308-9; Kulikoff “Uprooted Peoples,” p. 
146; John Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada and the United States o f North 
America, 2 vol. (London, 1810), 2:405-6. South Carolina imported nearly 90,000 
Africans between 1782 and 1810. Southerners had another source of slave labor: the 
sale o f slaves from the northern states, most o f which were dismantling the institution o f  
slavery. The number o f  slaves attained in this manner was small (Robert W. Fogel and 
Stanley L. Engerman, ‘Thilanthropy at Bargain Prices: Notes on the Economics of 
Gradual Emancipation,” The Journal o f  Legal Studies, 3 (1974): 377-401).
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Virginia, and it was the Chesapeake slaves who provided much o f  the back-breaking 
labor that was vital in the west. With the tobacco market’s collapse, more and more 
slave owners in Virginia and Maryland sought opportunity elsewhere. In the twenty 
years after George Washington’s election as president, the owners o f some 75,000 
Chesapeake slaves compelled them to walk to the expanding regions o f Kentucky and 
Tennessee. Georgia and South Carolina, states that were opening new lands to 
settlement, also received a significant number o f slaves. Advertisements for runaway 
slaves in Georgia show an increase in masters seeking to recover Virginia-born 
bondservants. This apparent growth suggests an increase in the movement of 
Chesapeake slaves into Georgia. Most o f the slaves forced to march westward or 
southward, however, accompanied their masters rather than a slave trader.21 Those 
whites who made it to the edge o f settlement wanted to raise a crop that would produce 
quick economic dividends. Cotton was the most popular choice, especially after the 
development and spread o f the cotton gin. The labor intensive nature o f cotton 
cultivation meant that slaves were in high demand in developing areas. Even though 
masters brought a significant number o f  bondservants with them, there were not enough 
slaves to satisfy their demands or the desires of those who had already settled.22
21 Kulikoff Agrarian Origins, 230-45; Kulikoff “Uprooted Peoples,” pp. 147- 
51; Deyle, “Irony o f Liberty,” pp. 57-61; Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,”, pp. 59-68; 
Lorena S. Walsh, “Slave Life, Slave Society, and Tobacco Production in the Tidewater 
Chesapeake, 1620-1820,” in Ira Berlin and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Cultivation and 
Culture: Labor and the Shaping o f Slave Life in the Americas (Charlottesville, 1993), 
pp. 192-93.
22 Jane Turner Censer, “Southwestern Migration among North Carolina Planter 
Families: ‘The Disposition to Emigrate,’” Journal o f Southern History, 57 (1991): 407-
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One of the results of this persistent demand was the development o f an interstate 
slave trade. Although muted by the importation o f Africans and the migration o f 
planters, the trade grew in strength at the end o f the eighteenth century. The shift in the 
Chesapeake from tobacco production to the raising o f grain, a less labor-intensive 
enterprise, meant that farmers needed fewer slaves. Those masters who stayed behind 
could sell their “excess” slaves to a small but growing group of slave traders. There is 
evidence of a small trade from Virginia and Maryland to Kentucky and Tennessee. In 
1795 a speculator announced his intention to bring slaves to Knoxville, informing the 
public of his intention to carry on “the Business, Extensively.” Other traders drove a 
handful o f slaves to Nashville.23 A southern route out of the Chesapeake also 
developed. In 1799 a man named Speers purchased slaves in Virginia, intending to 
bring them to Georgia, but the bondservants killed him and his assistant during the 
march. Around the same time an anonymous buyer in Richmond advertised for twelve 
to fifteen boys ranging in age from seven to fifteen years. That he promised to pay cash 
for the slaves is a good indication that he was an interstate trader.24 Likewise, Charles
26; Joyce E. Chaplin, “Creating a Cotton South in Georgia and South Carolina, 1760- 
1815 "Journal o f Southern History, 57 (1991): 299-315.
23 Chase C. Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee (Bloomington, Ind., 1957), p. 39 
(quotation); John R. Commons, et al. eds., A Documentary History o f American 
Industrial Society, vol. 2, Plantation and Frontier Documents, Ulrich B. Phillips, ed. 
(Cleveland, 1910), pp. 55-56; Anita S. Goodstein, “Black History on the Nashville 
Frontier, 1780-1810,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 38 (1979): 403-6.
24 Phillips, ed., Plantation and Frontier Documents, 2:70-71; Richmond 
Enquirer, 1 Feb. 1805. Speers was acting on behalf o f  James Simms, who had 
borrowed $10,000 dollars from the Georgia treasury. It is unclear whether Speers was a 
professional slave trader or if he was allied with Simms in an elaborate swindle.
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Ball, a former slave, recalled that when his master died, a Georgia trader bought Ball’s 
mother, while Carolina slave dealers purchased his brothers and sisters. Ball 
remembered seeing coffles leaving the nation’s capital while he worked in the 
Washington naval yards. Then in 1805, “Colonel M’Griffin,” a slave trader, purchased 
Ball and forced him to walk from Maryland to South Carolina.25 Coffles leaving the 
District of Columbia were frequent enough that an 1802 grand jury in Alexandria 
complained of the “practice of persons coming from distant parts o f the United States 
into this District for the purposes o f purchasing slaves.” The sight o f slaves ‘loaded 
with chains as though they had committed some heinous offence against our laws” 
pained the local residents.26 John Springs IU supplemented the income from his 
Springfield plantation in South Carolina by purchasing slaves in Maryland and Virginia 
and selling them to his neighbors. He had begun by 1806 and continued his 
speculations for thirty years.27
While Springs was clearly involved in the interstate trade and Ball’s tragic 
experience is straightforward, the interstate slave trade before 1815 was small. During
25 Charles Ball, Slavery in the United States: A Narrative o f the Life and 
Adventures o f Charles Ball, a Black Man (1837; reprint, New York, 1969), pp. 16-21, 
28, 36-50, 66-80, 86-95. More information on the circumstances involving Ball’s 
account is found in Blassingame, ed., Slave Testimony, pp. xxiii-xxvi.
26 Debates and Proceedings in the Congress o f the United States, Twentieth 
Congress, Second Session, 7 Jan. 1829 (Washington, 1854), p. 177 (quotation); 
Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 22 June 1827.
27 Michael Tadman, “The Hidden History of Slave Trading in Antebellum South 
Carolina: John Springs III and Other ‘Gentlemen dealing in Slaves’,” South Carolina 
Historical Magazine, 97 (1996): 6-29. Springs purchased from twenty to forty slaves 
per trip.
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this time, most o f the slave sales involved private transactions on a local level rather 
than the use o f a professional slave trader. Slave owners rarely sold more than a few 
slaves at a time, and most o f the larger sales involved the settlement o f estates.28 This 
private market was significant enough to provide much the South’s labor demand and 
arrange for the transportation o f  slaves across interstate lines. William Grimes, a slave 
who eventually escaped to freedom, experienced the tribulations of the local slave 
market. Looking back on his life, Grimes described how he had belonged to six 
different owners before he ran away. Despite moving from King George County, 
Virginia, to Savannah, Georgia, a slave trader did not buy Grimes. Instead, he changed 
hands as a result o f private transactions. It was only when Grimes’s last owner 
contemplated selling him to a speculator that the slave ran away.29 Furthermore, it is 
difficult to clearly distinguish between slaves who were part of the interstate trade and 
those who migrated with their master. In the Virginia Gazette and Independent 
Chronicle o f 1787, for example, Moses F. Austin of Richmond advertised that he 
wanted to buy one hundred slaves. He specified that they must be from twenty to thirty 
years old, “Hearty and well made,” and warned that they would be sent out o f state. At
28 Kulikoff Agrarian Origins, pp. 228-29; Deyle, “Irony of Liberty,” pp. 60-62; 
Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,” pp. 63-64; Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 19-22.
Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 12-19, makes the case for the “possibility of a 
substantial pre-1808 domestic slave trade” (quotation on p. 19). For an intensive look at 
the numbers o f slaves involved in probate sales, albeit for a later time period, see 
Thomas David Russell, “Sale Day in Antebellum South Carolina: Slavery, Law, 
Economy and Court Supervised Sales,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1993.
29 Ama Bontemps, ed., Five Black Lives: The Autobiographies o f Venture Smith, 
James Mars, William Grimes, the Rev. G. W. Offley, James L. Smith (Middletown, 
Conn., 1971), pp. 62-65, 77-78, 83-83, 94, 104.
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first glance it appears that Austin was an interstate trader, a  man who bought slaves and 
then transported them for resale. It is doubtful, however, that he would have considered 
himself as such. Speculators tended to buy younger slaves, especially those between 
fifteen and twenty-five. Moreover, Austin was a commission merchant in Richmond 
from 1784 to 1789, so it is misleading to label him a slave trader. In this case, he 
probably was making the arrangements on behalf o f a planter who lived out of state or 
for someone who planned to move further south. While the slaves were probably 
intended for interstate transportation, Austin does not appear to have been an interstate 
trader.30
Even as the internal slave trade increased, the federal government took action to 
stop the importation o f African slaves. In December o f 1802 President Thomas 
Jefferson advised Congress to start discussion of legislation that would end the 
international trade. Most observers agreed that such a measure would pass, but there 
was much wrangling over the specific shape of the law. One point o f disagreement 
revolved around what to do with those slaves confiscated from smugglers. Another 
bone o f contention involved the question o f appropriate penalties, that is, whether jail 
time would be sufficient or if the death penalty needed to be invoked. As might be
30 Austin’s advertisement is quoted in Robert McColley, Slavery and 
Jeffersonian Virginia (Champaign, 1964), pp. 164-65; Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,” 
p. 63; and Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 15. All three cite the advertisement as 
evidence that Austin was an interstate trader. Austin himself left no evidence that he 
ever moved slaves across state lines (David B. Gracy, Moses Austin: His Life (San 
Antonio, 1987), pp. 22-52). Tadman establishes the tendency o f traders to concentrate 
in younger slaves (Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 25). It made no difference to the 
slaves, obviously, whether Austin was a trader or not. They were tom from their family 
and friends and forced to move to another state.
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expected, both issues became the subjects o f compromise. Congress avoided making 
any disposition regarding captured slaves. Each state had to decide what to do with 
Africans captured off its shores. Penalties for smuggling were equally vague. It 
became a “high misdemeanor,” with the possibility of a fine for offenders.31 Most 
southerners supported the suppression o f the international trade, but there was division 
over the issue. Planters in the backcountry o f  Georgia and South Carolina generally 
desired more slave labor, so they opposed federal intervention. Many immigrants to the 
southwestern frontier also opposed the measure because it was difficult to acquire 
slaves in this area and stopping the flow o f Africans would probably raise prices. The 
rest of the South, not being as dependent on the trade, stigmatized the importation of 
Africans and desired to put an end to the traffic.32
While the debate regarding the international trade remained civil, discussion of 
the internal movement of slaves started a quarrel in the House of Representatives.
Things at first moved along quietly, but then Peter Early o f  Georgia realized that the 
language o f  the House bill could be applied to the coastwise trade, that is, the
31 The federal government executed one American for his involvement in the 
African trade. See James A. Rawley, “Captain Nathaniel Gordon: The only American 
executed for violating the Slave Trade Laws,” Civil War History, 39 (1993): 216-24.
32 Ronald T. Takaki, A Pro-Slavery Crusade: The Agitation to Reopen the 
African Slave Trade (New York, 1971), pp. 3-4; W. E. Burghardt Dubois, The 
Suppression o f  the African Slave-Trade to the United States o f America, 1638-1870 
(1896; reprint 1965, Baton Rouge); Stephen J. Goldfarb, “An Inquiry into the Politics of 
the Prohibition of the International Slave Trade,” Agricultural History, 68 (1994): 20- 
34; Davis, Problem o f Slavery, pp. 119-36; Dillon, Slavery Attacked, pp. 50-72; Duncan 
J. MacLeod, Slavery, Race and the American Revolution (New York, 1977), pp. 35-46; 
Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f American Politics, pp. 324-42; Kulikoff, Agrarian 
Origins, pp. 233-36.
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movement o f slaves among the ports o f the seaboard. It was common for slave owners 
to transport their slaves in this manner. Late in the session, Early introduced a measure 
to ensure that nothing in the act would forbid the "‘taking on board or transporting” 
those slaves legally held in the United States “in any vessel or species o f craft 
whatever” from one state to another. He sought to uphold the freedom o f southerners to 
move their slaves from state to state. The House passed the amendment, but the Senate 
balked at the idea. The upper house thought it necessary to regulate the legitimate 
coastwise shipment o f slaves, lest smuggling from Florida, at that time a Spanish 
possession, become rampant. Detection of large ships would be much easier than 
finding small ones, especially if, as the Senate proposed, they carried a manifest from 
the collector of the port of departure describing each slave on board. The Senate 
proposed to prohibit small vessels from transporting slaves from state to state. When 
the Senate finished with the bill and sent it back, David R. Williams o f  South Carolina 
moved that the House insist on its version of the bill. Loss of this point, he argued, 
would mean “no negroes shall be transported from one State to another to be sold or 
held in service.” Williams feared that control over the coastwise trade would lead to 
regulation of the interstate slave trade and restrictions on white migrants who brought 
slaves across state lines. Only eleven members voted for William’s motion. John 
Randolph then angrily asserted that if  the Senate version passed, the South would defy 
the entire law. Sensing a conspiracy, Randolph pledged to take his slaves from state to 
state, so that he might assert “the rights o f slaveholders,” even if it meant breaking the
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law. His extreme argument frightened many House members, leading to a conference 
committee to iron out the differences in the two bills.33
When the committee lowered the tonnage requirement to forty tons, both Early 
and Randolph were furious and renewed their attack. They saw such meddling with the 
coastwise trade as the first step in regulating slavery in the South. If  the federal 
government could limit the movement of slaves to a particular type of vessel, then it 
could outlaw slave migration altogether. Early pessimistically predicted that smuggling 
would be rampant. Randolph feared that since the bill involved the regulation of private 
property, it could become the pretext for universal emancipation He wanted to do 
away with the tonnage requirement for the ships. In a stem lecture to the House, 
Randolph warned that the southern states had a “deep stake” in “arresting the invasion 
o f their rights.” Having no requirement meant that there would be no grounds for 
further meddling in slavery and signal the federal government’s inability to regulate the 
peculiar institution. In his characteristic hyperbole, Randolph declared that he would 
rather lose all the other bills since the establishment o f the United States government 
than see this bill passed. He predicted the measure would “blow up the Constitution in 
ruins.” Despite Randolph’s bluster, a motion to accept the conference report passed 
sixty-three to forty-nine. He did not give up but, made a desperate, last-ditch effort to 
change it. The next day he gave an “animated speech” that protested the forty ton
33 Debates and Proceedings, Ninth Congress, Second Session, 12 Feb. 1807, pp. 
483-85; 18 Feb. 1807, pp. 527-28. There is no record o f the Senate debate. The 
amendment is inferred from the reaction of the representatives and from the final 
language of the act. See sections eight and nine o f  the act, in Ibid., Ninth Congress, 
Second Session, 2 Mar. 1807, pp. 1269-70.
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regulation- Randolph contended that the bill gave Congress a power it did not possess, 
a  right “subversive o f  the rights o f  property in the holders of slaves” which might lead 
to general emancipation. Again, he proposed to allow any vessel to carry slaves, a 
change that would have stripped the bill o f all effectiveness in preventing smuggling.
He also proposed an explanatory act, one that would bind the federal government from 
interfering in the rights of masters over their slaves. Randolph threatened to lead 
Virginia’s congressional delegation to President Jefferson’s house to urge a veto if his 
demands went unfulfilled. Again, he failed, as the House refused to reconsider the 
measure. Randolph did not carry out his threat and the measure became law.34
The bill, in effect, was the first piece of federal legislation that regulated the 
interstate slave trade. In proscribing certain vessels from carrying slaves from one state 
to another, Congress asserted its ability to control a means of transportation that would 
become increasingly important for the movement o f bondservants. Furthermore, few 
southerners were concerned with this assertion of power. As might be expected, 
northern representatives generally supported the bill, although New York had a 
significant number who voted against the provision.35 Only three southern members 
spoke out against the provisions regarding the coastwise trade, and did so for differing 
reasons. Randolph made it clear that he opposed the measure more for the precedent it 
set in regulating slavery than for any interference with an interstate trade. He wanted to
34 Ibid., Ninth Congress, Second Session, 26 Feb. 1807, pp. 626-27 and 27 Feb. 
1807, pp. 636-38; National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, 2 Mar. 1807; 
Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f American Politics, pp. 336-38.
35 The vote was 10-6 in favor o f the bill among the New York representatives.
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protect the right o f  southerners to bring slaves into new territories, something a growing 
number of Virginia citizens desired because of the worsening condition of the state’s 
agriculture and the lure of cheap land to the south and west. Randolph convinced all 
but one o f the Virginia representatives to vote against the measure.36 Early and 
Williams, on the other hand, tried to defend the coastwise trade in slaves. They 
represented two areas—Charleston and Savannah—that profited from the trade and 
strove to conserve an important economic interest. The representatives from South 
Carolina and Georgia voted unanimously against the bill. Significantly, the other states 
most affected by the movement o f slaves, whether by migration or sale, split almost 
evenly on the issue. Representatives from Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee voted eleven to ten for the bill.37 This close vote suggests that southerners in 
Congress did not heed the arguments o f Randolph, Early, and Williams. They gave 
little thought to how the regulation of interstate shipping could affect the internal 
movement of slaves. Those states not directly involved in the coastwise transportation 
of slaves did not find it important to safeguard this traffic. The vote that outlawed the 
importation of Africans shows a South divided over the issue o f regulating the internal 
movement of slaves. There was no consensus on the place of the internal slave trade 
because it was o f  minor importance to most southerners.38
36 See also Randolph’s later explanation in Debates and Proceedings,
Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1 Mar. 1816, pp. 1115-16.
37 The individual votes were Maryland 4-4, North Carolina 4-4, Kentucky 1-2, 
and Tennessee 2-0. There were no votes from Delaware representatives.
38 Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f American Politics, pp. 336-38 
characterizes the vote as purely sectional in nature.
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When President Jefferson signed the bill outlawing the African trade, the United 
States still depended on imported Africans to supply much of its burgeoning labor need. 
As the government wrested more land from Native Americans and made it available for 
settlement, the demand for slaves continued to increase. The weakly written law had 
little support where violations were most likely to occur, so traders continued to bring 
Africans into the country. They did so with impunity since the puny United States 
Navy had little hope o f mounting enough patrols to deter illegal activity. Furthermore, 
the provision giving states discretion in handling captured slaves only served to make 
state governments accomplices in the importation o f  Africans.39 Africans continued to 
come into the country, with from 7,000 to 10,000 arriving in the ten years after 1810. 
Smuggling most likely provided Louisiana with the bulk o f its new slaves during this 
decade. Only after the passage o f  stricter enforcement measures during James Monroe’s 
administration and Britain’s enforcement of the Atlantic slave trade did the flow o f 
African slaves to the United States virtually cease.40
The slow suffocation o f the international trade altered the flow o f  slaves within 
the country’s borders. When southerners who moved to the rapidly expanding cotton 
areas o f the Southwest could no longer count on buying newly enslaved Africans, they
39 The Georgia state government, for instance, advertised the auction of 30 to 40 
“prime African slaves” illegally imported (Savannah Republican, 26 Mar. 1819).
40 David Eltis, “The Nineteenth-Century Transatlantic Slave Trade: An Annual 
Time Series o f Imports into the Americas broken down by Region,” Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 67 (1987): 135; Joe G. Taylor, “The Foreign Slave Trade in 
Louisiana after 1808,” Louisiana History, 1 (1960): 37-39; Kulikoff, Agrarian Origins, 
pp. 232-35; Kulikoff “Uprooted Peoples,” pp. 150-52; Robinson, Slavery in the 
Structure o f American Politics, pp. 340-46.
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looked to the Chesapeake and, in so doing, fed the development o f the interstate slave 
trade. The men who became slave traders during this time were much different from 
the transatlantic traders o f the mid-eighteenth century. It took little capital to break into 
the interstate slave trade because there were fewer expenses. The greatest cost was the 
initial purchase of slaves, and many traders overcame this obstacle by borrowing 
money. Some participants in the trade did so on a part-time basis and often sold other 
goods, as well. Such individuals were either auctioneers who handled the division of 
estates or merchants who supplemented their income by arranging slave sales.
Interstate speculators, in contrast, were generally itinerant. They had no fixed depots 
ft>r the buying or selling o f slaves but roved about the countryside, buying a few slaves 
from different owners or purchasing them at auctions. When they acquired enough 
bondservants, traders marched their chattel south and sold them to whoever happened to 
be at hand. A few established themselves in a town and bought slaves from that area. 
John Stannard, for instance, remained in Fredericksburg, Virginia, long enough to 
publicize his desire to buy “likely” slaves. He was the exception, however, as most 
traders preferred not to advertise their presence. Moreover, before the 1820s, it is 
unusual to find the advertisement o f a slave trader in southern newspapers. Most 
notices for slaves were for the sale rather than the purchase o f bondservants, and the 
vast majority involved private individuals rather than professional slave traders.41
41 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 12 Sept 1810 (quotation); Deyle, “Domestic 
Slave Trade,” pp. 66-68. For examples o f slaves offered for sale, see Annapolis 
Maryland Gazette & Political Intelligencer, 18 Mar. 1810, 16 Jan. 1811; and Bancroft, 
Slave Trading, pp. 19-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
The outbreak of war in 1812 interrupted development o f  the nascent internal 
slave trade by limiting commerce o f  all types and reducing migration to the frontier. 
More importantly, the British took possession of slaves in Maryland and Virginia 
during their invasion of the Chesapeake. The Americans accused several British 
officers of taking slaves to the West Indies for sale. While few Chesapeake 
bondservants actually ended up in the markets of the Caribbean, a total o f3,000 to 
5,000 slaves left the area as a result o f  the war. With so many slaves and slaveholders 
affected, Virginia passed legislation for the compensation of owners whose 
bondservants ran away, were executed, or were transported out o f  state. The United 
States also insisted that England compensate American slaveholders for the loss o f their 
property.42 After the war, Eliza Fromentin surveyed the situation in the Chesapeake. 
Writing from the western shore o f Maryland, he observed that slave prices were quite 
high, as the “number of negroes carried away by the British during the late war has 
contributed not a little to raise the value of the negroes who are left behind.” The 
wartime loss o f  slaves and the heavy demand in the developing areas of the South 
caused a sharp increase in slave prices in the years immediately following the War o f  
1812 43
42 “Estimates o f the Value o f Slaves, 1815,” American Historical Review, 19 
(1914): 813-38; Niles’ Weekly Register, 15 Jan. 1814, p. 330; Frank A. Cassell, “Slaves 
of the Chesapeake Bay Area and the War of 1812,” Journal o f Negro History, A1 (April 
1972): 144-55. The Treaty of Ghent specified that Americans who lost slaves could file 
claims with the British government.
43 Eliza Fromentin to John McDonough, John McDonough Letters, Hill 
Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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These high slave prices came despite the languid state o f the Chesapeake’s 
agriculture. Even as the demand for slave labor diminished in Maryland and Virginia it 
grew phenomenally in other areas o f the South. Newly available lands in Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana were an irresistible lure to migrants. The high 
labor demand o f  cotton meant that settlers there naturally looked to slavery to supply 
their labor needs rather than hire white labor. This combination o f circumstances meant 
that masters in the Chesapeake were more likely to part with their bondservants than 
ever before.44 A British traveler surmised that many residents o f the Upper South found 
it “more profitable to breed slaves for the market, than to raise the appropriate produce 
o f  the soil.” While owners did not have to resort to breeding since slaves had children 
o f  their own volition, it was apparent that slaveholders were increasingly willing to sell 
their slaves to interstate traders.45 By 1820, about a third o f all slave migrants moved 
south with professional slave traders and the ratio increased throughout the decade.46
44 Censer, “Southwestern Migration,” pp. 407-26; Chaplin, “Creating a Cotton 
South,” pp. 171-200; James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History o f American 
Slaveholders (New York, 1982), pp. 69-95.
45 Adam Hodgson, Letters from  North America, written daring a Tour in the 
United States and Canada, 2 voL, (London, 1824), 2:194; Adam Hodgson, Remarks 
during a Journey through North America in the Years 1819, 1820, and 1821 (New 
York: 1823), p. 178. The question o f whether Virginia and Maryland agriculture was in 
a  state of declme is a contentious issue. What is clear, is that it was changing. Owners 
in this area were emigrating in greater numbers than before, while those who stayed 
behind were more willing to sell their “excess” slaves. For a recent interpretation o f the 
era, see William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second 
Party System 1824-1861 (Charlottesville, 1996).
46 The estimate of the movement of slaves is taken from Kulikoff, Agrarian 
Origins, pp. 241-42. For a higher figure, see Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 25- 
31,245-47.
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The interstate slave trade was becoming more noticeable in southern society. Whereas 
a few years earlier it was sporadic, unorganized, and uncommon, through the 1820s the 
trade became regular, organized, and ubiquitous. As more coffles headed south, most 
observers agreed that by 1817 that the “trade has greatly increased with the last two or 
three years.” Slave trading emerged as a vocation in its own right instead of being a 
part-time means o f earning extra money. An increasing number o f men became traders 
and it was during the 1820s that most o f the prominent antebellum speculators starting 
selling slaves.47
The advertisements o f Chesapeake newspapers clearly reflected the growth of 
the interstate slave trade. Before 1815, virtually all o f  the notices dealing with slave 
sales were for one or two slaves and interested parties were asked to “Inquire of the 
Printer.” For instance, someone offered up for sale three slaves sold “for no fault” and 
only because of “want o f employment.” They were “mostly brought up in the 
country...and are not corrupted by town habits.” More importantly, advertisements by 
someone who would pay cash for large numbers o f  slaves, a sure sign o f trading 
activity, were absent.48 The situation changed, however, within a few years. 
Advertisements plainly showed the presence of a significant trade by 1820. Henry
47 Niles’ Weekly Register, 19 July 1817, p. 323 (quotation); Deposition of 
Francis Scott Key, 22 Apr. 1816, Select Committee to Inquire into the Existence of an 
Inhuman and Illegal Traffic in Slaves... in the District o f Columbia, HR 14A-C.17.4, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Morris Birkbeck, Notes on a Journey in America 
(1818; reprint, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966), p. 21. See also the Liberator's conclusion that 
“Up to the year 1820, it would seem that the slave trade, which has since been so 
vigorously carried on between the north-eastern and south-western slave states, was 
hardly known” (Liberator, 20 Mar. 1838, p. 62).
48 Annapolis Maryland Gazette, 4 Mar., 21 Aug., 12 Sept. (quotation) 1810.
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Robertson, for instance, promised to give “the highest prices” for slaves between twelve 
and twenty-five years o f age. Other traders advertised that they would pay “CASH 
FOR NEGROES” and give a liberal price when they made purchases.49 Even as they 
specified the type o f slaves, speculators during this time often informed the public how 
many slaves they wanted to buy. Most commonly, they asked for anywhere from ten to 
twenty-five young slaves.
Traders often established a temporary headquarters in the local tavern, although 
they sometimes stayed in a hotel In Easton, Maryland, Austin Woolfolk rented space 
in Mrs. Green’s Tavern, but Joseph Woolfolk used Lowe’s Tavern, and other traders 
were in Union Tavern and Nabb’s Tavern.50 In the Washington area, the taverns got so 
full during the trading season that owners devoted specific rooms to keeping slaves. 
They became so crowded that patrons hardly had space to sleep on the floor. The Bell 
Tavern in Richmond became notorious for having speculators fill up its beds and for 
holding auctions at its front door. The men who bought the tavern in 1835 did so 
despite the “merited and invidious character universally imputed to it.”51 Traders
49 Ibid., 25 July 1822 (first quotation); Baltimore American & Commercial Daily 
Advertiser, 4 May 1815 (second quotation).
50 For Austin Woolfolk, see Easton Republican Star & General Advertiser, 2 
Jan. 1821, 9 Oct. 1827, 17 June 1828. For Joseph Woolfolk, see Ibid., 12 Apr. 1825, 9 
Oct. 1827,17 June 1828. For Union Tavern, see Ibid., 16 Jan., 22 Feb., 31 July 1821;
28 May 1822. For Nabb’s Tavern, see Ibid., 17 July 1821. Traders were also at the 
Fountain Inn (Ibid., 17 Apr. 1821,7 May 1822).
51 Jesse Torrey, A Portraiture o f  Domestic Slavery in the United States (1817; 
reprint, S t Clair Shores, Mich., 1970), pp. 41-42; Richmond Enquirer, 10 July 1835 
(quotation). The new owners of the Bell Tavern pledged to use “untiring perseverance 
and judicious arrangement to counteract the prevailing prejudices, and afford comfort 
and satisfaction.” Lewis Collier located his slave jail near the tavern, “where the sales
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stayed in taverns while in Baltimore, Annapolis, Alexandria, Washington, 
Fredericksburg, Norfolk, and Lexington.52 Speculators also made frequent use of the 
Queen Anne’s County jails in Maryland and the federal jails in Washington.53 As 
speculators roomed in hotels and rented space in local jails, they brought the interstate 
trade in contact with more and more people. Speculation was moving out of the 
periphery of southern society and into the mainstream.
Austin Woolfolk was one o f these early interstate traders. In late 1815 he 
traveled to Maryland and advertised that he would pay “a liberal cash price” for 
slaves.54 Once he purchased enough bondservants, Woolfolk drove them to his home 
state of Georgia in a cofile.55 Speculators like Woolfolk normally handcuffed the male
o f slaves are generally made.” (Ibid., 23 Aug. 1833). For evidence o f traders staying at 
the Bell Tavern, see Ibid., 8 June 1821. They also stayed at the Washington Tavern 
(Ibid., 14 July 1820, 8 June 1821).
52 Baltimore American, 18 Mar., 27 Mar., 22 Apr., 2 Sept. 1815, 2 July 1817, 25 
Sept. 1822,21 July 1823, 1 June 1824, 19 Jan. 1825; Annapolis M aryland Gazette, 29 
Aug, 5 Sept. 1822; Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 1 Mar., 5 Apr. 1825; Washington 
National Intelligencer, 16 Sept. 1826, 28 May 1827, 4 June 1828; Fredericksburg 
Virginia Herald, 2 Sept. 1816,20 Sept. 1817,28 Feb. 1818,16 Aug. 1820, 2 Mar. 1822, 
17 Sept. 1823; Norfolk American Beacon & Commercial Diary, 9 July 1816, 7 Mar., 3 
July, 17 Nov. 1817; Lexington Intelligencer, 4 Sept. 1830.
53 Undated Baltimore American, as quoted in the Genius o f Universal 
Emancipation, Mar. 1822, p. 442.
54 Baltimore American, 25 Dec. 1815. See Ibid., 24 May 1816, 19 June 1816, 
and 11 Aug. 1816 for more of his advertisements. For background on Woolfolk, see 
William Calderhead, ‘T he Role o f the Professional Slave Trader in a Slave Economy: 
Austin Woolfolk, a  Case Study,” Civil War History, 23 (1977): 195-211; Dickson J. 
Preston, Young Frederick Douglass: The Maryland Years (Baltimore, 1980), pp. 76-80; 
and Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 39-44.
55 Baltimore American, 12 July 1816.
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slaves together in pairs and passed a long chain or rope through all o f  the manacles to 
keep them together, much like fish on a stringer. As an added precaution, they often 
forced bondservants to sleep in their manacles. Reasoning that females and children 
were less likely to run away, speculators allowed them to trudge unchained behind the 
men. Those too young, old, or feeble to walk rode in the supply wagon. A speculator 
or one of his armed assistants followed the procession on horseback to make sure the 
slaves did not try to escape.56 Once the coffte went far enough south where the 
speculator thought the risk o f escape was m inim al, he unshackled the slaves. He did so, 
presumably, to speed up the march. One slave remembered how the trader who 
purchased him kept the coffle in chains until it crossed the South Carolina border.
Before paying a smith, the trader told the slaves to “give up all hope” of returning to 
their homes because it would be impossible for them to find their way back.57
Woolfolk’s slaves marched along a well-traveled course that became known as 
the “upper route.” It passed through Washington, Fredericksburg, Richmond, and 
Columbia, South Carolina, before stopping in Hamburg, South Carolina, just across the 
Savannah River from Augusta, Georgia. Augusta had long been connected with the
56 For contemporary descriptions of slave coffies, see Blassingame, ed., Slave 
Testimony, pp. 704-6; Western Luminary, 23 Nov. 1831; George W. Featherstonhaugh, 
Excursion through the Slave States, from  Washington on the Potomac to the Frontier o f 
Mexico (1844; reprint, New York, 1968), pp. 36-37; Henry C. Knight, Letters from  the 
South and West (Boston, 1824), pp. 78-79; F. Nash Boney, ed., Slave Life in Georgia: A 
Narrative o f the Life, Sufferings, and Escape ofJohn Brown, a Fugitive Slave 
(Savannah, 1972), p. 16; Ball, Slavery in the United States, p. 29; Richard Puryear to 
Isaac Jarratt, 3 Mar. 1834, Jarratt Puryear Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina.
57 Ball, Slavery in the United States, p. 38.
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trade in slaves; traders sold Africans there as late as 1806. Moreover, the federal road 
that stretched westward from the city gave it the advantage o f being easy to reach for 
Georgia residents. The Hamburg-Augusta area therefore emerged as the center of this 
southern interstate slave trade by 1820.i8 Traders who brought slaves down the upper 
route found it safer and easier to stop in Hamburg. There, they waited for prospective 
buyers to cross the Savannah River, since an 1816 Georgia law prohibited “the 
introduction o f slaves into this state by negro traders for speculation.” Migrants to 
Georgia and state residents, however, could bring slaves into the state as long as they 
did not sell them within one year of the bondservant’s entry date.59 The purpose of the 
law was to reduce slave speculation in Georgia and prevent the entry of undesirable 
slaves. It just shifted the point of sale to the other side o f the river, however, since a 
bridge and three ferries connected Augusta with Hamburg. Local residents knew how 
readily Georgia’s citizens evaded the spirit of the law. One remarked that “an agent 
may bring to the very borders of the state, a slave for a [Georgia] citizen, & that it is 
only necessary for the owner to lose a few days to meet his agent at the Savannah river”
58 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 15 May 1817; Donnie D. Bellamy and Diane 
E. Walker, “Slaveholding in Antebellum Augusta and Richmond County, Georgia,” 
Phylon, 48 (1987): 172; Avery Craven, The Coming o f  the Civil War (Chicago, 1957), 
p. 105.
59 Savannah Republican, 11 Jan. 1817 (quotation); Milledgeville Georgia 
Journal, 1 Jan. 1817; Journal o f the Senate o f the State o f Georgia (Milledgeville,
1816), p. 8; Ralph B. Flanders, Plantation Slavery in Georgia (Chapel Hill, 1933), pp. 
183-84; Ruth Scarborough, The Opposition to Slavery in Georgia prior to 1860 
(Nashville, 1933), p. 113. This law, and similar ones in other states, will be discussed 
in Chapter Four.
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in order to bring slaves lawfully into the state.60 Georgians may have found it 
comforting to believe that they were introducing slaves into their state rather than 
allowing the slave trader to do so. Traders were gaining a reputation for underhanded 
business practices, so buying slaves in South Carolina and bringing them into Georgia 
was one way to rationalize the trade’s growth. Georgia residents could convince 
themselves they were picking out the “better” slaves and leaving the rest to be dumped 
in South Carolina.
Once traders reached Hamburg, they halted their coffles, pitched their tents near 
the bridge, and prepared their slaves for sale. One traveler who stumbled across an 
encampment of speculators reported that he saw up to 300 slaves waiting to cross into 
Georgia.61 Woolfolk had an advantage over the other traders in this encampment. He 
was a native of the area, so once he arrived he turned the slaves over to his relative,
John Woolfolk, who then sold them. John, who also handled arrangements for rental 
property, let Augusta residents know that he had “Prime Young Negroes FOR SALE,
At the foot of the Bridge, South Carolina side, consisting o f Men, Women, Boys, and 
Girls.” Sellers like Woolfolk let it be known that they had lots o f twenty to forty 
Virginia bom slaves for sale.62
60 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 27 Oct. 1818.
61 Undated West Jersey Gazette, as reprinted in Nashville Whig, 19 Feb. 1817.
62 Augusta Chronicle & Georgia Gazette, 17 May, 23 Aug. (quotation), 1 Oct. 
1821, 24 Jan., 21 Feb. 1822,26, 30 June 1824. August and John were most likely 
brothers, but there is no direct documentation to confirm this surmise.
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Slave owners in the Augusta area and beyond eagerly bought bondservants who 
had walked from Virginia and Maryland. It is possible to examine  their buying habits 
for the years surrounding 1820 since the state law that called for the prohibition o f slave 
traders also established a system o f record keeping to deter such men. All slave owners, 
whether Georgia residents or not, were required to register their slaves with the clerk of 
court once they entered the state. The clerk duly recorded the owner, the person 
transporting the slaves (if different from the owner), the number o f slaves, their names, 
and their ages.63 The slaves recorded in the Richmond County books are a combination 
o f those brought by owners migrating to Georgia or beyond and those purchased in the 
Hamburg slave encampment. Even though it is impossible to distinguish between the 
two groups, an examination of the data gives insight into the activities of southern 
slaveholders.
Purchasers and migrants clearly preferred young bondservants who would be the 
most productive and profitable once they reached the form. Eighty percent o f the slaves 
who entered Richmond County between 1818 and 1824 were under the age of twenty- 
six, while forty-five percent were less than fourteen. The high number of young slaves 
is not surprising, especially since forty-four percent o f the slaves in the Upper South in 
1820 were less than fourteen. Slaves aged fourteen to twenty-five, however, entered
63 The record books containing this information for Camden, Columbia, Elbert, 
Franklin, Jackson, Morgan, Oglethorpe, Pulaski, Richmond, and Wilkes Comities are in 
the Georgia Department o f Archives and History, Atlanta, Georgia. The books for 
Richmond County are the most extensive, probably because most o f the slaves who 
entered Georgia came through the county. The sample under examination here runs 
from January 1818 to December 1824. The months from November 1821 to October 
1822, however, are missing. Thus there are records for seventy-two o f the eighty-four
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Richmond County in numbers greater than their population. Just over one-quarter o f 
slaves in the Upper South were o f that age, compared to thirty-five percent of the 
bondservants entering the county. As might be expected, slaves older than twenty-five 
years were not in high demand. About twenty percent o f slaves who entered the county 
were this age, compared with thirty percent of the bondservants in the Upper South. 
Males who entered Richmond County outnumbered females, but only in a slightly 
greater proportion than the Upper South’s population.64 Tables One and Two contain 
the exact population figures.
Table One
Slave Population of the Exporting States, 1820
0-13 14-25 26-44 45+ Total
Male
Number 256,227 146,218 119,144 59,557 581,146
Male
Percentage 22.6 12.9 10.5 5.3 51.3
Female
Number 241,478 144,037 111,570 55,430 552,515
Female
Percentage 21.3 12.7 9.8 4.9 48.7
Total
Number 497,705 290,255 230,714 114,987 1,133,661
Total
Percentage 43.9 25.6 20.3 10.2
Source: Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the 
Old South (Madison, 1989), p. 241.
months in the time period. The records o f the other counties were too sporadic to 
constitute a reliable sample.
64 The fairly equal ratio o f  male to female slaves is in stark contrast to the 
African trade, where there was a decided preference for young male slaves (Berlin, 
Many Thousands Gone, p. 101).
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Table Two
Slave Population Imported into Richmond County, 1818-1824
0-13 14-25 26-44 45+ Total
Male
Number 1,984 1,478 630 217 4,309
Male
Percentage 24.5 18.3 7.8 2.7 53.2
Female
Number 1,639 1,356 608 188 3,791
Female
Percentage 20.2 16.7 7.5 2.3 46.8
Total
Number 3,623 2,834 1,238 405 8,100
Total
Percentage 44.7 35.0 15.3 5.0
Source: Richmond County Slave Record Books, 1818-1824, Georgia Department o f 
Archives and History, Atlanta, Georgia (excluding November 1821 to October 1822).
Not only was there selective purchase, but the sales followed a seasonal pattern, 
as well. February and March were, far and away, the two busiest months, with over 
forty percent o f slaves being registered in these two months. In feet, nearly three- 
quarters of all slaves entered the county between November and March. Entry o f 
bondservants was barely noticeable for the rest o f  the year. This pattern suggests that 
white southerners shrewdly calculated when to buy slaves. There does not appear to be 
an unusually high number of males slaves purchased during harvest months, which 
indicates planters did not buy bondservants in reaction to a short-term labor need. At 
the time most slaves entered the county, planters had finished marketing their crops and 
were assessing their labor needs for the next year. Those who decided to expand their 
operations had ready cash with which to make down payments on slaves. They 
financed the remaining purchase price often over the course of one or more years. 
Migration was also more prevalent this time o f the year since farmers could market one
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last crop in order to have money for expenses. Table Three presents the seasonal 
structure o f slave importation into Richmond County.
Table Three
Slave Population Imported into Richmond County, 
1818-1824, by month
Male Male Female Female Total Total
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Jan. 580 7.2 502 6.2 1,082 13.4
Feb. 822 10.1 713 8.8 1,535 19.0
Mar. 899 11.1 809 10.0 1,708 21.1
Apr. 356 4.4 329 4.1 685 8.5
May 188 2.3 143 5.1 331 4.0
June 135 1.7 121 1.5 256 3.2
July 53 0.7 47 0.6 100 1.2
Aug. 83 1.0 79 1.0 162 2.0
Sept. 96 1.2 88 1.1 184 2.3
Oct. 267 3.3 227 2.8 494 6.1
Nov. 439 5.4 397 4.9 836 10.3
Dec. 391 4.8 336 4.1 727 9.0
Total 4,309 53.2 3,791 46.8 8,100
Source: Richmond County Slave Record Books, 1818-1824, Georgia Department of 
Archives and History, Atlanta, Georgia (excluding November 1821 to October 1822).
The pattern of the entry of slaves into Richmond County is similar to the pattern 
o f  slave trading that has been posited for other areas o f the South. For instance, New 
Orleans imported virtually no slaves from July to October, but received over ninety 
percent between November and April. The pattern for New Orleans may have been 
more pronounced because o f the necessity to prevent disease. June through October 
was the peak time for yellow fever in lower Louisiana, and most traders cut slave prices 
in late spring to make quick sales and reduce the risk o f an epidemic.65
65 Herman F. Freudenberger and Jonathan B. Pritchett, “The Domestic United 
States Slave Trade: New Evidence,” Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History, 21 (1991):
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
Even as the march of slaves exhibited a seasonal pattern, the number who 
entered Georgia steadily decreased over time. Fewer migrants journeyed south after 
most o f the state’s good land came under cultivation. The entry o f slaves in Richmond 
County diminished as the demand for labor leveled off. Bondservants entering the 
county dropped steadily from 1818 to 1824. Owners registered almost 2,600 slaves in 
1818, compared to barely over six hundred in 1824. Certainly some of the decline is 
due to less emphasis on keeping up with the necessary paperwork. As time passed, 
there was probably less desire to enforce the registration provisions. The pattern of 
entry, however, does correspond with the broad changes in movement, both white and 
black, in the South as a whole. Table Four contains the yearly totals of slaves registered 
in Richmond County.
Table Four
Slave Population Imported into Richmond County,
1818-1824, by year
1818 1819 1820 1821’ 1822” 1823 1824 Total
Total
slaves 2591 1434 1347 882 200 1038 608 8,100
‘January through October 
“ November through December
Source: Richmond County Slave Record Books, 1818-1824, Georgia Department o f 
Archives and History, Atlanta, Georgia.
As the amount of available land in Georgia declined, white migrants sought 
opportunity elsewhere. They moved in increasing numbers to a stretch of land across
463-67; Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 70-71; Laurence J. KotlikofF, “The 
Structure of Slave Prices in New Orleans, 1804-1862,” Economic Inquiry, 17 (1979): 
498.
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Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, an area that would become known as the Black 
Belt because o f the dark color o f the soil and, eventually, the concentration o f  slaves. 
Land in the Black Belt was durable, fertile, ideally suited to cotton, often close to 
excellent water navigation, and cheap. The frequent pressure on Native Americans to 
give up their lands, and the almost constant Indian Wars, coincided with the desire for 
more land and more slaves. When Andrew Jackson defeated the Creek Indians in 1814, 
they ceded their lands to the federal government and opened up large expanses of 
territory for white settlement. The Southwest became the most desirable location for 
white migrants by the mid 1820s.66
The demand for slaves in the Southwest fed the growth o f the internal slave 
trade. Virginia and Maryland, with their large supply of slaves, became the natural 
source o f labor. Settlers in developing areas wanted slaves, so Natchez and New 
Orleans emerged as the two major termini o f the interstate slave trade. Even before the 
major shift o f migration away from Georgia, an “extensive Slave-trade” between 
Natchez “and those western parts o f the States o f Virginia, Maryland, the Carolinas, and 
Georgia” began to develop. Migrants moving from Virginia reported seeing slave 
traders headed west with their purchases.67 Co files, which usually numbered about 
thirty, became more numerous on the roads o f western Virginia. As John Palmer made
66 A. A. Taylor, “The Movement o f Negroes from the East to the Gulf States 
from 1830 to 1850,” Journal o f Negro History, 8 (1923): 367-83; Censer,
“Southwestern Migration,” pp. 407-26; Chaplin, “Creating a Cotton South,” pp. 171- 
200.
67 Hodgson, Remarks during a Journey, pp. 178-79 (quotation); Hodgson,
Letters from  North America, 2: 194-95.
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his way through Virginia, he stopped at a  plantation near Lexington. It was a  hot 
Sunday in August when a drove o f slaves arrived at the plantation. A single trader who 
had come from Baltimore was in charge o f  the procession, and he stopped to ask the 
planter for lodgings that night. The planter gave his permission, so the speculator sent 
the slaves to the bam, where they slept in chains. Palmer was surprised to find the 
trader, a Louisiana resident on his way home, to be “communicative and intelligent.” 
This cofifle, like most o f the others that passed that way, walked to Nashville and then 
turned southwest onto the federal road to Natchez.68 Just as the presence o f speculators 
and their slaves in taverns and jails acquainted more people with the interstate trade, 
coffles made slave trading more visible. Travelers were known to curse the coffles 
because o f their brutality and for taking up valuable space on the roads.69 The sudden 
surge in the number of coffles presented a dim view of slavery and challenged 
perceptions o f  the peculiar institution. Southerners, especially non-slaveholders, had 
more consistent and graphic reminders o f slavery’s cruelty.
One o f the enterprising men who transported slaves to Natchez was Francis E. 
Rives o f Petersburg, Virginia. Rives joined with Peyton Mason, Sr. and Peyton Mason, 
Jr. to form a slave trading cooperative in 1817. The three men signed an agreement 
specifying they would split the profit in equal portions and be bound equally for the
68 John Palmer, Journal o f  Travels in the United States o f North America, and in 
Lower Canada, performed in the Year 1817 (London, 1818), pp. 142-44 (quotation on 
p. 144); Francis Hall, Travels in Canada, and the United States, in 1816 and 1817 
(London, 1818), p. 357.
69 “John Owen’s Journal o f his Removal from Virginia to Alabama in 1818,” 
Publications o f  the Southern History Association, 1 (1897): 93.
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cash used to purchase the slaves. Although rudimentary by later standards, the 
agreement was effective enough to get the men started in the slave trading business.70 
The members took turns escorting a total o f four coffles before quitting the trade in 
1823. Prior to each journey, all three purchased slaves in the vicinity o f Petersburg and 
Norfolk. They then housed the slaves in local jails, paying fees to the jailers. Once 
they assembled about twenty-five slaves, the partners bought horses, wagons, and food 
for the journey. They also packed a set of clothes for each slave to wear upon arrival in 
Natchez. Only one o f the partners escorted the slaves to the Southwest. Each cofifie left 
in December so that it would arrive during the peak buying season. Although it is 
unclear how long it took Rives and the Masons to reach their destination, coffles 
normally averaged about twenty-five miles a day. Traders who spent “7 weakes on the 
Road” between Richmond and Natchez were elated about having a short trip, since most 
traveled longer than that depending on their starting destination, the weather, and the 
condition o f the roads.71 Most traders carried food in their wagons, although some
70 The agreement is in Francis Everod Rives Papers, Duke. For other examples 
o f other partnership agreements, see “articles o f association” between Tyre Glen and 
Isaac Jarratt, 13 Nov. 1831; and “articles o f agreement” between Glen and William G. 
Norton, 6 June 1836, Tyre Glen Papers, Duke. More information on Rives may be 
found in Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 196-97 and Joel D. Trese, ed., 
Biographical Directory o f the American Congress 1774-1996 (Alexandria, Vir., 1997), 
p. 1763.
71 James A. Mitchell to ? Mitchell, 12 Dec. 1834, Southside Papers, Alderman 
Library, University o f Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia (quotation). The traveling 
time o f coffles is discussed in Ethan A. Andrews, Slavery and the Domestic Slave- 
Trade in the United States (Boston, 1836), p. 149; Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 285-88; 
Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 77; Charles Sackett Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi 
(New York, 1933), p. 149; and Freudenberger and Pritchett, “Domestic Slave Trade,” p. 
472.
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stopped at inns, forms, or foraged for comestibles. In any case, a large amount of food 
was necessary, since slaves who marched overland ate “ravenously.”72
In their pursuit o f  profit in the early republic, Rives and the Masons dealt with 
several difficulties. During their second journey, someone stole their horses in the 
“indian nation.” On another occasion they had to take back a slave on account of his 
being diseased. A buyer returned another bondservant the next year, the slave“being 
subject to fits.” When they could not sell “an old woman,” they gave her to a slave 
dealer in Natchez who bought seventeen other slaves. These unforeseen circumstances 
cut into the profit margin of the group, since they did not recoup any o f  their investment 
on these three slaves. Although the records show the firm netted just over $9,000 on the 
first trip, that figure is deceiving since the members later had to refund money for two 
o f the slaves. Profit for the second trip totaled just over $770. The final two 
expeditions were hardly more profitable and barely worth the trouble for the men. They 
spent nine years trying to collect their debts, and likely quit the trade because o f the 
hassle. Rives, at least, moved on to more stable ventures like banking and railroads.73
Driving coffles on foot was not the only way to transport slaves from the 
Chesapeake to the Southwest. Other traders marched their slaves to the western end o f 
Virginia and then loaded them on flatboats for a voyage down the Ohio and Mississippi 
Rivers to Natchez or New Orleans. Wheeling, Virginia, was a common embarkation
72 William Beverley to Robert Beverley, 3 Dec. 1830, Beverley Family Papers, 
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. Beverley, who was not a slave trader, 
was describing his experience in moving his slaves from Virginia to Alabama.
73 The quotations and the financial figures are from the trading book in the 
Francis Everod Rives Papers.
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point. Benjamin Lundy recalled that after 1815, the town became the “great 
thoroughfare o f the slave-trade between Virginia and the Southern and Southwestern 
States.”74 Other speculators bought slaves in Kentucky and Tennessee before loading 
them on flatboats. In either case, traders allowed the slaves, up to seventy-five on a 
boat, to roam the deck during the trip. If  the vessel needed to dock at shore for wood or 
other provisions, the speculator chained the slaves together in pairs to prevent their 
escape. Traders sometimes sold slaves during such stops.75 One traveler learned that 
young men could “make fortunes by slave-trafficking. They purchase all they can 
obtain, thrust them into prison for safe-keeping, drive them handcuffed through the 
country, like cattle, and boat them down the river.”76 Isaac Franklin got his start on this 
route. As a teenager Franklin transported his brothers’ produce to New Orleans, and 
while in Louisiana he witnessed several slave transactions. Franklin began selling 
bondservants by 1810, but his service in the War o f 1812 halted any efforts to establish 
himself in the slave trade. After the war, the twenty-six year old Franklin became a 
full-time speculator, most likely buying slaves in his home state and transporting them 
downriver to Natchez where he sold them.77
74 Samuel Joseph May, Some Recollections o f our Anti-Slavery Conflict (Boston, 
1869), p. 12.
75 Jefferson, ed., William Wells Brown, pp. 40-43; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 
29 Sept. 1826; Woodville Republican, 12 Dec. 1835.
76 Knight, Letters from the South and West, pp. 101-2.
77 New Orleans Daily Picayune, 7 Oct. 1846; Slave sale receipts dated 6 May
1809, 30 Dec. 1809, and 29 May 1810 in David Weeks and Family Papers, Louisiana 
State University; Succession o f Isaac Franklin, pp. 277, 283, 287.
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Franklin brought slaves to Natchez just as that city’s slave market emerged as 
one o f the most important in the United States. A visitor described the scene in 1817. 
He stood at the brow o f the two hundred-foot cliff overlooking the waterfront and was 
amazed to see fourteen flatboats o f slaves docked there. The bondservants, the majority 
o f  them women, “were dressed up to the best advantage, on the same principle that 
jockeys do horses upon sale.”78 Some traders sold their slaves right from the boats, but 
most led their slaves up the steep climb from “Natchez under the Hill.” The 
bondservants hiked “in a long straggling line, or sometimes in double files in well 
ordered procession.” They all carried a bundle, possibly new clothes, oftentimes 
balancing it on their heads.79 Traders kept their slaves in the town’s center until 1833, 
when the city passed an ordinance forcing jails outside o f  the city limits. Most 
speculators moved to an area that became known as the Forks in the Road or 
Niggerville, a small cluster o f buildings a few miles from Natchez. The trade, whether 
in town or at the forks, was “brisk and profitable.”80 This thriving business attracted 
numerous traders, including John M. Hundley, who advertised in 1822 that he “has just
7ft Henry B. Fearon, Sketches ofAmerica: A Narrative o f a Journey ofFive 
Thousand Miles through the Eastern and Western States o f  America (London, 1818), p. 
270.
70 Joseph H. Ingraham, The South-West by a Yankee, 2 vol. (1835; reprint, Ann 
Arbor, Mich., 1966) 2: 235-47 (quotation on p. 240).
80 Natchez Mississippi Journal and Natchez Advertiser, 19 Mar. 1833; Bancroft, 
Slave Trading, pp. 300-1; Estwick Evans, A Pedestrious Tour o f Four Thousand Miles, 
through the Western States and Territories during the Winter and Spring o f 1818 
(Concord, 1818), p. 213 (quotation). He also noted that slaves were “a subject o f 
continual speculation, and are daily brought, together with other live stock, from 
Kentucky and other places to the Natches and New Orleans market” (pp. 213-14).
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landed 50 Young Negroes, Consisting o f  Men, Women & Boys, from Maryland & 
Virginia, & from Kentucky.”81 The trade to Natchez was becoming thickly contested, 
meaning more competition and fewer profits for all involved. Just as importantly, the 
surge in slave trading had its mark on society in the area. The great influx in slaves 
fueled white fears of a revolt or a race war. Mississippi, and the other states that 
imported large numbers o f slaves, struggled with how to cope with the pervasive sense 
of unease.
New Orleans became a major center of slave trading activity as well. It was 
only when the coastwise trade became prominent in the mid 1820s that the New Orleans 
slave market became a major destination for speculators. Moving bondservants on the 
waterways was a more efficient way to deliver them to the Deep South. While this 
method was more expensive than an overland journey, it offered numerous advantages, 
including a reduced risk o f escape, less strain on the slaves, a quicker trip, and a faster 
time from purchase to resale.82 Woolfolk was one of the first slave traders to make 
extensive use of the coastwise trade, but men such as Franklin and Armfield, Abner 
Robinson, William Fulcher, Joseph Isnard, Edwin Lee, David Anderson, and 
Bartholomew Accinelly competed for a share of the New Orleans market.
81 Natchez Mississippi Republican, 10 Nov. 1818, 9 Jan. 1822, 24 Oct. 1822 
(quotation, emphasis in original); Natchez Mississippi State Gazette, 23 Feb. 1822,18 
June 1823.
82 Freudenberg and Pritchett, “Domestic Slave Trade,” pp. 472-75 contains an 
analysis of the relative costs for transporting slaves.
83 That these men were slave traders is evident from the frequent appearance in 
U. S. Customs Service Records, Port o f New Orleans, Louisiana, Inward Slave 
Manifests, Microfilm at Louisiana State University. See also advertisements in the New
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The coastwise trade also enabled the slave traders to expand the size of their 
operations since they did not have to accompany the slaves on board the vessel and 
could safely ship more slaves at once than they could escort in a coffle. The federal law 
o f  1816 had the unintentional effect o f  safeguarding the purchases o f  slave traders. It 
stipulated that all slaves shipped in the coastal waters be described by name, sex, and 
height. The captain then became responsible for the bondservants until arrival at the 
port of destination. Speculators arranged for someone to meet the ship at the dock, take 
charge o f the slaves, and sell them on the local market.84 These techniques enabled 
Woolfolk to become a major slave trader. Instead o f  asking for fifteen to twenty slaves 
to go to the Georgia market, he notified the public in 1821 that he would pay the highest 
prices in “United States’ money, gold or silver” for “Owe hundred likely young 
Negroes” who would be shipped to New Orleans. Ten years later he wanted three 
hundred slaves.85 It is unlikely that he actually wanted to buy three hundred slaves at 
one time, but the exaggerated number was a device to attract attention. By all accounts, 
Woolfolk and his relatives were successful in their efforts to expand their slave trading
Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 3 Jan., 5 May 1826, 9 Dec. 1828; New Orleans Courier, 
19 Mar., 16 Nov. 1825, 13 Jan. 1827.
84 Charles H. Wesley, “Manifests of Slave Shipments along the Waterways, 
1808-1864,” Journal o f  Negro History, 27 (1942): 155-74 discusses the statutes 
involving the coastwise trade.
85 Easton Republican Star, 2 Jan. 1821 (quotation, emphasis in original); 
Cambridge Chronicle, 1 Oct. 1836 as quoted in Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 40. The 
progression of Woolfolk’s purchases may be traced in his advertisements in the 
Baltimore American, 25 Dec. 1815, 24 May 1816, 12 July 1817, 7 Jan. 1824, 15 Feb. 
1825; Easton Republican Star, 2 Jan. 1821, 10 Sept. 1822. Woolfolk’s demands for the 
number o f slaves are in line with those o f other traders in Maryland.
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operations, at least during the 1820s. Instead o f being “bom slave-traders” they were 
acute businessmen who made themselves into the preeminent slave-trading firm in 
Maryland. Customs Manifests reveal that they consistently sent shipments of forty or 
more slaves to New Orleans several times a year. By the middle o f  the 1820s, Austin 
and his family dominated the trade out o f Maryland, sending, according to one estimate, 
2,288 slaves to Louisiana between 1819 and 1832. The Woolfolks handled so much of 
the Maryland trade that the name Woolfolk became symbolic o f the slave trade. 
Frederick Douglass recalled that slaves on Maryland’s Eastern Shore equated being 
“sold to Woldfolk [sic]” with banishment to the Deep South.86
Franklin, too, switched his base o f operations to the Chesapeake to take 
advantage of the coastwise trade to New Orleans. As he established himself in 
Alexandria, Franklin formed a partnership with John Armfield, a successful slave trader 
in his own right.87 The two men signed articles o f agreement in February 1828 and 
three months later leased a house on Duke Street in Alexandria that became the 
headquarters for their firm. They signaled their intentions to be a large trading concern 
by advertising for one hundred and fifty “likely young negroes o f  both sexes between
86 Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 39 (first quotation); Calderhead, “Professional 
Slave Trader,” p. 200 (estimate); Preston, Young Frederick Douglass, p. 76 (second 
quotation). For examples of Woolfolk’s slave shipments, see New Orleans Inward 
Slave Manifests, 25 Nov. 1822, 13 Dec. 1824,21 Apr. 1825, 5 May 1828.
87 Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, p. 23; Isabel Howell, “John Armfield, Slave- 
Trader,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 2 (1943): 3-29; Isabel Howell, “John Armfield 
ofBeersheba Springs,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 3 (1944): 46-64, 156-67. 
Armfield, a former stagecoach driver, advertised that he wanted to buy thirty-five or 
forty “LIKELY NEGROES, either separately or in families, for which the highest price 
will be given” (Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 6 June 1826).
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the ages of 8 and 25 years.” The firm consistently advertised for large numbers of 
slaves, saying it was “determined to give higher prices for slaves than any purchasers 
who are now, or may be hereafter in this market.”88 It then expanded into the Baltimore 
area, and Armfield was giddy that they paid less there for slaves than they did in 
Alexandria. He told a colleague that “Woolfolk’s done us a good kindness when he 
caused us to go into that market.”89
Franklin and Armfield could offer top dollar for slaves because they eliminated 
the middlemen in their operations by purchasing their own ships. They bought the first 
o f their four sailing vessels the same year they established their partnership. This ship, 
the United States, was a “fast sailing packet brig” that could hold up to one hundred and 
fifty slaves, although it normally carried about a hundred. The firm’s second ship, the 
Tribune, was of similar size and had two sections in its hold for housing slaves. The 
rear section held up to eighty bondservants and normally carried women, while one 
hundred men could cram into the forward compartment. Two raised platforms, each 
about five or six feet deep, jutted into the ship’s interior. On these ledges “the slaves 
lie, as close as they can stow away.”90 By 1835 one of Franklin and Armfield’s ships
88 Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 17 May 1828 (quotation); Succession o f Isaac 
Franklin, pp. 337-38;Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 1 June 1830.
89 John Armfield to Rice C. Ballard, 26 Mar. 1832, Ballard Papers. Franklin and 
Armfield’s entry into the Baltimore market cut into Woolfolk’s business. By at least
1836, but probably earlier, Woolfolk was out of slave trading but still living in 
Baltimore where he owned several pieces o f property (Christopher Phillips, Freedom’s 
Port: The African American Community in Baltimore, 1790-1860 (Urbana, 1997), p. 
230).
90 The United States is described in New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, 22 
Oct. 1828; Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 22 Dec. 1829 (first quotation); and New Orleans
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left Alexandria every other week during the shipping season. On return trips, the ships 
carried sugar, molasses, whiskey, and cotton. Franklin and Armfield’s vessels brought 
more regularity to the trade since they sailed at consistent intervals and they increased 
profits by integrating the business operations o f the firm. The ships reduced outside 
costs and were a source of revenue on the return voyage.91
The establishment o f a permanent headquarters was another vital component to 
the growth of the interstate trade. In 1823 Woolfolk opened his office at his residence 
near the Three Ton Tavern on Pratt Street in Baltimore.92 Establishing a fixed base o f 
operations enabled him to create a sense o f continuity in the increasingly competitive 
trade. Prior to this time, most slave traders operated out of taverns and stayed in town 
for several days or a week. Woolfolk, for instance, lodged in Mrs. Green’s tavern in 
Easton before he established a permanent jail. Once traders established their jails, they 
tended, at first, to be on the edge o f town or in undesirable areas. Woolfolk had to 
supply good directions to his residence that stood at the fork of the Washington and 
Frederick road in Baltimore.93 Samuel Dawson established his jail “about eight miles 
from Fredericksburg.” In Richmond, the best location that Lewis Collier could find was
Bee, 20 Oct. 1831. A description o f the Tribune is in William Jay, Miscellaneous 
Writings on Slavery (Boston, 1853), pp. 157-58 (second quotation).
91 Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, pp. 40-44.
92 Andrews, Domestic Slave Trade, p. 80; Baltimore American, 11 Aug., 12 Dec. 
1823, 9 Apr. 1824. Woolfolk described his residence as being “above” the tavern, 
alternately spelled Ton, tunn, or Tuns, but it is clear from his extensive descriptions of 
the house that he meant down the road from the tavern, not literally above it. See also 
Ibid., 4 Sept. 1823, 7 Jan. 1824.
93 Easton Republican Star, 2 Jan. 1821, 10 Sept. 1822, 11 Aug. 1823.
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“near the Poor-house.” Charles Mills was next to a livery stable while Goodwin and 
Templeman abutted a warehouse.94 An anti-slavery organization noted that speculators 
kept slaves on the outskirts of towns in “dilapidated huts.” Even though the interstate 
slave trade was increasing in size and establishing a constant presence in the South, it 
physically remained separate from the best parts o f  town.95
The greatest change in slave trading during the 1820s was the formation of 
partnerships.96 Although a joint venture forced them to share the profits, it held out the 
possibility of trading on such a scale where dividing the money would not be onerous. 
More importantly, having more than one person meant a division o f labor. Traders 
became responsible for handling one aspect of the trade—the purchases in the Upper 
South, movement o f the slaves, or the sales in the Lower South. George Kephart, for 
instance, mulled over whether to join forces with James Purvis or Thomas McCargo. 
Kephart wanted to stay in Virginia, admitting that it would be “unpleasant” to be in the 
“selling market.” He wanted to join with someone who “could be in the South all the 
season.”97
94 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 19 Apr. 1826; Richmond Enquirer, 19 Apr., 
24 Nov. 1833; 16 Sept. 1834. Collier later bought Bacon Tait’s jail, near the Bell 
Tavern (Ibid., 23 Aug. 1833).
95 Liberator, 7 June 1834, p. 91.
96 Before 1815, virtually all traders operated alone. For examples o f some early 
traders, all o f  whom operated individually, see Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 12- 
21; Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 19-25.
97 George Kephart to John Armfield, 16 Mar. 1838, Ballard Papers. Purvis 
traded in Baltimore (Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 39, 110), while McCargo bought 
slaves in Baltimore and Washington in order to sell in New Orleans (Tadman,
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In a similar fashion, Woolfolk employed several men in his speculative 
enterprise once he switched his focus to the coastwise trade. He started with a  number 
of his relatives. Richard Woolfolk originally sent slaves from Norfolk to New Orleans, 
but then moved to Maryland for the purpose o f buying slaves.98 Joseph Woolfolk also 
became an important buyer in Maryland, setting up his operations at Lowe’s Tavern in 
Easton.99 This location was ideal, since it was close to the site o f  the county slave 
auction, the local newspaper offices, the courthouse (where bills o f  sales were filed), 
and the local jail (where the sheriff boarded slaves for twenty-five cents a day). Joseph 
enticed planters to visit him by noting that he had just received “a fresh supply o f that 
much wished for article, CASH.”100 Austin, Richard, and Joseph sent their slaves to 
New Orleans where John and Samuel Woolfolk arranged for their sale. Even Austin 
Woolfolk, Sr. visited New Orleans and occasionally helped sell slaves.101 The use of
Speculators and Slaves, p. 232). Five years earlier both Purvis and Kephart were agents 
of Franklin and Armfield (Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 9 May 1833).
98 New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, 12 Mar., 5 May 1822, 18 June, 1 Sept. 
1822 have evidence of Richard Woolfolk shipping from Norfolk, while Ibid., 30 Dec. 
1822, 27 Jan. 1823, and 9 Apr. 1823 have evidence of his shipments from Baltimore. 
Calderhead, “Professional Slave Trader,” p. 198, characterizes Richard and three other 
Woolfolks as Austin’s brothers, although there is no clear evidence to indicate whether 
this assertion is true or not.
99 Easton Republican Star, 12 Apr. 1825, 9 Oct. 1827, 17 June 1828.
100 Ibid., 2 Aug. 1825 (quotation); Preston, Young Frederick Douglass, p. 78.
101 New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, 17 Dec. 1821; 26 Apr., 8 June, 30 Dec. 
1822, 9 Apr., 17 May, 18 Nov. 1823. For different interpretations of his activities, see 
Calderhead, “Professional Slave Trader,” pp. 195-211; Preston, Young Frederick 
Douglass, pp. 76-80; Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 39-44. That so many Woolfolks 
were involved in the trade may be another reason Douglass equated the name with 
speculation. Once they ran out o f relatives, the Woolfolks involved others in their slave
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
relatives was quite common in the slave trade. John Springs IE and his brother Eli 
bought slaves in Maryland and brought them to South Carolina.102 Samuel and Joseph 
Meek were involved together, as were Isaac Franklin and his brother, James.103 
Speculators also formed alliances with non-relatives. Franklin., for instance, signed 
articles of agreement with John Armfield in early 1828. Tyre Glen signed an agreement 
with Isaac Jarratt in 1831 and then with William G. Norton five years later.104 The 
tendency to form partnerships is indicative of how the interstate slave trade was 
becoming blatantly commercial and increasingly organized.
Not only did speculators form partnerships, but they also employed local agents 
who were responsible for a specific territory. Woolfolk appears to have been the first 
trader to employ such men, who bought slaves in one or two comities and then sent 
them to Baltimore for transshipment south. Henry N. Templeman worked the Eastern 
Shore for Woolfolk in the late 1820s. Like most o f the other agents, Templeman lasted 
only a few years with Woolfolk before he moved on to establish his own trading
trading operation. The firm of Woolfolk, Sanders, and Overly became a fixture on 
Maryland’s Eastern Shore (Princess Anne Village Herald, 14 Sept. 1830, as quoted in 
Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 32. Sanders and Overly went on to run their own slave 
trading firm once Woolfolk quit the business).
102 Tadman, “Hidden History of Slave Trading,” p. 21.
103 Joseph Meek Papers, Virginia Historical Society; James R. Franklin is 
described as Isaac Franklin’s brother in the Biographical Notes to the Rice C. Ballard 
Papers.
104 Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, p. 23; Howell, “John Armfield,” pp. 3-6; 
Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 6 June 1826; Agreement o f Tyre Glen and Isaac Jarratt, 13 
Nov. 1831, and “articles o f agreement” between Glen and William G. Norton, 6 June 
1836, Tyre Glen Papers. Armfield eventually married Franklin’s niece.
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operation.105 The rapid turnover o f the trade made it difficult to keep good people. 
Agents tried to establish themselves as speculators in their own right once they gained a 
few years’ experience. A trader, most likely Woolfolk himselfj advertised that he 
wanted three or four “respectable men” to “travel through different parts o f the state o f 
Maryland, to aid in the disposal o f a  very popular work -  to whom a liberal 
compensation will be allowed.” In order to prevent trouble, the advertisement warned, 
“no person need apply who will not enter into security for the amount placed in his 
hands.”106 Traders trusted agents with large sums o f cash since they needed to be able 
to purchase slaves on the spot, meaning that employing agents could be risky.
Another indication o f the trade’s growth was the tendency amongst speculators 
to form loose alliances with one another. Typically a small trader made an affiliation 
with a large speculator. Ira Bowman, for instance, had a meager slave trading business 
out o f a hotel in Alexandria, Virginia. In 1825 he started sending bondservants to 
Woolfolk in New Orleans on consignment. Both parties gained from the arrangement, 
as Bowman did not have to accompany his slaves to New Orleans and Woolfolk did not 
have take the risk o f  handing over large sums o f cash to someone o f dubious
105 Calderhead, “Professional Slave Trader,” p. 197; Easton Republican Star, 9 
Oct. 1827; Princess Anne Village Herald, 6 Dec. 1830, as quoted in Bancroft, Slave 
Trading, p. 32. For Templeman’s later trading activity, see Richmond Enquirer, 19 
Sept. 1834; H. N. Templeman Account Book, New York Public Library, New York, 
New York; Templeman and Goodwin Account Book, University o f  North Carolina; 
Omohundro and Templeman slave sale receipt, 18 Jan. 1844, Kennon Family Papers, 
University of Virginia.
106 Baltimore American, 18 Dec. 1822.
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reputation-107 Franklin and Armfield had similar arrangements with traders. Armfield, 
who lured away some of Woolfolk’s affiliates, established alliances with speculators in 
and around Richmond and Warrenton in Virginia, and Easton, Frederick, and Baltimore 
in Maryland.108 With these men making most o f  the purchases, Armfield arranged for 
the slaves’ transportation while Franklin sold them in Natchez and New Orleans.109 
Franklin and Armfield sold the slaves of their affiliates for half the profit, a  beneficial 
arrangement for both parties since it cut down on overhead.110 At the beginning o f each 
trading season, Franklin arranged for a coffle to be sent from Tennessee to Natchez 
before he left his home in Franklin, Tennessee. His brother, James, accompanied the
107 New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, 3 Nov. 1825,6 Feb. 1826, 2 Mar.
1827. Bowman’s advertisements are in Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 25 May 1825; and 
Michael Ridgeway, “A Peculiar Business: Slave Trading in Alexandria, Virginia, 1825- 
1861,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, 1976, pp. 19-21.
108 John Armfield to Rice C. Ballard, 26 Mar. 1832, Ballard Papers. The 
affiliates were Rice C. Ballard (Richmond), John M. Saunders (Warrenton), George 
Kephart (Frederick), Thomas M. Jones (Easton), and James F. Purvis (Baltimore) 
(Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 9 May 1833).
109 The assumption o f Franklin and Armfield’s division of labor is drawn from 
the feet that visitors to the firm’s slave pen in Alexandria saw Armfield and not 
Franklin, the establishment o f Franklin’s citizenship in Louisiana, the slave manifests of 
the firm which list Armfield as the shipper and Franklin as the receiver, and the men’s 
letters in the Rice C. Ballard Papers, all of which gives Franklin’s address as New 
Orleans or Natchez and Armfield’s address as Alexandria. See, respectively, Andrews, 
Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 135-39; Edward S. Abdy, Journal o f a Residence and Tour 
in the United States o f North America, 2 voL (London, 1835) 2:179-80; Succession o f  
Isaac Franklin, pp. 338-42; New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, 22 Oct. 1828; and 
Ballard Papers.
110 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 1 Nov. 1833, Ibid. In this letter, Franklin 
forwarded $20,000 to Ballard—receipts from sales o f Ballard’s slaves.
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cofile while Isaac traveled in comfort.111 At the end of each trading season, Armfield 
accompanied one overland coffle to Natchez or New Orleans and spent the spring in the 
South. He, too, traveled in style—in a barouche rather than riding horseback with the 
cofile.112
Franklin’s arrangement with Rice C. Ballard seems to have been typical o f  the 
alliances between traders. The Customs invoice that accompanied each shipment 
contained enough information to identify the slaves and usually gave their purchase 
price. Speculators sent specific instructions on another invoice, as well. When Franklin 
received a shipment of sixty-three slaves from Ballard, he assured the man that 
“together with your request what disposition I should make o f some of the negroes all 
of which I will attend to when an opportunity offers.” Franklin cautioned Ballard that 
the “invoyse price is so high that you may look out for short profits.”113 In 1836 Tait, 
Boudar, and Company of Richmond sent twenty-three slaves to Ballard, Franklin, and 
Company in Natchez. The invoice listed the name, age, height, color, and cost o f each 
o f the slaves. There was also a space for remarks. On the reverse of the invoice was a 
letter describing the specific qualities of many o f the slaves. One man was an 
“excellent marksman -  a pretty good cook and also a very smart dining room servant.” 
There was also “an excellent cook washer & Ironer & a very steady woman” in the
111 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 5 Oct. 1832 and James R. Franklin to Rice 
C. Ballard, 23 Nov. 1832, Ibid.
112 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 142, 148.
113 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 5 Nov. 1833, Ballard Papers.
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group.114 Specific skills such as these enhanced a slave’s value, so traders wanted to 
ensure that purchasers knew the abilities o f  any slaves they purchased.
It is clear that Franklin and Armfield considered themselves separate from their 
affiliates. In Richmond, for instance, Franklin and Armfield kept in constant contact 
with Rice C. Ballard. Franklin or his brother gave Ballard frequent information as to 
the state o f the slave market in general and the status o f  Ballard’s slaves in particular.115 
Ballard, in turn, concentrated on buying slaves in and around Richmond but did not 
have to take the time to accompany them to New Orleans or Natchez. Franklin and 
Armfield made some extra cash for handling a few more slaves. Since they were 
already established in the Lower South, the cost of taking on new slaves was minimal. 
There was a limit, however, to how many men could be affiliated with Franklin and 
Armfield. At one point, Franklin turned down the opportunity to expand his business 
dealings, explaining that he had as many “concerns & partners as our two men can 
possibly do justice.” 116
114 Slave invoice from Tait, Boudar and Company to Ballard, Franklin, and 
Company, dated 23 Sept. 1836. Tait purchased the fifteen men and twelve women for 
$22,246.70 and shipped them 26 Sept. 1836 on the Brig Tribune. He kept a jail in 
Richmond and became quite rich from the trade (Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 101). 
Thomas Boudar concentrated on selling slaves in New Orleans by the 1850s (Ibid., pp. 
92, 277, 314).
115 See, for example, the letter o f  Isaac Franklin describing the how Ballard’s 
“little slim assed Girls and boys are intirely out of the way [i.e., sold]” (Isaac Franklin 
to Rice C. Ballard, 8 Dec. 1832, Ballard Papers).
116 Isaac and James Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 9 Oct. 1833, Ibid. Isaac 
Franklin thought it better to do well with what they had rather than do too much and do 
it badly.
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Speculators had to trust one another if such an arrangement was to work 
properly. Unscrupulous traders in New Orleans could rob their colleagues by c laiming 
a lower selling price for slaves and pocketing the difference. At one point, Ballard grew 
uneasy about his alliance with Franklin and complained about the terms. Franklin 
responded with a long letter extolling the virtues o f Franklin and Armfield in an effort 
to convince Ballard to continue the arrangement.117 He knew that Ballard had few 
options, since speculators avoided the notoriously corrupt traders. Lewis Collier of 
Richmond busied him self “making  Dismal efforts to form several concerns with other 
Traders.” He failed, according to Franklin, because “he looks as much like a thief as 
any man I have ever seen in my life.” 118 Woolfolk eventually lost much his market 
because of his shady business practices. Armfield described Woolfolk’s “standing” as 
“verry bad” because he cheated people.119
Even as speculators moved in and out o f the interstate slave trade, they changed 
the nature of the business during the fifteen years after the War of 1812. Speculation 
was no longer a haphazard enterprise, with individual traders staying in taverns, buying 
up slaves where they could find them, and transporting them to the Deep South 
whenever they could manage to get enough to constitute a coffle. Innovations such as 
slave jails, agents, and coastwise sailing patterns brought a measure of certainty and
117 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 15 Aug. 1832, Ibid. Ballard continued his 
association with Franklin and Armfield, became a full partner in the firm and then 
retired by 1838.
118 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 9 Oct. 1834, Ibid.
119 John Armfield to Rice C. Ballard, 26 Mar. 1832, Ibid.
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regularity to the trade. Speculators established headquarters which doubled as jails, so 
they would no longer have to keep their slaves in local jails, or worse yet, taverns. A 
central location also made it easy for prospective sellers to locate them. Agents became 
responsible for clearly defined areas and enabled the firms to have better control over 
the market. Use o f the coastwise trade meant that traders did not have to waste valuable 
time transporting slaves to the Southwest. Buyers in Louisiana, Alabama, and 
Mississippi who desired labor now had a good indication of when new slaves would 
arrive and could be assured that they had enough slaves from which to choose.120 This 
increased systematization was combined with the relatively informal nature of the rural 
trade. Itinerant traders still roved the countryside or bought slaves at auction. They 
sold slaves in haphazard fashion, and only used the urban market if  they did not unload 
all o f  their bondservants once they reached the Deep South. There was a mix o f urban 
and rural traders in the South, as more traders operated on an informal basis in the 
backcountry but more slaves were sold in the urban markets. In the decade of the 1820s 
the interstate slave trade grew from paltry beginnings to a vital component of the 
southern economy. It became, in essence, the means o f  adjusting the cloak of slavery to 
the growing South. There was, however, increasing dissatisfaction with the means by 
which the interstate slave trade accomplished its purposes.
120 The interstate slave trade fits the general pattern of economic development 
posited in Charles Grier Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815- 
1846 (New York, 1991). The slave trade’s growth, however, seems more dependent on 
internal development through territorial expansion rather than integration into the 
Atlantic market economy. See also Harry L. Watson, “Slavery and Development in a 
Dual Economy: The South and the Market Revolution,” inMelvyn Stokes and Stephen 
Conway, eds., The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, Religious 
Expressions, 1800-1880 (Charlottesville, 1996), pp. 50-51.
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Chapter Two
Leonard Covington had to move from his Maryland home to a farm just outside 
o f Washington, Mississippi, in 1809. Covington, who had made a name as an Indian 
fighter and a member o f Congress, received an appointment as commander o f a 
company o f light dragoons in the Mississippi Territory. He first had to find land for a 
farm and then decide how to move his slaves. His brother, Alexander, went ahead to 
the new territory to secure a location and await the arrival o f  part o f the family’s slaves. 
Leonard wanted to ensure the safe transfer o f any bondservants he might dispatch to his 
brother and also wanted to make the transition to the new territory go as smoothly as 
possible. To those ends, he divided his slave force in two, so that a portion could 
prepare the land while the others tended crops in Maryland. Covington sent thirty-one 
slaves to Mississippi “under charge of careful friends” and kept twenty-five on the 
Aquasco Plantation in Maryland. Of the thirty-six slaves under the age o f  twenty, two- 
thirds went to Mississippi. By contrast, seven of the nine slaves over thirty years old 
remained in Maryland.1
Covington deliberately stocked the new plantation with young slaves who could 
better endure the hardships associated with establishing a  farm. He was not alone. 
Migrants understood the difficulties involved in the process. William Beverley, who 
moved to Alabama, was “greatly disappointed” with his new land and found life almost
1 Nellie Wales Brandon and W. M. Drake, eds., Memoir o f Leonard Covington 
by B. L. C. Wailes (n.p., 1861; reprint, 1928), pp. 53-59. More information on 
Covington can be found in Trese, ed., Biographical Directory, p. 869.
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more than he could bear. His meat rotted too quickly, the milk soured in six to eight 
hours, and barrels o f flour spoiled before he could use them. He felt that the “pioneer of 
the forest” must “endure tremendous hardships & privation of all kinds & live in filth & 
rags.”2 While life was hard on the master, it was worse, or course, for the slave. 
Bondservants such as those who belonged to Covington and Beverley had an arduous 
life once they reached their destination. Not only did they sufier the pain o f being been 
tom from their family and familiar surroundings, but the work o f establishing a form 
was especially toilsome. Clearing the land took several years since trees were normally 
girdled, or had a circle of bark cut out that caused the tree to whither and die. Slaves 
then dug out the stumps or plowed around the roots, in addition to their other duties o f 
burning underbrush, herding livestock, and constructing cabins, outbuildings, and 
fences. On top o f these activities, the slaves planted cotton as soon as possible. Being a 
cash crop, it enabled the owner to recoup his investment of time, money, and energy.3
The strenuous work o f  establishing a farm took its toll. Covington, like most 
other owners, knew that he must reserve his most active slaves for the new enterprise.
He was reluctant to bring older slaves who would be relatively unproductive but would 
still consume food, often scarce and costly in emerging areas of settlement. Young 
slaves in particular had the advantage o f more years o f service ahead of them than older
2 William Beverley to Robert Beverley, 1 Apr. 1831, Beverley Family Papers.
3 For information on settlement, see Stephen F. Miller, “Plantation Labor and 
Slave Life on the Cotton Frontier: The Alabama-Mississippi Black Belt, 1815-1840,” in 
Berlin and Morgan, eds., Cultivation and Culture, pp. 158-59; and Daniel S. Dupre, 
Transforming the Cotton Frontier: Madison County Alabama 1800-1840 (Baton Rouge, 
1997), pp. 9-48.
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bondservants and were more likely to procreate and thus increase the master’s equity. 
Owners also tried to balance their workforce between laborers and mechanics. 
Covington hoped his brother could make due with the slaves on hand because he had 
difficulty shaping the labor force to his liking. He told his brother that he had tried to 
purchase mechanics as recommended, but slaves in Maryland “are comparatively scarce 
and exceedingly dear.” Such mechanics were indispensable for the maintenance of 
plantations, especially for keeping equipment in good working order, and the lack of 
such talent could impair production. Even though aspiring planters had an idea of what 
types o f slaves they wanted, they often settled for bondservants o f almost any 
description.4
Covington’s experience offers insights into the movement o f slaves in early 
nineteenth century America. He deliberately chose to send most o f his younger slaves 
to Mississippi while keeping the older ones in Maryland. Taking his brother’s advice, 
he tried to purchase slaves whose skills would be productive on the frontier, but balked 
when asked to pay what he thought were exorbitant prices. The cost and availability of 
slaves in Maryland hindered Covington’s ability to send his brother the exact types of 
bondservants necessary for success in the new land. Alexander Covington would have 
to make do with unskilled labor. While Covington’s decisions were economic, there 
was a limit to what he could accomplish. He also had to consider his slaves’ attitudes. 
One of the men, Sam, refused to travel to Mississippi and maintained a “sullen silence 
on the subject.” Covington instructed slaves in Mississippi to write to Sam using “a few 
fine flourishes touching the good things and matters in Natchez” in order to convince
4 Brandon and Drake, eds., Memoir o f Leonard Covington, p. 54.
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the reluctant slave to move to Mississippi. When the epistolary campaign failed and 
Sam remained uncertain of Mississippi’s allure, Covington sold the man in Maryland, 
bought another slave, and sent that one to his brother. Even though several o f Sam’s 
friends and, quite likely, his family had already gone west, his desire to remain behind 
was strong enough that he defied his owner and risked severe punishm ent. He might 
have had a wife or family off o f the plantation and wanted to stay close to them.
Perhaps he heard stories about Mississippi’s harsh climate. Whatever the case, Sam 
won this battle o f  wills. Covington could have forced Sam to go to Mississippi, but 
demurred, most likely because he did not want to take the risk o f  having Sam run away 
during the overland journey, or saddle his brother with the headache o f dealing with a 
refractory slave. From Covington’s perspective, Sam’s insubordination could be 
contagious and lead to even greater troubles if other slaves decided not to do as they 
were told. The master’s decision to sell the slave was a bit o f compromise, one 
intended to prevent any further disturbances.5
Although Sam fought successfully to stay in Maryland, countless other slaves 
made the trek south or west. The early republic witnessed a great slave migration, with 
almost 350,000 bondservants leaving Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina between 1810 and 1840.6 Bondservants marched in slave traders’
5 Ibid., pp. 51-54,57, 59.
6 Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions o f  
the New Republic: American Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics, and 
Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), pp. 159-64. From 1790 to 1860 it is 
estimated that one million slaves crossed state lines due to some type o f  forced 
migration (Herbert Gutman and Richard Sutch, “The Slave Family: Protected Agent o f 
Capitalist Masters or Victim o f the Slave Trade?” in Paul A. David, et al., Reckoning
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coffles, migrated with planters, and became the objects o f  purchase by Deep South 
planters. The three components blended together, sometimes forming a seamless whole 
and often being indistinguishable on a  practical level. Slaves were exploited in all cases 
and the effects on them were virtually identical. Sam, and countless other slaves like 
him, suffered innumerable trials from the forced migration o f  loved ones. Forcible 
separations destroyed about one-third o f  all first slave marriages in the Upper South, 
and placed all slaves, but particularly those less than thirty years old, in danger of being 
separated from their families.7
While slaves might not make a distinction between speculation, movement with 
planters, and planter purchases, southern whites did. The slaves in Covington’s 
possession before he and his brother established the Mississippi plantation, for instance, 
could rightfully be considered a part o f  planter migration since they were not purchased 
expressly for a move to the frontier. Those slaves whom Covington purchased 
specifically for the purpose o f populating the Mississippi plantation are another case. 
They had much in common with bondservants found in traders’ coffles, namely, being 
purchased with the intention of being removed to another state. Covington, in effect, 
was speculating that these slaves would be productive once they moved to the 
Southwest. He, of course, would not agree with this assessment. The purchase of 
slaves, in his eyes, was the prerogative o f  the master and was not for speculation but as 
an investment. Southerners, in general, differentiated between buying slaves for
with Slavery: A Critical Study in the Quantitative History o f American Negro Slavery 
(New York, 1976), p. 99.
7 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 133-78.
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settlement and buying slaves for speculation.8 Even though migration and speculation 
were similar in outward appearance, southerners thought it vital to separate them as 
much as possible. The former was acceptable while the latter was looked upon with 
disdain. Creating an artificial distinction between the interstate slave trade and planters 
buying or selling slaves was one way o f marking the boundary between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. With the line firmly established, southerners believed that most 
slave movement was due to planter migration even as the trade increased in volume.
Disentangling the interstate slave trade from other types o f slave movement is a 
thorny problem. Contemporaries noticed the trade’s expansion and made conjectures 
about its extent. One o f the earliest estimates, noted that the trade had “greatly 
increased” during the last year and alleged that speculators brought 20,000 slaves into 
Georgia between 1815 and 1818. That is an astounding number and a preposterous 
estimate. In 1810 the African-American population of Georgia was 107,019 and with 
the natural increase would have been 132,483 in 1820 had no slaves entered or departed 
the state. The actual population was 151,419 in 1820, giving the state an increase o f 
almost 19,000 slaves over the natural growth rate for the decade.9 Bondservants
8 Allan Kulikoff rightly believes that it “might be misleading” for historians to 
draw a sharp distinction between planter migration and trader speculation. He sees the 
two as being indistinguishable on a practical level. It is difficult to cleanly separate 
them for the purposes o f allocating the percentages of slaves who were moved through 
the trade and those who were subject to migration. My point is that the behaviors were 
essentially similar, but that white southerners tried to distinguish between them for 
purposes of denying their own culpability in separating slave families and ruining 
slaves’ lives (Kulikoff, Agrarian Origins o f  American Capitalism, p. 251, note 52).
9 N iles’ Weekly Register, 19 July 1817 (quotation). See also undated New York 
Commercial Advertiser, as quoted in Warrenton (Virginia) Palladium o f Liberty, 23 
Aug. 1817. The population statistics are from U. S. Bureau o f Census, Census o f  1810
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certainly left the state with their masters, although the figure was relatively low because
fresh land was still opening up in Georgia and the incentives for whites to leave the
state were minimal. The importation of African slaves, moreover, was still substantial
and was probably greater than the movement o f  bondservants to other states. If
somehow the flow o f slaves out o f  the state offset the natural increase and the
importation of Africans, then just over 44,000 slaves entered Georgia during the decade.
Even if all of them came as part o f  the interstate trade, it is doubtful that almost half o f
them arrived in three years. The estimate o f20,000 slaves is, therefore, impossible.
What is significant is that contemporaries regarded the figure as credible. The sudden
increase in the slave market at Hamburg made it appear as though bondservants were
inundating the state. As more slave traders clogged roads with their coffles, incredible
estimates seemed plausible. The complete figures are reproduced in Table Five.
Table Five 
Georgia Slave Population, 1810 and 1820
1810 Georgia census, slaves 107,019
1820 Expected population by natural increase 132,483
1820 Georgia census, slaves_________________ 151,419
Number of slaves beyond natural increase_____ 18,936
Sources: U. S. Bureau of Census, Census o f 1810 (Washington, D. C., 1811), Census of 
1820 (Washington, D. C., 1821); Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Demographic Dimensions o f the New Republic: American Interregional Migration,
Vital Statistics, and Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), p. 81.
As the slave trade became more active by 1830, estimates became common,
even though they varied widely. In 1827 the African Observer noted that “[djealing in
(Washington, D. C., 1811), and Census of 1820 (Washington, D. C., 1821). The 2.4% 
annual rate of natural increase is found in McClelland and Zeckhauser, Demographic 
Dimensions o f the New Republic, p. 81.
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slaves has become a large business” and put the number o f bondservants exported out of 
the District o f Columbia and the adjacent areas o f Maryland and Virginia at 2,000 per 
year.10 Five years later a popular estimate from Virginia held that traders sold 6,000 of 
the state’s slaves in the Deep South each year.11 A guess from 1836 put the number of 
slaves who left Virginia, whether through sale or migration with owners, at somewhere 
between 60,000 and 80,000 annually. That same year, the Virginia Times o f Wheeling 
noted that “intelligent men” put slave exports at 120,000.12 A Virginia resident ably 
summed up the general trend when he wrote that the slave trade was carried on “to a far 
greater extent than ever.”13
Even if the estimates themselves varied widely, they displayed the pattern of a 
growing slave trade. In 1830, Virginia’s African-American population numbered 
461,634. Incredibly, the state had fewer African-Americans ten years later. Assuming 
a natural growth rate o f  2.0%, there should have been 551,697 African-Americans in 
1840. Instead there were 440,140, meaning the state lost over 111,500 African-
10 African Observer, June 1827.
11 Thomas R. Dew, Review o f the Debate in the Virginia Legislature o f 1831 and 
1832, as reprinted in The Pro-Slavery Argument as M aintained by the M ost 
Distinguished Writers o f  the Southern States (Philadelphia, 1853), p. 359; Drew Gilpin 
Faust, ed. The Ideology o f  Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830- 
1860 (Baton Rouge, 1981), p. 31; [Jesse Burton Harrison], Review o f the Slave 
Question, extractedfrom the American Quarterly Review, Dec. 1832 (Richmond, 1833), 
pp. 17, 32.
12 Wheeling Virginia Times, as quoted in Niles ’ Weekly Register, 8 Oct. 1836, p.
83.
13 Liberator, 13 Feb. 1836, p. 26 (quotation); Theodore D. Weld, American 
Slavery A s It Is: The Testimony o f a Thousand Witnesses (New York), p. 184.
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Americans during the decade. The vast majority of these people were slaves rather than 
free blacks, meaning that an average o f around 11,500 bondservants left Virginia each 
year. I f  the estimate o f 6,000 from 1831 is correct, then the slaves who were forced out 
of Virginia between 1830 and 1840 were split almost equally between slave traders and 
migrants. The other conjectures were preposterous. Once again, that ridiculously high 
estimates could be widely circulated reflects the spectacular growth o f the interstate 
slave trade. Table Six has the complete figures for Virginia’s African-American 
population.14
Table Six
Virginia Slave Population, 1820 and 1830
1830 Virginia census, African-Americans 461,634
1840 Expected population by natural increase 551,697
1840 Virginia census, African-Americans_______________440,140
Number o f  African-Americans less than natural increase 111,557
Sources: U. S. Bureau o f Census, Census o f 1830 (Washington, D. C., 1831), Census of 
1840 (Washington, D. C., 1841); Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Demographic Dimensions o f  the New Republic: American Interregional Migration,
Vital Statistics, and Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), p. 81.
The growth o f  the interstate slave trade in the lower Mississippi valley did not 
escape the attention o f  contemporaries, either. As more and more coffles and ships 
arrived in the slave markets o f Natchez and New Orleans, residents of Mississippi and 
Louisiana noticed the volume o f bondservants entering their states. In 1824 New 
Orleans was thought to import between 4,000 and 5,000 slaves from Maryland and
14 U. S. Bureau o f Census, Census o f 1830, (Washington, D. C., 1831); Census 
of 1840, (Washington, D. C., 1841). The annual rate o f natural increase is found in 
McClelland and Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions, p. 81.
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Virginia. Seven years later a New Orleans paper reported that 1,011 slaves entered the 
city in one month, but another count for the same time period put the figure at 1,327.15 
A visitor to Natchez learned that 4,000 slaves entered Mississippi in 1834 and that a 
third made their way to the city’s slave market.16 Just before the speculative bubble 
burst in 1837, the Natchez Courier thought that 250,000 slaves entered Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas in the past year.17
Like the figures for slaves brought out o f Virginia, the estimates for African- 
Americans entering Mississippi and Louisiana were off the mark. Taken together, the 
states had 101,878 African-Americans in 1820 and 175,247 ten years later. Assuming a 
natural increase o f 2.5%, the two states could have expected a population o f 130,414 in 
1830. Therefore, about 45,000 slaves entered Mississippi and Louisiana during the 
decade, since by this time there was virtually no African slave trade and few slaves left 
the state since the opportunities for settling land were still vast.18 In calculating the next
15 New Orleans Bee, 18 Nov. 1831 (first estimate); New Orleans Advertiser, 17 
Nov. 1831, as reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, 2 Dec. 1831 (second estimate); 
Hodgson, Letters from  North America, 2: 194; Liberator, 7 June 1834, p. 91.
16 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2: 244. Speculation even reached a fever 
pitch in Cahawba, Alabama. One Tennessee resident marveled at the “extravigant 
prices” that slaves fetched there. He learned that at least one thousand were sold in that 
city in the first five months o f 1836, including one hundred and sixty in one day. In 
amazement, he wondered, “What price does negroes bear in Tennessee!” (W. W. 
Fambro to Col. R. Weakley, 13 May 1836, Edward Litton Hickman Collection, 
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee, emphasis in original).
17 Undated Natchez Courier, as quoted in Weld, American Slavery As It Is, p.
184.
18 Census of 1820; Census o f  1830. The annual rate o f natural increase is found 
in McClelland and Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions, p. 81.
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decade’s imports, however, the two states gained an astounding 153,000 slaves above 
the expected natural increase, or over 15,000 per year. This net gain was mainly due to 
Mississippi nearly tripling its slave population between 1830 and 1840. The decade of 
the 1830s, especially before the panic o f 1837, was atime o f unparalleled movement of 
slaves from the Upper South to the Lower South. Table Seven has the complete 
figures.19
Table Seven
Louisiana and Mississippi Slave Population, 1820,1830 and 1840
1820 Louisiana and Mississippi census, slaves 101,878
1830 Expected population by natural increase 130,414
1830 Louisiana and Mississippi census, slaves 175,247
Number of slaves above the natural increase 44,833
1840 Expected population by natural increase 210,247
1840 Louisiana and Mississippi census, slaves 363,663 
Number of slaves above the natural increase 153,416
Sources: Census o f 1820 (Washington, D. C., 1821), Census o f 1830 (Washington, D. 
C., 1831), Census o f  1840 (Washington, D. C., 1841); Peter D. McClelland and Richard 
J. Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions o f the New Republic: American Interregional 
Migration, Vital Statistics, and Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), p. 81.
While it is apparent that the volume o f slave migration increased dramatically in 
the nineteenth century, the allocation o f responsibility remains unclear. The numbers 
are silent when trying to separate the interstate trade, movement with masters, and 
planter purchases. A further complication is the fact that no single source gives a clear 
view o f slave movement. Ship manifests offer a  glimpse into the movement of slaves 
along the nation’s coasts, but they do not clearly distinguish between traders and
19 Census o f  1840. The annual rate o f natural increase is found in McClelland 
and Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions, p. 81.
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planters. More importantly, they are incomplete. For instance, John Armfield told one 
observer that his firm shipped 1,000 slaves out o f Alexandria in 1833 and expected to 
ship 1,200 the next year. Surviving manifests indicate Franklin and Armfield shipped 
one hundred and sixty three in 1833 and two hundred and fifty eight a  year later. Not 
only are many o f the manifests themselves missing, but the coastwise trade made up 
only a portion o f the overall slave trade.20 Various counties and parishes have records 
of slave sales that have been analyzed by historians, but, again, they suffer from many 
of the same deficiencies. When looking at most surviving documents, there is no 
certain way to distinguish between traders and planters. More importantly, they, too, 
are incomplete since not all transactions involving the sale of slaves were registered and 
many of the records themselves are missing or have been destroyed.
Despite such difficulties, historians have tried to estimate the volume of the 
interstate slave trade. Allan Kulikoff provided the most thorough analysis for the years 
before 1820. He argued that there was no organized trade out of Virginia until about 
1810, and for the next decade about one-third o f the slaves who went south from the 
Chesapeake did so with a slave trader. Professional speculators became active in large 
numbers after 1820 as the number o f  slaves transported out of the state increased.21 On 
this point there is general agreement, although Michael Tadman held open the
20 Donald M. Sweig, “Northern Virginia Slavery: A Statistical and Demographic 
Investigation,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, William and Mary College, 1982, p.
226. Wesley, “Manifests of Slave Shipments,” pp. 155-74 has the most complete 
discussion of the matter. There has not been an attempt to estimate the proportion o f 
slaves transported in the coastwise trade.
21 Kulikoff Agrarian Origins, pp. 239-42; Kulikoff “Uprooted Peoples,” pp. 
151-52.
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possibility of up to one-half o f slave migrants being subject to the slave trade before 
1820.22 If there is some difference o f opinion regarding the size o f  the pre-1820 trade, 
there is universal acceptance that it increased dramatically in the 1820s and 1830s until 
the bubble of speculation burst during the panic o f 1837.23 A difference of opinion 
arises, however, in trying to calculate the volume o f  the trade after 1820. Robert Fogel 
and Stanley Engerman examined the interstate slave trade as part o f  their “cliometric” 
analysis and estimated that sixteen percent of slave migrants who moved south did so at 
the behest o f slave traders. Herbert Gutman and Richard Sutch effectively disputed this 
low estimate by questioning the sources upon which Fogel and Engerman based their 
study.24
The most sophisticated examination of the slave trade’s volume came from 
Michael Tadman, who gave a much higher figure for the percentage of slaves involved 
in the slave trade. In his analysis o f  the importance o f speculation in the years after
22 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 44.
23 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, American Negro Slavery: A Survey o f the Supply, 
Employment and Control o f Negro Labor as determined by the Plantation Regime (New 
York), pp. 188-90; Bancroft, Slave Trading in the Old South, pp. 382-403; Deyle, 
“Domestic Slave Trade,” p. 78.
24 Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The 
Economics o f American Negro Slavery (Boston, 1974), pp. 44-58. Their estimate is 
based on the work o f William Calderhead, who studied eight Maryland counties and 
concluded that three and a half percent of the state’s slaves moved south with slave 
traders (William Calderhead, “How Extensive was the Border State Slave Trade? A 
New Look,” Civil War History, 18 (1972): 42-55). For an effective rebuttal o f Fogel 
and Engerman, see Herbert Gutman and Richard Sutch, “The Slave Family: Protected 
Agent of Capitalist Masters or Victim o f  the Slave Trade?” in Paul A. David, et al., 
Reckoning with Slavery: A Critical Study in the Quantitative History o f American Negro 
Slavery (New York, 1976), 94-113.
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1820, Tadman employed a sophisticated survivor-rate technique involving figures from 
the United States Census records. Taking the number o f slaves in each age range of the 
census, he calculated how many should have survived the decade. Using these 
“survival rates,” he estimated how many slaves should have been present at the end of 
the decade in the Upper South and the Lower South and how many actually were 
enumerated in the census. He found that the Upper South had shed a substantial amount 
o f prime, young-adult slaves. Tadman also examined the coastal manifests o f  New 
Orleans and showed that Fogel and Engerman made faulty assumptions by not 
adequately taking into account sugar production’s heavy for young male slaves.
Finally, he compiled evidence o f trading activity in South Carolina in the 1850s. 
According to Tadman’s calculations, almost seven out o ften  slave migrants moved with 
slave traders in the 1820s. His figure for the 1850s was slightly lower, being just over 
six out of ten. The census records are not in the proper format for calculating the other 
decades, but Tadman estimated there was a similar rate o f trading. Thus he believed, 
for a whole, at least sixty to seventy percent o f slave migrants from 1820 to 1860 
moved south and west at the behest of a speculator.25
25 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 11-46,225-27, 237-82. His actual 
figures are sixty-nine percent for the 1820s and sixty-one percent for the 1850s. Deyle, 
“Domestic Slave Trade,” pp. 252-66 discusses the historiographical debate o f estimates 
involving the slave trade. James David Miller explores the attitudes and activities of 
emigrants from Georgia and South Carolina to the developing area of the Southwest but 
does not specifically deal with the issue o f planters bringing their slaves with them or 
using the services o f a speculator once they reach their destination (James David Miller, 
“South by Southwest: Planter Emigration and Elite Ideology in the Deep South, 1815- 
1861,” Emory University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1996).
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Tadman made several assumptions in his work. He believed that no significant 
numbers o f African slaves entered the United States between 1820 and 1860. The slave 
population, in other words, was closed. Tadman also posited that planters who moved 
westward brought all o f their slaves with them rather than engaging in selective 
migration. Finally, he discounted the presence o f  any significant number of Deep South 
planters who purchased their own slaves in the Upper South. That the United States 
was essentially a closed population after 1820 is probably correct, since by that time 
there was effective enforcement o f  the African slave trade laws. It is uncertain, 
however, whether owners brought all of their slaves with them rather than buying or 
selling bondservants prior to migration or how many Deep South planters made 
purchases in the Upper South. These two assumptions are the key to Tadman’s 
argument since they are the only way to separate planters from slave traders. According 
to him, migrants and planters engaged in behavior that was different from each other, 
and these activities become apparent when examining the census records. However, if 
migration cannot be neatly separated from speculation then his estimates lose their 
authority. The census records wall not be enough to estimate speculation’s volume if 
owners and traders engaged in similar activity.
Put another way, Tadman assumed that owners engaged in speculative behavior 
only when dealing with slave traders. Such was not the case. Even though they would 
not have viewed it as such, many white southerners speculated in slaves even when not 
selling to or buying from a trader. They commonly altered the composition o f the labor 
force prior to migration or traveled a thousand miles to buy slaves in the Upper South. 
Most southerners did not regard such activities with the disdain reserved for the slave
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trade. It was the short-term speculation, buying bondservants with the intention of 
quickly reselling them, that was troublesome because it ran counter to whites’ 
assumption that slavery was benign. Selling slaves for the sole purpose o f making 
money was hard to defend. Masters, however, could seize upon such behavior in order 
to justify their own actions. The slave trade, even though it paralleled the activities of 
slaveholders in many ways, came to be seen as distinct from migration with masters or 
planter purchases.
The contours of movement to the frontier obviously varied. Some whites 
brought all o f their slaves with them during their westward migration. When Thomas 
H. Dent moved from South Carolina to Alabama in 1836, for example, he “took along 
all the slaves that went with the rice plantation.”26 A move like Dent’s was an arduous 
ordeal for most bondservants, but masters accommodated the needs of those who could 
not keep up with the rest o f the group. A traveler met “a great many families o f planters 
emigrating to Alabama and Mississippi to take up cotton planting.” The male slaves 
walked, while some of the females and children rode in wagons. He estimated he saw a
97thousand slaves “all trudging on foot, and worn down with fatigue.”
Even though it was possible to take all slaves westward, many white migrants of 
the nineteenth century South were selective when it came time to move. Indeed, some
26 Thomas H. Dent, as quoted in James Benson Sellers, Slavery in Alabama 
(University, Ala., 1950), p. 36.
27 Featherstonhaugh, Excursion Through the Slave States, p. 152 (quotation); 
Basil Hall, Travels in North America in the Years 1827 and 1828,2 voL (Philadelphia, 
1829), 2:128-29; Hodgson, Letters from  North America, 1: 113-14,138. Tadman’s 
discussion of the structure o f planter migrations is found in Speculators and Slaves, pp. 
228-36.
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o f Tadman’s evidence suggests that planters did not bring a representative cross-section 
o f bondservants. He examined the coastal manifests into New Orleans in the years 
1841,1843, 1845, 1847, and 1849, separating the known slave traders from the rest of 
the sample. In both categories, he broke down the population into the age ranges found 
in the United States census and then compared the age structure o f the three categories 
to the slave population in the net-exporting states. It is obvious that slave traders 
selectively purchased slaves, as there is a disproportionate amount o f  male and female 
bondservants between the ages o f ten and twenty-nine. Such is to be expected since 
traders concentrated in supplying the most productive and desirable slaves. What is 
surprising, though, is the profile o f  the remaining slaves in the manifests. There is a 
decided lack of male slaves under ten years of age, and a noticeable concentration of 
male slaves aged twenty to twenty-nine. The other age ranges vary slightly from those 
o f the Upper South. This sample is not a pure one, as it is likely a few o f the smaller 
traders were not separated from the planters, but they probably did not bias the data in 
any way. The age structure reflects the nature of the Louisiana sugar production with 
its emphasis on adult males who could handle the bulk o f the labor in the cane fields 
and cannot be considered representative for the rest o f the South. The pattern that 
emerges, at least for Louisiana in the 1840s, is one that shows planters using selective 
migration or making slave buying trips o f  their own in order to meet their labor needs. 
Owners who bought slaves or brought them to Louisiana did not incorporate the 
extreme methods of the trade, but neither did they bring a cross-section o f the slave 
population. Rather than choosing bondservants on the humanitarian basis o f keeping all 
o f their slaves together, planters also incorporated economic considerations into their
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decision making. They, too, were concerned about profit and loss and brought the most 
productive slaves to their plantations rather than burden themselves with those slaves 
they perceived as being a drag on profits. Table Eight summarizes Tadman’s 
findings.28
Table Eight
Slaves Im ported into Louisiana by Slave Traders and Planters 
1841,1843,1845,1847, and 1849
Age Range 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40+
Upper South, Males 16.0 12.7 8.7 5.2 7.4
Upper South, Females 16.2 12.6 8.5 5.3 7.5
Upper South, Total
New Orleans Customs Manifests with
32.2 25.3 16.3 10.5 14.9
known traders, Males
New Orleans Customs Manifests with
3.5 17.8 32.4 4.2 1.4
known traders, Females
New Orleans Customs Manifests with
4.7 23.5 9.3 2.1 1.1
known traders, Total
New Orleans Customs Manifests without
8.3 41.3 41.7 6.3 2.5
known traders, Males
New Orleans Customs Manifests without
10.5 12.8 17.0 7.3 5.6
known traders, Females
New Orleans Customs Manifests without
10.6 14.6 11.0 6.1 4.5
known traders, Total 21.1 27.4 28.0 13.4 10.1
Source: Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders, and Slaves in the 
Old South (Madison, 1989), p. 234.
What is true for Louisiana in the 1840s holds for the rest o f the South,
particularly in the early decades o f the century. Most white migrants “took only
selected members o f  their slave forces, selling the others with the plantation to family
28 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 231-35, table on p. 234.
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members.” 29 One traveler encountered a caravan of white migrants headed for Georgia. 
Each family had a wagon and a selection o f “field slaves.” He learned that planters 
generally disposed of the slaves who had a personal attachment to their home and did 
not want to leave. Such slaves normally became the property o f a neighbor or a family 
member.30 James Williams, an escaped slave, recalled how his former owner “took 
great pains to buy up the wives and husbands o f  those of his own slaves, who had 
married out o f the estate” before moving to Alabama. The owner wanted to make sure 
that the two hundred and fourteen slaves who made the trip would be content and would 
“not need chaining together while on the journey.” Williams, however, did not have to 
walk to Alabama. Neighboring planters bought him, his wife, his children, and some of 
the other slaves. Besides selling slaves before migrating, masters also bought them. A 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, resident advertised his intentions to move to Florida in 1826 
and indicated that he wanted to buy a few “likely negroes.. .for my own use.”31
Owners frequently engaged in behavior similar to speculators. They altered the 
composition o f their slave force before they migrated, either by buying more 
bondservants, selling some o f their slaves, or both. Those who moved had a definite
29 Ann Patton Malone, Sweet Chariot: Slave Family and Household Structure in 
Nineteenth-Century Louisiana (Chapel Hill, 1992), p. 211.
30 Tyrone Power, Impressions o f America during the Years 1833, 1834, and 
1835, 2 vol. (Philadelphia, 1836), 2: 80-83 (quotation); JohnMelish, Travels through 
the United States o f America, in the Years 1806 & 1807, and 1809,1810, & 1811 
(London, 1818), p. 341.
31 James Williams, Narrative o f James Williams, an American Slave (New York, 
1838), p. 37 (first quotation); Fredericksburg, Virginia Herald, 30 Aug. 1826 (second 
quotation).
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preference for young slaves, just as speculators did. For instance, John Blakely went 
through Elbert County, Georgia, on his way to Alabama. The conscientious Blakely, 
whose slaves were “for the purpose o f  carrying into the state o f Alabama,” registered 
them with the county clerk as stipulated by the laws of Georgia. He brought twenty- 
three slaves, the eldest o f whom was thirty-five. Fifteen o f his slaves were less than 
sixteen years of age, hardly reflective o f  the age composition of the southern slave 
population. Another Alabama settler enlisted his father-in-law in Maryland to buy 
slaves and send them westward. He gave lengthy directions detailing which slaves he 
preferred, writing “it is better to buy none in families, but to select only choice, first 
rate, young hands from  14 to 25 years o f  age, (buying no children or aged negroes).”33 
Young slaves normally did not include children, however. William Beverley 
complained that the children he brought to Alabama were just a “dead expense” because 
they could not handle the intense labor demands of establishing a new farm. He asked 
his father to send him young male slaves aged sixteen to twenty who could handle an 
axe and not succumb to the challenges of the new environment.34
32 Affidavit o f John Blakely, 21 Sept. 1833, Slave Importation Register, Elbert 
County Georgia, Drawer 2, Box 76.
33 Jonathan Knight to William M. Beall, 27 Jan. 1844, Jonathan Knight Papers, 
Duke. Emphasis in original.
34 William Beverley to Robert Beverley, 9 June 1831, Beverley Family Papers. 
Thomas Harrison told his son that it was “out of the question” to waste money on 
provisions for the women and children, who would be unproductive (Thomas Harrison 
to James Harrison, 4 Jan. (quotation), 6 Jan. 1836, James T. Harrison Papers, University 
of North Carolina).
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Not all migrants bought or sold slaves and then packed up all their belongings 
for the westward journey. Others established a  type of advance settlement and kept the 
older slaves in the settled areas. James A. Tait and his father Charles Tait used this 
method when they moved to Monroe County, Alabama. In 1818 the younger Tait and 
several slaves started clearing land while the elder Tait stayed in Georgia and grew 
cotton. Once James Tait had the land in Alabama ready for cultivation, his father sent 
sixty slaves to him. They cleared more land and put more acreage into cotton 
production. Tait seemed quite pleased that “two or three more ten year olds” had 
become seasoned workers and proved able to withstand the hardships o f the work at 
hand. Like most other migrants, the Taits preferred to stock their new plantation with 
young slaves, although they brought more bondservants under the age o f  ten than was 
customary. Their strategy paid off, though, and they proved to be astute planters.
Within three years, Tait had an overseer and a gin house on the Alabama land. The 
settlement had passed from a rude group of cabins in the wilderness to the beginnings o f 
a plantation.35 William Beverley, who moved, in part, to escape the “intrusion o f rude, 
disgusting & unprincipled relatives,” found it convenient to leave some o f  his older 
slaves at his Virginia plantation because they were “incumbrances.”36
The number and proportion o f slaves who moved westward with white migrants 
decreased dining the nineteenth century. White emigration to Tennessee, Georgia,
35 James Tait to Charles Tait, 21 Jan. 1818 (quotation), 19 Jan. 1919; Charles 
Tait to James Tait, 14 Oct., 10 Nov. 1818, Tait Family Papers, Alabama Department of 
Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.
36 William Beverley to Robert Beverley, 8 June 1829, Beverley Family Papers.
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Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana was most numerous in the first 
two decades o f the century. According to one estimate, over 95,000 white residents 
moved into these seven states in the ten years preceding 1820. The number dropped 
during the next decade, and then plummeted to just under 40,000 between 1830 and 
1840. Table Nine presents the complete statistics.37
Even as white migration slowed, the movement o f slaves into these same states 
increased. From 1810 to 1820 almost 50,000 black migrants entered this area. During 
the next decade the number jumped to over 81,000, and then doubled in the 1830s, a 
time o f extensive growth in the slave trade. The demographic composition of the slaves 
involved in this great movement also changed. Six out o f ten slave migrants in the 
decade before 1820 were under the age o f ten, a figure almost double that of the entire 
South’s population. This percentage dropped steadily over time, especially in the 1830s, 
but did not reach the southern norm. Slaves aged between ten and twenty in 1820 
increased noticeably, while those aged from thirty to forty declined to half o f their 
figure. The foil statistics are found in Table Ten.
The change in white migration patterns altered the nature o f slave movement. It 
is probable that before 1820, the majority o f slave owners brought their bondservants 
with them to the edge o f settlement rather than moving and then buying from a 
speculator. White migrants appear to have favored young slaves who would provide a 
high return on their investment, withstand more work, labor for more years, and 
eventually produce children. As the newer states became settled and white migration
37 The figures for this and the following paragraphs are taken from McClelland 
and Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions, pp. 6, 138-43,159-64.
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Table Nine
Estimated interregional migration of the white population
1810-1840
Age 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40+ Total
1810-1820
Old South -82,368 -55,349 -36,035 -20,957 -28,069 -222,777
Percentage 37.0 24.8 16.2 9.4 12.6
New South 30,442 28,175 15,066 9,384 12,242 95,309
Percentage 31.2 29.6 15.8 9.8 12.8
1820-1830
Old South -78,768 -52,803 -35,730 -19,834 -25,516 -212,651
Percentage 37.0 24.8 16.8 9.3 12.0
New South 22,571 31,646 19,660 8,606 7,788 90,271
Percentage 25.0 35.1 21.8 9.5 8.6
1830-1840
Old South -118,297 -97,871 -61,900 -30,545 -35,119 -343,732
Percentage 34.4 28.4 18.0 8.9 10.2
New South -6,663 24,495 15,782 4,316 1,775 39,705
Percentage N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Old South: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina
New South: Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana
Age groupings indicate age at the beginning of the decade.38
Source: Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions o f  
the New Republic: American Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics, and 
Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), pp. 138-43.
abated, fewer slaves accompanied their masters to new land. As a result, some masters 
traveled to Maryland and Virginia to buy additional slaves, while others stayed in the 
Lower South and purchased slaves from speculators. Slave traders tended not to trade 
in children under ten years of age, but especially bought and sold slaves between fifteen
38 The composition of this and the next table have been slightly altered to make 
them more understandable. Thus, while the original population headings give the age at 
the end of the decade, I give the age at the beginning. For example, the age range o f 10 
to 20 years at the end of the decade becomes 0 to 10 at the beginning o f the decade. 
Also, the original tables did not calculate the total migration or the percentage of 
individuals within each age group.
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Table Ten
Estimated interregional migration o f the African-American population
1810-1840
Age 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40+ Total
1810-1820
Old South -36,545 -11,874 -5,623 -6,722 -2,433 -63,197
Percentage 57.8 18.8 8.9 10.6 3.8
New South 29,868 7,811 4,311 5,059 2,500 49,549
Percentage 54.2 15.8 9.3 10.9 5.0
1820-1830
Old South -49,061 -24,181 -10,002 -3,312 -5,474 -92,030
Percentage 53.3 26.3 10.9 3.6 5.9
New South 44,208 21,143 8,962 2,531 4,578 81,422
Percentage 54.3 26.0 11.0 3.1 5.6
1830-1840
Old South -84,722 -51,562 -28,962 -12,020 -13,426 -190,962
Percentage 44.4 27.0 15.2 6.3 7.0
New South 71,179 47,167 5,307 8,812 10,715 163,180
Percentage 43.6 28.9 15.5 5.4 6.6
Age groupings indicate age at the beginning o f the decade.
Old South: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina
New South: Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana
Source: Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions o f 
the New Republic: American Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics, and  
Manumissions, 1800-1860 (New York, 1982), pp. 159-64.
and thirty years old.39 It is this age grouping that gained strength over time, rising from 
a quarter o f the population in the decade after 1810 to forty-five percent in the 183 Os.
To put it another way, whites who migrated in 1835 as compared to twenty years earlier 
probably brought an equivalent ratio o f slaves with them to their new land, but the 
number o f bondservants declined because there were fewer white migrants. 
Additionally, those whites who were already in the Southwest needed more slaves for 
cultivation as they expanded their land holdings, so they relied more on speculators.
39 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 234.
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Rather than being relatively stable in the nineteenth century, the interstate slave trade 
increased in volume and proportion during the 1820s and 1830s as white migration 
declined and the demand for labor increased in the Lower South-
Even as speculation grew, a significant number of Lower South planters tried to 
bypass the interstate slave trade and took on the burden o f  finding their own slaves in 
the Upper South. They had a variety o f motives, but foremost was the desire to save 
money. Marius R. Robinson, a  Tennessee resident who attended Lane University, took 
a four-month, tour o f the South in 1834. He noted that a large number o f “respectable 
planters” from Louisiana went to Maryland and Virginia to buy slaves because they 
thought it “more profitable.”40 Such men hoped to save money since it was common 
knowledge that the prices o f slaves in New Orleans and Natchez were significantly 
higher than the prices in Baltimore, Alexandria, and Richmond. A Louisiana planter 
went to Virginia to buy slaves because, as he told an observer, the “slave-traders have 
exacted such a profit upon their slaves, that the planters, when intending to make a 
considerable purchase, either come to the north [i.e. northern slave states] for the 
purpose, or employ a factor [who would make the journey for them].” This planter was 
convinced that avoiding the interstate trade was the only way to drive prices down since 
“the infamy o f the traffic operates to prevent great competition” and kept prices 
artificially h igh41 Those who bought their own slaves in the Upper South did not
40 Tngraham, The South-West by a Yankee, 2: 244 (quotations); Liberator, 17 
May 1834, p. 77.
41 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 174.
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always find reduced prices, though. A  Louisiana sugar planter observed that many 
Alabama farmers in Richmond returned to their state rather than pay high prices.42
Traders obviously made money transporting slaves or they would not have been 
in the business. The trade’s profit rates varied enormously, depending on the time, 
location, and type of slave being sold. A figure of somewhere between twenty and 
thirty percent was common in the years between 1820 and 1836, meaning that 
speculators who brought slaves from Maryland to Louisiana in 1830 added nearly two 
hundred dollars to the price o f the slave. Planters who took on the responsibility of 
finding their own slaves could save a substantial amount o f  money, especially since 
they were likely to buy a significant number o f slaves on such a journey.43 According 
to one contemporary estimate, such men saved up to half o f the total purchase price.44
Not all planters from the Deep South, however, were satisfied with their savings. 
Andrew Dumford traveled from his plantation outside o f New Orleans to Richmond in 
order to buy slaves. After depositing $8,312 in a local Richmond bank, the free man o f 
color set out to find some bargains. Much to his chagrin, he thought that “people [i.e. 
slaves] is higher than ever” in Richmond because of all the Deep South planters in the
42 Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 25 June 1835, McDonogh Papers, 
Howard-Tilton Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
43 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 204-7, 292-95 has the higher figure, 
while Freudenberger and Pritchett, “Domestic Slave Trade,” contains the lower number. 
Robert Evans, Jr., “Some Economic Aspects of the Domestic Slave Trade, 1830-1860,” 
Southern Economic Journal, 27 (1961): 332, gives a profit rate of forty-five percent. 
William Calderhead, “Professional Slave Trader,” p. 201, estimates a profit rate of 
fourteen percent. Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, 1:70, revise Calderhead’s 
total down to ten percent.
44 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2 :244.
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city. “Even the negro traders,” he complained, were“surprised at the prices demanded.” 
Dumford hoped to gain an advantage by acting indifferently and claimed to be traveling 
to relieve a “liver complaint.” When this strategy failed, he pessimistically concluded 
that he would buy fewer slaves than he intended because other buyers were 
“committing folies with their money” and driving up the prices. Dumford’s overriding 
concern was to buy slaves at “the lowest market price.” Apparently someone accused 
him o f being miserly, for Dumford wrote his friend, “They all say that I wish to have 
people cheap. I tell them that I must have something  for my money, or [I will] send my 
money back to New Orleans in drafts.”45
While there were many advantages to purchasing slaves for one’s self, the 
greatest drawback was the problem o f bringing them home. Unless a planter bought all 
of the bondservants at one time, he had to make arrangements to detain his initial 
purchases. Some hotels and city jails were available for this purpose, especially in the 
larger trading centers. John W. Smith of the Southern Hotel in Alexandria advertised 
that his establishment had “every thing necessary” for travelers, including “particular 
provision for gentlemen from the SOUTHERN COUNTRY, and for the security and 
support of their servants.”46 Trader’s jails could be used for the same purpose, although 
private citizens tended to shy away from them because o f their reputation for disease.
45 Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 9, 25 June, 6 July 1835, McDonogh 
Papers. For more information on Dumford, see David O. Whitten, Andrew Dumford: A  
Black Sugar Planter in the Antebellum South (New Brunswick, N. J., 1995); and David 
O. Whitten, “Slave Buying in 1835 Virginia as revealed by the Letters o f a Louisiana 
Sugar Planter,” Louisiana History, 11 (1970): 231-44.
46 Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 5 Apr. 1825.
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Dumford refused to purchase a  family of eight because he did not want to put them in a 
slave jail and risk illness.47
Planters who successfully purchased slaves next had to make arrangements to 
bring the bondservants to their new home. One southerner who had purchased his own 
slaves advised a friend against using coastwise shipping, which was expensive and 
risky. He firmly stated, “I am for a Land Trip” since the slaves cannot get seasick and it 
takes just as much time. Two good mules, one or two horses, and a wagon was all that 
he felt was necessary. He even enclosed a detailed set of directions from Petersburg, 
Virginia, to Clinton, Mississippi.48 Others traveled overland because of the paucity of 
coastwise transportation. Dumford wanted to send his twenty-five slaves to New 
Orleans via ship, but would have had to wait four months. He did not want to tarry that 
long nor did he want to leave early and entrust his new purchases to a stranger.
Dumford considered traveling to Baltimore and then to Charleston to meet vessels, but 
concluded that the risk of missing the connection was too great and would place him in 
a worse situation. He eventually took the advice o f a fellow traveler and rented a 
wagon, bought some horses, and transported his slaves across Virginia to a port on the 
Ohio River. From there, they floated down to New Orleans. Even though it cost him 
money he had not planned on spending and took twenty-five days, Dumford had no
47 Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 25 June 1835, McDonogh Papers.
48 John H. Faulkner to William C. Fitzhugh Powell, 14 Sept. 1835, William C. 
Fitzhugh Powell Papers, Duke. Emphasis in original.
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choice.49 James Tutt also knew the difficulties o f bringing slaves out o f Virginia. He 
warned his father that travel on the Ohio River could be risky and advised him to “keep 
out a watch on your negroes [because] the abolitionists will take them off.” Tutt 
thought the only effective strategy to prevent slaves from running away was anchoring 
away from the shore at night.50
Despite the cost and the difficulty in making arrangements, some planters relied 
on the coastwise trade to transport their slaves. James Byers o f Rapides Parish, 
Louisiana, went to Virginia in 1822 to buy slaves for his plantation. He shipped thirty- 
seven slaves from Richmond to New Orleans, arriving with them in Louisiana during 
the first week o f February. It is obvious he wanted young slaves, since sixteen o f his 
purchases were less than ten years old and only one was over twenty years o f age.51 
Likewise, Wilfred Dent left his Louisiana home and traveled to Maryland to buy slaves 
in 1827. After purchasing twenty-nine bondservants, twenty o f them aged nineteen or 
less, he loaded them on a ship m Annapolis and sailed for home. Byers, Dent, and 
others like them were successful in transporting their slaves along the coast because 
they did so during the height o f the slave buying season. Dumford, while he may have
49 Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 10, 15 June, 6 July 1835, John 
McDonogh Papers.
50 James Tutt to Richard Tutt, 19 Sept. 1839, James Tutt Papers, Duke.
51 New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests, Shipment o f 2 Feb. 1822.
52 Ibid., Shipment o f  7 Jan. 1827. For other examples o f planters using the 
coastwise trade, see the shipments of Stephen Wickoff, 24 Apr. 1822, James Smith, 14 
Apr. 1825, and Joseph Chambers, 7 Jan. 1826.
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been successful in avoiding the Louisiana heat, waited too far into the year to ensure 
adequate transportation for his new purchases.
Those planters who did not want to make the arrangements for transporting their 
slaves could delegate that chore to a family member or trusted friend. When Henry 
Tayloe needed more slaves, he prevailed upon his brother Benjamin for help. Henry 
wrote that he wanted no one over the age o f forty-five, except for two or three “old” 
women to cook and a “trusty old man” to watch the hogs. I f  Benjamin had already 
purchased any old slaves, Henry wanted them exchanged for children “o f any age.”53 
When E. B. Vass o f Fredericksburg decided to move to Florida, he advertised for 
someone to “carry out Negroes for me.” He promised to pay “reasonable 
compensation” to anyone for their efforts.54 Mark Brown and James Wiles found out 
the hard way that entrusting one’s slaves to strangers was a risky proposition. They 
paid John Loflin to transport three newly purchased slaves from Virginia to Augusta, 
Georgia. When Loflin failed to appear as promised they suspected he had taken the 
slaves to Mississippi or Louisiana for sale. They offered a liberal reward for Loflin’s 
arrest.55
Planters who traveled to buy slaves encountered other difficulties, as well.
Slave traders made most of their purchases in cash or on short credit, which proved to 
be a great advantage since the slave’s seller did not have to worry about collecting a
53 Henry Tayloe to Benjamin Tayloe, 29 July 1839, Tayloe Family Papers, 
Virginia Historical Society.
54 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 30 Aug. 1826.
55 Woodville Republican, 25 Sept. 1830.
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debt. Planters who wanted to compete in the market had to come up with a ready stock 
o f  cash. Some left on slave buying trips after selling their crops. Dumford, for 
instance, sold his sugar before going to Virginia.56 Planters with sizable holdings could 
also secure loans to finance their slave buying trips. Ethan Andrews toured the South 
while doing research for his book on the internal slave trade. While traveling from 
Washington to Richmond, he fell in with a planter from Louisiana who had just 
purchased one hundred and fifty-five slaves, “the entire stock of a plantation near 
Fredericksburg.” The man, who was stocking a new farm in his home state, paid 
$75,000 for the bondservants and was somewhat concerned about the amount of money 
he just spent. He remarked to Andrews that he would soon pay off the loan for his 
slaves if cotton did not fell below ten cents per pound.57 Planters who traveled north to 
buy slaves appear not to have had any difficulties securing enough money to make their 
trips worthwhile. A  northern traveler heard that some brought up to $20,000 or even 
$50,000 with them for purchases.58
Judging from newspaper advertisements, there was a significant number o f Deep 
South planters who traveled north to buy slaves. Such men generally reiterated their 
desire for “likely young negroes,” which meant healthy slaves under twenty-five years
56 Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 9 June 1825, McDonogh Papers. For 
the ability of traders to pay for their purchases in cash, see Tadman, Speculators and 
Slaves, pp. 52-55.
57 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 171-72.
58 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2: 244. That figure seems high, given that 
Dumford, spent $6,876 on the twenty-five slaves he bought in Richmond (Andrew 
Dumford to John McDonogh, 6 July 1835, McDonogh Papers).
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of age.59 Planters took care to differentiate themselves from traders by emphasizing that 
any slaves they purchased were for their “own use and not fo r  sale.”60 Many went 
further and declared they were gentlemen who desired more slaves. For instance, one 
advertisement described a “Gentleman Wishing to purchase a few prime SLAVES for 
his own use and not fo r  sale” who was staying at the Indian Queen Hotel in Baltimore.61 
Planters revealed their identity to gain an advantage when buying slaves. It quickly 
became known that farmers in Maryland and Virginia treated planters differently than 
slave traders, especially regarding the price o f slaves. Maryland slave owners gained a 
reputation for having two prices for their bondservants, a “home price” and a 
speculative price, which was higher. They knew that traders had large amounts of ready 
cash for the purchase of slaves and they were willing to hike up prices in order to 
separate speculators from their money. Thomas Culbreth, who lived on Maryland’s 
Eastern Shore, thought slaves in his county “had two Prices, viz a neighbourhood or 
domestic and a foreign or Southern price. The domestic Price has generally been about
59 For examples, see Baltimore American, 1 Nov. 1820, 25 Aug. 1821,19 Oct. 
1822, 3 July 1824; Easton Republican Star, 2 July 1822; Fredericksburg Virginia 
Herald, 27 May 1820; and Norfolk American Beacon, 8 Jan. 1820.
60 Baltimore American, 25 Aug. 1831. Emphasis in original. For more 
examples, see Nashville Whig, 19 Mar. 1817; Norfolk American Beacon, 18 June 1818; 
Baltimore American, 23 Aug. 1820,29 Oct. 1821, 21 July 1822; 'Easton Republican 
Star, 2 July 1822, 18 May 1824; Richmond Enquirer, 12 July 1825, 20 July 1832, 24 
Feb. 1835; and Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 31 May 1826.
61 Baltimore American, 25 Aug. 1821. Emphasis in original. Similar ads are 
found in Ibid., Oct. 29 1821,2 July 1822,21 Aug. 1824; Washington Daily National 
Intelligencer, 9 July 1820,11 July 1833; Richmond Enquirer, 17 Aug. 1832, 13 Sept. 
1833; Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 22 July 1826, Norfolk American Beacon, 27 
Oct. 1817; and Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 11 Jan. 1825.
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a third less than the foreign and sometimes the difference amounts to one half.” 
Likewise, an advertisement in a Maryland paper notified qualified parties that they 
could buy a slave for the “home price.”62
Planters made good use of another advantage they possessed over speculators: 
the purchase o f slave families rather than individuals. It became well known in  the 
South that traders preferred to buy slaves singly rather than in families or in mixed age 
groups.63 Those men who emphasized that they were buying slaves in family units let 
it be known they wanted to protect the bondservants by ensuring “that their domestic 
relations may not be broken in upon.”64 Planters stressed that they would properly take 
care o f any slaves they purchased. One pointed out that any slaves he bought would go 
to “a healthy situation.” He noted his ability to pay cash for all slaves and emphasized 
that he “will not be accessory to the separation o f the individuals of a family.” Another 
planter, this one a “GENTLEMAN just arrived from Louisiana,” wanted to purchase 
fifteen or twenty slaves at a “fair cash price.” He added that the “slaves are for his own 
use, and to remain on his plantation in Louisiana, and not bought for speculation. He 
would prefer them in families.”65 One southerner wanted thirty to one hundred slaves 
“for his own exclusive use,” informing prospective sellers that he would only buy
62 “Estimates of the Value of Slaves,” p. 818 (first quotation); Cambridge 
Chronicle, 24 Dec. 1836, as quoted in Bancroft Papers (second quotation).
63 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 52-55.
64 Richmond Enquirer, 25 Jan. 1823. For an advertisement with similar 
wording, see Ibid., 12 July 1825.
65 Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 6 Apr. 1832 (first and second 
quotations), 31 May 1826 (remaining quotations).
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families from one or two large slave holders.66 A Virginian who owned an estate in 
Louisiana wanted forty prime slaves “o f  good character,” but only those who were 
“disposed to go.”67
Planters who underscored their desire to purchase families o f  slaves rather than 
individual bondservants separated themselves from speculators by playing on the 
paternal pretensions o f  slave sellers. The claim o f preserving family relations was a  bit 
o f  sophistry, since most slaves, even if  they were sold south with their immediate 
family, left behind aunts, uncles, cousins, or grandparents, not to mention close friends 
and their homes. The implicit claim o f  sheltering slave families from speculation was a 
rather invidious device used by planters to spare prospective sellers from uneasiness. If  
masters could be persuaded that the sale o f their slaves was not so disruptive as might 
first appear, then those who had misgivings about the process would be more likely to 
part with their bondservants. Just as importantly, buyers who purchased an entire 
family could get such slaves at a reduced price since slaves sold singly tended to have a
66 Richmond Enquirer, 17 Jan. 1835. Emphasis in original. A note in the 
advertisement indicated it was reprinted in papers in Petersburg, Danville, Culpeper, 
Raleigh, Fayetteville, and Baltimore. See Ibid., 20 July 1832 for another example o f  a 
similar advertisement that was widely reprinted.
67 Norfolk American Beacon, 18 June 1818. Most sellers and purchasers had a 
rather narrow definition of the slave family, considering it to be the mother and her 
children. According to his surviving letters, Dumford purchased two women and all 
five of their children. He did consider buying a husband, wife, and their six children, 
but it is unknown whether he did so (Dumford to McDonogh, 15 and 25 June 1835, 
McDonogh Papers). His letters give a description o f seven of the twenty-five slaves he 
purchased, although he mentions eighteen others he considered buying. All o f the 
slaves he considered were in family units of mother and children, or mother, father, and 
children).
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higher purchase price than those sold in family units.68 The “gentlemen” who bought 
slaves for their own use considered themselves to be engaged in nobler conduct than 
speculation. Even though their activities mirrored the slave trade, they could convince 
themselves o f  their pine motives, especially in comparison to speculators. A gentleman 
would not destroy families or force slaves to move to the Deep South against their will. 
The fiction o f a benevolent purchaser defined the limits of acceptable behavior in the 
South and enabled slaveholders to disregard reality in favor o f  a patronizing illusion of 
benevolence.
It is unknown how many planters journeyed north to buy slaves, but the number 
probably was significant.69 Perry Cohee, a planter in Lawrence County, Mississippi, 
spent several weeks in Talbot County, Maryland, buying slaves. He purchased a total 
o f sixteen bondservants for $2,720, including Frederick Douglass’s sister, aunt, and 
several cousins.70 When Pryor McNeill moved to Mississippi in 1825, the first thing he 
noticed was that “the money has nearly all disappeared out o f the Country, on account 
o f  so many going on to the east to purchase slaves.”71 Planters in that area so
68 Such purchasers, o f  course, ran the risk o f acquiring “unnecessary” 
bondservants.
69 Calderhead claimed that planters from the gulf states controlled the market in 
Maryland until 1822 when more speculators entered the market. He appears to have 
undercounted the slave traders in his analysis o f counties on the Eastern Shore 
(Calderhead, “Professional Slave Trader,” p. 202).
70 Land Grant records, Liber 50, September 1831 to August 1833, Maryland 
Department o f  Archives and History, Annapolis, Maryland; Preston, Young Frederick 
Douglass, p. 78.
71 Pryor McNeill to Malcom McNeill, 10 June 1825, Elizabeth Winston 
Collection, North Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.
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commonly made trips to the Chesapeake that one Virginia auction house advertised in a 
Natchez paper. It notified Mississippi planters that a judicial decree would force it to 
sell at least one hundred and fifty slaves at Royallton Mills, about forty miles from 
Richmond.72 Many o f  those who traveled north to buy slaves took pains to ensure they 
were not confused with slave traders. Benjamin Ballard and Samuel T. Barnes of 
Halifax, North Carolina, sent a  total of two hundred and twenty-four slaves from 
Norfolk to New Orleans in 1819. “The owner of these slaves,” Ballard wrote in the 
margin o f the slave manifest, “is moving to the parish o f  St. Landry near Opelousas 
where he has purchased lands and intends settling, and is not a dealer in human flesh.” 
Barnes made a similar notation discounting any connection with the interstate trade.73
Not even the Nat Turner rebellion o f  1831 deterred planters from buying slaves 
in Virginia. If  there was some reluctance on the part o f Deep South residents to buy 
from slave traders, there was no decrease in the numbers of planters who went north to 
buy slaves. Thomas R. Dew observed that even though Mississippi and Louisiana, the 
two largest purchasers o f Chesapeake slaves, passed laws prohibiting traders from 
importing slaves, prices rose instead of fell. He attributed the rise in prices to “the 
number of southern purchasers who have visited our State.”74 Lewis Sewall o f
72 Natchez Mississippi State Gazette, 5 Sept. 1818.
73 Slave manifests, as quoted in Phillips, American Negro Slavery, p. 182.
74 Dew, Review o f  the Debate, p. 361 (quotation); Faust, ed., Ideology o f  
Slavery, p. 32. Dew mistakenly described the Louisiana law one as one that prohibited 
the entry o f all slaves when it specifically barred speculators from bringing slaves into 
the state for resale (New Orleans Courier, 19 Nov. 1831; New Orleans Bee, 19 Nov. 
1831; New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 19 Nov. 1831; Joe Gray Taylor, Negro 
Slavery in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1963), p. 42; Judith Kelleher Schafer, “The
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Alabama wanted his friend to forward a copy o f  a newspaper containing his state’s law. 
He was concerned that the measure would be as strict as Louisiana’s and feared that he 
could not employ an agent to go and buy slaves on his behalf. Should that be the case, 
Sewall was ready. He had no plans to evade the laws, since he attached “more 
solemnity to a legal oath, than custom-house officers usually do.” Even though Sewall 
did not have to travel, enough planters made the trip that a newspaper cautioned 
Alabama travelers in Maryland to make certain they did not buy kidnapped blacks or 
slaves o f bad character.75 Joseph Ingraham, who visited the Natchez slave market in 
1834, learned that the phrase “‘he is gone to Virginia to buy negroes,’ or ‘niggers,’ as is 
the elegant and equally common phraseology, is as often applied to a temporarily absent 
planter, as ‘he is gone to Boston to buy goods,’ to a New-England country merchant.”76
Slave traders in the Upper South recognized that they competed with planters. 
Concerning a potential Alabama importation ban, Isaac Franklin warned fellow 
speculator Rice C. Ballard in Richmond to expect more southern planters than usual if 
the law passed. Franklin feared that if the Alabama legislature passed the measure, 
planters who wanted to “Introduce any slaves at all must go after them in person.” As a 
result, he told Ballard, the planters “will in all human probability carry the trade” to 
Richmond, Alexandria, Norfolk, and Baltimore. I f  a good crop is harvested, Franklin
Immediate Impact o f Nat Turner’s Insurrection on New Orleans,” Louisiana History, 21 
(1980): 367-68).
75 Lewis Sewall to James Dellet, 4 Jan. 1832, James Dellet Papers, Container 3, 
Folder 7, Alabama Department o f Archives and History (quotation, emphasis in 
original); Huntsville Southern Advocate, 4 Feb. 1832.
76 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2: 234.
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warned Ballard to be ready because “they will come on in Droves.”77 A reader of the 
Natchez Ariel knew that it was both profitable and beneficial for planters to go to 
Maryland or Virginia to buy slaves. They would pay half the Mississippi price and 
reduce the risk o f buying slaves o f questionable character. I f  a planter only wanted one 
or two slaves, then he could unite with a few other buyers and “send a trusty agent, with 
instructions to purchase negroes o f good character, not convicts, the inhabitants of jails, 
drunkards, rogues and vagabonds.”78
Slave traders recognized the serious nature of their competition with planters 
and tried to take advantage o f the situation. Franklin, the most famous speculator of his 
day, knew that Louisiana planters were a common sight in Virginia. He wrote his agent 
in Richmond that he “would be pleased to hear o f your making some good sales to the 
La planters.”79 Enough Deep South residents came through Richmond that trader James 
McFall advertised in seven newspapers o f Louisiana and Mississippi. He notified 
“Southern Merchants, Planters, Manufacturers” that he would take their orders ahead 
of time and have the slaves ready, along with all “legal vouchers, guarantees, &c.”80
77 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 28 Feb. 1831, Ballard Papers. In  the same 
letter, Franklin told Ballard that if  planters flooded the market, “we will have a chance 
to retaliate,” probably by lowering prices.
78 Undated Natchez Ariel, as quoted in Genius o f Universal Emancipation, 4 
July 1827, p. 7.
79 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 8 June 1832, Rice C. Ballard Papers.
80 New Orleans Bee, 21 Dec. 1833. Emphasis in original. According to the 
notice, McFall also advertised in the New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, Donaldsonville 
(Louisiana) Eagle, Natchez Courier, Vicksburg Advocate, Port Gibson (Mississippi) 
Correspondent, Covington (Louisiana) Palladium, and St. Francisville (Louisiana) 
Phoenix.
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Lewis Collier let it be known to ‘Tersons from the Southern States, wanting to buy a 
choice lot of slaves” would do well to visit him since he had a large number o f slaves on 
hand. He noted his “comfortable rooms with a  jail attached for the reception of 
Negroes” for those planters who made purchases.81 James Hutcherson, a speculator 
who made Alexandria his base o f operations, indicated that in addition to buying slaves, 
he “will also visit persons who may be strangers in the market, in the purchase o f such 
property.” He recognized the large numbers o f planters who journeyed north, and 
rather than competing directly with them in purchasing slaves, tried to take advantage of 
their inexperience. On one occasion, Hutcherson made arrangements for the purchase 
o f “a few likely negroes., .for the individual use o f a gentleman living in Arkansas 
Territory, and who is now in Washington city doing some business in Congress.” In 
case prospective purchasers were skeptical, Hutcherson assured them that “the most 
satisfactory references can be given that the servants wanted are not for sale.”82
Speculators needed to assure a skeptical public o f their veracity. Even though 
some traders assisted planters, others tried to pass themselves off as planters. Many 
speculators swore that the slaves they bought wrere for their own use, rather than for 
speculation. There is the assumption in their notices that buying slaves for one’s self 
was somehow better than buying them for resale. David Harding, a trader, tried to fool
81 Richmond Enquirer, 19 Mar. 1833. See also Collier’s similar ad in Ibid., 23 
Sept. 1833.
82 Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 3 July 1827 (first quotation); Easton 
Republican Star, 18 May 1824 (second quotation). In this advertisement, Hutcherson’s 
first name is given as John See Richmond Enquirer, 10 Dec. 1831, for Abner 
Robinson’s similar advertisement.
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the residents o f  Richmond by advertising that the slaves he bought were for his own 
use.83 Austin Woolfolk, who was too well known as a speculator to conceal his 
identity, tried to get good prices by indicating his desire to purchase fifty or sixty slaves 
“part o f which is for his own use, and for which he will give the highest possible price.” 
He also advertised for “fifty NEGROES, o f  different descriptions... for a cotton 
plantation.”84 Whether such efforts were successful or not is beside the point, since 
traders tried to use the presence o f planters in the Upper South’s slave markets to their 
advantage. They quickly realized the possibilities o f pretending to buy for a third party 
or themselves. It was more acceptable to sell a  slave to a private citizen than to a slave 
trader because the transaction was not based, southerners convinced themselves, on 
speculation. Without the speculative element, slaveholders purified the master-slave 
relationship and could believe that slavery was a benevolent institution. Gentlemen 
could then buy and sell slaves without concern for the consequences o f their actions. 
Traders tried to portray themselves as part o f  this gentry. One suspicious advertisement 
called attention to the fact that “A Gentleman wishing to purchase a few SLAVES, for 
his individual use, and not for sale” will give “CASH, And the highest prices.” The 
man gave no other information other than directing prospective sellers to a boarding 
house in Baltimore.85 Such an ad may have been placed by a planter, but the
83 Richmond Enquirer, 8 June 1821.
84 Baltimore American, 9 Nov. 1824; Washington Daily National Intelligencer,
9 Aug. 1825.
85 Baltimore American, 20 Feb. 1822. See Ibid., 9 Sept. 1822; Washington 
Daily National Intelligencer, 4 June 1828; and Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 32 for other 
shady advertisements.
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phraseology is reminiscent o f a trader, especially the emphasis on the highest prices. 
This advertiser also described himself as a “Gentleman.” Planters tried to distinguish 
themselves from speculators by using that term, and its frequent use in the 
advertisements for private purchasers suggest a gulf between planters and traders. 
Speculators were well aware that they were not “gentlemen,” even if they did make 
purchases on behalf o f planters. A  trader in Mississippi, for example, felt the sting o f 
being ignored by a Methodist minister and knocked off the preacher’s hat for “not 
speaking to a gentleman.”86
While southern “gentlemen” may have distanced themselves from the activities 
o f slave traders, it was not so easy to separate the activities of the two. Planters who 
purchased slaves before setting out for new territory in the expanding west would not 
consider their slaves to be subject to the slave trade, although such bondservants were 
purchased with the express purpose o f being moved to the west. Likewise, planters who 
traveled to Maryland or Virginia and purchased slaves would not have considered 
themselves as contributing to the slave trade, although their activities had the same net 
effect as speculation. The different types of slave movement, moreover, came from 
similar motives, even if the actual means of carrying them out varied. Economic 
rationality bounded the decisions. Masters who brought bondservants with them when 
migrating and those who traveled north to buy slaves made economic decisions. Slave 
owners were trying to acquire the most productive bondservants and shape their labor 
force to their specific needs. Their behavior was speculative in nature, although they
86 John Jones Journal, p. 76, manuscript in Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History.
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had difficulty admitting as such. Masters, of course, would not have compared 
themselves to a slave speculator. They made a careful and calculated distinction 
between the activities o f a slave trader who sold slaves expressly for profit and the slave 
owner who occasionally bought or sold bondservants. Many owners believed they had 
the best interest o f the slave at heart in such transactions and assumed the slave trader 
was only looking out for his own interest. The reality was much more complex. While 
there were owners who were genuinely concerned with sparing the feelings of their 
slaves, the majority acted with their own self-interest in mind. That they needed a foil 
upon which to project the unseemly portions o f slavery is not surprising, since the 
“gentlemen” engaged in much the same activities as most slave traders.
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Chapter Three
When the charter members o f  the American Colonization Society met in 
Washington in 1816, they wanted to find a prominent slaveholder to serve as the 
organization’s first president. Their choice o f Bushrod Washington, most thought, was 
an inspired one. He was the nephew o f  the country’s first president and a Virginia 
slaveholder who could bring instant credibility to the organization. The A.C.S. was a 
precarious coalition o f slave-owning southerners and anti-slavery northerners that 
advocated the transfer o f emancipated slaves and contraband Africans to Africa.
Official statements o f the A.C.S. expressed the hope that slaves would voluntarily go 
overseas, but privately many members were willing to deport not only bondservants, but 
free African-Americans as well The A.C.S. hoped to smother the peculiar institution 
by gradually reducing the number slaves while simultaneously eliminating the nation’s 
black population.1
Colonization tended to flourish in the Upper South because it was a moderate 
compromise with slavery. Many from this area who joined the organization thought 
slavery worked against the best interests of the United States because it was
1 P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York, 
1961); Early Lee Fox, The American Colonization Society, 1817-1840 (Baltimore,
1919); Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South 
(New York, 1975), pp. 200-12; JohnG. West, Jr., The Politics o f Revelation and 
Reason: Religion and Civic Life in the New Nation (Lawrence, Kan., 1996), pp. 110-12. 
Besides Washington, prominent southerners present at the creation o f the A.C.S. were 
John Randolph, Richard Bland Lee, Robert Wright, Robert Goldsborough, and Henry 
Clay. The actual name of the A.C.S. was the American Society for the Colonization o f 
Free People o f Color.
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economically unsound and potentially dangerous. The Richmond Enquirer, for 
instance, strongly backed colonization by pointing to “our languishing agriculture, our 
deserted farms, our decayed fortunes, our decreasing population.” It concluded that the 
slaves were a “curse to the land''' and should be removed by deportation to Africa. 
Banishing bondservants from the state would revive agriculture while relieving white 
fears that exhausted lands left slaves with too much free time on their hands.2 Others in 
the Upper South supported the organization because they thought it lessened the 
suffering of slaves. Rather than viewing bondservants primarily as a potential threat to 
society, such people empathized with their plight. They wanted to remove the stigma o f 
slavery and set the captives free, provided, of course, the former slaves were transported 
from the limits o f the United States. These people made provisions in their wills for 
their bondservants to be emancipated and often provided money to pay for deportation. 
They felt that giving their slaves to the government was preferable to keeping them 
enslaved. At the very least, slaves were free, families were preserved, and individuals 
had the opportunity to start anew in Africa.3
Washington, who lived at Mount Vernon, ostensibly shared many of these same 
attitudes. He ran into financial difficulties, however, much as his uncle had. Like many 
other plantations in Virginia, the production o f his estate failed to meet the demands of
2 Undated Richmond Enquirer, as quoted in Huntsville Southern Advocate, 10 
Dec. 1825. Emphasis in original.
3 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 113-16; Fox, American 
Colonization Society, pp. 194-211. George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the 
White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New 
York, 1971), pp. 11-12, discounts any feelings o f  humanity for the slave on the part o f 
those who joined the A.C.S.
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his spending. In 1821 Washington took a drastic step to buoy his declining fortune by 
selling fifty-four slaves to two men from Louisiana He netted $10,000 on the 
transaction. Washington knew he had to keep the sale a secret lest he damage his 
reputation as president o f the A.C.S. His hopes were in vain. The transportation of 
slaves was difficult to conceal, and someone spotted Washington’s bondservants 
trudging through Leesburg, Virginia, in chains. A local paper printed an account o f 
Washington’s “unhappy wretches” passing through the town in the midst of a coffle of 
one hundred slaves. Others picked up the story and soon Washington was under attack 
by newspapers along the Chesapeake seaboard, with the implication being that he sold 
his slaves to speculators. The Baltimore Morning Chronicle accused Washington of 
separating families. Pronouncing him “guilty o f selling (for the sake of hoarding up 
wealth),” it demanded an explanation.4
Washington shot back with an angry letter defending his actions. He charged 
that no one had the right to question his authority to “dispose o f property” which was 
lawfully his. Not only were his actions perfectly legal, he continued, but he resented the 
accusation that he had separated families. Washington took great pains to avoid such 
unhappy occasions, he said, and made sacrifices to keep families together. Not only did 
he sell the slaves for $2,500 less than their market price, but “those who were sold
4 Niles’ Weekly Register, 1 Sept., 1821, pp. 1-2; (first quotation); Baltimore 
Morning Chronicle, 25 Aug. 1822, as quoted in the Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 
Aug. 1822, pp. 25-26 (second quotation); Liberator, 22 Mar. 1834, p. 45; Gerald T. 
Dunne, “Bushrod Washington and the Mount Vemon Slaves,” Supreme Court 
Historical Society Yearbook, (1980): 25-29; Sweig, “Northern Virginia Slavery,” p.
234; Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, p. 173. Washington averaged about 
$185 per slave in the sale, significantly below the market price o f approximately $700 
(Phillips, American Negro Slavery, p. 370).
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carried with them no feelings o f  despondency or regret” and “cheerfully consented”  to 
go with their new purchasers after being assured they would have a good owner. 
Furthermore, he sold the slaves to “two gentleman o f  Louisiana” who lived on the Red 
River. The new owners, Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Williams, “meant to place them [the 
slaves] upon their own estates, and to keep them together.” With this statement, 
Washington denied any involvement in the interstate slave trade. The slaves were not 
subject to speculation by resale, but were merely being transferred to another part o f  the 
country. He claimed, moreover, that the actions o f  the slaves justified their sale. The 
final straw was the “insubordination o f my negroes, [and] their total disregard o f  all 
authority” that rendered them useless. Once Washington told the slaves he would never 
emancipate them, three tried to escape and he feared that all his other laboring men 
would try similar schemes.3
Washington’s actions were legal, and if his account is correct, he did his best to 
prevent his slaves from falling into the clutches o f speculators. The sale, however, 
seemed similar to speculation. One hundred slaves marching in chains brought to mind 
images of the slave trade rather than willing bondservants merrily moving south. 
Moreover, when the president o f  American Colonization Society succumbed to the 
temptation to sell his slaves to the Deep South rather than provide for their 
transportation to Africa, it was apparent that the movement was deeply troubled. 
Supporters o f the A.C.S. realized the threat that the slave trade posed to their 
organization. The surfeit of buyers in the Upper South, including slave traders and
5 Niles’ Weekly Register, 29 Sept. 1821, pp. 70-72 (quotations); Liberator, 22 
Mar. 1834, p. 45.
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planters from Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, kept slave prices artificially high. 
These inflated prices undermined the A.C.S. and made it less tempting for owners to 
emancipate their bondservants. In 1828 and 1830 colonizationists in Kentucky, for 
instance, pushed for bills that would have outlawed the domestic slave trade in their 
state. They portrayed non-importation as the first step to getting rid o f slavery since it 
would make slave property less valuable. In 1830 the bill failed by one vote, but passed 
in 1833.6
Despite Kentucky’s example, few looked to federal or state governments to take 
action. Most people registered their disapproval through individual efforts that had no 
direction or cohesion. They refused to deal with speculators, looked askance at their 
neighbors who did not do so, and denounced the most offensive aspects o f the trade. 
Those who opposed speculation offered no viable alternative to a commerce that was 
becoming vital to the South’s expansion. This unfocused sentiment shied away from 
extreme solutions but hoped that the slave trade, and possibly slavery itself, would 
somehow go away. Southerners who harbored doubts about servitude, no matter how 
small, were most likely to be troubled by the interstate slave trade. Those who did not 
believe in slavery absolutely could not believe in the absolute power of the slaveholder.
6 African Repository and Colonial Journal, Feb. 1830, p. 380; Staudenraus, 
African Colonization Movement, pp. 147-68; Lowell H. Harrison, The Antislavery 
Movement in Kentucky (Lexington, 1978), p. 47. Authorities generally ignored the 
measure, although see Christopher Waldrep, “Kentucky’s Slave Importation Law in 
Lyon County: A Document,” Filson Club Historical Quarterly, 65 (1991): 505-12. For 
a similar analysis o f the slave trade’s effect on colonization, see [Harrison], Review o f  
the Slave Question, p. 32.
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Their conditional acceptance o f slavery did not include unqualified approval o f the 
slave trade.7
In the first three decades o f the nineteenth century the Upper South possessed a 
deep ambivalence towards the interstate slave trade. The trade’s naked commercialism 
seemed to contradict many o f the justifications for slavery. Instead o f  providing food, 
clothing, and shelter in exchange for a slave’s labor, masters who utilized the trade 
profited while bondservants suffered. Speculation seemed to violate the idea of an 
implied agreement between master and slave. Owners profited from the exchange 
while bondservants suffered. Auctions and cofiles revealed the depths o f slaves’ agony
Q
and became powerful reminders o f speculation’s brutal consequences. As the trade 
grew it became more difficult for citizens to avoid the unpleasant conclusion that it was 
undermining the foundations o f good society. In the states where large numbers o f 
slaves were sold, citizens became dismayed at the blatant exploitation o f  the trade.
7 Similarly, southerners who actively opposed slavery hated the interstate slave 
trade. See Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 1 Aug. 1822, p. 22,2 Sept. 1826, p. 413; 
William Bimey, James G. Bim ey and His Times (New York, 1890), pp. 57-58; Carl 
Degler, The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 
1974), pp. 40-41; Davis, Problem o f Slavery, pp. 209-10; H. Shelton Smith, In His 
Image but...Racism in Southern Religion, 1780-1910 (Durham, 1972), pp.70-71; 
Gordon E. Finnie, “The Antislavery Movement in the Upper South before 1840,” 
Journal o f  Southern History, 35 (1969): 319-42; William M. Boyd, “Southerners in the 
Anti-Slavery Movement, 1800-1830,” Phylon, 9 (1948): 153-63; and Asa E. Martin, 
“The Anti-Slavery Societies in Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical Magazine, 1 (1915): 
269-70.
8 James L. Huston, “The Experiential Basis o f the Northern Antislavery 
Impulse,” Journal o f  Southern History, 56 (1990): 609-40. While Huston speaks about 
how the sight o f slave auctions galvanized northerners against slavery, his discussion 
influences this section. Southern citizens, at least for a time, also reacted to slave sales 
and coffles. Their reactions were not as vehement as those found in Huston’s work 
because residence in a slave society bounded their thinking.
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They had difficulty embracing the ways in which speculators reduced slavery to a crude 
measure o f profit and often felt traders were inhuman brutes who were associated with 
illegal activities. Many citizens of the Upper South feared that the trade degraded those 
who came in contact with it. Slaves, obviously, felt the trade’s sting most keenly, but 
speculation also had the potential to corrupt whites. There were concerns that as the 
trade degraded individuals, government itself could be threatened. A significant 
number o f owners responded by refusing to sell their slave to speculators in the hopes 
of keeping slave families together. Southerners even allowed the trade’s efficacy to be 
debated in the House of Representatives. Before 1830, then, there was widespread 
concern in the Upper South about the interstate slave trade’s negative effects on society.
There were specific reasons why southerners found the interstate slave trade to 
be unpalatable. In those states that exported slaves, coffles were tangible reminders of 
slavery’s brutality and the speculator’s inhumanity. A Bourbon County, Kentucky, 
slave owner described his first encounter with a coffle as something “more shocking to 
humanity than any that has ever come within my notice.” Indeed, for those who prided 
themselves on their enlightened treatment of slaves, the presence o f a slave coffle was 
almost scandalous. The sight o f nearly one hundred slaves “Chained and guarded. . .  
driven like other stock, from their native land” was something that ran counter to this 
man’s belief that the slave owner had a duty to protect his bondservants from the worst 
abuses o f the institution.9 Not only were the sights of manacled slaves offensive, but
9 Paris (Kentucky) Western Citizen, 24 Sept. 1822, as quoted in J. Winston 
Coleman Papers, King Library, University o f Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 
(quotation); Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Nov. 1822, p. 59.
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the image o f a slave driver on horseback with a whip or a gun was particularly 
appalling. Eyewitnesses commonly reported seeing slaves chained together with their 
white drivers riding alongside them carrying “whips and pistols.”10 A man who would 
treat slaves in this fashion could hardly be expected to harbor a virtuous character, 
according to those who disliked the trade. Slave owners who refused to sell to a trader 
made an implicit judgment that speculators had lost their essential humanity. In this 
view, only a man “steeled by avarice and petrified by cruelty” would remain unmoved 
by the “shrieks and groans” o f slaves who had been sold from their relatives.11 That 
slave traders denied the slaves’ essential humanity was a notion that became prevalent 
amongst southerners. A  resident o f Loudoun County, Virginia, complained that 
“inhuman traders” had recently appeared in the area.12 Richard H. Carter o f 
Rectortown, Virginia harbored the same feelings. He wrote to George Kephart, a slave 
trader in Alexandria, for a favor. Kephart’s agent bought a slave woman whose 
husband, Carter explained, “lives with me.” He wanted to buy the woman, named 
Mima, but already had more slaves than he wanted. Carter recognized that he was 
“induced to make an appeal to your humanity,” and asked to pay Kephart less than
10 William H. Blane, An Excursion through the United States and Canada 
during the years 1822-23 (1824; reprint, New York, 1969), p. 226.
u “American Convention [of] Abolition Societies, Minutes, 1828,” Journal o f 
Negro History, 6 (1921): 328.
12 Reprint of a “Letter from a gentleman” dated 10 Mar. 1828, as quoted in 
Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 29 Mar. 1828, p. 75. See also Fredericksburg 
Virginia Herald, 29 Sept. 1818; Easton Republican Star, 25 Sept. 1821; and Charles 
Grier Sellers, ‘The Travail o f  Slavery,” in Charles Grier Sellers, ed., The Southerner as 
American (Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 60.
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market value for Mima. He fuily understood that “such cannot be your usual way o f 
doing business,” but “must proceed from a motive o f  humanity” rather than the strictly 
commercial nature of the trade. It is unknown whether Carter succeeded in buying 
Mima at a discounted price, or even if  he acquired the woman, but his motives were in 
stark contrast to Kephart’s way o f  doing business. Twice Carter appealed to Kephart’s 
“humanity,” as if to stress to the slave trader that somewhere deep inside o f him there 
was an impulse that could also see the objects o f his speculation as human.13
Another reason to regard traders as brutes was the widespread perception that 
most, if not all, o f  them were involved in a particularly unsavory aspect o f bondage— 
kidnapping. It became increasingly common to hear stories o f  the sale of slaves with a 
term of years to serve, sometimes called apprentices, and the abduction and sale o f free 
blacks. Kidnapping grew in direct proportion to the interstate slave trade and the two 
quickly became intertwined, both in practice and in public perception.14 A Baltimore 
resident complained that the “horrid practice o f  kidnapping” had become prevalent. He 
linked the illegal activities to the slave trade when he complained how Maryland 
residents saw “almost daily, negroes chained together like oxen, driven through the 
country by a set o f men, who speculate on the miseries o f the human race.” The intense 
demand led to the formation o f  a “a line o f kidnappers” that ran from Philadelphia,
13 Moncure D. Conway, Testimonies Concerning Slavery (London, 1864), pp.
24-25.
14 Carol Wilson, Freedom at Risk: The Kidnapping o f  Free Blacks in America, 
1780-1865 (Lexington, 1994) has the most extensive discussion o f kidnapping. She, 
however, does not explicitly link the rise o f kidnapping to the development o f a 
vigorous interstate slave trade. See especially, pp. 11-13, 52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
through Delaware, and into Maryland.15 One o f  these “avaricious and unprincipled” 
criminals was Patty Cannon, ringleader of the most notorious band o f kidnappers in the 
United States. Cannon, her husband, and her sons stole free African-Americans, slaves 
with a limited time to serve, and slaves from Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Maryland, and the District o f  Columbia. Gang members used peaches to lure young 
black children and then seized and sold them. They used Cannon’s house as a  base of 
operations, chaining their unfortunate victims in the basement until selling them. The 
house was actually composed o f several different buildings that were reputedly built on 
different sides o f the state line between Maryland and Delaware, and the boundary 
between counties within Delaware. When authorities threatened, the gang moved 
across the state or county line, “thus eluding the officers o f justice by suddenly passing 
beyond their jurisdictions.” Only when the gang’s leader stood trial for murdering a 
slave trader from Georgia and killing three African-American children was the gang put 
out of business.16 The arrest and conviction were unusual, since, in general, the laws 
for enforcement of kidnapping were defective and enforcement o f them even worse.17
15 Undated Baltimore American, as quoted in the Genius o f Universal 
Emancipation, Mar. 1822, p. 441.
16 Isaac Briggs to Timothy Pickering, 5 June 1817, Records of the Select 
Committee on the African Slave Trade, National Archives (quotation). Wilson, 
Freedom at Risk, pp. 20-37 traces the exploits o f  the Cannon-Johnson gang. Only two 
o f its members were convicted o f  kidnapping. One, a white man, was whipped and 
forced to stand in the pillory, while the other, an African-American, was fined four 
thousand dollars and sentenced to forty-two years in prison. See also M. Sammy 
Miller, ‘Tatty Cannon: Murderer and Kidnapper of Free Blacks: A  Review o f the 
Evidence,” Maryland Historical Magazine, (1977): 419-23.
17 Examples o f kidnappers being caught and punished may be found in Niles ’ 
Weekly Register, 28 June 1828, p. 234; Woodville Republican, 6 May 1826; Genius o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
The feet that kidnappers could operate with virtual impunity tempted slave 
traders to combine illegal activities with their legal transactions. In Delaware, slave 
traders broke into the houses o f free blacks at night and carried them off.18 It was well 
known that kidnapped individuals could be found alongside slaves in the pens o f 
Baltimore and Washington. Slave dealers in those cities were said to use stratagems to 
distract free African-Americans, who were then “dragged by force” into the slave 
jails.19 Speculators o f this ilk created confusion in the minds o f many, who assumed 
that all traders must be crooked. The legal and illegal trade became hopelessly mixed 
for most people. A grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, complained o f “the practice o f 
persons coming from distant parts o f the United States for the purpose of purchasing 
slaves.” Scenes o f “wretchedness, and human degradation” in which parents were 
“wrested from their offspring, and children from their parents, without respect to the 
ties o f nature” were disgraceful. The complaint specifically referred to “the practice o f 
making sale of black people, who are, by the will o f their masters, designed to be free at 
the expiration o f a term of years.” This “class o f  beings,” the grand jury felt, was 
“entitled to our protection, by the laws of justice and humanity.” The grand jury’s
Universal Emancipation, 20 May 1826, p. 298-99; and Huntsville Southern Advocate, 1 
Aug. 1828.
18 Wilson, Freedom at Risk, p. 52; Walter C. Clephane, “The Local Aspect o f 
Slavery in the District of Columbia,” Records o f  the Columbia Historical Association, 3 
(1900): 235; Niles ’ Weekly Register, 19 July 1817, p. 323. For one example o f how a 
slave trader kidnapped a free black, see Solomon Northrup, Twelve Years a Slave, 
edited by Sue Eakin and Joseph Logsdon (Baton Rouge, 1968).
19 July Term o f  the Grand Jury of Baltimore, 1816, Select Committee.. .on the 
Illegal Traffic in Slaves.
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pronouncement did not clearly distinguish between the legal and illegal sale of slaves, 
but mixed the two together in the hopes o f putting an end to both types o f  distasteful 
commerce. By not differentiating between the legal and illegal strands o f the trade, the 
grand jury was typical o f  most attacks on kidnapping.20
The growing number o f abduction stories firmly linked slave traders with 
kidnappers in most people’s minds. Not everyone who sold slaves was involved in 
illegal activity, obviously, but all kidnappers utilized the interstate trade since they 
eventually had to sell their victims. In the eyes o f many observers, abductions and the 
legitimate sale of slaves were virtually identical and separating the two was impossible 
or pointless. Traders and kidnappers were both involved in the buying, selling, and 
movement o f African-Americans. The inhuman and underhanded components of the 
illegal trade were imputed to the legal trade, making speculation even more 
objectionable. A grand jury in Baltimore resented the growth of kidnapping and noted 
how it “necessarily attaches itself to the Slave Trade.”21 The most effective way to 
eliminate abduction would be to control the interstate trade. Jesse Torrey understood 
the link between the two. In a vigorous attack on slavery in the nation’s capital, Torrey
20 Washington grand jury, as quoted in Mary Tremain, Slavery in the District o f  
Columbia (1892; reprint, New York, 1969), pp. 49-50 (quotations). See also William 
Miner’s speech in Debates and Proceedings, Twentieth Congress, Second Session, 7 
Jan. 1829, pp. 177-78. For versions o f  this document that omit the references to 
kidnapping, see Theodore D. Weld and James Thome, Slavery and the Internal Slave 
Trade in the United States o f North America (London, 1844), pp. 205-6; Jay, 
Miscellaneous Writings, p. 155; Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 22 June 1827; Bancroft, 
Slave Trading in the Old South, pp. 23-24; and Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 15- 
16.
21 July Term ofthe Grand Jury o f Baltimore, 1816, Select Committee... on the 
Illegal Traffic in Slaves; Phillips, Freedom’s Port, pp. 230-31.
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described the unholy alliance between abduction and the slave trade. The “uncontrolled 
slave trade, between the middle and southerly states” was the root o f  the problem. It 
“gives facility to the extensive and increasing practice of kidnapping, (slaves as well as 
freemen,) and secures it from the possibility o f detection, except casually.” Here Torrey 
explicitly linked the growth of the legal sale o f slaves to the increase in the illegal 
kidnapping trade.22
The assumption that slave traders were brutes who dabbled in illegal behavior 
was concomitant with the notion that the pecuniary nature of the trade polluted the 
master-slave relationship by introducing a foreign element: speculation. Most people 
raised few objections to masters who bought or sold slaves when such transactions were 
motivated by necessity. Slaveholders had the right to sell slaves in the case of death, 
debt, or insolvency, but even then, as the case o f Bushrod Washington demonstrates, 
their actions could be reckoned as a betrayal o f the master’s implied duty to protect the 
slave. With an increasingly aggressive interstate slave trade, masters who sold to 
speculators had difficulty convincing themselves they were acting in a paternalistic 
fashion that was in the best interests o f their slaves. James Bimey, for instance, in his 
attack on the interstate trade, did not condemn slaveholders for buying or selling their 
slaves in good faith. He only decried the “commerce” in human beings. The notion o f 
taking a profit from the unnecessary misfortune o f  others lay at the heart of this type o f
22 Torrey, Portraiture o f Domestic Slavery, p. 31. Emphasis in the original. He 
was one of the few to clearly distinguish between the legal and illegal trades. His views 
may also be seen in Select Committee... on the Illegal Traffic in Slaves.
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opposition to the slave trade.23 Speculation in slaves, which seemed new given its 
vigorous growth in the early republic, forced southerners to re-examine slavery, an old 
institution. The trade’s increasing visibility was a pungent reminder that slaveholders 
were enmeshed in a system of profit which exploited the slave. Owners became 
increasingly tempted to sell slaves for gain, rather than for necessity such as debt or 
discipline. In a very real sense, the growth of the interstate slave trade caused a 
reappraisal of the master-slave relationship because it made clear a  facet of the 
institution to which most southerners would rather not admit, namely, that slavery, at its 
heart, was crueL Those who sold slaves to a speculator could hardly claim to be 
benevolent when it was widely believed that traders broke up families and banished 
bondservants to a life o f  misery. A thriving trade belied slaveholders’ attempts to 
defend slavery as something that was good for the slave as well as for the owner. To 
tolerate and accept a robust slave trade, southerners had either to change their 
assumptions about the slave trade or their attitudes toward slavery itself.
Disgust with speculation fed into the notion that the interstate trade threatened 
republican government. A Kentucky resident grimly noted his experience with the 
slave auctions on the courthouse steps, “the seat o f justice.” The trader who bought 
these particular bondservants forced one of them to carry an American flag, something 
the writer thought abhorrent because his forefathers “fought and bled for liberty and 
independence.” He shrewdly linked the situation o f the slaves to the symbols o f justice 
(the courthouse), and liberty (the flag) to show how unbridled commerce trampled on
23 Bimey, James G. Bimey, pp. 57-58.
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the country’s ideals.24 Another writer, styling himse lf  the “TRUE VIRGINIAN,” 
contrasted his ability to vote with the presence o f a slave coffle. He likened the power 
of a slave holder to sell his slaves as an “absolute and oppressive” tyranny that was 
worse than any “political despotism in the world.” Just as a political system could 
become extreme and abusive, so too could the institution of slavery. While this 
Virginian did not suggest an alternative to the slave trade, he implied that there must be 
a way to guard against the extreme abuses of slavery. He explicitly denied that 
abolition was the answer. “[K]nocking off the shackles o f a slave,” he thought, would 
be more evil than the trade itself because it would turn loose “a vagrant and a thief’ 
who was not ready for freedom He had no answer for the problem o f  the slave trade 
except to encourage good citizens to resist getting caught up in speculation. The lesson 
to be learned was that not only was unbridled speculation bad for the slave, but it also 
corrupted the master and could lead to society’s collapse.
That the interstate slave trade clashed with the notion o f a free government was 
most prominent in the nation’s capital. Edward Coles, a Virginian who later moved to 
Illinois so that he would not have to live in a slave society, saw coffles march through 
the streets o f  Washington. He described the trade as “a scene o f wretched and human 
degradation disgraceful to our characters as citizens o f a free government.” As James 
Madison’s secretary, Coles reminded the president o f the effects that such a “revolting
24 Paris (Kentucky) Western Citizen, 24 Sept. 1822, as quoted in Coleman 
Papers. Portions are also reprinted in Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Nov. 1822, 
pp. 59-60. The trader described in this account was probably Edward Stone, a notable 
speculator who made Paris his base o f  operations.
25 Lexington (Virginia) Intelligencer, 16 Aug. 1823.
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sight” would have on foreign dignitaries. Apparently his protestations elicited no 
response.26 A few years later, when President Andrew Jackson and his cabinet marched 
to celebrate the French Revolution, a slave coffle trudged the other way. A Washington 
newspaper noted that such “shocking scenes” o f the slave trade had to be prevented or 
“we must cease to call ourselves free.” The paper wondered “Oh patriotism! where is 
they indignation? Oh philanthropy! where is thy grief? OH SHAME, WHERE IS THY 
BLUSH?”27 The “pure feelings of humanity,” another paper explained, became 
paralyzed and justice had gotten “cramped” when there was no protest against 
something so contrary to the nation’s principles. In denying the essential humanity o f 
the slave, the interstate trade violated the basic principles o f  justice upon which the 
nation was founded. Speculation’s extreme nature could lead to corruption in slave 
owners as they put the profit motive ahead o f all others. Individual debasement, the 
thinking went, would eventually lead to despotism in the political arena. Moreover, if 
slave traders could induce slaveholders to trample casually on the most basic o f human 
rights, then it was no stretch to imagine that the next threat would be a denial of justice 
to certain classes of whites 28
26 Constance McLaughlin Green, Washington: Village and Capital, 1800-1878, 
2 vol. (Princeton, 1962), 1:53 (quotation); Ralph L. Ketcham, “The Dictates of 
Conscience: Edward Coles and Slavery,” Virginia Quarterly Review, (1960): 46-62; 
Drew R  McCoy, The Last o f the Fathers: James Madison & the Republican Legacy 
(New York, 1989), pp. 310-22.
27 Washington Spectator, 4 Dec. 1830 as reprinted in the Liberator, 1 Jan. 1831,
p. 1.
28 Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 22 June 1827. For a judgment that the 
Washington residents thought the slave trade “an evil apparently so inconsistent with
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Another significant vein o f resentment towards the interstate slave trade 
centered around the prospect o f breaking up families. I f  southerners allowed the 
wanton destruction of slave families, then it would be difficult to assume that slavery 
was a benign institution. The southern white conception o f  a  slave family most often 
consisted o f a woman and her children.29 Slave owners, moreover, commonly assumed 
that speculators would break up such families, no matter how- loosely defined the term 
might have been. The Benevolent Society o f Alexandria for Ameliorating and 
Improving the Condition o f the People o f Color described how slave traders continually 
tore “asunder the dearest connexions o f life.”30 A Kentucky resident agreed with these 
sentiments and called for legislation that prohibited men from driving slaves through his 
state. He contrasted the rightness of slavery with the “sordid”  world of selling slaves 
for profit. Knowing that “this unfortunate class o f our population” had been tom from 
its family was a thought “revolting to humanity, and must sicken every heart.”31
Southern opinion was not unanimous on the topic. An advertisement in a 
Warrenton, Virginia, paper is illustrative o f the conflicting attitudes towards the 
destruction o f  slave families. An owner who desired to sell three likely female slaves, 
one of whom had a male child, stated that “No objection will be made to traders 
purchasing.” Even though the person was willing to deal with a speculator, the specific
the principles applied to every thing else in America,” see Hall, Travels in North 
America, 2: 141.
29 Kulikoff Agrarian Origins o f American Capitalism, p. 246.
30 Genius o f Universal Emancipation, 19 May 1827, p. 322.
31 Western Luminary, 3 Nov. 1831.
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invitation for traders indicates that there was a significant portion o f  the population that 
would not. The seller directed all inquiries to the paper’s office, possibly because he 
felt shame at selling to a trader. It could also be that the person did not want to reveal a 
financial embarrassment or needed to get rid of an unruly slave. Whatever the motives 
for secrecy, opinion on the issue o f  dealing with speculators was fractured enough to 
require the specific inclusion of traders.32 Likewise, in Alexandria, William Chapman 
conducted an auction o f twenty slaves on the steps o f  Joseph Shumate’s tavern. He 
carefully noted that there would be “no objection to traders purchasing at this sale.” 
Auctions were a frequent venue for traders since they could buy slaves at a relatively 
low cost and often purchase individual bondservants. The specific invitation to traders 
again revealed a divided mind regarding speculation.33
Other advertisements, o f course, put no conditions on sales and allowed anyone 
to buy. One anonymous owner indicated he would sell his twenty year old female slave 
“with or without her infant male child.”34 Masters with particularly disobedient slaves 
wanted to make sure they would be rid o f them forever. One addressed his 
advertisement to “NEGRO BUYERS” and offered a likely fellow for sale, “Provided he 
is carried out o f the State.” Another who wanted to sell some slaves cryptically noted 
that ‘Tor causes which will be explained, the purchaser shall be at liberty to take them
32 Warrenton (Virginia) Palladium o f Liberty, 4 Feb. 1820.
33 Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 1 Apr. 1816. Tadman, Speculators 
and Slaves, pp. 113-18 believes that relatively few slave traders purchased their slaves 
at auctions. On the other hand, Russell, “Sale Day in Antebellum South Carolina,” 
makes a compelling case for the pervasiveness o f traders at auctions.
34 Baltimore American, 4 Apr. 1820.
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out o f the state.”35 Many simply offered up their slaves for sale, but usually directed 
interested parties to inquire o f the printer/6 Sellers who used printers as intermediaries 
desired a measure o f  discretion, since they could hide their identity from the prying eyes 
o f their neighbors. While such advertisements were numerous, those slaveholders who 
wanted to sell to a trader did not have to advertise their intentions. Speculators were 
conspicuous when they were in town and usually stayed at the same tavern or inn, so 
locating them was no difficulty. The primary benefit o f  advertising a slave for sale was 
convenience, as the newspaper editor could screen all inquiries before interested 
purchasers contacted the seller directly.
While selling to a trader might be the easiest way to “dispose” o f  some slaves, it 
was not an option that all considered. As the slave trade grew in strength, it became 
common amongst owners to place limitations on the sale o f their slaves. In the ten 
years following the War of 1812, virtually every major newspaper in the cities near the 
Chesapeake Bay contained advertisements for bondservants who could not be 
transported out o f the area. Sellers used such conditions to control who could buy their 
slaves, often excluding slave traders or planters who might transport the bondservants 
out o f the state. Not coincidentally, the advertisements that placed limitations on sales 
were more frequent from September to February, the prime slave selling season.
35 NorfoIk American Beacon, 7 July 1819 (first quotation); Baltimore American, 
12 July 1816 (second quotation).
36 Ibid., 10 Jan. 1817,13 Jan. 1820, 1 Feb. 1822, 30 Apr. 1825; Washington 
Daily National Intelligencer, 26 July 1816; Richmond Enquirer, 21 Mar. 1820, 19 Jan. 
1822, 1 Sept. 1826; Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 19 July 1815, 2 Mar. 1816, 3 Sept. 
1817, 21 Apr. 1819,2 Nov. 1820; Norfolk American Beacon, 13 Nov. 1815.
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Advertisers knew there would be more speculators in the area during these months and 
wanted to make sure they would not be bothered with such men. Such exclusions might 
be specific, such as the Fredericksburg resident who offered a  twenty-three year old 
woman and her three year old boy for sale, specifically noting that “No trader need 
apply.”37 Others were more subtle in registering their displeasure with the slave trade. 
One anonymous owner pointed out that his twenty-three year old house servant was 
“neither dishonest nor vicious” and must be sold to someone in the state. Requiring the 
buyer to keep the slaves in the state effectively shut slave traders out of the process.38
There was some o f this similar sentiment in Kentucky and Tennessee, although 
not as much since the slave trade from these states was not as well developed. For 
instance, a Nashville resident offered his “smart and valuable” man for sale, but “not for 
any fault or failing.” He warned prospective buyers that the slave “will not be sold to 
those who buy to carry down the river.”39 The same situation prevailed in Burke 
County, North Carolina, where there was no stigma attached to a master who sold a 
slave to his neighbor. Owners who sold bondservants to a buyer from another state
37 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 21 Jan. 1826.
38 Baltimore American, 3 Jan. 1820. For some of the many more examples, see 
Annapolis Maryland Gazette, 3 June 1819, 9 Mar. 1820, 25 Mar. 1824; Baltimore 
American, 2 Jan. 1815, 6 Feb. 1816,10 Sept. 1817,21 Feb. 1821, 2 Nov. 1822, 2 June 
1823, 18 Mar. 1824,4 Jan. 1825; Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 6 Jan. 1826, 1 Jan. 1827; 
Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 9 Sept. 1815, 20 May 1816, 8 Sept. 1818,18 
Sept. 1821, 5 Mar. 1822,10 Nov. 1826, 7 July 1830; Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 2 
Sept. 1816, 30 Aug. 1817,20 Sept. 1825; Norfolk American Beacon, 8 Aug. 1816,27 
Jan. 1817,2 June 1818, 15 Jan. 1819,10 Mar. 1820.
39 Nashville Whig, 18 Dec. 1819. See also Kentucky Gazette, 7 June 1824,13 
Mar. 1827.
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were often censored and the most objectionable act was to sell to a trader or agent who 
intended to carry the slaves to a distant market.40
Masters also sold slaves with a  term o f years to serve, but normally put 
conditions on such transactions. These term slaves were most common in Maryland 
and were a type o f  compromise with the peculiar institution. Owners benefited from 
having their bondservants work for a number of years but also eased their consciences 
by freeing their labor force, typically when the slaves reached thirty. Although such 
masters might have been trying to rid themselves of bondservants who were becoming 
less remunerative, they also could have sold them to a speculator. That there was less 
reliance on the slave trade than might be expected indicates other motives were at work. 
Slaves exerted pressure on the system to get decent terms for their release o f self­
purchase. The frequency of flight and the presence o f rebellion dictated that owners 
used eventual emancipation as an incentive to motivate some slaves and pacify others. 
Speculation, in this environment, sometimes worked to undermine slavery.41
Many owners made certain they sold their slaves to a state resident by requiring 
some type of security to that effect. Charles Carroll offered a large number o f slaves for 
sale, but required bonds to ensure the bondservants “shall not be sold or carried out o f 
the state.” Such bonds, however, seem only to have been popular in cities with a
40 Edward W. Phifer, “Slavery in Microcosm: Burke County, North Carolina,” 
Journal o f Southern History, 28 (1962): 137-65.
41 Phillips, Freedom’s Port, pp. 45-54; Christopher Phillips, “The Roots of 
Quasi-Freedom: Manumission and Term Slavery in Early National Baltimore,” 
Southern Studies, (1993): 39-66.
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thriving coastwise trade.42 Those who required a  bond before selling their slaves could 
at least convince themselves there was a minimum o f disruptions to the slaves as a 
result o f the sale. The owners probably reasoned that bondservants who stayed in the 
same area could at least see their friends and relatives (provided they were not sold to a 
trader). Some owners went so far as to stipulate that their slaves not be sold out o f state 
even to settle their estate. During the settlement o f William Smyth’s estate, the agent 
handling the sale was forbidden from selling the slaves to someone who would carry 
them out o f Maryland.43
Those owners who protected their slaves’ family life often sacrificed the best 
price for the thought o f preserving at least some sense o f family unity. Such sentiment 
also limited an owner’s flexibility when arranging a sale. Only the wealthiest of 
southern citizens could afford to buy more than one slave, so it was difficult to find an 
individual with a desire for the number and type o f  slaves in one family. These 
considerations did not deter R. H. Mosby o f Halifax County, North Carolina. He 
lectured prospective buyers th a t‘T am not disposed to violate the laws o f humanity by
42 Baltimore American, 20 Dec. 1816. For more examples o f bonds requiring 
the purchaser to keep the slave or slaves in the local area, see Ibid., 18 May 1816, 8 Jan. 
1820, 1 Apr. 1822; and Norfolk American Beacon, 28 July, 20 Oct. 1817, 23 Feb. 1818, 
18 Feb. 1819.
43 Easton Republican Star, 24 Apr. 1821. For other examples, see Baltimore 
American, 2 Sept. 1822; and Norfolk American Beacon, 11 July 1817. A traveler 
through Virginia learned that it was common for wills to direct executors not to sell 
slaves out o f the state, although such a statement was probably intended to persuade the 
hearer that slave owners had little to do with the destruction of slave families (Frederick 
Marryat, A Diary in America with Remarks on its Institutions (1839; reprint, Westport, 
Conn, 1962), p. 280).
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selling or separating children from parents.”44 Charles Goldsborough of Maryland 
found himself “encumbered” with a “certain description o f  property” that caused him 
much vexation. Having too many slaves to support, he wanted to sell a portion o f them, 
but knew that a sale would cause “violence” and necessitate “handcuffs and chains,” 
presumably if  he sold his slaves to a speculator. Furthermore, he complained to his 
friend in Mississippi, “you can not sell them here to any buyer for his own use for more 
than half or two thirds o f  their worth.” Instead of dealing with a trader or even a 
Maryland resident, Goldsborough wanted to sell his slaves to a cotton planter in 
Mississippi. The net result, he felt, would be similar to the migration of a poor white 
family. Goldsborough resigned himself to losing money on the sale because “If  I sell at 
all it must be in whole families.”45
Most notices in newspapers assumed that female slaves and their children would 
remain together. William and Hugh Pannell, who sold a variety of items in 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, advertised that they would sell a  woman and her three 
children. They informed readers that “She is not to be sold out o f the Borough,” and 
required a bond and security to that end. It is highly unlikely the Pannells would have 
required a bond for the woman while allowing the children to be sold to someone else 
who could carry them to the Deep South. The underlying assumption was that they
44 Advertisement o f  R. H. Mosby, as quoted in Rosser H. Taylor, Slaveholding 
in North Carolina: An Economic View (Chapel Hill, 1926), p. 71.
45 “Governor Charles Goldsborough’s Views on Slavery,” Maryland Historical 
Magazine, 39 (1944): 333.
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were to be sold together.46 Those masters who allowed children to be separated from 
their mothers usually had to spell out such behavior as being within the realm o f 
possibility. Grafton B. Duvall of Annapolis wanted to sell his slave woman and made it 
clear that she could be purchased with or without her eight children.47 There were few 
such advertisements. Sellers who wanted husbands to be sold with their families had to 
make such terms explicit. One owner offered a man, his wife, and their two children, 
noting they “will be sold together, cheap, not to be taken out o f state.”48
Masters who recognized the integrity of slave families strove to preserve them 
despite financial pressure to the contrary. Jesse H. Cobb, for example, begged 
Alexander Webb for “indulgence” in paying off a debt. Writing in April o f  1833, he 
asked for time to raise and house his crop. Then he would “carry some o f  my blacks to 
the south and get your money.” He wanted to do so in order to “do them a favor” and 
“sell them in families to good masters.” Cobb asked for an extension on his loan, lest 
he be compelled to “sell to Speculators.” The alternative, he feared, would be “parents 
and children[,] husbands and wives might be placed where they never see each other 
again in this world.” Cobb clearly linked speculation in slaves to the destruction of 
families since traders would turn around and sell the slaves to the best o f their
46 Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 20 Oct. 1817. For other advertisement that 
do not require a bond but stipulate that the mother stay in the area without mentioning 
the children, see Ibid., 22 July 1818, 1 Jan. 1819; Norfolk American Beacon, 10 Apr. 
1820; Lexington Intelligencer, 17 May 1823; Annapolis Maryland Gazette, 3 June 
1819; Georgetown National Messenger, 26 May 1819; and Baltimore American, 16 Jan. 
1816, 17 Sept. 1820.
47 Annapolis Maryland Gazette, 6 May 1824.
48 Baltimore American, 23 Aug. 1817.
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advantage rather than preserve family ties. It would have been easier for Cobb to sell 
his bondservants to a speculator—he would not have had to travel and he would have 
obtained a higher price—but the thought repelled him 49 When James Norman Smith 
fell into debt in 1829 he and his wife wanted to move away from their home in 
Tennessee and make a fresh start elsewhere. Rather than avoiding his debts, Smith 
decided to sell his land, slaves, and stock animals. He first sold his land to an old 
gentleman to whom he owed money, and squared that debt. Then, instead o f  selling his 
slaves for high prices to a speculator, Smith let the married slaves “choose their Masters 
who would Buy them with their Wives.” Such a strategy was inconvenient because it 
limited Smith’s bargaining position. He sold the balance o f his slaves for credit, being 
careful to keep mothers and children together. Since most traders paid in cash, he most 
probably sold to his neighbors and acquaintances in the area. Smith lamented that “it 
Took Nearly all My Property to pay My Debts,” but he must have gained some 
satisfaction from doing his best to preserve the families o f  his slaves.50
Other masters avoided speculators by arranging for the transfer of slaves to an 
acquaintance in the Deep South. James Madison, though encumbered by debt during 
his retirement in his home at Montpelier, refused to sell any o f his slaves to a 
speculator. He first sold a portion of his land, but that did not provide enough income. 
As a last resort, he arranged for the sale of sixteen bondservants to a “friend and
49 Jesse H. Cobb to Alexander Webb, 16 Apr. 1833, Jesse Cobb Letter, North 
Carolina Division of Archives and History.
50 Memoir of James Norman Smith, Book Two, p. 167, in Wallace Alexander 
Jones Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives.
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kinsman” from Louisiana. Even though the transaction “gave him much trouble,” 
Madison was able to convince himself that he saved his slaves from the worst effects of 
the sale. Rather than seek the high prices of a trader, Madison stubbornly held out and 
tried to preserve the family structure o f his slaves.51 Likewise, James Fisher o f 
Lunenberg County, Virginia, decided to sell his bondservants because o f his “heavy 
liabilities.” He instructed Joseph C. Hutchinson to take the slaves to Louisiana and sell 
them there. Fisher made it clear that he was “unwilling to see his servants seperated 
[sic] and scattered and perhaps sacrificed, they being mostly in families.” Hutchinson 
left in the M l of 1838 and sold the thirty-two slaves for $38,000. Before carrying out 
the scheme, Fisher secured the permission of his creditors, indicating that a concern for 
the welfare of his slaves was secondary to the smooth functioning o f the South’s credit 
and economic system. Like Madison, Fisher sacrificed some profit in order to keep 
slave families together as best he could.52
Masters in Virginia and Maryland who sold their bondservants to private 
citizens expected the buyers to honor the slaves’ families. These sellers also presumed 
that private citizens from the Deep South who bought slaves for their own purposes 
would do the same. For instance, John M. Felder, a member o f the House of 
Representatives from South Carolina, notified his colleague J. J. Roane that he wanted 
to buy about fifty slaves, but only in families. Roane thought his friend Austin 
Brockenbrough might be interested in selling some bondservants. There is nothing,
51 McCoy, Last o f  the Fathers, pp. 255-60 (quotations on pp. 256, 258).
52 Sterling Neblett Papers, Account of Testimony, 12 Sept. 1843, Duke.
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Roane told Brockenbrough, “more distressing to him [Felder] than the separation of 
families.” Roane was obviously trying to play upon the motives of Brockenbrough to 
shelter his slaves from the harsh effects o f selling them individually.53 Slave owners 
who dealt with planters from another state might reassure themselves that they had 
cushioned the bitter effects o f a sale on their slaves. In reality, any such sale was bound 
to separate a slave from some member of his or her family, not to mention friends and 
familiar surroundings. Bondservants lived their lives in terms o f aunts, uncles, cousins, 
grandparents, and friends. Any sale, no matter how careful buyers tried to be, wrecked 
the web o f the family network.
The men and women who made it explicit that they would not sell their slaves to 
speculators did so, in most cases, to give some type of protection to the slave family.
The trade was closely linked to the separation o f families, and those who refused to deal 
with traders knew that their slaves stood a much greater chance o f not being separated if 
a private individual purchased them. Such sellers understood very well the profit 
motive of traders, knowing that lone slaves normally commanded a higher price than 
those sold in units. When owners decided to bypass the speculative trade, non­
monetary factors took precedence over economic motivations. There was a definite 
limit, though, to the tender feelings of the owner, and the master-slave relationship 
should not be romanticized. The level of a master’s concern to keep his slave families 
together varied immensely. Furthermore, while owners may have made sacrifices to
53 J. J. Roane to Austin Brockenbrough, n.d., Austin Brockenbrough Papers, 
University of Virginia. See Whitten, “Slave Buying in 1835 Virginia,” pp. 231-44 for 
an example o f a Louisiana slaveholder who bought slaves in ‘Tamilies,” which 
consisted of a woman and her children.
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protect slave families, the very nature of slavery itself dictated an exploitative 
relationship. Owners were always cognizant o f  a slave’s monetary and productive 
value. John Woods, for instance, had several motives that influenced the sale o f his 
slave Winston. Wood purchased Winston in North Carolina and brought him to 
Tennessee, but soon realized that the slave was “desirus to get back to his Parants and 
friends.” After some time, Woods decided to arrange for the Winston’s return to his 
family. The slave had served so faithfully that Woods could not bear to think of being 
without his trusty servant. It was, however, just such a devoted service that allowed 
Woods to consider rewarding Winston for all o f his efforts. He explained that it was 
“My Duty” to reunite Winston with his family. Such an action was not to be done 
without regard to consequence, since Woods twice repeated he wanted a “faire price” 
for Winston. As with most relations between master and slave, there was a mixture of 
motives. Woods’s attempt to reunite Winston with his family was somewhat self- 
serving. Although losing a trusty and obedient slave would be inconvenient, he was 
careful to take nothing less than a fair price for his troubles. If  Woods had Winston’s 
interests truly at heart, he would have been willing to accept something less than the 
market value for the slave to ensure that the man could return to his family. The fact 
that he would sell the slave and get a good price in the bargain meant that Woods was 
trying to get the best o f both worlds. He could convince himself he was a kind and 
benevolent owner while simultaneously gaining a  suitable compensation for his 
efforts.54
54 John Woods to John Haywood, 17 Feb. 1818, Ernest Haywood Collection, 
University of North Carolina. For similar examples, see New Orleans Louisiana
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The thought o f selling slaves for speculation was repugnant enough to Baltimore 
residents that the city’s papers excluded advertisements headed “cash for negroes.” The 
growing presence o f “dens in the suburbs of the city, wherein misery personified is 
groaning in chains and gagged” became too obnoxious.55 Although notice o f the ban 
appeared in 1821, the practice o f excluding such advertisements started in 1820. That 
year most of the advertisements for slaves offered a few bondservants for sale, and a 
small portion requested to purchase slaves. Those notices that asked for more than one 
or two slaves were careful to note that such slaves were “not for speculation.”56 The 
newspaper even established the “General Register Office,” a service that “bought and 
sold [slaves] on commission.” Owners paid a fee to list their bondservants with the 
Register Office and then buyers or hirers examined the rosters of slaves. The head of 
the office facilitated the matching o f buyers and sellers. He notified the public that the 
registry was “the general resort and reference for those who wish to buy and sell.” The 
office advertised that it had the lowest priced slaves in town and emphasized that 
purchasers can always find satisfaction if they were buying or selling bondservants ‘fo r
Gazette, 30 Jan. 1823; Thomas Lenoir to William Lenoir, 13 Apr. 1806, Lenoir Family 
Papers, University of North Carolina; and John Gordon to “Cott,” 17 Apr. 1819,
Thomas Hardin Perkins Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives.
35 Niles’ Weekly Register, 21 July 1821, pp. 323-24 (quotations); Genius o f  
Universal Emancipation, Sept. 1821, pp. 44-45. Further evidence that Baltimore’s 
citizens dislike the trade comes from the example o f Harrison and Sterrett, a shipping 
company. When accused of being involved in the coastwise trade they quickly 
responded they “never were, and are not now, owners o f these or any other vessels” 
used for the trade and resented being connected “with a traffic, in which we never were, 
and never will be, concerned.” (Genius o f Universal Emancipation, July 1825, p. 149).
56 Baltimore American, 23 Aug. 1820 (quotation), 29 Oct. 1821,2 July 1822.
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this State on ly"  All advertisements stressed that the slaves were to stay in the area 
rather than go out o f state.57
The General Register Office was a compromise within the system o f slavery. 
Those who used its services recognized the need for slave transactions since they 
probably had “excess” slaves to sell or needed to raise some ready cash. They also 
wanted strict limitations on the terms of those sales. Sellers accepted the fair market 
value for their slaves in exchange for assurances that the buyers would not take their 
purchases out o f Maryland. There was to be no speculation on the misfortune o f others. 
The system excluded the largest slave traders from directly using its services since they 
were known by sight and would have been assumed to carry their purchases out o f the 
state. It is possible they used the office by employing a third party to pose as a local 
farmer and purchase slaves on their behalf. Establishing the Register Office was one 
way to soften the harsh effects o f speculation since, for those who used its services, it 
effectively neutralized the prospect of selling to a  slave trader. Those people who 
offered their slaves for sale through the office likely felt they were reducing the harmful 
effects of such transactions upon their slaves. Traders trumpeted that they would pay 
“cash for negroes” and it is significant the paper banned such advertisements. This 
close connection between cash and the slave trade seems to have rankled Baltimore 
residents the most. The emphasis on money demeaned the institution of slavery and 
reduced the master-slave relationship to one of crass commercialism. If  southerners 
could limit the amount of speculation and exclude traders, then they could still have
57 Ibid., 7 Apr., 17 May, 19 May, 17 Dec. (quotation, emphasis in original)
1821,1 Feb. 1822.
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faith in slavery’s goodness. Use o f the General Register Office was an attempt to 
dissociate slave sales from the slave trade and reassure southerners o f their noble 
aspirations surrounding their transactions. It was a way to put a positive face on a dirty 
business.
The system o f excluding the advertisements o f traders started to break down, 
however, as suspicious ads started appearing in the Baltimore papers by late 1822. One 
“gentleman from Tennessee” indicated he would pay “the highest prices” in cash for 
slaves. Another wanted “a few Prime Young Negroes for his individual use” and also 
promised to give cash and high prices.58 Such inducements were normally tools o f 
speculators. By 1823 the effort to keep traders from using the newspapers completely 
collapsed. Austin Woolfolk’s advertisements once again became a regular staple o f the 
paper, and other traders soon began using the words “Cash fo r  Slaves” at the beginning 
o f their advertisements.59 Any attempt to limit the types o f slave sales was bound to fail 
because it came between the relationship of master and slave. Not all owners wanted to 
be confined to certain conditions when selling their slaves, especially if they had 
bondservants they felt were a burden. There was a limited number of Maryland buyers 
who would keep slaves in the state, so those who wanted to rid themselves o f “excess” 
bondservants had to sell to a trader. The prospect of selling slaves at a high price to a 
trader rather than at a lower price to a neighbor was often too tempting for slave owners 
to resist.
58 Ibid., 7 Sept. (first quotation), 9 Sept. 1822 (second quotation).
59 Ibid., 11 Mar. (quotation, emphasis in original), 31 July, 11 Aug., 5 Nov.
1823.
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Slave owners o f  the Upper South tried to mitigate the negative consequences o f 
slavery through the General Register Office and the advertisements that excluded slave 
traders. In circumscribing the alternatives and limiting the possible buyers, these 
owners soothed their consciences by convincing themselves that they had taken the 
necessary steps to make the sale more palatable to their bondservants. Much o f the 
southern justification for slavery rested on certain obligations that masters had to their 
slaves, including food, housing, and clothing. A significant number o f slave owners 
also felt the sting o f  conscience when separating slave families. The interstate slave 
trade brought this tacit obligation into public view. Placing conditions on a slave’s sale 
was one way for owners to reassert their good faith in the master-slave relationship. 
Such steps, however, were paltry and often meaningless to bondservants who faced the 
prospect of separation from all things dear to them.
At its core, this early opposition to the slave trade rested upon the assumption of 
the slave’s humanity. The slave occupied an ambiguous and often contradictory place 
in southern society, being both a person and property. Slaves were treated like property 
when they were bought and sold, moved from place to place, and used as collateral in 
loans. Southern courts consistently upheld the property nature of the slave. 
Bondservants, however, were also human and did not always engage in behavior that 
suited slave owners. Possessors of free wills, they could choose to disobey their 
masters (and suffer the consequences) or comply with the orders given to them. Most 
southerners recognized this aspect of slavery, as welL This begrudging recognition of 
humanity was just the minimum. Masters could also assume that slaves had feelings, 
had strong family ties, and were subject to the same emotions as other human beings.
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Doing so required a  certain amount o f empathy and imparted a sense o f  dignity to the 
slave. Most owners preferred not to think about the consequences o f their actions upon 
their slaves. In the case of sale, masters could defend their decisions by telling 
themselves that what they did was in the best interest of the slave, or that circumstances 
beyond their control forced them to act. This notion o f paternalism, almost a fanciful 
dream by the master, was one way to justify the institution of slavery. The slave trade, 
however, operated in direct opposition to any paternalistic pretensions. It assumed the 
proprietary nature of the slave and assigned a dollar amount to the master-slave 
relationship. Masters who had no regard for the consequences o f the sale upon their 
slave denied the slave’s essential humanity and degraded their own.
In one sense, this ability to see the humanity of bondservants put masters and 
slaves on the same level. A Kentucky periodical tried to underscore this point by 
reprinting several notices of slave auctions. Its hope, the editor explained by quoting 
another periodical, was to “assist our readers to realize that human beings are indeed 
bought and sold in this ‘land o f liberty.’”60 The paper wanted to shatter the casual 
assumption of slaves’ savagery and replace it with a deep understanding of the 
vulnerability of slaves’ lives. The paper therefore tellingly contrasted bondage and 
liberty, putting its argument in terms that most southerners would understand.61 John 
Randolph made much the same point, but in his own idiosyncratic style. He mocked
60 Undated Christian Mirror, as reprinted in Western Luminary, 8 Mar. 1826, p. 
559. Emphasis in original.
61 James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation o f the Old South (New 
York, 1990), pp. 68-70.
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how masters tried to ease their consciences, and captured how slaveholders professed 
one motive but acted from another. In 1820 he placed sarcastic advertisements in two 
newspapers that lampooned those individuals who thought they were doing their slaves 
a favor by putting conditions on their sale. He asked “Southern and Western Planters” 
to buy “One thousand prime Virginia bom SLAVES” from a man who was “contracting 
the scale o f his business.” Randolph exaggerated the size o f  the slaveholding—one 
thousand was preposterous in 1820 Virginia—while the use o f  the word “business” was 
a deliberate attempt to capture the feeling o f the master-slave relationship. He knew 
that the slave’s prime function was to increase the holdings o f the master and, as such, 
the pecuniary motives o f  slaveholders came first. Randolph’s advertisement indicated 
that the slaves would be sold together or in families to suit purchasers. “No proposals 
from any slave trader,” he added, “will be attended to.” Randolph ridiculed those 
planters who pretended that they could ameliorate the shock o f a slave sale for their 
slaves. He recognized that even though owners might make a  distinction between 
selling to southern planters and selling to speculators, the slaves did not separate the 
two transactions because both caused pain and hardship.62
Several years before he placed the advertisements, Randolph had launched a 
public attack on the interstate trade in the House of Representatives. The actions o f a 
slave woman bound for Georgia so moved him that he implored his colleagues to curb 
the trade’s excesses. In March of 1816 a slave trader purchased the woman and her two
62 The advertisement is quoted in Savannah Daily Republican, 6 May 1820. The 
paper notes that the advertisement is attributed to Randolph and that it appeared in 
undated issues of the Richmond Enquirer and the Washington Federal Gazette. 
Examination o f  these two papers did not reveal the notice.
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children, intending to forcibly separate them from her husband and her other offspring. 
The woman refused to go. While being housed in a  local tavern as the speculator 
completed his purchases, the woman tried to kill herself by leaping out of a third story 
window. She broke her arms and back.63 After Randolph learned o f the incident, he 
rose to his feet in the House and blasted the “inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves 
carried on in the District.” He made a tangible connection between the legal sale of 
slaves, which he thought inhuman, and the kidnapping o f free persons, which he 
thought to be exacerbated by the trade. In so doing, he cast doubt upon the efficacy of 
the interstate slave trade by closely linking it to an illegal and abhorrent activity. 
Randolph turned his finger o f scorn towards an issue that most other southerners would 
rather avoid or ignore.
He began by pointing to events that were happening under the very noses o f the 
representatives. Not even on the rivers o f Africa, he said, was such a sin committed 
before God and man. At least the African trade plucked savages from their native 
wilds, rather than “tearing the civilized, informed negro, habituated to cultivated life, 
from his master, his friends, his wife, his children, or his parents.” Randolph 
distinguished between the movement o f slaves as a natural consequence of ownership,
63 Jesse Torrey to John Randolph, 29 Apr. 1816, Select Committee...on the 
Illegal Traffic in Slaves. Charles Miner o f Pennsylvania, in his speech of 7 Jan. 1829, 
related the story of how the woman inspired Randolph to act (Register o f Debates, 
Twentieth Congress, Second Session, p. 178). The incident happened at George 
Miller’s tavern on F Street, the most notorious tavern in Washington. For corroboration 
o f Miller’s establishment as a frequent destination for slave traders, see Washington 
National Intelligencer, 28 Sept. 1815, 7 May 1816; Deposition o f Francis Scott Key, 22 
Apr. 1816, and Sworn Statement o f Samuel Booker, 7 Mar. 1816, both in Select 
Committee...on the Illegal Traffic in Slaves.
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and the “systematic slave market.” The former was something in which the government 
had no authority to interfere, while it was the latter that Randolph found so offensive. 
That Washington had become a “depot for this nefarious traffic” was regrettable. 
Interstate traders confined slaves in prison before chaining them together in cofiles and 
driving them like cattle on southern roads. He was mortified when a foreigner of “high 
rank” told him that even though America calls itself the land of the free, the workings o f 
the slave trade would cause “the despotisms of Europe” to be “horrorstruck and 
disgusted.” 64
Randolph sounded almost like an abolitionist when he described “hard-hearted 
masters” who sold slaves for pecuniary gain. Employing a technique that would 
eventually become standard fare with anti-slavery advocates, he used an emotional plea 
that appealed to the finer senses of his listeners and depicted the struggles of a few 
heroic slaves. Randolph told the story o f a slave who had saved enough money to 
purchase the freedom of his wife and child. When the man died, his master sold the 
family anyway, contrary to the standards of decent society. This and other stories put a 
human face on a trade that treated its subjects as commodities. By ignoring abstract 
arguments and concentrating on concrete examples, Randolph hoped to prod the House 
into taking some type o f action to prevent the worst abuses of slavery within
64 Debates and Proceedings, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1 Mar. 1816, 
pp. 1115-17 (these and the following quotations are from this speech); Washington 
National Intelligencer, 2 Mar. 1816; N iles’ Weekly Register, 9 Mar. 1816, p. 30;
Wilson, Freedom at Risk, pp. 69-70; Russell Kirk, John Randolph o f Roanoke: A Study 
in American Politics (Chicago, 1964), pp. 131-39. Randolph’s speech is often quoted 
but seldom analyzed. See also Nehemiah Adams, South-side view o f Slavery; or Three 
Months at the South in 1854,3rd ed. (Boston, 1855), p. 196; Weld and Thome, Slavery
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Washington. At the end o f his appeal, Randolph moved that the Committee o f the 
District of Columbia “devise some speedy means to put a stop” to both the lawful and 
illegal trading in slaves in the District. I f  the House declined to act, Randolph 
characteristically threatened to undertake the business himself “and ferret out of their 
holes and comers the villains who carried it on.”
Randolph’s stance was quite a departure from his ravings during the debate over 
the closure o f the international trade. Nine years earlier he fought desperately to 
increase the tonnage of ships that carried slaves because he was afraid o f limiting the 
authority o f masters over their slaves. The man who earned a reputation as the South’s 
foremost opponent of federal interference with slavery was now asking Congress to do 
the very thing he earlier had opposed. Randolph hastened to explain that he was not 
interfering in “the contract between the owner and his slave,” and pointedly explained 
his previous efforts to preserve that relationship. The growth of the interstate slave 
trade and the concomitant rise o f  kidnappers changed Randolph’s mind. In 1816 he was 
willing to end the slave trade in the District of Columbia, a far more drastic step than 
increasing the tonnage of ships engaged in the coastwise trade.
Part o f his reasoning involves the status o f the District itself being under control 
o f the federal government. The sale o f slaves within Washington was subject to 
Congressional regulation and a 1794 federal statute prevented the exchange of 
bondservants from Virginia and Maryland within the city limits. Eighteen years later 
Congress amended this law and allowed Alexandria residents to take slaves into the
and the Internal Slave Trade, p. 206; Tremain, Slavery in the District o f  Columbia, p.
50; and Bancroft, Slave Trading in the Old South, pp. 45-46.
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District. Residents o f Washington still could not enter Alexandria to buy slaves in order 
to bring them back to the District to sell or reside. The intended effect o f the 
amendment was to prevent the sale o f slaves in the District. As a consequence, most of 
the transactions for the purchase or sale o f slaves took place in Alexandria, usually in 
private jails. However, some traders temporarily housed slaves in Washington’s taverns 
or small hotels on the outskirts o f town. The nation’s capital became a depot for the 
exhibition o f  slaves rather than a market, with the large slave traders of the 1820s 
operating out o f Alexandria or Baltimore. The perception, however, was that the 
District o f Columbia had a thriving slave trade because of the Alexandria trade.65
The oversight of commerce within federal territory was, in Randolph’s mind, a 
different matter than regulation o f trade between the states. The federal nature o f  the 
District set it apart and Randolph did not ask for regulation o f the trade outside o f 
Washington. He shrunk from full interference with the trade but wanted to find a 
moderate solution for a public eyesore. His rhetoric, however, does much to reveal his 
frame o f  mind. Randolph referred to a “crying sin before God and man” that separated 
slave families and drove them through the streets like “beasts.” The increased visibility 
o f the interstate slave trade, and its obvious brutality, gave Randolph reason to pause.
He had no desire to abolish slavery or impair the rights of masters, but he did see the 
worst side o f  slavery and wanted to remove the most odious aspects o f the peculiar
65 Hall, Travels in Canada, and the United States, p. 425; Mobile Commercial 
Register, 12 Sept. 1822; Bancroft, Slave Trading, pp. 49-53; Tremain, Slavery in the 
District o f Columbia, pp. 31-33; Clephane, “Slavery in the District o f Columbia,” pp, 
224-28,235; William T. Laprade, “The Domestic Slave Trade in the District o f 
Columbia,” Journal o f Negro History (1926): 19-21,27-30; Ridgeway, “A Peculiar 
Business.”
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institution. The best way to preserve slavery, he felt, was to reform it so that its 
opponents would have no room for criticism. Randolph was sensitive to the South’s 
reputation, as is obvious from his reference to the foreigner’s stinging remark. He also 
had a regard for the treatment of the slaves themselves, seeing them not as brutes, but as 
humans who needed the protection of the federal government. Randolph sought to 
domesticate domestic slavery.66
There was scant opposition to Randolph’s proposal, even from southern 
representatives, and northerners remained mute on the issue. Robert Wright of 
Maryland weakly protested that the laws concerning the trade were sufficient.
Referring to the War of 1812, he said that Europeans practiced a worse type slavery 
when they impressed sailors, so there was no reason to draw attention to the interstate 
slave trade. He tried and failed to bury the issue by diverting attention to a non- 
controversial topic. Fellow Maryland representative Charles Goldsborough agreed with 
Randolph’s assessment and noted that he, too, had seen coffies in Washington’s streets. 
Goldsborough did not want to limit the trade, though, and noted that laws would be o f 
no value in arresting the trade because they would not be enforced. When Henry St. 
George Tucker of Virginia suggested that a select committee would be the best method 
for addressing the situation, the House readily complied. Shifting the burden to a 
committee would remove the obnoxious issue from debate. In addition to Randolph,
66 Kirk, John Randolph o f Roanoke, pp. 131-33. This concept is taken from 
Willie Lee Rose, “The Domestication o f Domestic Slavery” in William W. Freehling, 
ed., Slavery and Freedom (New York, 1982), pp. 18-36. My analysis extends the 
concept that Rose first elucidated.
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the committee included one member each from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and 
South Carolina.67
After spending two months gathering information, the committee turned over its 
evidence to the House. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that the most egregious 
abuse associated with the internal slave trade was the “atrocious” kidnapping o f free 
persons. Committee members struck out the word “commerce” in describing the 
overall trade and substituted “traffic.” Although this may have been an attempt to 
portray the trade negatively, it is possible that it was meant to circumvent the wording 
o f the Constitution that allowed Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The 
committee also recommended that state authorities deal with the problem rather than the 
federal government. These conclusions were not shared with the entire House, since the 
report was ordered to lie on the table just before Congress adjourned.68 The House did 
not want to take on the difficult issue of the interstate slave trade, and most members 
were content to let the issue die. While there was a vague sentiment against the trade 
and a slight impulse to reform it, there was not enough o f a commitment to actually do 
anything. Despite its recent growth, the interstate trade was more o f a minor irritant 
than anything else. Even though no direct action was taken, it is significant that the first 
direct attack on speculation in the Capitol had come not from a northerner, but from a
67 Debates and Proceedings, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 1 Mar. 1816, p. 
1117. That Northerners were mute is an assumption based on the lack of any statements 
in the public records o f the day. The other committee members were Joseph Hopkinson 
(PN), Charles Goldsborough (MD), William Mayrant (SC), and John Kerr (VA).
68 Papers o f the Select Committee...on the Illegal Traffic in Slaves, (quotations); 
Debates and Proceedings, Fourteenth Congress, First Session, 30 Apr. 1816, p. 1465;
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southerner, and one who had a solid reputation as a defender of slavery. Another 
southerner supported his opinion. Just as importantly, this examination o f the slave 
trade stemmed from the Upper South, while the Lower South remained silent on the 
issue. Southern members did not defend the trade, justify it, or shift the blame onto the 
back o f the slave trader, as they would do later. Northern members refused to attack the 
trade as emblematic o f  the harsh state o f slavery in the South or call for an immediate 
end to slave trading and the abolition o f  slavery in the District of Columbia. In 1817, 
discussions about the slave trade generated no light and no heat. It was not yet a part o f 
the nation’s consciousness.
The next denunciation of the interstate slave trade in Congress came three years 
later, during the debates surrounding the admission o f Missouri. This time the 
discussion was dramatically different. Northerners raised the issue and forced 
southerners to respond. James Tallmadge triggered the debate when he moved that 
slavery be prohibited from Missouri and slave children bom after statehood be free at 
age twenty-five. The northern representatives who allied with Tallmadge used their 
observations of the slave coffles in Washington as a way to seize the moral high ground 
and bludgeon the South. In the face o f  this outside attack on slavery and the trade, 
southerners relied on apologetics to defuse northern accusations. They refused to 
discuss the moral implications of speculation but concentrated instead on the 
constitutional right o f  southern migrants to carry bondservants into new territory. 
Southerners hoped to keep the slave trade out of the debates because they were not
Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 1 May 1816; Niles ’ Weekly Register, 4 May 
1816, p. 165.
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comfortable with defending it as an integral part of servitude and did not have a 
coherent explanation for its existence. The focus o f the deliberations had changed, as 
well. There was no mention of kidnapping; instead, debate centered on whether or not 
the presence o f a  thriving slave trade in Washington contradicted the principles o f free 
government and if the slave trade should be allowed in territory added to the United 
States. Northerners depicted the trade as emblematic o f  slavery and drew the 
conclusion that such an evil institution must not be allowed to expand. Their 
experience with the District of Columbia’s slave trade became the basis for their 
remarks about what slavery would be like in Missouri.
Arthur Livermore o f New Hampshire fired the first salvo when he used the slave 
trade to blast the South. In dramatic fashion, he described how the separation o f 
“mothers and children” led to “agonies of grief.” Tallmadge then kept up the pressure 
by refusing to listen to any excuses for the trade. He noted that a “slave driver, a 
trafficker in human flesh” carrying a whip just drove a coffle past the Capitol.
Tallmadge hinted that providence placed the coffle there to provide a dramatic 
illustration for his argument. He described how the “males, who might raise the arm of 
vengeance, and retaliate for their wrongs, were handcuffed, and chained to each other, 
while the females and children were marched in their rear, under the guidance of the 
driver’s whip!” Tallmadge could not believe such scenes took place in “Republican 
America.”69 Livermore and Tallmadge’s vivid descriptions were a powerful indictment
69 Livermore’s remarks are in Debates and Proceedings, Fifteenth Congress, 
Second Session, 16 Feb. 1819, 1:1191-92, while Tallmadge’s are on 1: 1210. See also 
Glover Moore, The Missouri Controversy 1819-1821 (Lexington, 1953), pp. 33-51.
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of slavery’s dark side. They referred to scenes with which most o f  their fellow 
representatives were familiar and directly connected slavery’s vitality to a robust slave 
trade. In doing so, they tried to mobilize opposition to the spread o f slavery by arguing 
that the admission of Missouri as a slave state would strengthen the slave trade. The 
two men hoped to tap into the emotions of their colleagues by describing slavery in the 
most dismal way possible.70
If northern representatives intended to use these condemnations of the trade to 
aggravate their southern colleagues, they failed. The indictment o f speculation and 
slavery drew no heated response from the southern delegates. Only Louis McLane of 
Delaware directly addressed the issue. In opposing Tallmadge’s amendment, McLane 
argued in favor of the dispersal o f slaves into land west of the Mississippi River because 
those who moved would be less restless. He also tried to convince his colleagues that 
such bondservants would live better lives because they would be on superior land. 
McLane apologetically noted that, on a personal level, he would not permit slaves to be 
sold by traders, or become the objects of profit. He believed the states, not the federal 
government, should regulate the movement of bondservants and pointed to the example 
o f Delaware. His home state prohibited the introduction or exportation of slaves for 
sale. McLane’s bland appeal failed to rouse his colleagues to action. No other southern 
congressman referred to the interstate slave trade during the Missouri debates. The 
virtual silence of southerners on the slave trade suggests that they would not be drawn
70 Huston, “Experiential Basis,” 609-40 describes northern revulsion at seeing 
slave auctions and cofiQes, albeit for a later time period. He convincingly argues that 
northerners who had first-hand experience with slavery were likely to be shocked by 
what they saw and actively oppose the institution.
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into a discussion o f slavery’s morality, nor would they criticize any portion of it. 
Southerners could hardly defend slavery through an admission o f the interstate slave 
trade’s brutality and the feet that it would spread to new territory. Their willingness to 
criticize speculation evaporated in the face of northern assaults on slavery.71
Northern representatives changed tactics once it became apparent their criticism 
would not draw out southerners. They alleged that the spread of slavery into Missouri 
would further increase the smuggling of Africans into the United States. On this 
account, they tried to tar the legal interstate trade with the brush o f the illegal African 
trade. John W. Taylor argued that an expansion o f slave territory would make the 
whole country west o f the Mississippi River a “market overt for human flesh.” The 
natural consequence of allowing slaves into Missouri, his argument ran, would be an 
increase in smuggling. On the shores o f Africa there would be a rise o f  unscrupulous 
men who bought slaves with “a few gewgaws or a bottle of whiskey” and then sold 
them in New Orleans. Like the earlier attack on slave coffles, the denunciation o f the 
international trade drew a muted response from southerners, who merely asserted that 
the foreign trade was illegal and they did not wish to revive it.72
Although using the interstate slave trade as a moral indictment o f  slavery and 
dredging up the African slave trade did not cause southerners to rise to the bait, another
71 Debates and Proceedings, Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, 17 Feb. 1819, 
2: 1233-34; Don Fehrenbacher, The South and the Three Sectional Crises (Baton 
Rouge, 1980), pp. 9-23. Even South Carolina Senator William Smith, who defended 
the institution without reservation, did not mention the trade.
72 Debates and Proceedings, Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, 15 Feb. 1819, 
1: 1175.
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tactic did draw a heated response. When northern senators linked the interstate trade 
with the migration of bondservants across state lines, southerners responded quickly. 
This creative method relied on the ninth section of the Constitution’s first article to 
argue that Congress could prevent the importation and migration o f slaves into new 
territories or states. Timothy Fuller o f Massachusetts was the first to try this approach. 
Again, he injected a moral indictment into his argument by saying he feared that the 
“opening o f an extensive slave market will tempt the cupidity of those who would 
otherwise perhaps might gradually emancipate their slaves.” The establishment of “a 
new and boundless market” for slaves, moreover, would doom the nascent colonization 
movement. Philip P. Barbour of Virginia brushed past the allegations o f a vast slave 
market and defended the right of southerners to carry their slaves into Missouri. 
Prohibiting such movement would effectively prevent slaveholders from moving into 
the new state. He pointed out that slave labor was necessary to establish farms, and 
since few slaves would be available for purchase, there would be no incentive for 
migration. Barbour tried to avoid the topic of the slave trade, merely noting that 
“nothing scarcely but the necessity o f the master, or the crime of the slave” induced 
masters to sell their slaves. The Fifteenth Congress adjourned having accomplished 
nothing, except to show that southerners were reluctant to face the moral criticisms of 
slavery and eager to steer the debate to a strict interpretation of the Constitution that 
defended property rights.73
73 Ibid., 15 February 1819, 1: 1183-84, 1188; Fehrenbacher, The South and the 
Three Sectional Crises, pp. 22-23.
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The Missouri debates continued into the next session, but when discussing the 
movement of slaves, the congressmen continued to talk past one another. Northern 
representatives continually mentioned the movement o f slaves by traders, while their 
southern counterparts constantly spoke of migration. In the Senate, Jonathan Roberts o f  
Pennsylvania referred to a Louisiana law that outlawed the carrying o f slaves into that 
state unless done so by a United States citizen who intended to settle there. John Elliot 
of Georgia responded by noting that slaves were not subject to restrictions o f migration 
because they had no volition or self-determination. They might be carried, but they did 
not migrate. The Constitution, he explained, did not allow Congress to inhibit transfer 
or removal o f slaves from one state to another. Such a right was “claimed and exercised 
by the States, and they will never surrender it.” He went on to admit that slavery was an 
“evil,” but sound policy dictated migration because the slave population was safer when 
it was dispersed instead o f being cooped up in a few slave states.74 Senators from 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and Kentucky all concurred that Congress could 
lawfully outlaw the importation of slaves from areas outside the United States but 
cannot “regulate the internal distribution” o f slaves.75
Southern representatives produced an argument similar to their counterparts in 
the Senate. A jittery Alexander Smyth of Virginia explained what would be the 
consequences of confining slaves to Virginia. “Let Saint Domingo answer,” he said,
74 Ibid., Sixteenth Congress, First Session, 17 January 1820, 2: 125-26 and 129-
35.
75 Ibid., speeches o f Walter Leake, 19 Jan. 1820, 2: 197-99; William Smith, 26 
Jan. 1820, 2:259-64 (quotation on 2: 260); James Barbour, 1 Feb. 1820, 2: 317-20; and 
Richard M. Johnson, 1 Feb. 1820,2: 351-52.
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since the more that slaves were concentrated, “the greater the danger.” He thought 
dispersion was the best policy for a “distinct people” whose growth might endanger the 
peace. Not only would dispersal lead to safety for all, but Smyth believed it improved 
the treatment o f slaves. Reid of Georgia asserted that slaves were held to an easy form 
of bondage, thus justifying the institution.76
It is clear that southern congressmen would not acknowledge the presence o f an 
interstate trade that destroyed slave families and caused untold hardship. Their way o f 
dealing with the situation was to deflect all references to the inhumanity  or barbarity o f  
speculation and instead assert that Congress had no power to regulate the migration of 
bondservants. They assumed that most o f the slaves who moved into new territory 
came with migrating owners rather than slave traders. The use of the word “migration” 
to describe the slaves was intentional, as it did not paint as harsh a picture o f the slaves’ 
conditions and bypassed constitutional questions. Southerners were beginning to 
realize that the slave trade was vital to slavery’s continued existence. They were not, 
however, willing to admit publicly that slave owners participated in the trade. There 
was no consensus on how to respond to northern attacks on speculation. Southerners 
were struggling with how to reconcile their defense o f slavery with their misgivings 
surrounding speculation, especially in the face o f outside pressure to end the trade.
In the end, of course, Missouri retained slavery, and the interstate slave trade 
remained unregulated. Northern congressmen used the trade as a convenient tool to 
attack the South. Vivid rhetoric describing the markets o f human flesh and the cries o f
76 Ibid., Sixteenth Congress, First Session, 18 Jan. 1820,1:1010-12 (quotation),
1 Feb. 1820, 1: 1024-27.
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slaves separated from their families became a weapon against slavery’s expansion. 
Those who opposed the peculiar institution tried to cut through some o f  the abstractions 
and make the discussion personal. They hoped to sidestep the theoretical issues o f law 
and policy by stirring up the emotions o f  their listeners. Although the Missouri debates 
may have identified “the doctrine o f states’ rights with the defense o f slavery,” the 
contours of debate reveal that the interstate slave trade was included in the defense 
perimeter. The inchoate nature of the trade, specifically the fact that it was just 
developing into a major source of labor ft>r the Deep South, meant that southerners did 
not rush to defend it. They began to recognize the growing importance of the slave 
trade to the maintenance o f  slavery, if  not through the presence o f coffles in the South, 
then through the persistent attacks of northern representatives.77
Those who defended the trade did so in cold and legalistic terms. They 
managed to avoid interference with the trade, but there was something hollow about 
their victory, especially in light of the heated and emotional arguments of slavery’s 
opponents. Although southerners hid the interstate slave trade under the guise o f state 
sovereignty and migration, such defenders needed another strategy to protect slavery 
because the moral attacks left them vulnerable. They needed to draw a sharper 
distinction between migration and the slave trade because the former was widely 
regarded as legitimate while the latter was suspect because selfish motives could be 
imputed to it. The slave trade, furthermore, seemed to contradict one o f the main 
reasons for accepting slavery—that the institution improved bondservants’ lives.
77 Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age 
o f  Jefferson (New York, 1965), p. 220.
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Southerners needed to find a consistent and effective way to ward off criticism o f a slice 
o f their society that was an easy point o f attack for outsiders and that caused misgivings 
for many insiders as well. Distinguishing between the slave trade and planter migration 
was a start, but would prove inadequate to withstand the sustained abolitionist attacks of 
the next decade.78
Southerners did not rush to defend the interstate trade in the literary realm, 
either. George Tucker, for instance, struggled with how to reconcile the trade with his 
support of slavery. Bom in Bermuda, Tucker grew up in Virginia near his distant 
cousin, Henry St. George Tucker. He failed as a lawyer, but his skill in selecting rich 
young women to marry ensured that he would have enough money to support his vices 
of gambling and lavish parties. Tucker served in the state legislature before his election 
to the United States Congress, where he betrayed his Jeffersonian Republican principles 
by supporting the Bank of the United States and Henry Clay. His legal career seemed 
to be a dalliance more than anything since he aspired to be a writer.79 In Letters from  
Virginia (1816), Tucker used the well-wom literary device of a fictitious outside 
observer to satirize society, in this case Virginia’s. In his fifth letter, he provided a 
sentimental description of a coffle o f slaves and their cruel trader. Tucker invited the 
reader’s attention by musing whether he was in Norfolk or on “some barbarous coast,”
78 For consistent attacks on the interstate slave trade and strident southern 
countermeasures in the 1830s and beyond, see David L. Lightner, “The Door to the 
Slave Bastille: The Abolitionist Assault upon the Interstate Slave Trade, 1833-1839,” 
Civil War History, 34 (1988): 235-52; and David L. Lightner, “The Interstate Slave 
Trade in Antislavery Politics,” Civil War History, 36 (1990): 119-36.
79 Robert Colin McLean, George Tucker: Moral Philosopher and Man o f  Letters 
(Chapel Hill, 1961), pp. 3-36.
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implicitly linking the interstate trade to its African forebear. Tucker’s French traveler 
heard and then saw thirty slaves who were chained to one another. The sight o f the 
coffie appalled him and he felt pity for the slaves who clung to one another for 
emotional and physical support. He was especially touched by a woman and her three 
children, one of whom suckled while the other two held either side of their mother’s 
apron to prevent being separated from her. Tucker described several “varieties of 
distress,” from a “soft gentle sorrow” to a “grim and threatening  despair, that asked for
OA
nothing but a grave.” A speculator had just bought the slaves at an auction.
Tucker’s detailed description makes it clear that he had seen a slave coffie. His 
moving portrayal o f  the scene was intended to provoke emotions o f sympathy for the 
slaves. He noted that they sang a  hymn, showing their nobility in the face o f calamity. 
Tucker not only described the slaves in the coffie, he imbued them with vivid emotions. 
Posing as the Frenchmen, he wondered how someone could hear without compassion 
“the shrieks of a mother, tom forever from the bosom of her children” or not have a 
pang o f conscience when the “little child of innocence” was tom from its mother. He 
described slaves as human beings so that whites would regard them as such, rather than 
insensitively dismissing them as brutes. Any person who thought that slaves were not 
human was sadly blinded from seeing that bondservants “love their wives, their 
children, their homes, as well as their masters.” Tucker cited the fact that the “sentence
a i
of banishment strikes them like the message of death” as proof o f their humanity.
80 [George Tucker], Letters from  Virginia, translatedfrom the French 
(Baltimore, 1816), pp. 29-30.
81 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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If  the slaves had a certain amount of dignity and humanity in Tucker’s account, 
the same cannot be said for the slave trader. The “rough looking white man” sat 
“carelessly lolling in his sulkey.” A short distance from the courthouse, he stopped at a 
tavern, “supplied himself with brandy, and his horse with water, (the poor negroes, o f 
course, wanting nothing,) stepped into his chair again, cracked his whip, and drove on, 
while the miserable exiles followed in funeral procession behind him.” The visitor 
labeled the trader as rude brute and wanted to call down fire from above “to blast the 
wretch,” even though such thoughts were unchristian. Somewhat confused, the visitor 
asked a local resident what the slaves did to deserve such a punishment. The man 
replied that the slaves had done nothing at all but their master wanted money and “these 
drivers give good prices.” Tucker implicitly showed how the commercial nature of the 
slave trade warred against the paternalistic pretenses of slave owners. The writer 
wondered how Virginians could “tolerate an abuse of this horrible character” since such 
a “dreadful punishment” was inflicted on an “innocent being.” Tucker was certain that 
“Virginians are not barbarians” even though their actions may tell a different story.
Habit made such men forget the situation of the “poor wretches” and even reconciled 
them to such horrors.82
Tucker clearly condemned the slave trader. Like the later southern novels that 
perpetuated the myth of the slave speculator, his portrait of this man was one­
dimensional.83 There was no room for admiration of the speculator’s character; he was
82 Ibid., pp. 29-35.
83 Tadman, Speculators ana Slaves, pp. 180-84.
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motivated by money, was lazy, drank too much, and had no redeeming qualities. What 
set Tucker’s work apart from later novels was his portrayal o f witnesses to the coffie 
and the slaves themselves. Tucker was most critical of the auction’s observers, 
something that was in stark contrast to all o f  the later antebellum fiction. He singled out 
the witnesses for rebuke because they allowed such reprehensible activities to flourish 
in their midst. No civilized nation should tolerate such treatment of any part of its 
population. Those who sold slaves were not merely caught in a web of forces beyond 
their control, but were willing participants in the destruction o f slave families. Like the 
trader, they were motivated by profit because they received good prices for their slaves 
from speculators. Tucker equated the slaveholder who sold his slaves with the 
speculator who bought them. Both shared the blame for the slave trade and both had 
allowed slavery to become repugnant.
The heroes o f  the description were the slaves. Tucker’s slaves were different 
from whites, but any inferiority was from their situation rather than their color. The 
later accounts of slave sales painted bondservants in stereotypical terms, portraying 
them as wholly devoted to their owners and accepting the reasons for the auction.
Tucker refused to stereotype the slaves in his story. They did not show excessive 
devotion to their masters and, just as importantly, they were not miraculously rescued in 
the end; they marched southward singing their hymn. The overall lesson that Tucker 
wanted to teach was that slavery exploited the slaves and caused the white mind to 
“sink.”84
84 Letters from  Virginia., pp. 73-101, quotation on p. 101.
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Tucker’s second work, published eight years later, was less critical o f  Virginia 
society. He was more forgiving o f  those who sold their slaves and depicted a state 
struggling through difficult economic times. The poor condition o f Virginia agriculture 
forced owners to part with their slaves even as they worked to keep their labor force 
intact. In The Valley o f  the Shenandoah (1824), Trueheart, an attorney, handled the 
disposition o f  Mrs. Grayson’s property. Her husband’s death forced Mrs. Grayson to 
sell her slaves in order to prevent foreclosure. Trueheart conformed to his client’s 
wishes and located a buyer in Georgia who was expanding his cotton holdings. Finding 
such a man relieved Mrs. Grayson, since the pain of separation from her servants would 
be softened since all o f them, or at least nearly all, would go to a “good master” and the 
structure o f their families would be preserved.85
Naturally the slaves learned of the sale since the domestic servants overheard the 
conversation between Trueheart and Mrs. Grayson. One of the oldest slaves 
approached her owner and asked for a favor. She requested that her daughter and 
grandchildren not be included in the pending sale because they would be worked too 
hard in Georgia.86 Mrs. Grayson reasoned with the slave and convinced her that slave 
life in Georgia will not be as bad as imagined. The old slave relented to the sale, but 
asked that her youngest grandchild be sold to a Virginia farmer. Mrs. Grayson agreed 
and called all o f  the slaves together to officially inform them o f the impending sale.
[George Tucker], The Valley o f  the Shenandoah; or, Memories o f  the 
Graysons, 2 vol. (New York, 1824), 2:194-96.
86 The mention o f sale to Georgia is in stark contrast to all later fiction, which 
assumes slaves will go to Louisiana.
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She assured her bondservants that none o f them would be sold “against their wishes.” 
Three or four slaves indicated their desire to stay in Virginia, so Mrs. Grayson spared 
them from the auction. In a final act of “genuine benvolence,” she gave her old clothes 
to her slaves and fed them sugar and molasses.87
The slave auction commenced that afternoon, and many people were “extremely 
shocked” to see fellow human beings “set up for sale to the highest bidder, like horses 
or cattle.” Even those who were accustomed to such things found it disagreeable. 
Tucker defended the scene, though, in asserting that slaves hardly felt their fetters and 
that all o f  their wants were supplied. Only “moderate” coercion was necessary to 
persuade them to take part in the auction and they did not “feel it to be wrong” since 
they were members o f “a sort o f patriarchal family.” When one of the slaves cried on 
the auction block because she would be separated from her husband, the man’s owner 
bid on her. He risked financial ruin by trying to keep the “hussey” and her husband 
together. Trueheart came up with a better idea: sell both o f the slaves to the Georgia 
bidder. It was done and all parties were satisfied. The true crisis of the day came when 
two slave traders bid for a likely mulatto girl who suited the tastes of the “libertines of 
the French or Spanish settlements.” Under orders from Trueheart, the auctioneer 
slowed down the bidding while the attorney authorized a bystander to buy the woman 
on his behalf. When one o f the speculators made a disparaging remark about 
Trueheart’s motives, the local formers rebuked the man and forced him to leave the
87 Ibid., 2:196-201,212.
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auction. The end result was that no spouses were separated, no slaves were sold to 
Georgia against their wishes, and the plans of the slave trader were thwarted.88
Tucker’s second work was a curious blend of conflicting attitudes. He was not 
as critical o f slavery as in his first novel, but did condemn the institution, or at least its 
effects. The slave trader, the crowd, and the slaves were depicted in simplistic ways. 
The bondservants, for instance, professed undying devotion to their mistress and instead 
crying, wailing, and grimly submitting to the speculator as before, they were almost 
happy to go to Georgia. Tucker, though, could not just explain away the auction and its 
blunt intrusion into slaves’ lives. He was critical of absentee ownership and the 
separation o f families. Tucker was one o f the few southern novelists to address these 
issues without apology. He struggled to explain something so shocking as an auction, 
but ended up deadening its impact. While Tucker was commenting on the horror of the 
auction for the slave, he tried to reconcile that situation with the paternalistic view of 
slaveholders. Slavery was still a “necessary evil,” but his second novel softened the 
harsh edges of the peculiar institution and acquitted those masters who took care of their 
slaves. The greatest evil o f slavery, he concluded by 1824, was the dissolution of slave 
families from an auction. This result could be, and often was, prevented by the quick 
thinking and resourcefulness o f the upstanding citizens of the South. He came to accept 
the slave trade’s presence by denying its pervasiveness.89
88 Ibid., 2: 206-10. Tucker was unusual in that he regarded a slave family as 
including the husband.
89 Ibid., 1: 62 (quotation); McLean, George Tucker, pp. 183-86; Susan J. Tracy, 
In the Master’s Eye: Representations o f Women, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Antebellum 
Southern Literature (Amherst, Mass., 1995), pp. 48-61.
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Tucker’s changing attitudes came, in part, because o f  success in increasing his 
slaveholdings. As he prospered, he saw the difficulties o f his neighbors and became 
afraid that Virginia would be swamped with idle slaves. For that reason, he defended 
slavery’s expansion during the Missouri Compromise. Since the spread o f slavery to 
the Southwest would lessen the chance of unrest in Virginia, he did not want to confine 
bondservants in the “older” states where they would eventually outnumber whites and 
threaten society. Tucker believed in diffusion and looked to the day when slaves would 
decline in value and become a burden to their owners, who would then lead the drive 
for emancipation. He later supported colonization and proposed that the United States 
buy land west o f the Rocky Mountains “that may be suitable for colonizing the free 
people of color.” Tucker held moderate attitudes on slavery, wanting it protected but 
wishing somehow to reform or gradually abolished it. His divided mind appeared in his 
second novel. He could hardly defend the willful fracturing o f  slave families that he 
described in Letters, so he modified his portrayal of the slave trade. It was now 
something that enlightened slaveholders needed to resist. The underlying motive, 
however, was a justification of slave sales and an attempt to show how little the trade 
disrupted the lives o f slaves. The evolution of Tucker’s views is indicative of how most 
southerners were learning to deal with the slave trade.90
Like Tucker, John P. Kennedy straggled to find a context for the slave trade in 
his writings. Kennedy’s novel Swallow Bam first published in 1832, reflected this
90 Register o f  Debates in Congress, Eighteenth Congress, Second Session, 2 
Mar. 1825,1: 736 (quotation); McLean, George Tucker, pp. 180-86; Debates and 
Proceedings, Sixteenth Congress, First Session, 25 Feb. 1820, pp. 1531-35.
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ambivalent view o f slavery and the separation o f slave families. He devoted a chapter 
to slave life and observed that the slaves were blessed with a “kind and considerate 
master” who frequently looked in on them to make sure they were comfortable. The 
slaves always happily greeted their master who gave them gifts. There was an “air of 
contentment and good humor and kind family attachment” between owner and slave. 
Kennedy’s treatment of the slaves was flattened and robbed them o f their humanity 
since they were perfectly content with their lives.91 Even though the slaveholders were 
“men of kind and humane tempers,” there was the necessity o f  reform. Kennedy 
thought masters were liable to reproach “for the neglect or omission o f  our laws to 
recognize and regulate marriages, and the relation o f family amongst the negroes.” He 
was ashamed that he had no answer for charges that families were separated and called 
for stiff punishment to prevent the separation of husband and wife or parent and child. 
The “disregard of these attachments has brought more odium upon the conditions o f 
servitude than all the rest of its imputed hardships.” Foreclosing the separation families 
would gratify conscientious slaveholders and silence critics o f slavery.92
Kennedy was obviously a harsh critic of family break-ups and was candid 
enough to admit that they were prevalent, or at least widespread enough to bring infamy 
on the South. He did not blame the slave trader and, in fact, he foiled to mention the
91 John P. Kennedy, Swallow Bam, or a Sojourn in the Old Dominion (1832; 
reprint, New York, 1854), pp. 451-52; Charles H. Bohner, John Pendleton Kennedy: 
Gentleman from Baltimore (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 86-87, 187-88. Tucker and Kennedy 
were the only two southern novelists prior to 1840 who addressed the issue o f the 
interstate slave trade. This paucity is in stark contrast to the glut in the 1850s, 
especially following the publication o f Uncle Tom’s Cabin.
92 Ibid. p, 459.
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practice of speculation, or depict an auction. Kennedy did not rely on the scapegoat of 
the slave trader who was responsible causing anguish and grief among untold slaves but 
who was thwarted by the actions o f the virtuous citizenry. He, instead, called for a 
reform of the slave owners who should be punished for separating families. Rather than 
allowing the sale and speculation to continue unbridled by blaming others for its 
existence, Kennedy would legally limit the power o f  slaveholders over their 
possessions. He sought an answer in the law rather than in the crafting o f a mythology. 
Kennedy recognized the agitation over slavery and blamed the separation of families for 
most of the problems. Like John Randolph, he wanted southerners to reform slavery in 
order to silence outside critics.93
Tucker, Kennedy, and other critics of the slave trade sensed that continual 
exposure to coffles would dull the senses of white southerners. The African Observer, a 
short-lived anti-slavery journal, thought “this traffic may be readily reconciled” once 
“the nerves and the conscience have become inured to the purchase and sale o f human 
beings as goods and chattels.”94 Another southerner, this one a resident o f North 
Carolina, told Andrews he could tolerate everything about slavery but the “shocking 
separations” when slaves left family and loved ones behind. When told that such scenes 
were inseparable from slavery itself, the man reluctantly concluded that if the slave
93 Although Kennedy admitted slavery was “theoretically and morally wrong,” 
any sudden freedom o f the slaves would bring calamity. He felt the question o f 
emancipation must be left to the southerners who would deal with it in a reasonable 
fashion (Ibid., pp. 455-58).
94 African Observer, May 1827, p. 54.
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trade could not be made better, “it must be submitted to with all its inconveniences.”95 
An Alexandria newspaper agreed. It condemned the trade, those who participated in it, 
and the others who sat idly by because soon people would “become so accustomed to its 
repulsive features, that they cease to discourage it in others.”96
Citizens in the Upper South were divided as to the trade’s virtue, alarmed at its 
growth, and uncertain o f its proper place in society. The increased number of coffles 
and the growing presence of speculators at estate sales and public auctions clashed with 
southerners’ idealistic assumptions about slavery. While the exploitation of slaves on a 
plantation could be a  private affair, coffles and auctions were constant reminders of how 
slaves could suddenly be uprooted and separated from all they knew. Upper South 
residents could no longer blithely assume that the yoke o f bondage was easy or that a 
slave’s burden was light. The obvious growth o f  speculative activity raised concerns 
that the master-slave relationship was being tilted too much towards exploitation. 
Concerns over the trade’s expansion, however, were not translated into specific 
activities devoted to controlling speculation. There were halting efforts, like the 
General Register Office, but they proved inadequate to the task at hand. Citizens o f the 
Upper South were more likely to ignore the issue or deflect discussion elsewhere. John 
Randolph made no progress in his attempt to regulate the District o f Columbia’s trade 
and the Missouri debates reveal a willingness to debate migration rather than
95 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 195-96.
96 Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 22 June 1827. For more examples, see James S. 
Buckingham, The Slave States o f  America, 2 vol. (London, 1842), 1:182; “American 
Convention,” p. 328; and Charles Lyell, A Second Visit to the United States o f North 
America, 2 vol. (New York, 1849), 2:125-26.
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speculation. Even though Upper South residents were divided when it came to the 
interstate slave trade, they were slowly moving towards more cohesiveness. They were, 
in fact, beginning to adopt attitudes that were prevalent in the Lower South.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Four
When John Belton O’Neale looked out his front door in 1816 he was mortified 
to see a speculator and his slave coffie “on John O’Neall’s Lane, on the Columbia road” 
in central South Carolina. The gang, which marched “sadly along,” consisted o f “all 
sizes, ages, sexes, and conditions.” The children, shielded by the innocence o f youth, 
were “playful as other [i.e. white] children” despite being “nearly or quite naked.”1 
O’Neale, a Quaker, was so moved by the slaves’ plight that when elected to the South 
Carolina House o f Representatives, he sponsored a bill that prohibited the entry of all 
slaves into the state.2 He tried to convince his fellow representatives that the slave trade 
was not only “unfeeling[,] tyrannical and oppressive,” but also dangerous. O’Neale 
feared that speculators flooded the state with “a population that could not be controlled 
nor governed.” He used “impassion’d eloquence” to describe “all the horrors o f the San 
Domingo revolution,” implying that South Carolina might be next to suffer a race war. 
Upon completing his speech, O’Neale glanced at his collegues and noted with 
satisfaction that there was not “an unmoistened eye in the assembly room.”
O’Neale was not the only person in South Carolina to have misgivings about the 
slave trade. The same year he lamented the presence o f the trade, a grand jury in
1 “Memoir o f  John O’Neall,” pp. 61-62, John O’Neale Papers, Duke. He also 
spelled his name “O ’Neall.”
2 South Carolina House o f Representatives Journal, 25 Nov. 1816 through 19 
Dec. 1816, pp. 2, 142,207, Manuscript in South Carolina Archives, Columbia, South 
Carolina.
3 “Memoir o f  John O’Neall,” pp. 63-64, John O’Neale Papers.
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Spartanburg thought it a “serious and lamentable grievance” that “slaves from other 
parts of the Union” were brought into the state. In York, another grand jury came to a 
similar conclusion and asked for a law “against the introduction o f  slaves into this 
state.”4 Governor David Williams, perhaps sensing the general mood o f the state, 
expressed his concern about the situation. In his address that opened the 1816 
legislative session, he asked the legislators to stop the “remorseless merciless 
traffic.. .which is a reproach to our morals, and an outrage to our feelings.” Not only 
did slave trading create countless “suffering victims,” it brought in “convicts and 
malefactors.” The recent war had allowed slaves to run loose in the state and something 
must be done to remedy the situation. Williams felt that “wise policy” and the “lights 
o f humanity” intersected in this case. Not only was outlawing the slave trade prudent, it 
was the right thing to do.5 Seven years earlier, Williams had joined Peter Early and 
John Randolph in the House o f Representatives to fight for protection of the coastwise 
transportation o f  slaves. Apparently Williams’s commitment to protect the interstate 
movement o f  slaves had its limits. While it might seem noble to debate the right to 
transport slaves, the reality o f bondservants entering the state persuaded Williams to 
adopt a different stance.6
4 Spartanburg grand jury, as quoted in H. M. Henry, The Police Control o f  the 
Slave in South Carolina (Emory, Vir., 1914), p. 106 (first quotation); Charleston 
Southern Patriot and Commercial Advertiser, 7 Dec. 1816 (second quotation).
5 Charleston Courier, 4 Dec. 1816 (quotation); Henry, Police Control, p. 106.
6 Williams’s opposition to lowering the tonnage for coastwise vessels 
transporting slaves is described on pp. 19-22 o f  this study.
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Williams signed O’Neale’s law in December o f  1816. Citizens and emigrants to 
South Carolina could not bring slaves into the state, although migrants passing through 
could have bondservants. The measure mandated the seizure o f all slaves imported in 
violation o f the act, their auction, and the transferal o f half the proceeds to the informer. 
Those importing the slaves were fined $50, while those who knowingly bought an 
imported slave incurred a $400 penalty.7 O’Neale noted with delight that the law was 
“unpopular with the Slave drivers and brokers.”8 His exultation was short-lived, 
however, since the measure was too harsh. As written it could not be, and was not, 
enforced. The demand for slaves in South Carolina was too great and numerous 
residents violated the law. Others flooded their representatives with petitions. By the 
time the legislature convened, seven hundred and thirty-five petitions were awaiting 
action. One local paper complained, “God only knows how many more will be 
presented before the end o f the session.”9 Legislators were loathe to abandon the law 
altogether, so they struck a compromise and allowed South Carolina residents to bring 
in slaves whom they acquired by inheritance, bequest, or marriage.10
7 Charleston Southern Patriot, 21 Feb. 1817; Niles' Weekly Register, 15 Feb. 
1817, p. 399; Henry, Police Control, pp. 106-7. The statute is reprinted in David J. 
McCord, ed., The Statutes at Large o f  South Carolina (Columbia, S. C., 1840), 7:451- 
54.
8 “Memoir o f John O’Neall,” p. 61, John O’Neale Papers.
9 Charleston City Gazette, 4 Dec. 1817, as quoted in Henry, Police Control, p. 
107 (quotation); Port Folio, July 1818, p. 70. For an example of the petitions, see 
Kulikoff Agrarian Origins o f  American Capitalism, p. 226.
10 McCord, ed., Statutes at Large, pp. 455-56.
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Andrew Pickens, the new governor, had no confidence in the amended statute. 
He pointed out how the law, which was “repugnant to the interests o f many o f  our 
fellow citizens, is violated with impunity.” Pickens also felt it would have no effect 
even if supported by citizens. No one would stoop so low as to “incur the odium 
attached to the character o f an informer.”11 After “one o f  the most eloquent and 
animated debates that has taken place on the floor for many years,” the legislature 
agreed with Pickens and repealed the law in 1818.12 O’Neale was no longer in the 
House o f Representatives to fight for his bill. He complained bitterly that another 
Quaker, Walter Herbert, sought political gain by leading the opposition to the law. 
Herbert, “having the wealthy slave owner” on his side, “was elected to the displacement 
of J. B. O’Neale.” In doing so, O’Neale felt Herbert was betraying his faith by “placing 
himself foremost in the ranks o f those who were increasing the miseries o f the 
bondsman.”13
Most residents o f  the Lower South recognized that the importation o f slaves was 
necessary to support the expansion o f the plantation system. More white migrants and
11 Charleston Courier, 30 Nov. 1818; Niles’ Weekly Register, supplement to vol. 
xvi (1819), p. 70.
12 Charleston Courier, 12 Dec. 1818 (quotation); Niles’ Weekly Register, 2 Jan. 
1819, p. 352; McCord, ed., Statutes at Large, 7: 456-58; South Carolina House of 
Representatives Journal, 23 Nov. 1818 through 18 Dec. 1816, p. 198, South Carolina 
Archives. The vote in the Senate was close, 22-19, while the House vote was not, 73- 
30. For the reaction o f a Savannah resident to entire affair, see William Gaston to W. 
Karthaus and Company, 9 Jan. 1819, William Gaston Papers, Chicago Historical 
Society, Chicago, Illinois.
13 “Memoir o f John O’Neall,” pp. 64-65, John O’Neale Papers. O’Neale later 
became chief justice o f the state (A. E. Keir-Nash, “Negro Rights, Unionism and
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the increase o f  available land fueled the desire for slave labor. Those who desired to 
improve their rank in society knew the surest way to advance was through acquiring 
land and slaves. While land might be cheap and plentiful, slaves would be inexpensive 
and available only if  someone brought them to the labor-starved areas of settlement. 
Ensuring the penetration of the slave trade into developing areas would drive down the 
price of labor and increase the profitability o f  farming operations for those who invested 
in slaves.
Even though southerners believed a large number of slaves were necessary for 
expansion, every state that imported a significant number of bondservants tried to stop 
the interstate slave trade. Residents of these states were not uniformly enamored with 
the slave trade or with speculators. They had different reasons, however, to view this 
commerce with suspicion. Instead o f wringing their hands over how the trade 
emphasized the commercial aspect o f slavery, citizens o f the Lower South were 
concerned with how the large increase of bondservants would impact their society.
There was much ambivalence about the slave trade and about the actions of traders 
themselves. A variety of fears—concern about the growing and restive slave 
population, the assumption that speculators trafficked in the worst sort of slaves, and the 
drain of currency and capital to slave exporting regions—intermingled and motivated 
southern legislatures to enact laws outlawing the slave trade. South Carolina, like the 
other importing states, passed its law only when a numbers of fears combined to impel 
legislative action. Because there were so many motives, it becomes difficult to sort out
Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice 
John Belton O’Neall,” South Carolina Law Review, 21 (1968): 141-90).
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precisely why states denied themselves something upon which they were so 
dependent.14
The impulse to prevent the entry o f speculators and their slaves moved like a 
wave over the importing states. Once residents perceived the large numbers o f slaves 
entering their state, they sounded the alarm and tried to staunch the flow. As we have 
seen, South Carolina tried to keep out slaves in 1816. At the same time, Georgia passed 
a similar measure. These two states lay at the end o f  the “upper route” and witnessed an 
alarming growth of slave importations after 1815.15 State residents and bona fide 
immigrants could bring slaves into Georgia. The legislature, however, specifically 
prohibited “the introduction of slaves into this state by negro traders for speculation.” 16 
In 1817 the legislature amended the law17 before abolishing it in 1824.18 Five years 
later the state again prohibited speculators from bringing slaves into the state.19
14 There are brief discussions of the state legislation outlawing the internal slave 
trade in Phillips, American Negro Slavery, pp. 202-3; Bancroft, Slave Trading in the 
Old South, pp. 271-75; Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the 
Ante-Bellum South (New York, 1956), p. 253; and Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 
83-87.
15 That at least some Georgia citizens were cognizant o f the South Carolina 
legislation is seen in the 1 Jan. 1817 issue o f  the Milledgeville Georgia Journal, which 
compares the two laws. Many South Carolina residents, as well, kept an eye on the 
Georgia legislation (Charleston Southern Patriot, 15 Feb. 1817).
16 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 1 Jan. 1817 (quotation); Savannah Republican 
11 Jan. 1817; Journal o f  the Senate o f  the State o f  Georgia (Milledgeville, 1816), pp. 8- 
9; Scarborough, Opposition to Slavery, p. 113; Flanders, Plantation Slavery in Georgia, 
p. 184. Flanders mistakenly describes a 1798 law designed to close the foreign slave 
trade as intended for the interstate slave trade.
17 Undated Augusta Herald, as reprinted in Charleston Courier, 15 Dec. 1817; 
Niles’ Weekly Register, 19 July 1817, p. 323; Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 16 Dec., 
23 Dec. 1817; Scarborough, Opposition to Slavery in Georgia, pp. 113-15.
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At about the same time, Kentucky and Tennessee moved to close their doors to 
slave traders. Tennessee acted first, prohibiting the importation o f slaves “for the 
purpose o f selling or disposing them, or any of them, as articles o f  merchandize.” The 
1812 law, which ran for five years, allowed citizens to bring in slaves for their own use 
and mandated emigrants swear before a justice o f  the peace they were not violating the 
laws.20 The state then passed another law in 1826 reinstating the prohibitory statute.21 
Persons entering Kentucky had to swear they “brought no slave or slaves to this state, 
with the intention o f selling them.”22 Despite the feet that the law was not repealed, 
advocates o f colonization introduced laws to prevent slave traders from operating in the 
state. Those who fevored the law hoped that cutting off the activities o f  slave traders
18 Acts o f  the Regular Assembly o f  the State o f  Georgia (Milledgeville, 1825), p. 
124; Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 21 Dec. 1824. The legislature was unsuccessful in 
striking down the law in 1821 (Journal o f  the Senate o f  the State o f  Georgia 
(Milledgeville, 1821), p. 144; Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, Dec. 1821). 
Scarborough, Opposition to Slavery, pp. 117-18 discusses all the legislation.
19 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, 26 Dec. 1829, 16 Jan. 1830; Milledgeville 
Georgia Journal, 26 Dec. 1829. The bulk of this legislation controlled the activities o f 
free blacks, particularly sailors. It also became illegal to teach slaves to read or write, 
and slaves or free persons of color who introduced rebellious literature into the state 
were punished severely.
20 Acts passed the Second Session o f the Ninth General Assembly o f  the State o f  
Tennessee (Nashville, 1812), pp. 109-10 (quotation on p. 109); Nashville Whig, 30 Sept. 
1812; Caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, 1790-1865 (1922; reprint, New 
York, 1968), pp. 43-44.
21 Acts passed at the Extra Session o f  the Sixteenth General Assembly o f the 
State o f  Tennessee, 1826 (Knoxville, 1826), pp. 31-33; National Banner and Nashville 
Whig, 13 Dec. 1826.
Hamson, Antislavery Movement in Kentucky, p. 46.
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would eventually rid the state of slavery. Bills failed to make it out o f  the legislature in 
1828 and 1830.23
As the bulk o f the slave trade shifted to the emerging Southwest, those states 
responded with prohibitive legislation. The emergence o f New Orleans as a major 
importer o f slaves led to much concern in Louisiana. In 1826 Representative Thomas 
Overton o f Rapides Parish introduced a bill to prohibit the entry of slaves into the state 
for sale. The law, intended to eviscerate the interstate trade, prohibited anyone from 
bringing in slaves after June 1, 1826 “with the intent to sell or hire the same.” 24 Those 
convicted o f the Louisiana law could be sentenced up to two years in prison and fined 
$1,000. The state seized the slaves, sold them, and paid one-quarter o f the profits to the 
informer, thus putting it in the business o f slave trading.25 Like the other states, 
Louisiana’s law did not last long. Two years after its passage the legislature repealed 
it.26 One year after the passage of Louisiana’s prohibition law, Alabama passed a
23 Western Luminary, 17 Dec. 1828, p. 197; Niles’ Weekly Register, 6 Feb. 1830, 
p. 399; Undated Frankfort Kentuckian, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 
27 Dec. 1828, p. 87; African Repository and Colonial Journal, Feb. 1830, p. 380; 
Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 145-46.
24 Baton Rouge State Gazette, 31 Mar. 1826 (quotation); House Journal,
Seventh Legislature, Second Session (Baton Rouge, 1827), pp. 61, 63, 66, 76-77. 
Although the record of the House vote is lost, the Senate voted 9 to 5 in favor of the 
bill. Those opposing the bill were Cabeen (Oachita), Flaugeac (Opelousas), Goff (St. 
Tammany, Washington, St. Helena), Smith (Feliciana), and Thomas (East Baton 
Rouge). Residents or immigrants who brought in slaves could not sell them for two 
years {Senate Journal, Seventh Legislature, Second Session (Baton Rouge, 1826), pp. 
77-78, 87).
25 Baton Rouge State Gazette, 31 Mar. 1826.
26 Senate Journal, Eighth Legislature, Second Session, 1828, pp. 14, 19-20,23, 
26; House Journal, Eighth Legislature, Second Session, 1828, pp. 12,17,31. As part of
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similar provision. Taking advantage of a clause in the state’s constitution that enabled 
them to outlaw the importation o f slaves, Alabama legislators barred slave traders from 
bringing bondservants into the state.27 Like the Louisiana act, Alabama residents could 
bring in slaves for their own use, provided they waited two years before selling them.28 
Again, like Louisiana, Alabama legislators repealed the act after two years.29
The growth of Natchez as a slave trading center may have prompted the framers 
o f Mississippi’s first constitution to incorporate a provision empowering the legislature 
to prevent slave traders from doing business in Mississippi.30 Governors David Holmes 
and Gerard C. Brandon urged legislators to enact measures that would keep speculators
this legislation, slave traders could not bring in a child under ten years o f age unless 
there was adequate certification that the child was an orphan {Baton Rouge Gazette, 7 
Jan. 1829; Judith Kelleher Schafer, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court o f  
Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1994), p. 165; Taylor, Negro Slavery in Louisiana, p. 40).
27 The constitutional provision, adopted in 1818, was intended to prevent the 
international trade (See provisional Governor William Bibb’s concerns about the 
“importation o f  slaves from any foreign country” in Natchez Mississippi State Gazette, 
25 Jan. 1818).
28 Woodville Republican, 12 May 1827; Niles' Weekly Register, 7 Apr. 1827, p. 
100; Western Luminary, 9 May 1827, p. 355; Thomas Perkins Abemethy, The 
Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828 (1922, reprint; Tuscaloosa, 1990), p. 167; 
Sellers, Slavery in Alabama, p. 174.
29 Journal o f  the House o f  Representatives o f  Alabama, Tenth Session 
(Tuscaloosa, 1828), pp. 29,36,47, 73; Journal o f  the Senate o f  Alabama, Tenth Session 
(Tuscaloosa, 1828), p. 23.
30 Winboume Magruder Drake, “The Framing o f Mississippi’s first 
Constitution,” Journal o f Mississippi History, 29 (1967): 321-22; Alfred H. Stone, “The 
Early Slave Laws o f Mississippi,” Publication o f  the Mississippi Historical Society for  
1899, p. 135; Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 162.
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out o f the state.31 The legislature tried, and failed, to outlaw the slave trade in 1827 
when a bill passed the Senate but lost in a tie vote in the House.32 Alone among the 
states that imported a  large number o f slaves, Mississippi tried to regulate the slave 
trade instead of barring it. In 1808, the territorial legislature required that all slaves 
over fifteen years o f age brought in by professional speculators have two certificates o f 
character. This law was most likely intended for the international trade, coming as it 
did during the debates on the international slave trade.33 In 1819 the state legislature 
passed a law requiring a tax of $20 for each slave brought in for sale or as merchandise. 
Slaves convicted o f murder, burglary, arson, rape, or grand larceny could not cross the 
border, and state residents were exempt from the tax unless they brought the slaves 
from Louisiana or Alabama. Free blacks and mulattos were barred from emigrating to 
the state.34 Six years later the legislature imposed a two-and-a-half percent tax on any 
“auctioneer, or transient merchant, or vendor o f merchandize or slaves.” Like the
31 See the statements o f Governor David Holmes in Natchez Mississippi State 
Gazette, 1 Mar. 1818; Natchez Mississippi Republican, 4 Jan. 1820; and the declaration 
of Governor Gerard C. Brandon in Woodville Republican, 18 Jan. 1828. The content o f 
these statements will be discussed later.
32 Senate Journal, Tenth Session, p. 109; House Journal, Tenth Session, pp. 
243-44; J. F. H. Claiborne to JohnT. McMurran, 9 Feb. 1828, J. F. H. Claiborne Papers, 
Alabama Department o f  Archives and History; Winboume Magruder Drake, EH, 
“Constitutional Development in Mississippi, 1817-1865,” Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University o f North Carolina, 1954, p. 163.
33 Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 162.
34 Acts passed at the first Session o f  the second General Assembly o f  the State o f  
Mississippi (Natchez, 1819), pp. 4-7; Niles’ Weekly Register, 24 Apr. 1819, p. 160; 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 11 May 1819. The reason for the exemption concerning 
slave purchased in Louisiana and Alabama is that they would have, in most cases, been 
purchased from slave traders.
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earlier tax on slaves, the law was also an attempt to discourage transient traders from 
selling slaves in Mississippi but was also a means o f combating the state’s deficit.35
Even while all o f the importing states save Mississippi restricted the interstate 
slave trade between 1815 and 1830, they ultimately abandoned their ineffectual efforts. 
It took a cataclysmic event, in this case the Nat Turner rebellion, to galvanize the Lower 
South into taking action once again. The activities of Nat Turner and his collaborators 
confirmed the worst fears o f  whites throughout the South. One slaveholder confided 
that he could no longer look at his favorite slaves “with any degree of complacency.” 
Where he saw loyalty before, now he only detected an attitude of “trickery, murder & 
bloodshed.” A “sycophantic smile” veiled thoughts of “I only wait for an opportunity 
to embrace my hands in yours & your innocent childrens blood.”36 Such thoughts of 
terror set off an “almost frenzied legislative activity” throughout the South. States of 
the Deep South passed another round o f laws designed to repress the activity o f free 
blacks, control the activities o f  slaves, prevent the introduction of more bondservants, 
and thwart slave traders.37
Louisiana responded first. Governor A. B. Roman, recalling the previous ban on 
speculators, argued that recent events in Virginia formed an “irresistible” justification 
for new legislation. The planters o f Louisiana reaped fewer benefits from the trade than
35 Laws o f  the State o f  Mississippi, Eighth Session (Jackson, 1825), p. 123 
(quotation); Woodville Republican, 11 Jan. 1825. The tax was later lowered to one 
percent (Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, pp. 162-63).
36 Robert P. Walker to George Blow, 24 Sept. 1831, Blow Family Papers, 
Virginia Historical Society.
37 Herbert Aptheker, Nat Turner’s Slave Rebellion (New York, 1966), p. 74.
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they expected, especially given the low quality o f slaves they purchased. Roman 
described how the “cupidity o f  the negro traders has often rendered them little 
scrupulous in regard to the characters of their slaves they have imported into this state.” 
He feared a conspiracy amongst importers to buy slaves in the Virginia jails “where 
insubordination lately displayed itself.”38 A Virginia planter only added to the scare 
when he informed a commercial house in New Orleans that a number of slaves involved 
in the uprising were pardoned and ordered to be transported out o f the state. He 
expected that “most of them will be landed on the banks of the Mississippi” in less than 
a month.39 A Richmond paper concurred, noting that the slaves in the Southampton 
area “are thinning by sales fo r  distant markets-”40
Not all Louisiana residents succumbed to the hysteria. A planter from Iberville 
Parish thought any legislation would be “grossly illusory” and favored only by the 
“most credulous.” This planter, who came from a parish that needed a large number of 
slaves to sustain its sugar producation, could not believe that Louisiana was in such low 
repute that its neighbors considered it the “Botany-Bay, the Australasia for the 
discarded villainy of the other states.” The recent uprising in Virginia notwithstanding, 
he felt the legislature should consider the current bill in a calm and deliberate manner.
38 New Orleans Courier, 1 Oct. 1831.
39 New Orleans Advertiser, 14 Oct. 1831. A similar scenario was described in 
the New Orleans Argus (See undated New Orleans Argus, as quoted in Charles Elliott, 
History o f  the Great Secession from the Methodist Episcopal Church in the Year 1845 
(Cincinnati, 1855), p. 16.
40 Undated Richmond Compiler, as quoted in undated Lexington Kentucky 
Reporter, as quoted in Western Luminary, 6 Nov. 1831. Emphasis in original.
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The planter recited a litany o f  reasons why Louisiana should not exclude slaves. There 
was no replacement for them. The state had enough trouble with “disasters incidental to 
climate.” The “depressed prices” for its agricultural products would only get worse. 
With the exception o f a few great slaveholders, the rest o f the state needed slaves to 
convert unproductive land to fertile acreage. Common “diseases” like “eating dirt” 
conspired to ensure a “great mortality” among the slaves and kept their prices high. 
Prohibiting the entry o f slaves would deter migrants to the state, thus depressing land 
prices. Finally, any such law would be unconstitutional.41 Writing from New Orleans, 
Isaac Franklin anticipated some type o f  prohibitory legislation. He frankly declared, “I 
am much at a loss how to act should no law be passed.” Franklin welcomed the push 
for legislative action, since “if  there was no probability o f  a restriction on the 
introduction o f slaves they [i.e., their prices] would be very low and dull.” Should such 
a bill fail, slave prices would again plummet.42
Serendipitously, Governor Roman had already called a special legislative 
session for the purpose electing a new senator. Roman kept up the pressure for a new 
law when the session opened. He disputed the “vague rumors” that insubordinate slaves 
had crossed Louisiana’s borders, but reminded the legislature o f its duty to adopt 
prudent measures to keep undesirable slaves out of the state. Roman told legislators 
that a “large number” o f  slaves from Virginia had been tried for involvement in the
41 New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 21 Oct. 1831.
42 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 26 Oct. 1831, Ballard Papers. Although he 
did not want to, Franklin had the option to switch to the Mississippi market. He did, 
however, enjoy the artificial demand for slaves created by the legislature’s deliberations 
(James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 30 Oct., 14 Nov. 1831, Ibid.).
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revolt and were condemned for deportation. Executing the sentence would “carry into 
neighboring states the contagion o f  their crimes.” Louisiana had the right to refuse such 
“wretches” in order to preserve its public tranquility.43 Even though the slave traders in 
Louisiana waited with their “mouths open to catch any thing that may fall from the 
damd legislature,” it was obvious some type of prohibitive legislation would pass.44 The 
legislature easily enacted a law that prohibited the interstate slave trade. Immigrants 
could bring in slaves for their own use, but neither they nor Louisiana residents could 
purchase slaves in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, or the Arkansas Territory. This 
provision, although easily evaded, was an effort to make up for the lack of legislation in 
the neighboring states.45 One speculator thought that he and his colleagues were being 
unfairly singled out. He wrote that the ‘Tlanters & Citizens are very savage against the 
traders.” Louisiana’s law lasted only until the beginning of 1834, when the legislature 
repealed all of the provisions barring the entry o f slaves into the state.46
43 Senate Journal, Extra Tenth Session, 1831, pp. 1-2 (quotations); New Orleans 
Courier, 16 Nov. 1831; New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 15 Nov. 1831.
44 James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 14 Nov. 1831, Ballard Papers.
45 Senate Journal, Extra Tenth Session, 1831, p. 8; New Orleans Courier, 19 
Nov. 1831; New Orleans Bee, 19 Nov. 1831; New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 19 
Nov. 1831; Taylor, Negro Slavery in Louisiana, p. 42; Schafer, ‘Immediate Impact,” 
pp. 367-68; Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, p. 75.
46 James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 14 Dec. 1831, Ballard Papers 
(quotation); House Journal, Twelfth Legislature, Second Session, pp. 6, 9; Woodville 
Republican, 11 Jan. 1834; Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, p. 76. In his letter, Franklin 
incorrectly predicted that the Louisiana legislature would tighten its laws and “pass an 
entire proabition in July (against Planters Emigrants &c...).”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
Louisiana was not the only state to respond to the Turner rebellion. Other 
southern states revealed their fears when they also passed prohibitory legislation. 
Georgia, a state the imported few slaves by this time, passed a non-importation law 
anyway.47 In neighboring Alabama, Governor John Gayle felt the states o f the Deep 
South should put up a united front against Virginia. He noted how speculators buy 
slaves o f “bad character” at low prices and then sell them in Alabama and elsewhere, 
meaning that the contagion o f rebellion might spread. Scenes similar to the Nat Turner 
rebellion might be repeated in Alabama. If the states of the Deep South passed laws to 
end the importation o f slaves as merchandise, then perhaps they could check the 
“mischief’ inherent in allowing the entry o f “slaves of every description” and achieve a 
triumph for the “cause o f  humanity.”48 The discovery of a slave who had been kicked 
out of North Carolina for “distributing seditious publications” only served to increase 
fears in the state 49 Caught up in the frenzy, the legislature quickly passed a bill that 
was intended to put slave traders out of business. The law was part of a larger effort to 
control the slave and free black populations. While it prohibited the entry o f  slaves
47 Scarborough, Opposition to Slavery, pp. 119-20.
48 Alabama Senate Journal, Thirteenth Session (Tuscaloosa, 1832), pp. 56-57 
(quotations); Mobile Commercial Register, 14 Dec. 1831.
49 The slave, Jacob Cowan, was arrested for circulating the “infamous Walker 
Pamphlet.” The North Carolina authorities wanted him “sold into the interior o f some 
o f the Southern States, where he would be deprived of the opportunity afforded by a 
seaport town to receive & distribute such books.” Cowan ended up in Mobile, hardly 
insulating him from the ocean (James F. McKee to the Police o f Mobile, 3 Nov. 1831 
(quotations); David Crawford to Gov. John Gayle, Jr., 18 Nov. 1831, Governor’s Papers 
(1831-35) Gayle, Container SG 5628, Folder 1, Alabama Department o f Archives and 
History.
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except those by citizens and emigrants for their own use, it also had numerous 
provisions regarding “free persons o f color.”50 The next session, when passions cooled, 
the legislature repealed the clauses pertaining to the importation of slaves, making it 
legal for speculators to bring in slaves once again, but did not touch the provisions 
regarding free blacks.51
Mississippi, true to form, responded differently than the other importing states. 
The Natchez Gazette warned that Virginia was “swarming with Negro traders” in the 
wake of the rebellion. As a result, slaves who were “directly or indirectly engaged in 
the work of murder” would soon arrive in Mississippi.52 Instead o f enacting legislation 
like its neighbors, the state changed its constitution. The 1832 document prohibited the 
introduction o f  slaves “as merchandize or for sale” after May 1, 1833.53 A bill to enact
50 Alabama Senate Journal, Thirteenth Session, p. 103, 134-35; Mobile 
Commercial Register, 25 Jan. 1832; Huntsville Southern Advocate, 28 Jan. 1832;
Sellers, Slavery in Alabama, p. 175. Those who brought in slaves could not sell them 
within three years. The provision regarding the assemblage in groups of five was 
exempted for worship services. It also fined owners $500 for not feeding or clothing 
their slaves. Free persons of color could not enter the state, while those already in 
Alabama could not learn how to read or write, could not gather in groups of greater than 
five without permission, and could not talk to a gathering of slaves without permission.
51 Journal o f  the Senate o f  Alabama, Fourteenth Session (Tuscaloosa, 1832), pp. 
6, 25, 37; Huntsville Southern Advocate, 16 Mar. 1833; Mobile Commercial Register,
17 Nov., 24 Nov. 1832
52 Natchez Gazette, 5 Oct. 1831, as quoted in Stampp, Peculiar Institution, p.
254.
53 The Constitution o f  the State o f  Mississippi (Jackson, 1932), p. 25; Sydnor, 
Slavery in Mississippi, p. 163; Winboume Magruder Drake, “The Mississippi 
Constitutional Convention of 1832,” Journal o f  Southern History, (1957): 366; Andrew 
Fede, “Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the U.S. South: A Caveat Concerning 
Caveat Emptor,” American Journal o f  Legal History, (1987): 351-52.
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enforcement legislation failed to pass in the ensuing legislative session, leaving 
Mississippi in the anomalous position o f  prohibiting the slave trade but having no 
means o f  enforcing the constitution.54 The Natchez Courier viewed the situation as a 
compromise and speculated why the legislature did not take more aggressive action. It 
noted the Louisiana law was too severe, thus it was “either evaded or openly violated 
with impunity.” The paper also appealed to class interests. Even if Mississippi could 
draft effective legislation, the rich will still import slaves by sending their agents to 
Virginia or Maryland. The poor, who wanted only one or two slaves, could not afford 
such an expense and “must either submit to the extortions of the wealthy, or rest content 
with what they have.”55 Mississippi’s citizens voted to repeal the slave trading 
amendment in 1833, but county officials did not follow proper form in tallying the votes 
and thus the constitution remained intact. The legislature refused to amend the 
constitution and a bill for another referendum failed.56 Even as it ignored the will of the 
people, the Mississippi legislature increased the bond for transient merchants and 
imposed a two and one-half percent tax on sales by slave traders.57 Thus, the state 
prohibited slave trading in the constitution but taxed it by legislation.
54 Senate Journal, Sixteenth Session, p. 57; House Journal, Sixteenth Session, p. 
375; Natchez Courier, 25 Jan. 1833.
55 Natchez Courier, 23 Aug. 1833.
56 Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 163-64; Drake, “Constitutional 
Development,” pp. 180-81.
57 Laws, Seventeenth Session, p. 49; Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 164.
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As the example o f Mississippi shows, states sporadically enacted and tepidly 
enforced the legislation regarding the importation o f  slaves. Most observers agree that 
such laws “carried few terrors for the trader.”58 Even though speculators may not have 
been terrified, not all o f  them automatically evaded the laws. At least one resident o f 
Georgia noticed a change after the legislature banned slave traders. He noted the “heart 
is seldom pained by those disgraceful exhibitions [Le. slave coffles] which were before 
so common among us.”59 In a later letter, the writer observed how approximately the 
same number o f slaves entered the state, except fewer did so at the behest of a 
speculator. I f  an honest citizen wanted a slave, he only had “to lose a few days to meet 
his agent at the Savannah river, or any other part o f our frontier, and introduce his slave, 
himself, agreeably to law.”60 It was “very certain” that speculators had disappeared 
from “some” of the counties. More importantly, “the character o f those [slaves] 
introduced is better.. .Purchasers for their own use will be circumspect, while it is 
known that speculators frequently purchase slaves o f  the worst characters, because they 
can get them cheap.”61 What the writer failed to note was that Georgia citizens who 
traveled to the South Carolina border bought slaves from speculators, so it is hard to 
imagine how the “character” of the slaves could be better. Whether consummating the
58 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 87-93 (quotation on p. 87); Bancroft, 
Slave Trading in the Old South, pp. 273-75; Stampp, Peculiar Institution, p. 256.
59 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 13 Oct. 1818. See Ibid., 4 Dec. 1821 for a 
similar opinion.
60 Ibid, 27 Oct. 1818.
61 Ibid, 10 Nov. 1818. Emphasis in original.
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sale in South Carolina or in Georgia, slave traders still were instrumental in the 
transaction. Perhaps the writer was hopeful that itinerant traders were doing less 
business while traders with known reputations were responsible for more sales.
Even if it is unclear whether the prohibitory legislation in Georgia was effectual, 
some of the largest slave traders complied, at least initially, with the bans in Louisiana. 
They could easily divert their operations to Natchez, a market that was just as profitable 
as New Orleans. Following Louisiana’s initial importation ban, Austin Woolfolk 
concentrated his efforts on selling slaves in Natchez. He notified his Louisiana 
customers that he had fifty “Virginia bom” slaves for sale and that “Planters would do 
well to call and supply themselves, as the Legislature has passed a law prohibiting them 
[slaves] from being brought into the State after the 1st June.”62 As advertised, Woolfolk 
began diverting his slave shipments to Natchez. Whoever filled out the Customs 
Manifests for Woolfolk crossed out the words “for the purpose of being sold or 
disposed o f as Slaves, or to be held to Service or Labor” and wrote “to be held to 
Service or Labor” and “to be shipped aboard a steamboat for Natchez in the State of 
Mississippi.” Seven of Woolfolk’s shipments in 1826 and 1827 were diverted in this 
manner.63 Woolfolk also notified Louisiana residents he had a “large number of likely 
young Virginia bom Negroes” for sale at Pumely Tavern in Natchez.64
62 New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 21 Mar. 1826.
63 Slave shipments with arrival dates of 5 Dec. 1826, 6 Feb., 11 May, 31 May, 
22 Nov., 7 Dec. 1827, New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests.
64 New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 13 Jan. 1827.
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Likewise, Louisiana’s 1831 ban and the Turner scare influenced the behavior of 
Franklin, the greatest speculator o f the day. He worked quickly to liquidate his 
operation before the ban took effect, selling two hundred and seventy slaves in a month. 
After he sold out, Franklin executed no bills o f sale in New Orleans until the law’s 
repeal. He informed a  fellow trader that he “had to leave N. O. for this place [Natchez] 
for the purpose of selling the negroes that came out by the last shipment.” He moaned 
that switching all o f  his operations to Natchez was “hard work for a One Eyed man.”65 
Franklin was not the only speculator to shift his base o f operations. A visitor to New 
Orleans saw the boats “crowded with slaves” glide past the city and continue up the 
Mississippi to Natchez. That market, he learned, “has consequently become inundated, 
by having poured into it, in addition to its usual stock, the Louisianian supply.” Up to 
three hundred slaves awaited sale in the Natchez market in the months following the 
Louisiana ban. There were so many slaves diverted there that prices dropped 
noticeably. Paul Pascal, who normally traded in New Orleans, wrote a colleague that 
even if he did not know o f a law that could adequately prevent the slave trade, he 
grudgingly admitted that times had changed. The law and Nat Turner’s rebellion had 
inhibited demand. He told his supplier in Norfolk that, despite the decreased supply, 
“Niggers do not bring any price at this moment and the Speculators have as many as 
200-300, which they do not put on the market on account o f the very low price.”66
65 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 9 Jan. 1832, Ballard Papers (quotations); 
Stephenson, Isaac Franklin, p. 76.
66 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 1: 106-7 (first quotation); James R. 
Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 18 Jan., 29 Oct. 1832, Ballard Papers; Paul Pascal to
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Some southern citizens assumed the laws would affect the slave trade.
Residents o f Baldwin County, Georgia, drafted a notice that gave “Fair Notice to Negro 
Speculators’’ that the law prohibiting their activities would be enforced. The notice 
added that “the citizens o f this and other states will be dealt with alike.” One Putnam 
County, Georgia, resident called on the legislature to seek an adequate remedy, 
something he acknowledged was a task of “some delicacy and difficulty.” It was 
difficult to frame a law that respected the constitutional rights o f emigrants while still 
being effective. One part of the answer, the writer felt, was empowering officers to 
“search out and prosecute” offenders.67 Other Putnam County residents were 
unconcerned with the niceties of the law. Should the authorities fail to enforce the law, 
they promised to uphold the measure, which was “sanctioned by every principle of 
justice, humanity, policy, and interest.”68 The Alabama importation ban created a 
scarcity and increased slave prices in the Tuscaloosa area. Ninety-nine field hands, for 
example, sold at twice their assessed value.69 Nathaniel Harrison tried to talk his son 
William out of settling in Alabama. He pointed out that the legislation prohibiting the 
entry of slaves would raise the prices o f slaves in that state. Harrison offered to buy 
slaves in his home state o f Virginia and send them to his son. That way “you might
Bernard Raux, 24 Dec. 1831 (translation from the French), Pascal Papers, Houghton 
Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts (second quotation).
67 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 28 Aug. 1816, (first quotation, emphasis in 
original); 6 Nov. 1816 (second quotation, emphasis in original).
68 Norfolk American Beacon, 2 Jan. 1818; New Orleans Louisiana Gazette, 25 
Feb. 1818. The quotation is found in both papers.
69 Liberator, 18 Feb. 1832, p. 26.
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exchage them for land in the Mississippi state, or sell them in the state of Missi. for cash 
& thus increase the capitol in money.”70 Other traders took the laws seriously. A 
colleague of speculator Isaac Jarratt counseled him to be cautious when it came to 
legislation. Once Alabama passed its importation law, Jarratt’s friend opined that “you 
would do better in the western District than any place I know of, if you continue the 
trafic.”71
Citizens in the states that exported slaves knew quite well that trading bans 
affected the price o f slaves. In the Chesapeake, the area from which the bulk o f  the 
slaves came, the Georgia law drew attention. A Baltimore paper reprinted the law’s 
provisions and a notice of both the Georgia and South Carolina legislation appeared in a 
Washington paper.72 Publications in Washington, Alexandria, Lexington, and 
Baltimore printed notices when Louisiana prohibited traders in 1826.73 According to a 
Virginian, the law’s enactment dropped the value of slaves in the Old Dominion by 
twenty-five percent two hours after its passage was known in Richmond.74 When
70 Nathaniel H. Harrison to William A. Harrison, 23 Mar. 1832, Hooe-Harrison 
Papers, University o f Virginia.
71 W. Poindexter to Isaac Jarratt, 26 Jan. 1832, in Jarratt-Puryear Papers, Duke.
72 Baltimore American, 16 Jan. 1817; Niles’ Weekly Register, 15 Feb. 1817.
73 Niles’ Weekly Register, 20 May 1826, pp. 262-63; Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 
31 Mar. 1826; Lexington Intelligencer, 25 May 1826; Genius o f  Universal 
Emancipation, 29 July 1826, p. 382.
74 Speech o f Abel Upshur at the 1829 Virginia Convention, as quoted in Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin (1854; reprint, Salem, N. H., 1987), p. 
289; Abdy, Journal o f  a Residence, 2:249.
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Louisiana prohibited the trade following Nat Turner’s rebellion, newspapers in North 
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia printed comments on the law.75
The states that imported slaves kept close watch on other legislation. When the 
Georgia legislature passed a prohibitive law in 1817, that state’s residents knew that 
South Carolina had just prohibited the entry o f all slaves. South Carolina, in turn, kept 
up with activities in Georgia.76 When Louisiana prohibited traders in 1826, notices 
appeared in other southern states. The Huntsville Southern Advocate applauded the law 
because it was a “death blow” to the “barbarous kidnappers” who “doomed [free 
blacks] to a life o f  slavery and wretchedness.”77 Once Louisiana prohibited speculators 
from bringing slaves into that state, one reader of the Natchez Ariel argued that 
Mississippi should follow suit. Louisiana had all the advantages, the paper felt, because 
planters from that state sent their agents to select the best slaves in Natchez, and left the 
“refuse” behind.78 One publication predicted the Louisiana law would end the slave 
trade and slavery itself. In a bit o f  wishful thinking, the Western Luminary agreed with 
an editorial from New York that opined the law would do “more to hasten the abolition 
o f slavery.. .than any measure which has yet been adopted.” If  the other states o f the
75 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, 27 Oct. 1831; Raleigh Register and North 
Carolina Gazette, 27 Oct. 1831; Richmond Enquirer, 2 Dec., 6 Dec. 1831. See also 
N iles’ Weekly Register, 10 Dec. 1831, p. 266.
76 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 1 Jan. 1831; Charleston Southern Patriot, 15 
Feb. 1817; Charleston Courier, 15 Dec. 1817. Louisiana residents also knew of the 
Georgia law (New Orleans Louisiana Gazette, 25 Feb. 1818).
77 Huntsville Southern Advocate, 23 June 1826.
78 Undated Natchez Ariel, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 4 
July 1827, p. 6 (quotation); Woodville Republican, 8 Jan. 1827.
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Lower South closed their borders to slaves, then slaveholders in Virginia would support 
the American Colonization Society because they would have no other way to deal with 
their “excess” slaves.79
No such thing happened, o f  course, since the laws often went unheeded and 
unenforced. William Beverley scoffed at Alabama’s attempt to control the importation 
o f slaves in the wake o f Nat Turner’s rebellion. He wrote his father that the law 
prohibiting the activities of speculators “was not in the least regarded while it existed.” 
Beverley saw “traders in Tuskaloosa selling [slaves] under the noses of the 
legislators.”80 Although the rate dwindled, speculators still imported slaves into New 
Orleans following Louisiana’s two bans and some advertisements appeared in the 
newspapers.81
While open defiance was one strategy, traders were clever enough to find ways 
to evade the laws. One common complaint about prohibitory legislation was that it 
contained too many loopholes by which the speculators found a “mode of creeping out” 
o f any penalties. One method was for traders to pose as immigrants and hire out their 
slaves for the term o f eighty or ninety years.82 As we have seen regarding the Georgia
79 Western Luminary, 14 June 1826, p. 780.
80 William Beverley to Robert Beverley, 10 Jan. 1833, Beverley Family Papers.
81 For example, see Bernard Raux’s shipment of thirty-five slaves from Norfolk 
to New Orleans on 2 Mar. 1827 (New Orleans Inward Slave Manifests) and the ad for a 
“CHOICE lot o f young negroes” who are acclimated to Louisiana’s climate (New 
Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 3 Oct. 1826). Generally speaking, fewer speculators 
advertised in Louisiana newspapers during the trade bans.
82 Augusta Herald, 9 Dec. 1816, as quoted in the Charleston Courier, 15 Dec. 
1817 (quotation); Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 12 Aug. 1817.
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law, slave traders like Woolfolk and Joseph Wood brought coffles to the state’s borders 
and waited for residents to cross into South Carolina before consummating a sale.
Wood advertised that his depot, just across the Savannah River in Hamburg, was 
stocked with “a likely parcel o f  Virginia Negroes.”83 By this means traders obeyed the 
law’s letter but not its spirit, since the practical effect was merely to shift the point of 
sale to another location without excising the trader from the transaction. The purchaser 
then legally brought slaves into the state, since they were for his own use.84
Laws requiring certificates o f good character for slaves were similarly 
ineffective. One Louisiana man bought twelve slaves who had been convicted in 
Maryland but pardoned on condition of their transportation out of the state. Such slaves 
obviously should have been prohibited from entering Louisiana, but were not. That he 
could get away with his actions was a testament that justice was “often both lame and 
blind in Louisiana.” A Baton Rouge paper expressed indignation at the feet that 
speculators publicly announced their willingness to purchase slaves who lacked the 
necessary certificates. When needed, however, “certificates of the necessary kind are 
forthcoming!”85 Bacon Tait, a Richmond slave trader, could have solved any mysteries 
for the newspaper. Tait tutored a fellow speculator on the finer points o f  evading a 
Mississippi law requiring certificates of good character. He dismissed the paperwork as
83 Advertisement of Joseph Wood, as quoted in William Jay, A View o f the 
Action o f  the Federal Government in behalf o f Slavery (New York, 1839), p. 78.
84 Liberator, 21 Apr. 1832, p. 62.
85 New Orleans Mercantile Advertiser, 29 Dec. 1826, as quoted in Woodville 
Republican, 8 Jan. 1827 (first quotation); Baton Rouge Gazette, 15 Oct. 1831 (second 
quotation).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
185
“more trouble than profit,” but advised his friend Paul Pascal to have the certificates “to 
prevent the possibility o f a difficulty.” Since “you can put as many negroes as you 
please” on one certificate, Tait told Pascal to bring one along. The “usual way” to 
obtain a certificate was to get two freeholders to look at the slave coffle and then sign 
off that they were of good character. Tait graciously provided a copy of the certificate 
in which the signers swore that the slaves “have not been guilty or convicted o f murder, 
Burglary or arson or any other felony.”86 Armfield told fellow slave trader Rice Ballard 
how to handle the laws that required certificates. Armfield was preparing a pre-printed 
form that left spaces for the purchaser’s name and the slave’s price. He could take the 
form to a justice of the peace, who would sign it, and have his clerk testify that 
Armfield was “a Hell o f a fellow under his hand and the seal o f the clerks office.” The 
miserly Armfield anticipated there would be “no difficulty” getting the receipts printed, 
but resented “paying those damd Rascalls for making of them.”87 Regarding the laws of 
all types, one trader simply said they presented “no important difficulty,” while an 
observer succinctly noted that “Means will be found to evade the laws.”88
Slave traders could evade the laws because it was virtually impossible to 
distinguish between the different types of slave migration in the South. A Georgia 
newspaper affirmed this idea when it concluded it could not differentiate between “the
86 Bacon Tait to Nathaniel Courier, 4 Oct. 1832, Pascal Papers.
87 John Armfield to Rice C. Ballard, 26 Jan. 1832, Ballard Papers.
88 African Observer, May 1827, p. 54 (first quotation); J. D. Paxton, Letters on 
Slavery; Addressed to the Cumberland Congregation, Virginia (Lexington, Ken., 1833), 
p. 29 (second quotation).
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trader for profit from the citizen buying for his own use.”89 Migrants who brought 
slaves with them or planters who bought bondservants in the Upper South were engaged 
in activity that elided with the trade. Citizens who migrated with their slaves, however, 
carefully distinguished themselves from speculators even though their activity was 
virtually indistinguishable on a practical level The laws that singled out traders for 
exclusion upheld the fiction that the slave trade was completely separate from 
bondservants who migrated with their masters.
It was difficult, moreover, to keep track o f which slaves entered a state. Many 
o f the laws asked citizens and traders to register with the local court system or the 
justice o f the peace. Besides being onerous, such activity was ineffective. Lack o f 
desire for strong government intervention and the rural nature o f  the South combined to 
ensure the laws would be difficult to enforce. Itinerant traders were involved in much 
o f the interstate slave trade and keeping track o f their transactions was next to 
impossible. Those who wished to avoid registering their slaves or wanted to import 
them illegally usually could do so with impunity. Furthermore, slave traders could pass 
through a “closed” state on their way to an “open” state. When they entered the 
“closed” state they were initially complying with the law, but while on the march they 
could easily sell slaves. The provisions that allowed emigrants to bring in slaves for 
their own use provided a  cover for slave traders who claimed they were moving to the 
state.90 Even those traders who operated primarily in the urban areas could sell with
89 Milledgeville Georgia Jotimal, 23 Oct. 1830.
90 Hall, Travels in North America, 2:219-20.
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impunity, as there was no desire to clamp down on scofflaws. Most often the 
legislation became a burden for those it was intended to help. Louisiana’s 1832 law did 
not last because it was a “greater inconvenience to the citizens of the state, than its 
framers had foreseen.”91
The demand for slaves was too intense for the southern states to regulate 
commerce in bondservants. Thomas Dew knew that the non-importation laws were 
more sound than fury. He observed that as long as the demand for slaves existed, “the 
supply will be furnished in some way or other.” Dew noted that the price o f slaves in 
Virginia rose instead o f fell after Louisiana enacted its 1832 law. He attributed the 
increase to the large volume o f  southern purchasers in the state. They looked for 
bargains, since Virginians were “frightened into a determination to get clear of their 
slaves at all costs.” He correctly predicted that the storm would blow over and 
Louisiana would no longer be in a position to deny itself what it needed to sustain its 
agricultural system.92 One slave trader in Louisiana knew he only had to wait for the 
legislature to reverse the laws against speculators. He confidently predicted that 
residents would come to their senses and demand repeal. When that happened, he knew 
that “the Niggers will augment in price.”93
If  the laws were so “utterly inefficient,” then it is curious why all o f  the states 
that imported slaves wrestled with whether or not to forbid the activities o f  speculators
91 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 1: 181.
92 Dew, “Review o f the Debate,” p. 361.
93 Paul Pascal to Bernard Raux, 24 Dec. 1831 (translation from the French), 
Pascal Papers.
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and only Mississippi did not enact legislation designed to thwart traders’ activities. 
Lawmakers in the Deep South knew that other legislatures tried, and failed, to cope with 
the issues surrounding the importation o f slaves. It is puzzling why they would enact 
measures that were proven to be ineffective and then leave some o f  them on the books 
for years.94 There were a variety o f motives that gave rise to the laws and it was only 
when several factors combined that states tried to regulate the interstate slave trade. A 
latent opposition to the slave trade and traders existed in the South, but some type o f 
leading issue had to gain credence for legislation to become popular enough to be 
supported. Furthermore, most o f  the laws were directly connected to abuses associated 
with the slave trade and concerned the activities o f slave traders. Such attitudes 
involved negative consequences for the state, misgivings for what the trade did to the 
slaves, doubt as to traders’ character, and fear for what the slaves would do once they 
arrived.95
The hesitant and half-hearted attempts to regulate the interstate slave trade 
reveal a divided mind in the Deep South. Unlike the Upper South, residents of 
importing states were not primarily concerned with the negative effects o f speculation. 
Legislation from the Lower South reveals that citizens there were just as concerned with 
controlling the slave population as they were with stopping the activities o f speculators.
94 Hall, Travels in North America, 2:219.
95 Those Deep South residents who disagreed with slavery despised the slave 
trade. A thriving slave market increased slavery’s power and made colonization or 
manumission impractical. As opposition to slavery withered, so did opposition to the 
interstate slave trade (Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1821; Western Luminary, 
29 Aug. 1827).
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Most o f the laws regulating the trade also circumscribed the activities o f all slaves or 
free blacks. Legislators accepted the fact that the slave population would increase and 
concentrated on reducing the possibilities o f a rebellion. To that end, they tried to 
prevent the importation o f undesirable bondservants but permit the entry of tractable 
slaves. Legislators thus made a distinction, however fuzzy, between the slaves who 
accompanied migrants and those who were found in slave traders’ coffles. In reality 
there was no essential difference between the two groups, so it appears that whites 
projected their worst assumptions o f slavery on the slave trade and tried to ease their 
fears by passing legislation that could not, or would not, be enforced.
One vein o f resentment towards the slave trade was that it could bankrupt the 
state since cash tended to flow out when citizens bought a large number of slaves. 
Complaints were usually not heard during flush times, but only when the economy 
turned sluggish. Speculators became a convenient target. A Georgia resident groused 
about how the trade stripped the state o f money, even while leaving it with slaves who 
were ‘‘worse than nothing.” One trader blamed adverse legislation on people’s 
perceptions that they paid too much for slaves.96 The 1827 Alabama act was, in part, a 
reaction to the panic o f 1825. A depression in the cotton market led many to fear that 
too much money was being sent out of the state.97 A couple o f years later, a Natchez 
newspaper called for a ban on the importation o f slaves. In deliberately not playing
96 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1816 (quotation); James R. Franklin to 
Rice C. Ballard, 14 Dec. 1831, Ballard Papers.
97 Abemethy, Formative Period, p. 167. That the 1825 panic led to the 1827 act 
is inferred from their proximity in time and the experience o f other states. There is no 
extant primary source that links the two.
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upon the “mawkish sensibilities” o f the state’s residents, it sensed potential danger in 
the combination o f  the cotton market’s decline and the increase in the number o f slaves. 
The paper assumed that the Louisiana importation ban gave residents of that state a 
great advantage. They could visit Mississippi and select the best slaves. The result left 
Mississippi with undesirable bondservants. Further compounding the situation was 
Virginia and Maryland’s determination to “get rid o f a population that is at once an 
expense and a nuisance to the people.” If the legislature did not act, citizens must brace 
for the state’s “ultimate ruin.”98 People in New Orleans, for instance, condemned the 
slave trade after the panic of 1836. Ignoring their complicity, they blamed it for putting 
“millions into the pockets of people living between the Roanoke, and Mason and 
Dixon’s line.”99 Since Louisiana was the largest importer of slaves, that state struggled 
with the amount o f money that left the state in the pockets of speculators. In a wide- 
ranging address, Louisiana Governor Jacques Dupre outlined several reasons why the 
state should prohibit slave traders from doing business in his state. He began with a 
sketch of the sugar trade, noting how the other southern states tried to lower the sugar 
tariff. He pointed out that Louisiana bought luxuries, necessities, slave clothing, steam 
engines, and machinery from these states. The largest expense was slaves, which
98 Undated Natchez Ariel, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 4 
July 1827, p. 6. Niles’ Weekly Register, 1 Dec. 1827, p. 211, in noting the Mississippi 
complaints, admitted that the “very worst of our population” was going to the south and 
west. A “good riddance, perhaps, to us, but not, we should suppose, a valuable 
acquisition in a quarter of our country so much overloaded with slaves.”
99 New Orleans Courier, 15 Feb. 1839.
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amounted to $2,500,000 annually. The result was widespread debt, so Dupre proposed 
prohibiting the entry o f all slaves into Louisiana.100
At least one resident commended Dupre for his “wisdom and frankness” on the 
issue. He thought low prices and the probable repeal o f the tariff would combine with 
the purchase of slaves to produce “an abyss o f insolvency.” Only the states that 
opposed continuation o f the tariff and sell their slaves to Louisiana would benefit from 
the legislature’s refusal to pass the law. Such states had been “little grateful” for the 
“outlet” Louisiana gave for the “most dangerous” portion of their population.101 The 
reader later claimed an “almost unanimous voice” that clamored for an end to the 
“scourge” that introduced into Louisiana “every thing that is vicious and abominable.” 
He wondered if Louisiana would become like Jamaica, a country that needed twelve 
thousand soldiers to keep the peace. The reader reasoned that the welfare of a “few 
speculators” should not come before the security o f Louisiana’s population.102
William Haile, a cotton planter, disagreed. He doubted such a law could be 
permanent in “a country like Louisiana” with “so much valuable land in a state o f 
nature.” Haile recognized the desire o f men like himself who wanted to buy slaves so 
that they could expand their planting operations, even if doing so required debt. He
100 Ibid., 7 Jan. 1831. Dupre’s estimate may have been close. Assuming an 
average price o f $500, Louisiana residents would have purchased five thousand slaves 
in a year (price information in Freudenberger and Pritchett, “Domestic Slave Trade,” p. 
457). For South Carolina’s reaction to Dupre’s message, see Charleston Southern 
Times, as reprinted in New Orleans Courier, 9 Feb. 1831. The Courier also took the 
opportunity to register its disapproval o f nullification
101 New Orleans Courier, 13 Jan. 1831.
102 Ibid., 22 Jan. 1831.
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ventured several guesses as to who might support such a law. Noting the governor’s 
heritage, Haile thought maybe the “french would like to stop the tide o f emigration to 
the state” so they may continue to control the government. Perhaps the slave traders 
and the money brokers in New Orleans were the ones behind the law. Haile felt the law 
would “enable the traders to sell their negroes on time.”103 The legislature remained 
unmoved by the governor, while the committee dealing with the introduction o f  slaves 
reported against the expediency o f immediate prohibition. Most likely it reasoned that 
the 1826 law proved ineffective, so there was no reason to believe the current law 
would be any more efficacious.104
Even more than fears about the currency drain, residents o f the importing states 
were worried that they were trading money for the potential o f  rebellion. The number 
o f slaves arriving in New Orleans, a local commented, have “added fearfully” to the 
number o f bondservants in the state. This growing disparity between the black and 
white population was a fact too alarming “to be viewed with indifference.” Ships 
arriving in New Orleans are “freighted with a living cargo o f vice and crime, to be 
disgorged upon our shores.” The probable result was too terrible to mention.105 
Louisiana’s governor devoted most of his public pronouncements after the Nat Turner 
rebellion to elaborating upon this theme. After quelling any fears that rogue slaves had
103 Robert Haile to Douglas Hamilton, 21 Jan. 1830, William S. Hamilton 
Papers, Louisiana State University.
104 New Orleans Courier, 21 Jan. 1831; Liberator, 26 Mar. 1831, p. 51.
105 Undated New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, as quoted in Genius o f  
Universal Emancipation, 22 Jan. 1830, p. 155 (first quotation); New Orleans Courier, 7 
Jan. 1831 (second quotation).
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crossed Louisiana’s border, governor Roman drew attention to census information. He 
was alarmed at the growing inequality between the white and slave populations. 
Louisiana had already received too many slaves that were the “scum” o f Virginia’s 
population. Roman thought the “total prohibition of slaves into this State” for a few 
years was the only way o f “avoid the danger with which we are now threatened.” The 
only possible exception to the ban could be slaves brought in by bona fide emigrants.106 
Governor Brandon o f  Mississippi expressed similar concerns to his constituents. After 
passage o f  Louisiana’s 1827 law, Brandon wondered whether his state would become 
“the only receptacle for the surplus black population of the middle states.” The “vast 
number” entering Mississippi “has excited uneasiness in the minds o f many o f our 
fellow citizens.”107
The influx o f bondservants who flooded the importing states heightened the fear 
of a slave rebellion. Southerners frequently overestimated the potential for revolt and 
too often were paralyzed by fears of destruction and bloodshed. There were, however, 
enough instances o f revolt (all o f them unsuccessful) to keep the idea a massive slave 
rebellion alive.108 A Georgia resident fanned the flames by noting that in his county 
two hundred voters lived amidst seven thousand slaves. With such a grim outlook, 
Georgians should not sleep until they corrected the situation. “The attempt at
106 Senate Journal o f  the tenth extra session (New Orleans, 1832), pp. 1-3 
(quotations on pp. 2, 3); New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 16 Nov. 1831.
107 Woodville Republican, 8 Jan. 1828.
108 Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South (Durham, 
N. C., 1940), pp. 89-96,116.
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Richmond, Va. and lately at Camden, S. C. should be a  warning to us,” he gravely 
admonished his fellow citizens. Matters would only get worse, since a reported 13,000 
slaves crossed the Yadkin River in the last three months and up to 50,000 entered the 
state in the last year.109 The preposterous estimate and the apocalyptic rhetoric reveal 
more about the writer’s state of mind than about the slave trade itself. A wild 
importation figure such as this reflected the fear of a slave population that was growing 
exponentially and a white population that was virtually stagnant. Even as owners 
bought more slaves in order to expand their holdings, they also feared that the very 
slaves they imported would rise up and destroy white civilization. A. L. C. Magruder 
carefully recorded his thoughts on the subject in a leather book, evidently preparing for 
a debate on the potential of barring slave traders in Mississippi. He attacked the 
“barbarous and inhuman men” who seized free persons and sold them as slaves. The 
growth of the “pestiferous” and “troublesome” slave population was due mainly to the 
demand o f “lazy, slothful persons” who delight to spend their time in idleness. Their 
selfishness would eventually cause “an overflow” of slaves and lead to an insurrection. 
The example of St. Domingo was fresh in Magruder’s mind. If Mississippi did not act, 
the result would be the shedding of “much blood.” There were just too many “evil 
consequences” to justify the importation of slaves.110
109 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1816. Such numbers were, of course, 
ridiculously high, but fear drove the estimates.
110 Manuscript of A. L. C. Magruder, 19 Mar. 1828, James Trudeman Magruder 
Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. That Magruder was preparing 
for a formal debate is inferred from his opening statement that he will “now rise to 
prove, if possible by my few, and disjointed remarks” that prohibiting the work of slave 
traders would be beneficial.
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For southerners who worried about the potential o f  a slave revolt, the specter of 
St. Domingo was “unforgettable” and provided a terrible example.111 In fighting for the 
bill to outlaw the entry o f slaves into South Carolina, John O’Neale described “the 
horrors of the San Domingo revolution” and the “consequent massacre.”112 A grand 
jury in Putnam County, Georgia held similar beliefs. In an official statement it argued 
that the entry o f too many slaves would cause the state to become like the “ensanguined 
fields o f St. Domingo.” Two years later a Georgia citizen repeated the slogan to argue 
that slaves were a “domestic enemy’’ and should not be allowed to grow in force.113 
Similarly, Magruder feared that an influx of bondservants “might give rise to an 
insurrection” like the one in St. Domingo that would lead to “the expulsion of all the 
whites.”114
Those who cited Haiti’s example may or may not have wanted to prohibit the 
activities o f slave traders since reference to it was not necessary to persuade others that 
slave traders were potentially dangerous for the South. The notion that speculators 
bought and sold undesirable slaves was firmly fixed in heads of most southerners.
Thus, it was not just the addition o f  more slaves that scared these southerners, but the 
purchase of the wrong kind of slaves. A grand jury in Putnam County made just this
111 Eaton, Freedom-of-Thought, p. 89.
112 “Memoir o f  John O’Neall,” pp. 63, John O’Neale Papers.
113 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 6 Nov. 1816 (first quotation), 29 Sept. 1818 
(second quotation; emphasis in original).
114 Manuscript o f A. L. C. Magruder, 19 Apr. 1828, John T. Magruder Papers, 
Mississippi Department o f Archives and History.
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point. It labeled the introduction o f slaves into Georgia by slave traders as a 
“demoralizing tendency” that had “dangerous consequences.” No evidence was needed 
to support the assertion that speculators brought in slaves “of the very worst cast, 
corrupting those already among us, and ready at all times for insurrection and 
crime."115 A Natchez judge was concerned that slaves entering Mississippi brought 
evils that were “almost incalculable.” Slaves brought in by speculators “corrupt the 
moral atmosphere o f the country; degrade by their vices and by their examples, the state 
and reputation o f  the society in which they mingle, and continually jeopardise by their 
very presence, the property and lives o f good and peacable men.” One southerner 
despaired when he thought o f how those who patronized slave traders might one day 
cause the state to be plunged into a “war of extermination.” Slave traders had the worst 
kind o f slaves imaginable for sale, and these malcontents would only “scatter firebrands 
among the combustibles.”116 A New Orleans paper agreed, noting how “the vilest 
criminals were often vomited on our shores.” Residents of Georgia, too, felt they were 
receiving slaves “o f the very worst characters.” Such bondservants were “often taken 
out o f jails, pardoned perhaps for some crime on condition of being sent out o f state.” It 
was rumored that the jails o f North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia 
were opened so that their convict slaves could be brought to Georgia.117
115 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 6 Nov. 1816. Emphasis in original.
116 Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 28 Sept. 1828, p. 19 (first quotation); 
Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 13 Oct. 1818 (second and third quotations).
117 New Orleans Mercantile Advertiser, 29 Dec. 1826, as quoted in Woodville 
Republican, 8 Jan. 1827 (first quotation); Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 12 Aug. 1817 
(second quotation), 4 Dec. 1821.
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The New Orleans city council was alarmed the city was gaining a reputation as a 
dumping ground for the undesirable slaves o f  the Upper South. It petitioned the 
legislature in 1816 to do something to prevent the entry of convict slaves into the state. 
A report circulated that a ship from New York was filled with a “great number” of 
slaves who were condemned to hard labor and headed to New Orleans.118 This came on 
top of reports that a ship full o f convict slaves had already landed in the Crescent City. 
Governor William C. C. Claiborne became so alarmed at the prospect o f hordes of 
unruly slaves being unloaded in his state that he asked the legislature to take swift 
action. He called for passage o f  a measure that would “prevent slaves o f such character 
from being let loose among the good people o f this state and wholly to put down so 
disgraceful a traffic.” 119 The legislature promptly approved a law barring the entry of 
slaves convicted o f murder, rape, arson, manslaughter, burglary, or insurrection.120 
Almost as if to confirm the suspicions of those who voted for the law, an “inhuman 
speculator from New York” unsuccessfully tried to bring seventy or eighty convict 
slaves into the state within a month of the measure’s approval.121 Dupre, governor more
118 A Digest o f the Ordinances, Resolutions, By-laws and Regulations o f the 
Corporation o f  New-Orleans, and a Collection o f  the Laws o f  the Legislature relative to 
the said City (New Orleans, 1836), p. 97.
119 Louisiana House Journal, First Session, Third Legislature (New Orleans, 
1817), pp. 22-23.
120 Louisiana Senate Journal, First Session, Third Legislature (New Orleans, 
1817), p. 30; New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 19 Feb. 1817; Taylor, Slavery in 
Louisiana, p. 37; Niles’ Weekly Register, 15 Feb. 1817, p. 399; Charleston Southern 
Patriot, 21 Feb. 1817. Since the burden of proof was on the importer, a certificate from 
the clerk of court in the importing county was sufficient to prove good character.
121 Niles’ Weekly Register, 15 Feb. 1817, p. 399.
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than a decade later, complained how the slaveholding ships came “freighted with a 
living cargo of vice and crime, to be disgorged upon our shores.”122 Having the largest 
slave market in the South was a blessing and a curse. The large volume of slave sales 
sometimes led Louisiana residents to feel they received the worst slaves. At one point, 
a paper drew a parallel between the domestic and the African trades. It noted that the 
former was more dangerous, since there was no comparison “between the ability and 
inclination to do mischief possessed by the Virginia negro, and that o f the rude and 
ignorant African.”123 Louisiana residents were not the only ones to complain.
Governor David Holmes of Mississippi urged the new legislature to act immediately to 
“put an end to this odious traffic.” Even though stopping the trade was impossible, the 
legislature could still strive to “lessen the evil.” Slaves o f the “most vicious character” 
were be found in trader’s cofries, so some action must be taken.124
The statements of southerners who assumed a thriving slave trade increased the 
risks o f a rebellion reveal much about their underlying attitudes toward the peculiar 
institution. They recognized the exploitative nature o f  slavery and made no apology for 
it. Rather than wringing their hands over the blatant commercialism o f the slave trade, 
most residents of the Deep South viewed speculation as a natural consequence slavery. 
They did, however, recognize the possible excesses o f  slavery’s commercial tendencies 
in that speculators would try to buy inferior slaves and sell them at high prices. The 
genesis o f the stereotype of interstate slave traders, then, came from the assumptions o f
122 New Orleans Courier, 7 Jan. 1831.
123 Ibid., 15 Feb. 1839.
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the Lower South residents. Over time, the prevailing attitudes in the Upper South 
changed to conform to the rest o f the South.
Residents o f the states that imported slaves believed that traders would do 
almost anything to make money. Many southerners assumed that speculators, 
especially itinerant traders with whom they were not familiar, concealed the true 
identity of slaves. Traders were known to use various techniques to make slaves appear 
younger, such as blacking or plucking gray hair, and rubbing grease on the skin to make 
slaves appear more youthful. It became widely believed that traders altered their slaves 
before putting them on the market. William Wells Brown, a slave who worked for a 
trader named Walker, helped prepare the “old” slaves for market. When Walker 
brought his slaves down the Mississippi River he ordered Brown “to have the old men’s 
whiskers shaved off, and the grey hairs plucked out where they were not too numerous, 
in which case he had a preparation o f blacking to color it, and with a blacking brush we 
would put it on.” At completion o f the process, Brown thought some of the slaves 
looked up to fifteen years younger than they had just a few minutes before. To 
complete the ruse, Walker “taught” the slaves their new ages. Since Walker transported 
his slaves on flatboats where they could be seen by whites, Brown tellingly explained 
that these operations took place in a room out o f the sight o f passengers, lest they 
discover that the trader was altering the condition of his slaves. The proof of the 
process’s efficacy was testified to by Brown, who thought that some of the people who 
bought slaves from Walker “were dreadfully cheated, especially in the ages o f the
124 Natchez Mississippi State Gazette, 1 Mar. 1818. The governor presented his 
message on 7 Oct. 1817.
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slaves whom they bought.”125 John Knight, writing from Natchez, complained that 
since traders were “generally such liars,” purchasers “know nothing whatever” of the 
slaves they bought. Buyers, he concluded, had to “judge by the looks o f  the negroes, 
endeavouring to avoid getting old rascals.” 126 Besides altering the physical appearance 
of slaves, speculators also dressed their bondservants in new clothing. Buyers were 
more likely to assume that a clean, well-dressed slave would be easier to manage than 
one who was dirty and clad in rags. One Georgian complained of how the tidy 
appearance of a speculator’s drove of “well dressed, good looking negroes” concealed 
the feet that they had been convicted o f crimes and were on their way to Alabama.127
While traders changed the outward appearance o f slaves, they also tried to 
conceal inner qualities that might hinder a sale. The experience of Henry Bibb 
demonstrates how one trader erased problematic aspects of the slave’s past. Bibb had 
twice run away from his master before the man, out of exasperation, sold him to a 
speculator. When prospective purchasers asked Bibb if he ever had run away before, 
the trader quickly answered that Bibb was a  model slave who had never tried to flee.
The speculator even pressured Bibb to act piously and appear to be a Christian so that
125 Bontemps, ed., Great Slave Narratives, p. 40. Theophilus Freeman, a trader 
operating out o f New Orleans, engaged in much the same activity (Boney, ed., Slave 
Life in Georgia, p. 96).
126 John Knight to William M. Beall, 18 Mar. 1844, John Knight Papers. 
Emphasis in original.
127 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1821. Traders in the African trade, of 
course, used similar methods to dupe purchasers (Daniel P. Mannix and Malcolm 
Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1514-1865 (New York: 
Viking Press, 1962), pp. 127-30).
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someone would regard him as being docile and want to purchase him.128 Speculators’ 
attempts to erase the past of the bondservants indicated that they regarded a slave’s life 
as something malleable that had little importance. More importantly, these questionable 
practices contributed to the growing stereotype of slave traders. This “coaching” o f 
slaves and the altering o f their past became one o f the chief complaints about traders. 
One southerner grumbled that people who bought slaves from speculators must be 
“circumspect,” since “it is known that speculators frequently purchase slaves of the 
worst characters, because they can get them cheap.”129
Traders in the Lower South became widely known for their shady business 
transactions since dissatisfied customers frequently hauled them into court. The legal 
records o f the South were littered with the proceedings o f citizens who were quick to 
look for legal assistance when they felt wronged in a slave sale. Theodore Hunter wrote 
to attorney Joseph H. Bryan for help in suing a “negro speculator” who sold Hunter an 
unhealthy slave who later died.130 Bernard Kendig, a slave trader in New Orleans, was 
sued thirteen times in ten years. Four times there was no verdict in the case, once he 
was found not guilty, three times he was found guilty o f  fraud, three times he was found 
to have sold defective slaves, and twice he sold stolen slaves.131 Lewis C. Robards o f
128 Henry Bibb, Narrative o f  the Life and Adventures o f Henry Bibb, an 
American Slave (1850; reprint New York, 1969), p. 102.
129 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 10 Nov. 1818. Emphasis in original.
130 Theodore Hunter, as quoted in Don H. Marr, Jr., “Slave Trading and Slave 
Traders in North Carolina,” M. A. Thesis, East Carolina University, 1995, pp. 11-12.
131 Richard Tansey, “Bernard Kendig and the New Orleans Slave Trade,” 
Louisiana History, 23 (1982): 159-78.
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Lexington, Kentucky, made frequent court appearances. He sold slaves who were 
subject to fits, were diseased, and had “nigger consumption.” Robards even seized and 
sold free blacks.132 Citizens o f the Lower South, then, were receptive to laws outlawing 
the trade because they hoped to purge their state of such malefactors. The underhanded 
dealings o f speculators almost invited legislative intervention.
In Louisiana, the state with the largest market for importing slaves, warranties in 
the sale o f slaves was the most common issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
the fifty years prior to the Civil War. The situation became so acute that the state 
became the only one to support the right o f redhibition through statute. In redhibition, 
the law specifically protected the buyer o f a slave from any possible physical, moral, or 
mental defects o f the slave. The state law forced the seller to declare any defects the 
bondservant possessed; silence on the subject assumed that the slave had no faults. If 
an undetected flaw became apparent, then the buyer could cancel the sale, return the 
slave, and get his or her money back. An alternate strategy was to demand a refund for 
a portion o f the slave’s diminished value. In these cases, in effect, a new purchase price 
was determined by the court and the seller had to refund the difference between it and 
the original. Buyers o f bondservants in other states had to rely on the judiciary to 
compensate them for any loss they suffered as the result o f  a  sale, and Louisiana’s law 
was a response to the questionable business practices of the slave traders.133 The 
presumption in Louisiana was that the trader was at fault, whether by omission or
132 J. Winston Coleman, Jr., “Lexington Slave Dealers and their Southern 
Trade,” Filson Club Historical Quarterly, 12 (1938): 12-14.
133 Schafer, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court, pp. 129-31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
commission, implies that Deep South residents were comfortable in defining the master- 
slave relationship in commercial terms. The speculation did not rankle citizens in this 
area, but the willful representation o f fact did.
Itinerant traders, that is, ones without a fixed address in the importing states, 
were especially bothersome because they tended to get away with more frauds. Citizens 
were confident they could sue an established trader or make an appeal to return a 
defective slave to him because they could find him after the sale. There was no 
guarantee, however, that a purchaser would ever see an itinerant trader again. The 
potential for abuse and fraud was enormous. The New Orleans Bee grasped this point 
when it made the crucial distinction between types o f traders in its city. In calling for a 
slave importation law that kept out the “worst” slaves, it sought protection “against the 
cupidity o f the non resident seller, who can have but little regard for our domestic 
tranquility.” Such men, a Spartanburg, South Carolina, grand jury agreed, were 
“dangerous to the safety o f the State.”134 This class o f speculators “always” bought the 
cheap and seemingly ubiquitous bad slaves. Such traders, who were utterly destitute of 
“sensibility and principle,” purchased a “villain” instead of a “good slave” and made 
twice the profit. Itinerant dealers of this type introduced the worst slaves imaginable 
because it was o f “little consequence” to them. Such slaves would eventually “corrupt 
the entire mass o f our colored population.”135 Louisiana considered a law against
134 New Orleans Bee, 20 Dec. 1820 (first quotation); Spartanburg grand jury, as 
quoted in Henry, Police Control, p. 106 (second quotation).
135 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 13 Oct. 1818 (first four quotations); 4 Dec. 
1821 (remaining quotations).
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itinerant traders in 1831, about six months before the Turner rebellion. Isaac Franklin, 
an established trader who was not a Louisiana resident, was “Foilled and bedeviled” 
when he heard the news. He confessed he was never “so much at a loss in all my 
Trading.” 136 Franklin accused the legislature o f trying “to close every Avenue to the 
Trade.” He told a fellow speculator he was “using all my influence with the members” 
to thwart the measure. In its present form, the bill would “make the Negroes on the way 
[to Louisiana] be [lijable to seizure.” A “depressed” Franklin confided that he might 
have to become a  citizen o f Louisiana. Should his efforts fail, “god knows what will be 
the consequences.” 137 Fortunately for Franklin, the measure did not become law.
Southerners formed opinions about itinerant traders based on their dealings with 
them or the stories o f others. The reputation o f  itinerant traders quickly sunk, 
something that caused trouble for a resident o f Tennessee who tried to sell his own 
slaves. Will White of Nashville tried to sell at least nine o f his slaves in Natchez. His 
frustration mounted at not being able to get as much as he had hoped for the 
bondservants. He told his wife that several persons would not buy his slave John 
outright but wanted to take the man on a trial basis. They hesitated to purchase the 
man, “alledging [sic] that a great number o f deceptions have been practiced by traders.” 
White was in a difficult position, because he did not visit Natchez regularly, and so 
taking the slave back would be a cumbersome problem. All he wanted, he wrote his
136 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 20 Feb. 1831, Ballard Papers.
137 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 28 Feb. 1831, Ibid.
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wife, was a “fair profit” or he would bring John back to Tennessee.138 A Virginia 
resident summed up the feelings that many had for itinerant traders when he advised his 
son to buy slaves from a local resident. He thought dealing with a speculator was risky, 
because “it is best to get one [slave] that is well known: For it is hasardous buying 
strange Negros.”139 One Tennessee resident learned this lesson the hard way. He 
bought a slave from an itinerant trader at night, only to have his overseer tell him the 
next day that the slave had no toes on his feet. The seller stuffed cotton in the man’s 
shoes to accomplish a “base and monstrous imposition.”140
The distrust of itinerant traders coexisted with the vague notion that residents of 
the Upper South were trying to jettison the worst o f their slaves. Deep South citizens 
could assume such because they would probably have done the same thing. Other than 
for debt or some calamitous circumstance, the sale o f a slave who was, on the surface at 
least, contented and a good worker made little sense. Those who purchased slaves were 
often wary about which slave they bought since, put in the same situation, they would 
probably have sold the worst o f  their slaves and kept the best for themselves. One 
Georgian described the slaves found in a trader’s coffles as “incendiaries, poisoners and 
murderers, who cannot be convicted.” Such malcontents were “reserved till the Georgia 
negro buyer comes along.” It is no wonder that the “worst kind are generally sent to
138 Will White to Eliza White, 20 Apr. 1821, Felix Grundy Papers.
139 John Callaway to Dr. Henry G. Callaway, 16 Jan. 1809, Pocket Plantation 
Papers, University of Virginia.
140 As quoted in Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee, pp. 35-36.
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us.”141 A Louisiana resident whined that citizens of Virginia and Maryland were 
ungrateful for the “outlet we have hitherto afforded them for the most dangerous part of 
their population.” He asked the legislature to put a stop to slave speculation in the 
state.142 When slaves in Virginia went bad or became unprofitable because of running 
away or stealing, owners thought it justifiable to “save themselves from loss.” Their 
prudent response was to sell their difficult slaves.143 Maryland residents, a Natchez 
newspaper thought, viewed the slave trader as a benefactor because he bought the 
“rogues and vagabonds” and sent them south.144 It made perfect sense to assume that 
slaveholders in other states would “generally and very naturally, sell their worst slaves 
first.” In this manner they would “gradually throw off their black population, and 
especially the vicious part o f it.” The “unprincipled speculator” abetted this heinous 
work because he bought up convict slaves and sent them to the “deluded” states to the 
south and west.145 A Washington paper, in observing that Mississippi complained about 
convict slaves, admitted that there was “no doubt” that the “very worst of our colored
141 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1816
142 New Orleans Courier, 13 Jan. 1831. The next week the same writer 
chastised those legislators who did not want to stop slave imports. He wondered if they 
wished “to reduce Louisiana to the fate o f Jamaica, which is obliged to maintain a 
garrison often or twelve thousand soldiers.” (Ibid., 20 Jan. 1831).
143 N iles' Weekly Register, 14 Sept. 1822, p. 18.
144 Undated Natchez Ariel, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 4 
July 1827, p. 7.
145 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 13 Oct. 1818.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
population has long been passing to the south-west.” This process was “good riddance” 
for Virginia and Marlyand, but not for Mississippi.146
Residents o f the Deep South were not only concerned about the unruly, 
rebellious, or convict slaves in a trader’s coffles, but some had fears about kidnapped 
freemen who might also be in shackles. A “few” of the slaves sold in Georgia were 
“stolen from the owners and others who were bom free are kidnapped.”147 Those who 
considered the matter wondered why the citizens of Georgia would permit abducted 
slaves to enter their state. Such slaves were likely to seek liberty “at any cost, and at 
every sacrifice,” and their example would make it difficult to preserve order.148 One 
Georgian thought the “most horrid feature o f the internal slave trade” was the “seizure 
and sale o f persons o f color as free by the law of nature and the laws of the land, as the 
persons who steal them.” He was concerned that his state would become known as an 
easy destination for kidnapped blacks and that they would cause the other slaves in 
Georgia to seek their freedom.149 The underlying fear o f those who gave any thought to 
the illegal traffic in freemen and apprentices was that the entire system o f slavery would 
become unstable through the efforts of a few troublemakers, both white and black.
146 Niles ’ Weekly Register, I Dec. 1827, p. 211. There are few examples of 
Upper South residents who tried to calm such fears. The Richmond Enquirer 
vigorously disputed the assertion that Virginia residents sold slaves of questionable 
character, claiming that slaves sentenced to banishment from the Old Dominion were 
“not so vicious” as people might think (Richmond Enquirer, 2 Dec. 1831).
147 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 12 Aug. 1817.
148 Niles’ Weekly Register, 19 July 1817, p. 323.
149 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 1 Sept. 1818. See Ibid., 4 Dec. 1821 for 
another attack on kidnapping.
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Whites broke the law and introduced a black element that was too closely associated 
with liberty. Slaveholders worried that abducted freemen would contaminate those 
slaves who, their owners thought, were content with their lives and who did not need to 
know about such dangerous ideas as freedom or independence. The fear o f kidnapped 
freemen was confined mainly to Georgia since the kidnapping trade peaked around 
1820. As fewer traders resorted to kidnapping, those states that received the bulk of the 
slaves were less concerned with the problem.
While the kidnapped freemen found in slave traders’ coffles could infect slaves 
with ideas o f liberty, it was common to assume that speculators trafficked in diseased 
bondservants. The prospect of sick slaves struck fear into the hearts of owners, since an 
epidemic could cripple a planter’s workforce. Those who dealt with speculators had to 
be careful in all respects. James A. Tait, a planter in Alabama, knew that speculators 
often had diseased slaves and instructed his overseer not to allow any traders or their 
slaves on the property. Tait later fired the man for negligence, noting in his memoranda 
book that his former employee permitted “a negro speculator, with young negroes that 
had the [wjhooping cough, to stay all night on the plantation, whereby my little negroes 
took the cough.” Four o f “our little negroes” died as a result o f their exposure to the 
disease.150 It was commonly assumed that traders’ jails were often the breeding ground 
for diseases o f all types. Cities o f the Lower South constantly faced epidemics, and the 
packing together of slaves in close quarters was a recipe for disaster. The two largest
150 Memoranda Book of James Tait, Tait Collection, Auburn University 
Archives, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama. James and Bacon Tait were 
apparently not related.
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slave markets, Natchez and New Orleans, constantly battled with the slave traders over 
the issue of diseased bondservants. In 1833 a scandal involving sick slaves rocked 
Natchez. An unusually large number o f slaves were available for sale, many o f whom 
had cholera. Being “crowded” into the slave pens meant that they “endanger[ed] the 
lives o f the citizens, and jeopardise[d] the interest o f the city.” Many belonged to 
Franklin, who had brought about one hundred o f them from Alexandria to New Orleans 
and then transferred them to a steamboat for the trip to Natchez. On the way up the 
Mississippi River, they were exposed to cold weather and “several” died. Franklin 
buried five in the public graveyard but then put up to eighteen others “into a deep ravine 
within the city. Their bodies were secretly, and in the night[,] deposited in holes formed 
under the banks o f the ravine made by the rain, and only partially covered by earth 
thrown from the top o f the bank.” The rains that washed the earth away from the 
shallow graves revealed a grisly scene.151
It was not the first time Franklin had dumped the bodies of slaves in a ravine. 
Five months earlier he had jokingly confided to a friend that “the way we send out Dead 
negroes at night and keep Dark [Le., silent] is a sin.”152 Franklin’s “sin” caught up to 
him. The coroner hastily convened an inquest, but the speculator could not give a 
satisfactory explanation when confronted with the evidence of his bungling attempts at
151 Mississippi Journal and Natchez Advertiser, 19 Apr. 1833 (quotations); 
Natchez Mississippi Gazette, 27 Mar. 1833; Washington Mississippi Gazette, 4 May 
1833, as quoted in Stampp, Peculiar Institution, p. 250; M.W.B. to Richard Watkins, 14 
July 1833, Palmore Family Papers, University o f Virginia.
152 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 8 Dec. 1832, Ballard Papers. Franklin told 
Ballard that seven or eight of his slaves were sick, and the epidemic led to most trying 
times he had ever seen. He pledged, though, “I will not give up the shipp.”
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a cover-up. Within two days, eighty-one of the town’s citizen signed a petition that 
asked to expel all speculators and their slaves from the city limits and to prevent the 
landing of slaves from New Orleans. The petition noted that “some o f the Negro 
Traders” had “adopted the horrible and inhuman practice of throwing the bodies o f  their 
Dead Negroes” into the city’s swamps. As a result o f the slaves’ decomposition, the air 
was “loaded with obnoxious exhalations, at a time when the cholera, that King o f 
Scourges, is lurking in our neighborhood.”153 Two days later the city council met in 
special session. The audience of several hundred was in a surly mood. Council 
member Felix Houston claimed he was “opposed to negro trading as a business being 
encouraged or permitted by the laws o f  the state” and claimed that it detracted from the 
city’s “character and standing.” Another council member, William Vannerson, 
demanded action. He recalled how “this desolating scourge” had previously been 
introduced “among us in several instances by the traders as they are called.”154 That 
evening the city council unanimously passed an ordinance expelling all traders from the 
city’s center. It applied only to “those persons commonly called Negro Traders,” with 
the fine set at ten dollars per day per slave.155
153 Petitions, 22 Apr. 1833, Record Group Natchez, Reel 47, Mississippi 
Department o f Archives and History. Emphasis in original.
154 Natchez Mississippi Journal and Natchez Advertiser, 26 Apr. 1833.
Emphasis in original.
155 Minutes o f the Selectmen, 22 Apr. 1833, Record Group Natchez, Reel 2, 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Apparently no specific action was 
taken against Franklin. He did, however, struggle to rebuild his reputation. When small 
pox struck the town one year later, many residents blamed him (James R. Franklin to 
Rice C. Ballard, 2 Feb. 1834, Ballard Papers).
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Even before the city council’s action, seven o f the town’s slave traders had tried 
to restore their damaged reputations. They appeared before a Justice o f  the Peace and 
swore affidavits as to how many of their slaves, if any, died from disease.156 Some o f  
these speculators joined with other traders to differentiate themselves from Franklin by 
publishing an open letter in the local paper. In it they praised the conduct of the town’s 
citizens and “out o f the respect of the feelings of the people o f Natchez” moved their 
slaves outside the city.157 The speculators and the city council were merely completing 
the process begun four years before when the city council banned traders from the city’s 
center between November 15 and April 15.158 Apparently, the new ordinance was 
enforced. James R. Franklin grumbled that the “City Councill compells us all to leave 
the limits o f the Coperation in two days. We shall have to take to the woods.”159
156 Certificates o f  Negro Traders, 22 Apr. 1833, Record Group Natchez, Reel 36, 
Mississippi Department o f  Archives and History. Those traders who made such an oath 
were Samuel Bennett, Pierce Griffin, Paul Pascal, Lewis D. Collier, Samuel Wakefield, 
William Oldham, and Michael Hughes.
157 Natchez M ississippi Journal and Natchez Advertiser, 26 Apr. 1833. Those 
traders who signed the letter were John W. Anderson, Samuel Wakefield, Lewis K. 
Grigsby, William Oldham, Thomas McCargo, Benjamin Hansford, R. A. Peuyeur 
[Puryear], Samuel Bennett, John F. Harris, and Paul Pascal.
158 Municipal Records, 9 June 1829; 26 Jan. 1830, Record Group Natchez, Reel 
45, Mississippi Department o f Archives and History. Traders were excluded from an 
area bounded by Fourth Street North, Fourth Street South, Seventh Street and the 
riverfront bluff. Traders who wanted to sell slaves had to keep them out of sight, not 
overcrowd the rooms, make sure none were diseased, and keep the facilities clean. The 
amended law may have been influenced by the petition o f several traders (Municipal 
Records, 4 Nov. 1829, Record Group Natchez, Reel 47, Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History).
159 James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 24 Apr. 1833, Ballard Papers.
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Where slave traders would not, or could not, regulate their own activities, the 
municipalities stepped in. At about the same time Natchez cracked down on 
speculators, New Orleans took similar steps. After “reiterated complaints” from 
citizens, the city council passed an ordinance prohibiting the exposition or sale of slaves 
in the city’s center. The council referred to the “thousands of slaves daily imported here 
from the North, and among whom very serious diseases have already broken out.”160 
When this law proved inadequate, the council banned “negro dealers” from housing 
their slaves within the incorporated city limits. Besides being notorious for disease, the 
slave depots were close to residences and lowered property values in the 
neighborhood.161 Although passed in late November 1834, the law was only in place 
from January through April o f  1835. Austin Woolfolk successfully presented a petition 
to the city council that allowed slave pens below Esplanade Street.162 By 1840 the city 
had successfully negotiated a truce with the slave dealers. The council passed an 
ordinance requiring a license for slave depots and specified that such structures must be 
built o f brick, be two stories high, and “kept constantly clean and properly ventilated.”
160 New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 30 Mar. 1829, as quoted in Western 
Luminary, 3 June 1829, p. 377. The streets o f Girod, Levee, Esplanade, and Treme 
bounded the area, which was roughly composed o f the French Quarter and the central 
business district. In 1831, the city council mandated that all slaves entering the city 
must be registered with the mayor’s office within twenty-four hours of arrival. The law 
was presumably intended to keep a closer reign on the activities o f slave traders (New 
Orleans Louisiana Courier, 22 Oct. 1831).
161 A Digest o f the Ordinances, Resolutions, By-laws and Regulations o f the 
Corporation ofNew-Orleans, and a Collection o f  the Laws o f the Legislature relative to 
the said City (New Orleans, 1836), pp. 139-41.
162 Digest o f Ordinances, p. 141; New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 7 Apr. 1835.
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Additionally, if an infectious disease broke out in such a place, the speculator must 
notify the mayor within twenty-four hours.163
Even though such laws might have been burdensome to traders, the prospect of 
facing epidemics was even worse. Obviously the death of slaves was a loss on their 
investment. Franklin was in no mood to hear the complaints o f one of his business 
associates. Losing two slaves “makes me laugh to hear of a man being in distress.” 
Franklin pointed out he had forty or fifty sick and had lost four in forty-eight hours. He 
feared that the only way he could do business “next season” would be to purchase 
sparingly at reduced prices.164 I f  linked to disease, speculators would have a difficult 
time drumming up business. Competition for purchasers was intense during epidemics 
because buyers were scarce. Traders knew that it was in their best interest to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that their slaves were healthy, or at least distance their 
operations from sickly slaves. One speculator felt the pinch when a small pox epidemic 
broke out in Natchez amongst the imported slaves. He told his wife that the “shocking 
disease” crippled his business because it “prevented the country people from coming in 
town” to buy bondservants. It forced him to vaccinate his slaves and move them to the 
country in the hopes of preventing them from becoming infected.165 Franklin’s brother,
163 A Digest o f the Ordinances and Resolutions o f the General Council o f the 
City ofNew-Orleans (New Orleans, 1845), p. 28.
164 Isaac Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 30 Mar. 1834, Ballard Papers.
165 Alfred Royal Wynne to Almire Wynne, 8 Mar. 1831, Wynne Family Papers, 
Box 18, Folder 1, Tennessee State Library and Archives. For more evidence that it was 
difficult to sell slaves during epidemics, see James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 14 
Nov. 1833, Ballard Papers.
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James, complained that he could not sell any slaves, as times were “dreadful.” It took 
all o f  the time and the effort of the healthy slaves to care for those who were sick. The 
result was a depressing situation. During a Natchez epidemic, he whined, “I never 
wanted to leave any place so bad as I do want to leave this damn hole.”166
The threat o f disease was a practical reason why residents of states that imported 
slaves felt uneasy or resentful of the interstate slave trade. There was another 
explanation why those in the Deep South felt ambivalent about the trade—there was a 
genuine, although shallow and scattered, concern for the consequences o f the trade upon 
the slave. Speculation obviously had harmful effects upon slaves, who were dragged 
from their homes and families, and this forced deportation could be bothersome. At 
least before 1830 a significant number o f  Deep South citizens could relate to the charge 
that the speculator was a “pitiless wretch, who has not the spirit or pride to pursue a 
more honorable calling.”167 Like the international trade, the interstate trade was piracy 
and objectionable to “every honorable principle of nature.”168 Governor William Rabun 
o f Georgia railed against the “abominable traffic” in slaves that was becoming “every
166 James R. Franklin to Rice C. Ballard, 7 May (first quotation), 14 Nov. 1833, 
2 Feb. 1834 (second quotation), Ballard Papers. Slave jails in the Upper South also 
suffered from the association with disease. They appear to have been healthier because 
of the climate and the shorter period o f  time bondservants spent in the facilities 
(Andrew Dumford to John McDonogh, 25 June 1835, McDonogh Papers; Richmond 
Enquirer, 16 Sept. 1834; Sturge, Visit to the United States, p. 31; Abdy, Journal o f  a 
Residence, 2: 179).
167 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 Dec. 1816.
16 8 Augusta Georgia Courier, 19 June 1826, as quoted in Genius o f Universal 
Emancipation, 15 July 1826, p. 364. There was limited sentiment that the trade 
“destroys all the sensiblities of the white” population (Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 4 
Dec. 1821).
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day more common.”169 In the end, reasoned one Georgia resident, dispensing with 
abstractions and scholastic jargon will lead to the conclusion that “the trade is morally 
wrong.”170 The governor o f South Carolina, David R. Williams, called the trade 
“remorseless” and “merciless.” It was a “reproach to our morals, and an outrage to our 
feelings.” He wanted the roads o f  his state free from the sight o f  slaves “constantly 
dragged through them, to minister to insatiable avarice.”171 James G. Bimey led the 
drive to keep slave traders out o f Alabama A slaveholder, Bimey began to take an 
interest in the American Colonization Society in 1826. He recognized how the internal 
slave trade undermined the principles of the A.C.S., so when he went to Montgomery, 
he brought with him the rough draft o f the bill that eventually passed. After easy 
passage o f the law, Bimey observed that it did not please the large slaveholders who 
wanted unlimited access to buying slaves. It did please those who were concerned with 
the growth o f the state’s slave population and “those who despised slavetraders.”172 
Such attitudes, though, were never widespread in the Deep South, especially after the 
mid 1820s. Residents there never had the depth or breadth o f disgust for the trade that 
was common in the Upper South. Perhaps it was easier to justify the purchase o f  slaves 
rather than their sale. After all, the slave owner who purchased more bondservants
169 Journal o f  the Senate o f the State o f Georgia (Milledgeville, 1818), p. 8 
(quotation); Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 3 Nov. 1818; Scarborough, Opposition to 
Slavery, p. 115-16.
170 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 29 Sept. 1818.
171 Charleston Courier, 4 Dec. 1816. See also the statement o f Mississippi 
Governor Holmes (Natchez Mississippi State Gazette, 1 Mar. 1818).
172 Bimey, James G. Bimey, pp. 56, 57 (quotation).
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could argue that he was fulfilling his duty to the slaves. Instead o f abandoning them at 
a sale, he was adopting them into his household.
More importantly, the states o f  the Deep South tolerated and ultimately 
embraced the interstate slave trade because they had no other choice. Their continued 
expansion and vitality depended on a fresh supply o f  bondservants. Speculators saw the 
need and worked vigorously to meet it. Their efforts, however, were not always looked 
upon with favor. Citizens o f the Deep South, groping for easy answers to a complex 
situation, lashed out at speculators for causing problems o f their own doing. They did 
not want to face the fact that they were to blame for the currency drain and the rapid 
growth o f the slave population. Epidemics, moreover, defied any rational explanation, 
but it was convenient to blame speculators for importing sick slaves. Traders gained a 
reputation for shady business dealings. The pronouncements against the trade and the 
traders reflect southern fears. Striking at the interstate trade was a means o f defusing 
the tensions of slavery. Instead of taking definite action to limit the growth o f the slave 
population, southerners used ceremonial solutions against speculators. The Deep 
South’s inability and unwillingness to deal forthrightly with the interstate slave trade led 
to distorted perceptions o f speculation. Citizens were increasingly willing to rely on a 
simple stereotype o f  traders rather than look realistically at the trade’s consequences. 
Eventually these attitudes spread to the Upper South as it came to embrace the interstate 
trade and alleviated its qualms about speculation in slaves.173
173 The attitudes came full circle in the 1850s during the agitation to reopen the 
African trade (Takaki, Pro-Slavery Crusade).
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Chapter Five
John Hartwell Cocke was a prosperous slaveholder in Fluvanna County, 
Virginia, who owned Bremo Plantation. When thinking about slavery, Cocke’s mind 
could not find rest. He considered the institution to be a “curse upon our Land.” 1 It is 
not that he feared a rebellion or thought that slavery inefficiently allocated labor. 
Instead, Cocke wrestled with the moral dimensions o f the institution. He understood his 
dependence on slavery even while reluctantly admitting that it clashed with his 
Christian faith. Cocke and his wife Louisa were evangelical Protestants who had 
difficulty reconciling the teachings of the New Testament with the ownership o f human 
beings. They thought slavery was a corrosive agent that undermined the basis o f  good 
society since it ran counter to the development of Christian character in both whites and 
blacks. Instead of sitting by idly, the Cockes worked to ameliorate slavery where they 
could even while entertaining ideas that someday the institution would be abolished.
John Cocke hoped ultimately to emancipate his slaves and send them to Liberia, 
but doing so required much preparation. He believed that only the “confidential 
domesticks or mechanicks” were “sufficiently enlightened to make liberty either useful 
to themselves, or beneficial to any free community.” The others, who formed a 
“separate Caste,” must be readied for emancipation, especially since God would one 
day remove slavery. Cocke arranged for local artisans to instruct his slaves in the
1 Unsigned, undirected letter of John Hartwell Cocke, Sr., Dec. 1833, Cocke 
Family Papers, University o f Virginia.
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mechanical trades and hired northern women as tutors to teach reading and writing. 
While John concentrated on the practical aspects o f the slaves’ education, Louisa saw to 
the spiritual component. She taught Bible classes to their bondservants and oversaw 
their Christian education. Not only would the slaves be productive when freed, but they 
would also be virtuous. The Cockes used Bremo as a training ground for freedom.2
Emancipation must be carefully planned and gradually implemented. John 
Cocke believed that colonization was the only viable alternative. He could not envision 
ex-slaves living harmoniously next to their former masters, so an African colony 
seemed like a providential idea. Like many other enthusiasts of colonization, Cocke did 
not rigorously apply logic to his schemes and believed the government could fund the 
endeavor with its surplus revenue. With the weight o f God and government on its side, 
colonization was the perfect answer, and Cocke could not understand why any 
slaveholder would not support the idea. He wrote that once colonization secured 
adequate funding, the slaves “would as naturally be carried away as water flows down 
to the Ocean.”3 While colonization might be irresistible to the slaveholder, Cocke 
recognized that not all slaves would consent to the scheme. Deportion to Africa would 
sever family ties, hence another reason for the slow preparation o f bondservants. Given
2 Undirected letter o f John Hartwell Cocke, 23 Sept. 1831, Cocke Family 
Papers (quotations); Louis B. Gimelli, “Louisa Maxwell Cocke: An Evangelical 
Plantation Mistress in the Antebellum South,” Journal o f  the Early Republic, 9 (1989): 
53-71; Martin Boyd Coyner, “John Hartwell Cocke o f Bremo: Agriculture and Slavery 
in the Ante-Bellum South” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University o f Virginia, 
1961. That the Cockes arranged for their slaves to learn reading and writing was 
unusual and illegal.
3 Undirected letter of John Hartwell Cocke, Sr., 23 Sept. 1831, Cocke Family
Papers.
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enough time, slaves would eventually recognize the benefits o f colonization and agree 
to it. Even though John Cocke was too sanguine about colonization’s ability to rid the 
land o f  slavery, he and wife were typical o f evangelical Christian slaveholders. The 
Cockes and others like them were, in essence, trying to break through what they saw as 
the grime o f slavery and recast their slaves as copies of themselves. Slaves must be 
rescued from the intellectual and moral retardation imposed by the peculiar institution. 
At the same time, they must be sheltered from the withering effects o f slavery’s worst 
abuses.
Even as the Cockes had a condescending view of their slaves, they also 
recognized the essential humanity o f  the bondservants and endeavored to treat them in 
accordance with Biblical principles. They were sensitive to the destruction o f slave 
families, as evidenced by their attitudes towards the slave trade. Both husband and wife 
saw the trade as one o f the worst consequences o f slavery because it destroyed the basic 
spiritual unit of society, the family. Without a stable slave community, the Cockes felt 
they could not adequately train their people. Moral development began in the home and 
a ravaged family unit was a poor foundation for Christian growth. Selling slaves 
indiscriminately also set a bad example on the plantation and undermined the Cockes’ 
efforts to model spiritual values for their bondservants. John explained to a friend that 
the “deep depravity o f the slave trade” ran counter to his frith. He not only disagreed 
with speculation, but took active steps to counteract it. Cocke intervened during the 
sale o f his brother-in-law’s slaves and arranged the transaction through a commission 
merchant rather than a speculator. When Cocke’s brother-in-law complained of his low 
profit, the commission merchant testily responded that it was the best possible price
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unless the slaves were sold to traders. In this case, Cocke prevailed upon his brother-in- 
law to accept a lower price in order to prevent the slaves from falling into a trader’s 
clutches. He recognized the necessity o f sale but wanted to blunt its impact as much as 
possible.4
Cocke also tried to shield his own slaves from the trade. His humanitarian 
principle was bounded by the smooth operation o f  Bremo. When faced with dissension 
or sale, Cocke chose the latter but still spared his slaves from the most harmful effects 
o f speculation. The continued disobedience of a  few slaves led Cocke to sell them lest 
the rest of his workforce catch the contagion o f impudence. He sold bondservants to 
close friends whom he knew well and would treat them properly.5 Louisa hated such 
occasions. She confided to her diary that she was “a good deal disturbed of late on the 
occasion o f my husband’s having to sell some o f the color’d people to Alabama for bad 
conduct.”6 Louisa understood the deep pain associated with the slave trade and worked 
to protect her slaves from it. On more than one occasion she was unsuccessful, showing 
that the principles o f  faith had their limits and even those owners with good intentions 
could not always act upon their scruples. For John Cocke, there was no question that 
speculation in slaves was wrong. He understood the agony o f sale for his slaves and
4 John H. Cocke to Ralph Gurley, 31 Mar. 1833, American Colonization Society 
Papers, Library o f Congress, as quoted in Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward 
Dissolution: The Virginia Slavery Debate o f1831-1832 (Baton Rouge, 1982), p. 224 
(quotation); Bernard Peyton to John Hartwell Cocke, 20 Feb. 1828, Cocke Family 
Papers.
5 Coyner, “John Hartwell Cocke,” p. 83.
6 Louisa Cocke Diary, 16 Jan. 1824, Cocke Family Papers.
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took active steps to prevent such pain. Cocke believed in the essential dignity o f his 
slaves, noting that slavery caused them to “sink” and ignorance kept them hobbled.7 He 
did sell his slaves on occasion, but not for profit or gain. Instead he sold his 
bondservants out o f necessity, in order to maintain strict discipline on his plantation, 
and sacrificed money in the process. No doubt Cocke could have gotten a better price 
had he dealt with a speculator, but he put his slaves’ feelings ahead of his desire for 
extra cash.
The Cockes’ attitudes towards slavery and the slave trade were animated by 
their Christian faith. John Cocke considered American plantations to be the most fertile 
ground for missionaries. Christian doctrine was necessary to correct the wrongs among 
the “domestic heathen” in the middle and southern states.8 He was unlike most o f his 
fellow slave owners in that he made an essential distinction between slavery and the 
slave. It was the institution of slavery that degraded the slaves, and, ultimately, whites 
as well. Others pointed to bondservants themselves as the trouble, essentially believing 
that Africans were destined to be slaves and that slavery itself was something that must 
be tolerated and protected. Cocke’s thinking was unusual for his day, and led him to 
believe that owners should not treat their slaves as beasts of burden and callously sell 
them for gain. For evangelical Christians like Cocke, it was the unbridled commerce in 
slaves that caused much discomfort. The interstate slave trade epitomized this blatant 
disregard for the basic dignity o f  the slave. But as Cocke’s situation demonstrates, the
7 Unsigned, undirected letter of John Hartwell Cocke, Sr., Dec. 1833, Cocke 
Family Papers.
8 Ibid.
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line between selling slaves for disciplinary reasons and selling them for gain was often 
blurred. While Cocke could claim he wrestled with his conscience, he doubtless made 
money from the sale o f his malefactors. To those outside the plantation, it probably 
mattered little why Cocke sold the slaves, since many felt one reason was as good as the 
next. Most importantly, the results for the slaves were the same no matter which 
explanation Cocke used to justify his actions. The slaves were separated from their 
family just as they would have been had Cocke been deliberately dabbling in the slave 
market. Evangelical Christians, while they might find fault with speculation, often 
ended up participating in the very thing they abhorred. They found their situation 
exacerbated by the feet that they could find no effective remedy for what they saw as a 
deadly poison.
Southern evangelical churches and individual Christians struggled with the slave 
trade. A grudging acceptance of slavery in the eighteenth century grew into specific 
denunciations o f slave trading. Congregations disciplined members who took part in 
speculation in order to purify the church. Most o f  the qualms about the trade dealt with 
violations of Christ’s teaching or the fear that speculation in slaves would corrupt the 
master by encouraging him to pursue riches rather than holiness. Until about 1830, 
southern evangelical religion was an effective force that shielded the slave from the 
master’s excesses. The situation changed, however, as the churches began to actively 
defend slavery. Denunciations o f the trade’s injustice gave way to an emphasis on 
slavery’s goodness no matter the consequences for the slave. Masters’ authority over 
their bondservants approached an absolute right that should not be interfered with or 
questioned.
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Evangelicals’ fundamental distaste for the interstate slave trade stemmed from 
an equivocal attitude towards slavery and concern over the effects o f speculation. In the 
eighteenth century, the southern evangelical denominations—Methodist, Presbyterian, 
and Baptist—were not fully committed to slavery, and even questioned the efficacy o f 
the institution. In the main, they ascribed to the belief that slavery, while not clearly a 
sin, could easily start the believer on the road to destruction. It could cause whites to 
become overly concerned about money at the expense of their spiritual affairs while 
making them grow callous toward the suffering o f individuals. Thoughtful slave 
owners knew that as slavery exploited blacks and destroyed their family lives, it could 
also undermine the morals of whites. There was a vague sentiment amongst 
evangelicals to either free the slaves or ameliorate their condition, and there was 
moderate support for prohibiting ministers from owning bondservants. Evangelicals 
tended to criticize slavery in the abstract, point out its evils, and emphasize that slaves 
were persons precious to God. There was, though, no concerted or determined effort by 
the evangelical denominations to destroy the peculiar institution. Those who harbored 
an aversion to slavery assumed that it would die naturally and did not want to take 
drastic action lest they cause too much social disruption. Revolutionary rhetoric about 
freedom, furthermore, combined with the powerful message o f the New Testament to 
ensure that slavery was not universally accepted by Christians as a beneficial 
institution.9
9 Donald G. Mathews, Religion in the Old South (Chicago, 1977), pp. 66-69; 
John B. Boles, “Introduction,” in John B. Boles, ed., Masters and Slaves in the House o f  
the Lord: Race and Religion in the American South 1740-1870 (Lexington, Ken., 1988),
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The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Bible was open to 
interpretation regarding slavery. It could be used to defend or attack servitude. Paul the 
apostle addressed the issue o f a slave who had run away in his letter to Philemon and 
directed the slave return to his owner as a sign o f good faith. Many could, and did, use 
this passage and others to put the Bible to use in justifying slavery and protecting it 
from the attacks of those who sought to abolish the institution. Most clergy in the South 
accepted the fact that slavery was not going anywhere. They separated its civil aspects 
from their moral leadership. Their congregations followed suit, believing the church 
should not try to destroy slavery but should instead enforce the commandments of the 
Bible as they impacted upon slavery. Most Christians believed in the utility o f slavery 
to keep the races separate and as a means o f social organization. While slavery was not 
uniformly positive in their eyes, it was necessary. Parts of the Bible, though, were put 
to use by those who opposed slavery. The operation of the golden rule, teaching to do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you, could undermine the basis o f a slave 
society. Few people would willingly consent to slavery. Even if the Bible justified 
slavery, the golden rule militated against a harsh treatment o f slaves. Most Christians 
assumed masters had a duty to treat their slaves with more than a modicum o f decency 
lest they face heavenly sanction.10
pp. 8-9; James D. Essig, The Bonds o f Wickedness: American Evangelicals against 
Slavery, 1770-1808 (Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 26-52.
10 Anne C. Loveland, Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order, 1800-1865 
(Baton Rouge, 1980), pp. 206-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
Each evangelical denomination dealt differently with slavery. The Baptists o f  
the eighteenth century officially condemned it as a “moral evil” and cautioned members 
about its ill-effects. They took no effective steps, however, to ensure its demise within 
the denomination. At a time when the interstate trade was o f minor significance, 
especially in comparison to the African trade, the Baptists left it up to the local churches 
to take their own steps to stamp out commerce in slaves. A 1793 report o f the Virginia 
Baptist General Committee seems to be typical o f the attitude amongst many Baptist 
churches. It described slavery as neither a moral nor a religious issue and thus not a 
legitimate topic o f discussion. Slavery, the conference decided, was firmly established 
in the country and was a purely political matter addressed in the political realm. The 
church, in other words, should not become entangled in the issue.11 Like the Baptists, 
the Presbyterians made tepid moves against slavery. In 1787 the ruling synod of 
Presbyterianism, fearing that slaves might be dangerous to the community, 
recommended that church members prepare their slaves for freedom and take steps to 
bring about abolition. There was no mention o f the church’s stance regarding the sale 
of bondservants. In 1818 the Presbyterian General Assembly used even stronger 
language to condemn slavery itself, calling it a “gross violation of the most precious and 
sacred rights of human nature... utterly inconsistent with the law of God.”12
11 Smith, In His Image, but..., pp. 47-55; Alice D. Adams, The Neglected Period 
o f Anti-Slavery in America (Boston, 1908) p. 100; W. Harrison Daniel, “Virginia 
Baptists and the Negro in the Antebellum Era,” Journal o f Negro History, 56 (1971): 1.
12 Religious Intelligencer, 27 June 1818, p. 58 (quotation); N iles’ Weekly 
Register, supplement to vol. xvi, (1819), pp. 153-55; Smith, In His Image, but..., pp. 
55-58.
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Unlike the other two denominations, the Methodists took action in the 
eighteenth century to deal with slavery within the church. The denomination that would 
become the biggest in the antebellum South proclaimed in 1784 that it should find some 
method to “extirpate this abomination from among us.” It voted to expel members who 
did not take steps to emancipate their slaves within a year, although individuals who 
lived in states that did not allow manumission were exempt from the rule. Delegates 
also decided to banish members who bought or sold slaves, except to liberate them. 
Although not specifically noted, the rule applied to both the foreign and domestic slave 
trades, although it appears to be intended more for the importation o f Africans. The 
African trade was the most important source of new slaves, and if  the church could 
prevent its members from acquiring new slaves, then it was more likely to eliminate 
bondage. These rules, though, were so unpopular they were suspended the next year. 
Five years later the church asked members as a “general rule” to refrain from “buying 
or selling the bodies and souls o f men, women, and children, with an intention to 
enslave them.”13 In 1796 the General Conference voted to permit slaveholders to join 
the church and allowed members to buy slaves as long as they notified their local 
church. A committee would then determine the number of years the slave had to work
13 Lewis M. Purifoy, “The Methodist Anti-Slavery Tradition, 1784-1844,” 
Methodist History, 4 (1966): 3-16 (quotations on p. 4); Smith, In His Image, but..., pp. 
38-47; Arthur Dickens Thomas, Jr., “The Second Great Awakening and Slavery 
Reform, 1785-1837,” Unpublished Th.D. Dissertation, Union Theological Seminary, 
Richmond, Virginia, pp. 78-79; Donald G. Mathews, Slavery and Methodism: A 
Chapter in American Morality, 1780-1845 (Princeton, 1965), pp. 69-70. Over one-third 
o f the churches in what would become the Confederacy were Methodist in 1860 (James 
M. Buckley, Constitutional and Parliamentary History o f the Methodist Episcopal 
Church (New York, 1912), pp. 249-50).
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before paying off his or her purchase price. Methodists could not, however, sell slaves, 
presumably to protect all parties involved from the ravages o f the trade. The general 
intent was to stop the spread o f slavery within the Methodist denomination and 
ultimately render it extinct, although such an outcome was highly unlikely. The net 
result was a compromise with slavery even as the Methodists desired to eliminate the 
abuses associated with the indiscriminate sale of slaves. Methodists continued to 
struggle with the commerce in slaves, as the 1804 General Conference exempted 
members from Georgia and the Carolinas from the rule regarding the purchase and sale 
of slaves. These three states were the primary areas for the importation of Africans, so 
their exemption made the rule virtually useless. By the time the African trade was 
outlawed in 1808, the individual conferences were allowed to set their own rules 
regarding speculation, but conferences in those states that imported the bulk o f  the 
slaves did not bar members from buying or selling slaves. The Methodist church 
stopped trying to regulate the trade and concentrated its efforts on the moral suasion of 
its members.14
Part o f the reason for the softening o f the Methodists’ stance, and that o f the 
other denominations as well, was the spread of the plantation system throughout the 
South. The churches competed for membership and one way to attract potential 
members who owned slaves was to remain silent on the issue. Resistance to slavery 
moved out o f the official church debates and into local congregations and individual 
consciences. Southern churches no longer offered any effective resistance to slavery.
14 Emory S. Bucke, ecL, The History o f American Methodism, 2 voL (New York, 
1964), 2: 13; Lucius C. Matlack, History o f  American Slavery, (1849), pp. 31-34.
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Most o f  the anti-slavery clergy left the South because their views increasingly came in 
conflict with the opinions o f  their members, and their departure made it even more 
difficult for the churches to mount any effective resistance to slavery. The only true 
opposition to the peculiar institution remained in the Upper South, where there was less 
dependence on slave labor.15
The growth o f slaveholding congregants led to a reexamination o f the church’s 
relationship to slavery. Churches that wanted to attract converts were willing to soften 
their anti-slavery stance, while the increase in slaveholding members meant that they 
could effectively lobby for change within the organization. The evangelical churches 
came to recognize that overthrowing the social order by abolishing slavery was 
foolhardy, so antislavery members tried to blunt the harsh impact o f the peculiar 
institution. In this fashion, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians wanted to influence 
the behavior of individual slaveholders rather than make sweeping changes in their 
society. These denominations hoped to persuade masters to reconsider the treatment of 
their slaves, especially living arrangements, housing, food, punishment, religious 
instruction, and the threat o f  sale. Using scripture as a guide for action would “promote 
the moral welfare o f the whole plantation.” Christian faith could then be used to bolster 
slavery by reforming its abuses. Such efforts, though, needed the cooperation of slave 
owners, and their commitment varied. Some wanted no interference in their affairs.
15 Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings o f the Bible Belt 
(New York, 1997), pp. 92-95, 155; Smith, In His Image, but..., pp. 69-76; Dillon, 
Slavery Attacked, p. 110. The disaffected clergy tended to move to Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois. Those southerners who remained opposed to slavery tended to join and 
dominate anti-slavery organizations, which were mainly confined to the Upper South 
(Smith, In His Image, but..., p. 70; Mathews, Religion in the Old South, pp. 75-79).
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Those owners who seriously believed in the tenets o f spiritual dominion over their 
slaves, however, saw the institution as beneficial to the bondservants because it 
provided them with an introduction to civilization. The slave quarter was potentially a 
mission field for the master.16
Even though slavery could be justified as a type of moral guardianship, there 
were still doubts amongst evangelicals about how, why, and when their stewardship 
would end. The peculiar institution was, it seemed, necessary for racial control and 
continued southern economic development. Any talk o f emancipation played upon 
white fears o f a race war, and the property rights o f  slaveholders were firmly 
entrenched. Still, evangelicals o f  the early nineteenth century could not bring 
themselves to an unquestioning acceptance of the perpetual nature o f slavery. In 1816 
the Methodist General Conference threw up its hands and concluded that “little can be 
done to abolish the practice so contrary to the principles of moral justice.” Two years 
later the Presbyterian General Assembly took much the same position. It declared 
slavery to be a moral dilemma, but judged emancipation to be even worse, believing it 
to be socially disruptive. The Presbyterians denounced the notion o f “immediate and 
universal emancipation.” Sudden freedom for slaves, who were mired in “ignorance
16 Betram Wyatt-Brown, “Modernizing Southern Slavery: The Proslavery 
Argument Reinterpreted,” in J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson, eds.,
Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor o f C. Vann Woodward (New York, 
1982), p. 34 (quotation); Mathews, Religion in the Old South, p. 75; Randy J. Sparks, 
‘Mississippi’s Apostle o f Slavery: James Smylie and the Biblical Defense of Slavery,” 
Journal o f Mississippi History, 51 (1989): 96; Oakes, Ruling Race, pp. 96-100; Joyce E. 
Chaplin, “Slavery and the Principle o f  Humanity: A Modem Idea in the Early Lower 
South,” Journal o f  Social History, 24 (1990): 299; Rose, “Domestication of Domestic 
Slavery,” pp. 18-36; Kenneth Moore Startup, The Root o f All Evil: The Protestant 
Clergy and the Economic Mind o f the South (Athens, 1997), pp. 69-1 A.
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and vicious habits,” would impair the “safety and happiness o f  the master and the 
slave.” The best course o f action, the Assembly felt, was for slave owners to patronize 
the American Colonization Society, and provide religious instruction for their slaves.17
John Jones, who eventually became a Methodist minister, was an evangelical 
who struggled with slavery. Before accepting the call to the ministry, Jones felt it was 
good to own slaves. After his conversion, he came to hate slavery and thought that 
most o f his fellow evangelicals saw it as a “great social, political, and moral evil.” Like 
his fellow churchgoers, Jones endured slavery for the present but looked to the day 
when it would ultimately be extinguished. The attitude of evangelicals like Jones who 
hoped for slavery’s eventual end but took no decisive steps to bring it about was typical. 
Their rhetoric was concerned with fixing their eyes on the heavenly kingdom rather 
than on earthly affairs. As a result, they were more likely to tolerate the evil o f slavery 
and work to lessen the harsh impact of the peculiar institution. Instead of trying to 
reshape society to fit their conception of Christianity, they did the reverse. They 
modified their faith to fit peculiar aspects o f their situation. Evangelicals tried to make 
the more objectionable features o f their society less problematic for Christians, and 
even those who did not believe. The churches tended to accommodate the social system 
rather than change it. It was their sense of moral stewardship and their belief that they 
could reform slaveholders that led them to accept what many regarded as sin.18
17 Religious Intelligencer, 27 June 1818, p. 59 (quotations); Niles' Weekly 
Register, supplement to vol. xvi, (1819), pp. 153-55.
18 John Jones, as quoted in Randy J. Sparks, On Jordan’s  Stormy Banks: 
Evangelicalism in Mississippi, 1773-1876 (Athens, 1994), p. 67 (quotation); Albert J. 
Raboteau, Slave Religion: The “Invisible Institution ” in the Antebellum South (New
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Even as the plantation system spread and slaveholders filled the church pews, 
the Second Great Awakening swept through the South and gave impetus to  the growth 
of the evangelical churches.19 Converts flocked to the Methodist, Presbyterian, and 
Baptist churches in record numbers. By 1850 these three denominations had grown to 
such an extent that they composed over nine-tenths of the churches in the South, with a 
membership of about one-seventh of the population. Affiliation was only part o f their 
influence, since ministers regularly preached to congregations up to four times the size 
of the enrolled membership. The evangelical denominations, then, had widespread 
power in the South at a time when church attendance was a customary feature of life. 
Most slave owners in the South belonged, at least nominally, to one o f  the evangelical 
denominations.20 Even while the hierarchical nature o f southern society tended to 
reproduce itself within the church, there still was an undercurrent of egalitarianism. All 
white people, whether they owned slaves or not, could join the church provided they 
made the necessary declaration of faith, although not all men would have the same 
amount o f  influence once inside its doors. Much of the early nineteenth century 
preaching stressed the equality o f man before God, in that all people were sinners
York, 1978), pp. 186-87. For an account o f how Jones agonized, and ultimately 
accepted slaveholding, see John G. Jones Journal, 7 Apr. 1833 and 7 Apr. 1836, 
Mississippi Department o f Archives and History.
19 John B. Boles, The Great Revival 1787-1805: The Origins o f  the Southern 
Evangelical Mind (Lexington, Ken., 1972).
20 C. C. Goen, Broken Churches, Broken Nation: Denominational Schisms and 
the Coming o f the American Civil War (Macon, Geo., 1985), pp. 54-57; Oakes, Ruling 
Race, pp. 96-100. Heyrman estimates that by 1830 evangelicals made up less than half 
of the southern population (Heyrman, Southern Cross, p. 5).
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regardless o f station in life. This leveling influence, combined with the democratic 
structure o f the expanding churches, tended to attract the poorer segments o f  the 
population, especially non-slaveholders. The egalitarian current of evangelicalism 
operated against the idea o f racial inequality and allowed African-Americans to join 
white chinches. In Mississippi, for example, evangelical churches routinely baptized 
African-Americans and gave them the right hand of Christian fellowship, but also made 
sure they sat in their own section in the back o f the church. Baptists, in particular, 
sought out blacks for church membership. In Virginia, black and white Baptists 
worshipped together throughout the eighteenth century and up until 1860. The criteria 
for membership were the same for both races, as were the disciplinary rules, although 
slaves might suffer church discipline for running away from their master or for being 
disobedient. Blacks could legally preach to congregations until 1832, when the outburst 
of legislation following the Nat Turner rebellion prohibited black preachers. Although 
practices varied widely, slaves commonly participated in the church life o f the 
evangelical denominations in the South. Social interaction did not lead to social equity, 
and whites controlled the power structure o f the churches.21
The presence o f  African-American members, however, had some influence in 
keeping alive an anti-slavery sentiment in the evangelical churches. While the majority 
of southerners who were opposed to the peculiar institution were animated by their
21 Sparks, Jordan’s Stormy Banks, p. 60; Mathews, Religion in the Old South, 
pp. 66-69; Boles, “Introduction,” pp. 8-12; W. Harrison Daniel, “Virginia Baptists and 
the Negro in the Early Republic,” Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography, 80 
(1972): 60-62; Daniel, “Virginia Baptists in the Antebellum Era,” pp. 1-7; Raboteau, 
Slave Religion, pp. 101-2.
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religious beliefs, they tended to organize their efforts through a colonization society 
rather than directly confront slavery. Evangelicals who were uncomfortable with 
slavery thought, or wished, it would someday end. They had no idea how such an event 
would come to pass and colonization became a comforting way to push off the problem 
for another day. This inchoate opposition to slavery led to a tendency within the 
evangelical denominations to criticize slavery in the abstract and delineate the duties of 
both master and slave. Evangelical ministers reiterated that slaves were persons who 
were precious to God, thus giving slaveholders a religious obligations to their 
bondservants. These churches did not take the radical step of condemning slavery as a 
sin, but they did put the slaves on the same level as their owners in one important 
respect: their relation to God. In theory, then, the deeply devout slaveholder was no 
better in God’s eyes than one o f his slaves.22
The presence o f African-American members was a visible reminder that early 
church doctrine emphasized slaves as being persons precious to God. This idea created 
burdens for masters who assumed the role of moral guardian for their bondservants.
The Virginia Conference of the Methodist church ordered owners to instruct their slaves 
in the “principles and duties o f religion.”23 Teaching slaves to read and right was illegal 
in the southern states, but earnest masters assumed responsibility for their slaves’ 
religious instruction or delegated it to their wives or a trusted slave preacher. Reflective 
owners extended their efforts into the moral lives o f their slaves. They tried to improve
22 Boles, “Introduction,” pp. 8-9.
23 William W. Sweet, Virginia Methodism: A History (Richmond, 1955), p. 200.
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the living conditions in the quarters. Other owners raised money for the American 
Colonization Society or sent their slaves to Africa. The idea of guardianship was 
extended to include almost any aspect o f a slave’s life and gave masters an excuse to 
meddle wherever they pleased.
Of particular concern for masters who presumed the mantle o f trusteeship was 
discipline, punishment, and sale. Evangelical religion, when viewed in this way, 
provided principles that were subversive to the complete authority of the master over 
his slaves. Those who owned other human beings, after all, would eventually be 
accountable to their heavenly master.24 The prospect o f a divine judgment could 
persuade owners to reconsider harsh treatment o f slaves. This idea was especially 
noticeable when the slave was a Christian. Presbyterians went further than the other 
two evangelical denominations in protecting slaves who belonged to the church. In 
1822 the Presbyterian General Assembly used strong language to prevent a master from 
selling a slave “who is also in communion and good standing with our church, contrary 
to his or her will.” The offender should be suspended from church membership “till he 
repent, and make all reparation in his power to the injured party.”25 The Hanover, 
Virginia, Presbytery reaffirmed the stance of the national church when it mandated that
24 John G. West, Jr., The Politics o f Revelation and Reason: Religion and Civic 
Life in the New Nation (Lawrence, Kan., 1996), p. 82; Barbara Layenette Green, “The 
Slavery Debate in Missouri, 1831-1855,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Missouri, Columbia, 1980, pp. 110-11; Dillon, Slavery Attacked, pp. 97-100; Mathews, 
Religion in the Old South, pp. 28-30, 40-41, 68-71.
25 Abolition Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine, July 1822, p. 36
(quotations); Religious Remembrancer, 20 June 1818, p. 171; Religious Intelligencer,
27 June 1818, p. 60.
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any o f its members who sold a slave who was also a church member should be 
disciplined until they repented.26 Here the church denounced the slave trade in general 
and, amazingly, extended special protection to slaves who were members o f  a local 
congregation. Insulating a slave from sale was virtually unthinkable and a serious 
erosion o f  the rights which slaveholders presumed. Bondservants who converted and 
then joined the church would have special status that limited masters’ abilities to attend 
to their affairs.
A widow who lived in Tennessee ran into just such a problem. She planned to 
move to Alabama, but had to make arrangements for her slaves. The woman, who 
belonged to a Presbyterian church, wanted to sell a female slave and her two children. 
The slave’s husband, who lived in the same city, had a different owner. When the 
woman applied for a certificate of good standing from the church in order to be 
admitted to another Presbyterian congregation in Alabama, she was denied. Since the 
slaves were members o f her church, the elders felt it wrong to grant the request unless 
she made arrangements not to separate the woman and the children from the father. The 
husband’s owner made a reasonable offer for the three slaves, but the widow refused. 
She then sold the female slave to a “most wicked man” and moved to Alabama with the 
children. The woman was “o f course” suspended from the church.27 While this episode 
demonstrates that evangelical churches took action against speculation, it also shows
26 Thomas, “Second Great Awakening,” p. 148. The church, o f course, risked 
attracting a flood of slave converts once news leaked out about the privilege. There is 
no evidence to suggest that such a thing happened.
27 Undated Maryville Trumpeter, as reprinted in the Liberator, 9 May 1835, p.
73.
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that church discipline was ineffective for those members who did not feel compelled to 
remain in good standing. They chose personal autonomy over group affiliation.
Even though the Presbyterian church was the only one specifically to bar its 
members from selling one another, other evangelicals felt much the same. Frederick 
Douglass observed how there was a “scandal connected with the idea o f  one Christian 
selling another to the Georgia traders.”28 An evangelical minister from Prince George, 
Maryland, was particularly troubled by what transpired when he was out o f town. Ned, 
a “very reputable black communicant,” frequently attended prayer meetings. Ned’s 
“hard-hearted” master flogged him for his diligence. When a “Georgia buyer” came 
through the neighborhood, the master sold Ned. The minister could not comprehend the 
action, especially since it came on the “Holy Sabbath.'1'’ Ned did not complain when the 
irons were riveted on his wrists, but cried and said, “Jesus suffered more.” The minister 
implored his fellow Christians to come to their senses and look at the treatment of 
slaves. He wondered, “Is there not a thunder-bolt o f  wrath, reddening and threatening 
to smite a Christian nation, that dares still to traffic in the ‘souls of men?’” The minister 
probably had qualms about slavery before the incident with Ned, but the callous sale o f 
Ned for acting upon his Christian beliefs sent him firmly into the anti-slavery camp.29
Most southern clergy, though, supported slavery even if they opposed the 
interstate slave trade. Jeremiah Jeter, a Presbyterian minister and slave owner in eastern 
Virginia, wondered what to do with his slaves. He wanted to be rid o f  his bondservants,
28 Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and M y Freedom (1855; reprint, New York, 
1968), p. 302.
29 Religious Remembrancer, 26 Oct. 1816, pp. 33-34. Emphasis in original.
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but the laws o f Virginia forbade emancipation. None o f his slaves wanted to go to 
Liberia and he was not willing to force them into exile. The best course of action, he 
decided, was to “sell them or give them away.” Again, the slaves protested and Jeter 
did not carry out his scheme. Failing to dispose o f his bondservants, Jeter concluded it 
was his “solemn obligation” to keep them and be a conscientious master. He justified 
his inaction by arguing that free blacks were usually worse off than whites. Although 
Jeter’s writing may be an exercise in self-justification, he seemed to be truly troubled 
with slavery. His preaching reflected his sense of personal confusion. Instead of 
emphasizing the goodness o f slavery or illuminating whites on the scriptural basis o f the 
institution, he stressed the responsibility o f masters to their slaves. Jeter thought that 
the “prevalent opinion” o f the 1820s was that slavery “imposed great responsibilities, 
and was fraught with many evils, economical, social, political, and moral,” a statement 
that perfectly captured his own attitude. Most people, he thought, felt that slavery 
should be abolished as soon as possible. Jeter himself harbored a slight hope that 
eventually slavery would be peaceably removed.30
Divided minds like Jeter’s were not unusual for the time since most evangelicals 
had a conditional acceptance of slavery. Even though they tolerated the presence o f the 
peculiar institution, they could not abandon the vague idea that it was, somehow, wrong 
and needed to be reformed, controlled, and eventually eliminated. They tried to make 
the system o f slavery itself seem moral by ameliorating the blatant violations of God’s
30 Jeter, Recollections, p. 68 (quotations); Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, p.
187.
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law.31 One way to align masters with evangelical beliefs was to bring religious worship 
to the slaves. Evangelicals felt slaveholders had a  duty to provide spiritual leadership 
for their bondservants, since slavery was an extension of God’s plan to bring 
Christianity to the world. Few southerners would question whether Africans were 
better off as Christians even though enslaved, especially in comparison to their heathen 
relatives in Africa.32 By adopting this line of thinking, evangelicals could justify their 
participation in the African slave trade since they thought it good fortune for a slave to 
be sold to a Christian owner rather than a non-Christian. Richard Furman, the noted 
minister, felt that church members should not purchase slaves if he or she felt it was a 
sin to do so. He did counsel, though, that “if all serious Christians should abstain from 
purchasing the slaves that are brought here, they must of course to into other hands, 
where it is not probable they would fare as well.”33
The elimination o f the African trade shifted the focus o f spiritual leadership to 
the plantation, where masters could compel their slaves to sit through religious 
instruction. Finis Ewing, a Presbyterian minister in the 1820s, noted how many in the 
church seemed “by their conduct” towards slaves “not to consider themfellow -beings” 
Judging their actions, Ewing assumed that many masters were “taking no pains at all to 
give their servants religious instruction of any kind.” He especially abhorred how some
31 Mathews, Religion in the Old South, pp. 75-79; Chaplin, “Slavery and the 
Principle o f Humanity,” pp. 299-315.
32 Rose, “Domestication o f Domestic Slavery,” p. 27.
33 As quoted in Jimmy Gene Cobb, “A Study o f White Protestants’ Attitudes 
toward Negroes in Charleston, South Carolina, 1790-1845,” Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Baylor University, 1967, p. 29.
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slaveholders required their “servants to work, cook, &c., while the white population is 
praying around the family altar.”34
Evangelicals also scrutinized the treatment o f slaves. They thought it their 
Christian duty to prevent, as much as possible, many o f the abuses that were too often 
associated with slavery. Excessive labor, extreme punishment, and the withholding of 
necessary food and clothing were the most common targets.35 Thomas S. Clay prepared 
a pamphlet for the Georgia Presbytery on how masters could improve the moral 
condition o f their slaves. He first noted that bondservants learn from the “experience of 
judicious, humane planters.” Owners must buttress their personal lives with procedures 
that promoted religious instruction, moral excellence, temperance, stable family unions, 
and plantation discipline.36 One catechism stressed the need for masters to provide 
adequate clothing, abundant food, medicine, and proper care when old or infirm.37 
Ewing similarly complained how some members o f the “visible church half-feed, half- 
clothe, and oppress their servants.” Such actions were a negative example for the slaves 
and non-believers.38
34 F. R. Cossitt, The Life and Times o f Rev. Finis Ewing, 3rd ed. (Louisville, 
1853), p. 273. Emphasis in original.
35 Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, p. 209; Startup, Root o f all Evil, pp. 70-71.
36 Thomas S. Clay, Detail o f  a Plan for the Moral Improvement o f Negroes on 
Plantations (n.p., 1833), p. 3.
37 Charles Colcock Jones, A Catechism o f Scripture Doctrine and Practice, fo r  
Families and Sabbath Schools, designed also fo r the Oral Instruction o f Colored 
Persons (Savannah, 1844), as quoted in Mason Crum, Gullah: Negro Life in the 
Carolina Sea Islands (Durham, N.C., 1940), p. 204.
n o
Cossitt, Finis Ewing, p. 273. Emphasis in original.
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I f  evangelicals were serious about bringing civilization and morality to their 
slaves, then the wanton operation o f the interstate slave trade was a poor message to 
send to bondservants or to critics o f  slavery. The family unit was the building block of 
society and to endanger it was to threaten the basis o f community. A thriving interstate 
slave trade, most evangelicals felt, worked at cross purposes to the efforts to teach 
slaves the virtues of American society. Even though much o f  southern perception o f 
slavery involved the exclusion o f slaves from many rights and privileges, most 
evangelical Christians would not begrudge slaves the opportunity to have a family 
life.39 The Western Luminary, a publication o f the Presbyterian Church, lamented the 
suffering associated with the slave trade. Speculation broke up families through 
“heathenish commerce in the blood, and sinews o f human beings.” The thought o f such 
suffering should “excite the virtuous indignation, and rouse the Christian sympathies, of 
every individual who possesses a single spark o f  humanity.”40 A publication intended 
to serve as a guide for Christian slave holders made much the same point. It stressed 
the need to “keep families together-”41 Isham Harrison had already taken these lessons 
to heart. When his brother James sent forty-nine slaves from South Carolina to
39 Oakes, Slavery and Freedom, is the most trenchant argument that southerners 
defined their freedom in relation to slavery.
40 Western Luminary, 23 Nov. 1831 (quotation); Mitchell Snay, Gospel o f  
Disunion: Religion and Separatism in the Antebellum South (New York, 1993), pp. 95- 
98; Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, pp. 209-10. For one cleric’s struggles with the 
harshness o f  slavery, see William W. Freehling, “James Henley Thomwell’s Mysterious 
Antislavery Movement.” Journal o f  Southern History, 57 (1991): 383-406.
41 Jones, Catechism o f  Scripture, as quoted in Crum, Gullah, p. 204. Emphasis 
in original.
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Alabama for sale, it was hard on Isham. Several years later the devout Isham praised 
his brother for turning his “attention to the religion o f  our Lord” even while confessing 
that he “always regretted the sale o f your negroes.” When Isham had the opportunity to 
buy some slaves, he tried to cushion the blow by purchasing a family. Even though 
Isham said he paid $200 too much for the slaves, he admitted it was “worth something” 
to see slave families  reunited.42 One southern evangelical asserted that a Christian 
country should be distinguished by its belief that all men love one another. “But in 
what slave market is this badge exhibited,” he wondered. He also wanted to know if  the 
label “Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you do ye even so to them” was 
written on the whip o f any slave driver.43
The fact that southern society did not recognize slave marriages as legally 
binding did not deter evangelicals from ascribing some type o f  moral equivalency to 
slave unions.44 J. D. Paxton, a  Presbyterian minister, expressed the attitude o f many 
when he wrote that the forced separation of husbands from wives, and children from 
parents was “at variance with natural religion.” Such absences meant that husbands 
could not protect their wives, wives could not be obedient to their husbands, and neither 
could provide for their children. For Paxton, the interstate slave trade destroyed the 
integrity of the slave family and eroded the Christian basis of slavery. It did not matter 
to him whether the state recognized such marriages as valid since God’s natural law was
42 Isham Harrison to James Harrison, 8 Mar. 1836, James T. Harrison Papers.
43 Western Luminary, 19 Jan. 1831, p. 322.
44 Part o f the problem in recognizing the legal validity o f slave marriages lay in 
the assumption that slaves could not be a party to a contract.
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important.45 Separation between parent and child could be especially poignant and was 
hardly evidence that slavery improved the life o f the enslaved. The members of Glen’s 
Creek, Kentucky, Methodist Church were especially troubled by the actions o f William 
Garnett, one o f  their own. Some members accused Garnett o f  “selling a Negroe 
Woman from her child to go down the River.” The church voted to strike him from the 
membership roll in order to teach him a lesson about the worldly depravity o f  
speculation. Garnett returned to fellowship once he made amends.46
It was the interstate slave trade, the evangelical churches realized, that caused 
most o f the family separations. Philip A. Bolling, a Virginia evangelical, recognized 
the connection between the two. During the Virginia slavery debates, he defended 
slavery itself but said no one can “justify the traffic in human beings. High-minded 
men ought to disdain to hold their fellow creatures as articles o f traffic—disregarding 
all the ties o f  blood and affection—tearing asunder all those sympathies dear to man— 
dividing husbands and wives, parents and children, as they would cut asunder a piece of 
cotton cloth.” If men would read their Bibles and take to heart the command to “do 
unto all men as you would have them do unto you,” then the slave trade would 
disappear.47 A Presbyterian divine attacked the slave trade as one of the “palpable 
evils” connected with slavery. He was shocked that his brethren were caught up in the
45 J. D. Paxton, Letters on Slavery; Addressed to the Cumberland Congregation, 
Virginia (Lexington, Ken., 1833), p. 56.
46 As quoted in Walter B. Posey, The Baptist Church in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley 1776-1845 (Lexington, Ken., 1957), p. 94.
47 Bolling, as quoted in Thomas, “Second Great Awakening,” pp. 414-15.
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traffic in human flesh and souls. Such men were “not scrupulous to whom they sell, 
provided they can obtain a better price!” The result was an offense to the Lord. John 
Early, who preached at a Methodist camp meeting in Portsmouth, Virginia, called the 
slave speculator “among the blackest o f characters.” When a trader’s wife stopped 
Early after the service and said she was offended by him, he replied that “he was sorry 
he had injured his wife” and more sorry “she had a negro speculator for a husband.”48
Although the separation of slave families was bothersome to evangelicals, the 
commercial aspect of slave trading was even more alarming. The two were 
interconnected, since it was the speculative nature o f slave sales that usually destroyed 
black families. Evangelicals feared that the rampant growth o f slave speculation—with 
all o f its potential for profit—would seduce church members into worshipping money 
rather than God. An evangelical who sold slaves to a speculator was assumed to be 
doing it for the wrong reasons. In 1823, for instance, the Goshen Association, a Baptist 
group centered in Fredericksburg, Virginia, was asked to “express an opinion on the 
subject of traffic in slaves as a business o f speculation.” The Association’s answer was 
clear. It used the “strongest terms” to denounce “unhesitatingly” the “business of 
speculating in slaves as an unfeeling, and unchristian practice, by no means to be 
tolerated in the Church o f Christ.”49 This response stressed the business nature o f the 
trade as the most objectionable feature rather than emphasizing the harmful aspects 
upon the slave family. The mere pursuit o f wealth was selfish and something not to be
48 Cossitt, Rev. Finis Ewing, p. 273 (first and second quotations); Early, as 
quoted in Thomas, “Second Great Awakening,” pp. 32-33 (subsequent quotations).
49 Goshen Association Minutes, p. 6, Library o f Virginia, Richmond, Virginia
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excused because it was diametrically opposed to the spirit o f Christianity. It is not that 
the church was anti-money, but it was against speculation, especially when it wreaked 
such devastation on the lives of slaves. Such naked pursuit of wealth clouded the eyes 
of the true believer and caused him to take his concentration off o f spiritual matters.
The Western Luminary made its position clear. Speculators merely acted for “gold- 
sordid gold,—for the sake o f  heaping up that unrighteous mammon.” Masters who sold 
their slaves to speculators were “more guilty” because they enabled the trade to 
flourish.50
Many Christians struggled with the effects of slave speculation, as seen in the 
pages o f the Religious Herald, a publication that was widely circulated amongst 
Virginia Baptists. A reader wondered “Where is the impropriety in any member of the 
church o f Christ, buying and selling slaves for speculation?” He questioned the 
church’s opposition to the trade and challenged its authority on the matter. The writer 
felt it was “improper” for a Baptist church “to pass the highest censure on any member 
who continues this traffic.” The Herald noted that it had previously received questions 
of a similar nature, but thought it improper to answer them. Now, with its authority 
under fire, it blasted the reader’s attitude with a long and detailed indictment o f the 
slave trade. It was a “manifest impropriety” for a  Christian to engage in slave 
trafficking. Speculation, the paper noted, was “deemed a disreputable one by the world 
generally. Those who follow it forfeited the esteem o f the community.” Since the term 
“negro-buyer” was often used in reproach, the Christian should avoid association with
50 Western Luminary, 23 Nov. 1831 (emphasis in original); Startup, Root o f all 
Evil, pp. 43-44,68.
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the trade since it would dishonor “the cause o f Christ.” Baptists “generally” agreed it 
was a “degradation o f the Christian profession,” and induced other believers to harbor 
ill sentiments towards the malefactor. Most importantly, slave trading was 
“incompatible with the spirit o f the gospeL” It had a “hardening tendency” and 
frequently snapped “asunder the cords o f affection for the sake o f little gain.” 
Speculation led owners into temptation and set a bad example since traders associated 
with gamblers and others riddled with vice. The only conclusion believers should draw 
was that it would be “wholly impracticable” to maintain a Christian character in a traffic 
that was concerned with the pursuit o f  mammon- It followed that speculation should be 
made a subject for church discipline since a congregation that harbored a slave trader 
“would be greatly paralyzed” and its “usefulness measurably destroyed.” Since the 
public had decided that the traffic was “discreditable,” then the church could not 
disregard public opinion with impunity. The Herald* s statement condemned the trade 
in the strongest terms possible, on religious, social, and moral grounds. While it 
pointed out the effects that the trade had on the slave, it was more concerned with the 
effects on the church and the white community. Believers who dabbled with the 
interstate slave trade were playing with fire. The lust for money could scorch the 
master and bum the slave.51
Owners, then, could not take their duties lightly and must strive to remain 
uncorrupted by the potential for evil that lay in the slaveholding relationship. There 
lurked about all kinds of opportunity for immoral thoughts and actions. The slaveholder 
who began to put the pursuit o f money ahead o f  spiritual affairs would be tempted to
51 Religious Herald, 15 Apr. 1836.
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sell his slaves to raise the necessary cash to gratify his desires. His personal co mfort 
would come at the expense o f  the slaves’ familial relations. It was this type o f 
speculation in slaves, the desire to make money, that seemed to bother evangelicals the 
most. Slaveholders must strive to act in accordance with the principles o f humanity and 
justice. Any who made “merchandize o f their fellow-creatures” engaged in a  “flagrant 
violation o f duty.” Elijah Eagleston, pastor o f the Presbyterian church in Madisonville, 
Tennessee, took quick action to root out what he saw as evil in his midst. He secured 
the expulsion of two o f his most prominent members after they sold slaves because of 
the high market prices. This thirst for money could spread and poison the entire 
congregation.52 Most Christians understood the necessity to sell slaves in hard 
economic times or at the settlement o f an estate and could sense the differences between 
a sale o f  this type and speculation in slaves. One religious writer articulated the 
distinction by condemning the “indiscriminate” sale of slaves as immoral, while 
recognizing  that there were occasions where such transactions sprang from “motives of 
humanity.” Where owners acted as humans, they realized that slaves had legitimate 
claims on their “sympathies.” The result would be that slaves would be treated with a 
measure o f regard for their feelings.53 Speculation involved the naked pursuit o f profit 
and came from the exploitation of the slaves. In this way, it was a twofold evil— 
corrupting the speculator and demeaning the slave.
52 Western Luminary, 23 Nov. 1831 (quotation); Ernest T. Thompson, 
Presbyterians in the South, vol. 1 ,1607-1861 (Richmond, 1963), 1: 345.
53 Abolition Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine, June 1822, pp. 18-22 
(quotations on p. 18).
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Evangelical sermons also stressed the deadly nature o f the slave trade. Ewing 
consistently preached against the “traffic in human flesh,” referring to the disruptive 
effects on the slave family. He noted that many masters were not “scrupulous to whom 
they sell, provided they can obtain a better price.” The worldly desire for riches 
crowded in and led owners into temptation, leading to debasement of both master and 
slave. God was displeased with the situation, Ewing surmised, and doubtless heard the 
cries of those who were separated from their family.54 Paxton also called the slave trade 
an “evil” that ought to convince people to reform slavery or abandon it all together. He 
pointed out most southerners had seen the trade, whether at the court house or in a 
coffle along the road, and realized that speculation involved “hundreds o f  thousands o f  
dollars.” Paxton knew that the love o f money was the root of all evil, so the high profits 
o f the trade led to the blatant disregard of the slaves’ families. “No passion is more 
unfeeling than avarice,” he concluded. In speaking to Christians, Paxton asked any who 
have “hearts to feel for a fellow creature’s woes and a fellow creature’s wrongs” to 
work to prevent such scenes from occurring in the future.55
The growth of the interstate slave trade in the 1820s and beyond challenged the 
church’s relationship with slavery. A thriving trade brought the harsher features of 
slavery to light and forced evangelicals to reconsider their support for the peculiar 
institution. They desperately groped for a way to reduce speculation while 
simultaneously affirming their support for slavery. The three evangelical
54 Cossitt, Finis Ewing, p. 273 (quotations); Caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro in 
Tennessee, 1790-1865 (1922; reprint, New York, 1968), pp. 131-32.
55 Paxton, Letters on Slavery, pp. 134-35.
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denominations took different approaches, with the Presbyterians taking national action, 
the Baptists making local efforts, and the Methodists hewing to a middle way. In 1815 
the Presbyterian General Assembly officially condemned slave speculation. This 
national meeting o f  church representatives denounced the “transfer o f  slaves by way o f  
traffic” and “severity” in the management of them as “inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Gospel.” The Assembly recommended that churches “make use o f  all prudent measures 
to prevent such shameful and unrighteous conduct.”56 Three years later the same body 
asked individual churches to “discountenance” the “cruelty of separating husband and 
wife, parents and children, and that which consists in selling slaves to those who will 
either themselves deprive these unhappy people the blessings o f the gospel, or who will 
transport them to places where the gospel is not proclaimed.” Such actions undermined 
the sanctity of the family and were just grounds for “the discipline and censure of the 
church.” The Assembly, however, did not elaborate what punishment would be suitable 
for those who engaged in speculation.57 It was not always easy, moreover, to prove a 
seller’s motives. The Concord, Kentucky, Presbyterian church excluded John Moore 
from church privileges for selling a boy slave at an auction. Moore appealed this 
decision to the Presbytery of West Lexington, which reversed the decision. The 
appellate presbytery expressed its “decided disapprobation of the practice o f exposing 
slaves to publick sail” but could find no scripture that directly applied to the situation.
56 Thompson, Presbyterians in the South, 1: 328 (quotations); Smith, In His 
Image, but..., p. 59.
C " T
Religious Remembrancer, 20 June 1818, p. 171 (quotations); Religious 
Intelligencer, 27 June 1818, p. 60; Abolition Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine, 
July 1822, p. 36; N iles' WeeHy Register, supplement to vol. xvi, (1819), pp. 153-55.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
249
Determined to ferret out the evil in its midst, the church appealed the decision to the 
synod, which seemed at a loss as to what to do next. After originally reversing the 
presbytery’s decision, the synod remanded the case to the session for more information. 
Specifically, the synod wanted to know whether Moore took “due pains” to sell the boy 
at a private sale before resorting to an auction.58 The evasion o f the synod illustrates a 
crucial problem in dealing with those who sold slaves: determining motive. If  Moore 
tried to find a private buyer, then it could be argued that he wanted the sale to be as least 
disruptive on the slave as possible, since the slave would remain near his family. The 
use o f an auctioneer, on the other hand, would signal Moore’s desire to profit on the 
transaction at the expense of the slave. Sale to a stranger likely meant exile for the 
slave and a higher profit for the seller. The churches could not always discern an 
owner’s motives, so action usually became the basis of judgment.
Unlike the Presbyterians, the national church body of the Baptists made no 
official pronouncement on the trade. Instead it left it up to the church associations or 
the individual churches to set their own policies when it came to the buying and selling 
o f slaves. One association, when mulling over what to do when there was a forcible 
separation o f  slaves, dodged the question and advised churches to “act discretionally.”59 
There are, on the other hand, numerous examples o f Baptist associations taking action 
against the slave trade. The Dover Association ruled in 1816 that its members who 
engaged in the slave traffic should be dealt with as “offenders against the laws of God
58 Thompson, Presbyterians in the South, 1: 327-28.
59 Daniel, “Virginia Baptists in the Early Republic,” pp. 62-64.
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and man.” Expulsion o f this type was the strongest form o f discipline available to the 
church.60 Likewise, the Chowan Association, a group comprising eighteen churches in 
four counties o f  North Carolina, faced the problem two years later. A query, or formal 
question, was put to the Association asking if it was consistent for a professor o f  the 
Christian religion to “be engaged in purchasing negroes with a view to sell them to 
speculators.” The Association did not mince words in its reply, describing such an 
action as “at open war with the spirit of the gospel, and shocking to all the tender 
feelings of our natures.” The answer to whether a Christian should sell slaves to a 
speculator was an emphatic no.61 Several years later the Sandy Creek Baptist 
Association faced the same question. In 1835 it adopted a resolution that found it 
“inconsistent with the spirit o f the Gospel o f Christ, for a Christian to buy and sell 
negroes, for the purposes o f  speculation or merchandise, for gain.”
There are numerous instances of Baptist churches taking vigorous steps to 
prevent the slave trade from becoming a significant factor in their members’ lives. The 
First Baptist Church of Richmond expelled William Muse for “breach of promise” after 
he broke his word to one o f his slaves. Muse promised to find a local master for the 
man, and when he sold the slave to New Orleans, the church took action to show him
60 Reuben E. Alley, A History o f Baptists in Virginia (Richmond, n. d.), p. 149.
61 James A. Delke, History o f the North Carolina Chowan Baptist Association 
1806-1881 (Raleigh, N. C., 1882), p. 80.
62 George W. Purefoy, A History o f the Sandy Creek Baptist Association from  its 
Organization in A. D. 1758, to A. D. 1858 (New York, 1859), pp. 163-64. Sandy Creek, 
having twenty-two churches in four counties, asked its churches to give two warnings 
and then exclude members who “will not abandon the practice” o f buying or selling 
slaves for profit.
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the error o f  his ways.63 The constant buying and selling o f  slaves could attract the 
attention o f  other members o f the congregations, as it did in the case o f  William E. 
Jones. Several o f the members o f the Mt. Salem Baptist Church, Virginia, had their 
feelings “wounded” by Jones’s actions in selling slaves “abroad.” Jones asked for a 
meeting so the church could make a full investigation and “deal with him as she might 
think proper.” In a special session, church members heard that Jones only sold the 
slaves to pay his debts and “did not intend to pursue the calling [i. e., slave trading] with 
a view to worldly aggrandizement.” The church did not censure Jones, although it 
made it clear that it was “not intending thereby however, to give countenance to negro 
trading, as a general practice for mere gain.” Mt. Salem “utterly oppos’d” any and all 
slave traders. Such local action was sporadic, however, and did not prove effective in 
keeping Baptists from dealing with slave traders.64
Like the Baptists, the Methodists as a national body ceased to regulate the 
interstate slave trade. Certain portions o f the church, though, continued to operate as a 
brake on the growing commerce. In 1813 the Virginia Conference agreed that if  any o f 
its members were found guilty o f “carrying on directly or indirectly the trade o f  slave 
speculation,” they were to be expelled.65 Four years later the conference clarified the 
matter by affirming the principle that Methodists should not buy or sell slaves unless to
63 First Baptist Church, Richmond, Virginia, Minutes (typescript), 19 Apr. 1825, 
p. 372, Virginia Baptist Historical Society, University o f Richmond, Richmond,
Virginia.
64 Mt. Salem Baptist Church, Mt. Salem, Virginia, Minutes, 10 Mar. 1829, 
Library o f  Virginia. Emphasis in original.
65 Sweet, Virginia Methodism, p. 200.
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keep husbands, wives, parents, and children together. Such activity was, the church 
felt, just another form o f “immorality.”66 Church members could own slaves and buy 
and sell them as long as they did so for humanitarian reasons. What constituted 
humanitarianism was open to debate, and the eventual result was a permissive attitude 
regarding the speculation o f slaves. For instance, two elders of a Virginia church were 
charged with buying and selling slaves, but the Conference considered some 
“palleating” circumstances and acquitted them.67 Most likely they were able to 
demonstrate their good intentions in the transaction, although the justification of one 
sale over another was a significant loophole.
Tennessee Methodists tried to simplify the matter by specifically excluding 
members who bought or sold slaves for speculative profit. This stance remained the 
official position o f the Methodist churches in Tennessee although as time passed the 
matter was forgotten.68 The Western Conference of the Methodist church had a similar 
policy. Embracing the states of Tennessee and Kentucky, it called upon its members to 
cease their involvement in the slave trade. Such westerners were not to “sell or buy a 
slave unjustly, inhumanly., or covetously.” Methodists were not asked to stop all slave 
transactions, merely the ones that were contrary to God’s law. The rule appears to be 
just as much for the slaveholder as for the slave, since it was designed to protect the
66 William W. Bennett, Memorials o f Methodism in Virginia, from  its 
Introduction into the State, in the Year 1773 to the Year 1829 (Richmond, 1871), p. 641.
67 Thomas, “Second Great Awakening,” p. 80.
68 Goodstein, “Black History on the Nashville Frontier,” p. 416, credits this rule 
and others like it as being responsible for attracting African-Americans to the Methodist 
church in Tennessee.
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owner from the temptations o f  the world. While a dampened enthusiasm for the slave 
trade would certainly uphold the sanctity o f the slave family, it would also keep the 
owner from felling into the trap o f  pursuing worldly gain at the expense of heavenly 
business. Suspected members were judged at the quarterly meeting and those who fell 
short of the standard were expelled. The provision was drawn too loosely and it was 
difficult to interpret the meaning o f  justice, humanity, and covetousness. The result was 
an ineffectual standard that was difficult to enforce.69
Even though evangelical denominations and church associations failed to 
establish clear policies in dealing with the trade, Christians worked individually to 
reduce speculation’s impact. Mary Blackford, a devout Christian, lived in 
Fredericksburg, Virginia. The slave trading firm of Smith and Finnall bought a house in 
her neighborhood by “deceiving” the owner’s son. They started converting the 
structure into a jail, building a sixteen foot high brick wall to keep slaves in and curious 
stares out. Blackford organized resistance to the “Bastille” but no one could afford to 
buy the property. Then, a “generous, kind-hearted Yankee” interceded and bought the 
house at an “exorbitant price.” Blackford had the “infinite pleasure” of seeing the wall 
pulled down and the iron grating taken out o f the windows. While Blackford’s 
opposition to the trade may seem extreme, she was motivated by her religious beliefs 
and the desire to keep undesirables, both slaves and speculators, out o f  the area.70
69 Charles B. Swaney, Episcopal Methodism and Slavery: With Sidelights on 
Ecclesiastical Politics (1926; reprint, New York, 1969), p. 6; Patterson, Negro in 
Tennessee, pp. 108-13.
70 L. Minor Blackford, Mine Eyes have seen the Glory: The Story o f a Virginia 
Lady Mary Berkeley Minor Blackford 1802-1896 who taught her sons to hate Slavery
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In a similar fashion, Ann Meade Page and her husband were evangelicals who 
taught many o f their two hundred slaves to read and write, despite the neighbors’ 
protests. When Page’s husband died in 1826, she faced a difficult situation. Page 
wanted to colonize her slaves, but state law required her to pay creditors first. The 
result was a public auction o f half the slaves at Annfield Plantation. She was well 
aware that some of her slaves might fell into the hands of slave traders, a result she 
abhorred. On the day o f the sale several traders showed up at the auction, so Page 
retreated to her study and prayed that none of her slaves be purchased by the 
speculators. Her prayers were answered as none o f  the slaves went to owners far from 
Annfield. Page even had some money left over, which she used send some of the 
remaining slaves to Liberia.71
The Reverend John Jones refused to have any dealings with slave traders. He 
deplored the slave trade and sometime around 1825 came upon an acquaintance and a 
slave trader. When Jones refused to speak to the speculator, “this dealer in human flesh 
rudely knocked off my hat, and began to abuse me for ‘not speaking to a gentleman.’” 
Jones turned the other cheek, retrieved his hat, and rode off. After the slave trader 
boasted about knocking off the Jones’s hat, a good friend arranged for a writ to be
and to love the Union, F. Nash Boney, ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 39-42, 
quotations on pp. 41, 42). Finnall was likely N. C. Finnall, who later teamed with 
Theophilus Freeman in a  long-distance slave trading firm (Bancroft, Slave Trading in 
the Old South, p. 26). The identity o f  Smith is unknown. Finnall and Smith moved 
their operation to a different part o f  town after Blackford chased them away.
71 C. W. Andrews, Memoir o f  Mrs. Ann Page, 2nd ed. (1856, reprint; New York, 
1984), pp. 30, 44-45, 52-53.
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sworn out against the man. When the speculator was hauled before the town’s 
magistrate, he paid a fine and “confessed the turpitude o f  his unjustified act.”72
Evangelicals may have taken strength from the denunciations o f the slave trade 
they read in religious publications. The Western Luminary had no sympathy for two 
slave traders who were killed by the slaves they were escorting to Natchez. Calling the 
murder the “Awful Judgment o f  Heaven upon Slave-Traders,” the Luminary implied that 
the “inhuman and merciless” actions o f the speculators justified their being bludgeoned 
to death and weighted down with stones to sink to the bottom o f the Ohio River. 
Following the incident, the paper printed a  reader’s letter from two years earlier that 
detailed the horrible practices o f this specific trader, as if his brutality excused the 
actions o f the slaves. The letter closed with the ominous line, “Heaven will curse that 
man who engages in such traffic, and the government that protects him in i t ” Instead 
o f calling for the apprehension of the slaves who were still at large, the publication 
urged the legislature of Kentucky to “put a stop to this abominable traffic.” The sharp 
words drew no protest from readers.73 The Christian Advocate, a publication affiliated 
with the Methodist church, attributed the grisly death o f the slave traders to the 
“Shocking effects o f Slave-tradinff and reprinted much o f the Luminary's
72 John G. Jones ’’Autobiography”, pp. 75-76, manuscript in Mississippi 
Department o f Archives and History. Emphasis in original.
73 Western Luminary, 4 Oct. 1826, p. 108. Emphasis in original. Edward and 
Howard Stone, the traders, died alongside two other white men on the boat. This 
incident and others like it will be discussed more folly in the next chapter. That there 
was no protest from readers is inferred from the lack of letters in subsequent issues.
The Luminary did print letters o f readers who disagreed with its editorials (Ibid., 23 
Nov. 1831,18 Jan. 1832).
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information.74 These Christian publications did not condemn the actions of the slaves, 
despite the obvious threat that such a massacre would have on white hegemony. The 
fear o f slave revolt was constant in the South and the Luminary’s words gave no 
comfort to jittery whites. There was almost an implied sanction to the deed, as if  the 
evil actions o f the traders needlessly provoked the slaves into armed rebellion.
The coverage of the religious publications is in stark contrast to secular 
newspapers. One described the “horrid crime” and “shocking deed” in great detail. It 
described the “plundering” o f the boat and the “timely vigilance” o f  citizens in rounding 
up the slaves.75 Another labeled the deed a “DREADFUL MASSACRE!!!!” and 
described how one o f the slaves defended his master to the end. At least the “miserable 
beings concerned in the murder o f their masters” were arrested, convicted, and 
sentenced to hanging.76 One account of the “Horrible Massacre” sought to instill 
sympathy for the “unfortunate victims.”77 Such reactions were in line with one might 
expect from white society: shock that whites were murdered, no sympathy for the 
slaves, and a call for retribution. No matter how awful the actions o f the traders, the 
slaves were not justified in their actions because they engaged in the ultimate form o f 
disobedience. That these attitudes were noticeably absent from religious publications
74 Christian Advocate, 21 Oct. 1826, p. 27. Emphasis in original.
75 Louisville Gazette, 22 Sept. 1826, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal 
Emancipation, 14 Oct. 1826, p. 33.
76 Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 29 Sept., 27 Oct. 1826.
77 Lexington Kentucky Reporter, 25 Sept. 1826. Accounts with a similar 
perspective are found in Woodville Republican, 14 Oct. 1826; and Milledgeville 
Southern Recorder, 24 Oct. 1826.
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shows the difficulty that evangelicals had in reconciling the trade to their Christian 
beliefs.
As time wore on, evangelicals found it increasingly difficult to condemn the 
slave trade and remain loyal to slavery. The abolitionist campaign increased in the 
1830s and forced southern churches to swing around to slavery’s defense. Some o f  the 
most biting criticism of the peculiar institution came from northern churches and 
northern Christians. These attacks came on a broad front, including political, moral, 
and religious grounds. Abolitionists used scripture to indict slaveholders and 
southerners in general. The Presbyterian Synod o f Cincinnati was especially vocal in 
pushing for deliberate and concrete action that would put slavery on the road to 
extinction. It resolved that the buying or selling o f  slaves “for the sake o f gain” was a 
“heinous sin and scandal.” Since such sins prevailed “to an alarming extent” in the 
nation and the chinch, the synod called for a day o f  prayer and fasting to help “the 
people of color in our land.” Such prayers were as much for the petitioners as they were 
for the slaves, since the church was trying to deliver the country from God’s wrath.78 
The Chillicothe, Ohio, Presbytery adopted a similar statement. It held that the “buying, 
selling, or holding a human being as property, is, in the sight o f God, a heinous sin.”79
Southern clergy raced to their Bibles to prove that God’s word upheld the 
peculiar institution, and as a result, the church became the “bulwark” o f slavery from
78 Western Luminary, 1 Dec. 1830, p. 290.
79 Walter B. Posey, “The Slavery Question in the Presbyterian Church in the Old 
Southwest,” Journal o f Southern History (1949): 322 (quotation); Smith, In His Image, 
but..., p. 81.
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the 1830s. Synods, presbyterians, associations, and conferences began issuing 
statements that the Bible sanctioned slavery. Eventually the southern pro-slavery 
argument united religion and morality with slavery, investing the sectional conflict with 
a profound religious significance.80 Once the southern clergy began to defend the 
peculiar institution at all costs, southerners with qualms about slavery no longer could 
speak out for fear of being branded as disloyal. Nor could they risk questioning an 
objectionable portion o f  slavery like the slave trade. For example, in 1835 a minority 
report o f  the Synod o f Kentucky leaked out that blasted the slave trade. The report 
described the trade as especially odious because it exposed slaves to sale “like a beast of 
the field” and led to their transportation “in chains, like a felon.” Such actions were a 
“flagrant violation o f every principle o f mercy, justice, and humanity.” The instability 
o f slave family life produced licentiousness in them since they had no guarantee of a 
permanent family. While the separation o f slave families was hateful, “cupidity5’ was 
often worse, since it corrupted those who sold slaves. The writers asked preachers to 
read the lengthy address to their congregations, although it is likely that most did not.81 
Northern anti-slavery activists used it as an indictment o f southern society and reprinted
80 Snay, Gospel o f  Disunion, p. 53 (quotation); Goen, Broken Churches, pp. 66- 
67; Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, pp. 194-96. For an early, and unusual, Biblical 
defense o f the slave trade, see Warrenton (Virginia) Palladium o f Liberty, 25 Feb. 1820. 
The author, an “Inquisitive Slave-holder,” cited the examples Abraham and Joseph to 
prove that “buying African servants and holding them fo r  a possession — is warranted 
by written word o f God.” Emphasis in the original. Several times he referred to the 
purchase o f African slaves, although it is possible he was extending his argument, by 
implication, to the domestic slave trade.
81 Committee o f the Synod o f Kentucky, An Address to the Presbyterians o f 
Kentucky, Proposing a Plan fo r  the Instruction and Emancipation o f their Slaves 
(Cincinnati, 1835), quotations on pp. 5, 12.
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it widely. Once northerners started using the report to attack slavery, southern 
moderates were discredited; any condemnation o f  the slave trade made them look like 
abolitionists. The committee’s report just worsened the situation and encouraged those 
who would oppose the slave trade to remain silent on the issue.82
In such a divisive atmosphere it could hardly be expected that the national 
church structures could survive. They did not. The Presbyterian Church was the first to 
buckle under the strain. When anti-slavery advocates within the church pushed for a 
statement on slavery in 1836, the General Assembly ruled that it was a legal matter and 
not the province o f the church. The following year, the church divided.83 In 1845 the 
Baptist church split along sectional lines due, in large part, to the slavery issue. The 
issue that triggered the schism was whether missionaries could be slaveholders.84 The 
Methodist Church, too, fell victim to agitation over slavery. A report o f the Tennessee 
Methodist Conference in 1836 called slavery an “evil” but one that was subject only to 
civil authority. The church could do nothing except “require kindness” on the part of 
owners towards their slaves. As a result, the “indiscriminate” traffic in slaves was 
cruel, criminal, and subject to church discipline. Just what constituted the
82 The most provocative portions of the address were reprinted in Weld, 
American Slavery as It Is, p. 167; Jay, Miscellaneous Writings, p. 259; and John G. 
Palfrey, The Inter-State Slave Trade: Anti-Slavery Tract No. 5, 1855, reprinted vn Anti- 
Slavery Tracts, Series I, Numbers 1-20, 1855-1856 (New York, 1970), p. 6.
83 Posey, “Slavery Question in the Presbyterian Church,” p. 322; Smith, In His 
Image, but..., p. 81.
84 David T. Bailey, Shadow on the Church: Southwestern Evangelical Religion 
and the Issue o f  Slavery, 1783-1860 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), pp. 241-44; Snay, Gospel o f  
Disunion, pp. 134-38; Posey, Baptist Church, pp. 97-98.
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indiscriminate traffic in slaves was not defined and left it wide open for debate. Owners 
could now justify nearly any transaction involving slaves.85 In 1840 a British delegate 
to the General Conference raised the issue o f  slavery. After much debate, the 
Conference affirmed that the buying and selling of slaves was forbidden, but upheld the 
institution of slavery itself. It was an attempt at compromise between North and South, 
but southern delegates vehemently fought against  the ban on selling slaves. When 
northern Methodists pushed for enforcement on the rules regarding slavery, southerners 
refused to consider issue. They insisted that slavery was subject to civil regulation and 
was not open to moral debate. Within four years the church split.86
Once the southern churches began to defend slavery aggressively, evangelicals 
excused the actions of slaveholders. Most looked for ways to justify slavery and 
explain its ill effects rather than seeking to question its objectionable aspects. 
Evangelicals had to find ways to explain the slave trade rather then decry its negative 
effects. James Smylie, who led a church in Mississippi, refuted the allegations o f the 
Chillicothe Presbytery. He stressed that masters were patriarchal leaders o f their slave 
families who had specific duties for their slaves. In this case, since most slaveholders 
were “honest [,] scrupulous and conscientious,” slavery itself was not sinful. When 
masters acted as Christians, the result was beneficial to the slaves, who received food, 
clothing, medical attention, and religious instruction. The slave trade, he also
O f
Liberator, 9 Apr. 1836, p. 57. The Conference blamed abolitionists for 
agitating on the subject and needlessly raising passions.
86 Purifoy, “Southern Methodist Church,” p. 352; Bucke, ed., History o f 
American Methodism, 2:17-18; Snay, Gospel o f Disunion, pp. 131-34.
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explained, was a  natural part o f slavery. Smylie noted that Abraham bought slaves and 
treated them well. Joseph’s sale to slave traders shows that the practice was common in 
Biblical days. The feet that Abraham prospered and Joseph rose to high rank in Egypt 
was enough for Smylie to conclude that God sanctioned the slave trade.87 Smylie was 
not the only Presbyterian minister to defend the interstate slave trade. George Junkin 
argued that the Bible clearly condoned slave sales. He pointed to the example of 
Moses, but also noted how the Hebrews bought servants from “heathens” and held them 
in perpetual servitude. In this way, God used righteous masters to teach salvation to 
their slaves. The implication of Junkin’s reasoning was not only should Christians hold 
slaves, but they were justified in buying more because it could be construed as a 
missionary activity.88
The newly created Southern Baptist Church became increasingly vocal in its 
defense of slavery and put scripture to use to show that God ordained the peculiar 
institution. Part o f  slavery’s defense involved a changed opinion about the slave trade. 
In 1835 the Savannah River Association of the Baptist Church was asked if slaves who 
were involuntarily separated could re-marry. The Association felt that such separations 
were equal to death, since there was virtually no hope o f being reunited. To forbid 
slaves to re-marry would expose the parties to “greater hardships” and “stronger 
temptations.” In the eyes o f this Association, then, the sale of slaves to the Deep South
87 James Smylie, Review o f  a Letter, from the Presbytery o f  Chillicothe, to the 
Presbytery ofM ississippi, on the subject o f Slavery (Woodville, 1836), pp. 4 
(quotation), 16-19; Sparks, “Mississippi’s Apostle o f  Slavery,” p. 95.
88 George Junkin, The Integrity o f Our National Union vs. Abolitionism  
(Cincinnati, 1843), pp. 30-31,37-39,43.
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was equivalent to a death sentence. Sales that separated families were so frequent that 
there had to be a ruling that made it possible for the relatively smooth functioning of 
plantations.89
A popular Baptist publication, the Religious Herald, also defended the slave 
trade. Although it had earlier denounced the trade, the Herald changed its opinion by 
1848. A  reader wondered if it was proper to be a slave trader if he conducted his 
business “on principles o f  humanity.” Such a discussion, the paper answered, would 
neither be “profitable nor interesting.” No general rule could be laid down because 
each case must be decided on its own merits. The church normally excluded 
speculators from fellowship, but the Herald realized that auctioneers and general agents 
often had to “dispose” o f slaves as well. Since there could be no overall judgment of 
slave traders, there was “neither precept nor example in Scripture in regard to the 
traffic.” All cases must be decided on their own merits, “as exceptions from ordinary 
rules.” The paper, in essence, accepted the presence o f the slave trade in southern 
society when it offered no more resistance to it.90 Baptists had come to recognize that 
speculation, while troublesome, was not an issue that deserved much attention or debate 
because it was a normal course of southern society. To question the trade would be to 
open the door to an even broader examination of slavery, something that zealous anti­
slavery northerners were only too willing to do.
89 William G. Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice: Its 
Distinctive Features shown by its Statutes, Judicial Decisions, and Illustrative Facts 
(New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1853), p. 109.
90 Religious Herald, 27 Apr. 1848.
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The Southern Methodist Church did the most dramatic turnabout. Its General 
Conference in effect sanctioned the domestic slave trade without specifically 
mentioning it. When the church split, the southern wing kept the 1789 General Rule o f 
the Discipline that forbade the “buying and selling of men, women, and children, with 
the intention to enslave them.” Attempts to repeal it in 1846 and 1850 were 
unsuccessful, but the 1854 Conference interpreted the clause as “referring exclusively to 
the slave trade, as prohibited by the Constitution and the laws o f the United States,” in 
other words, the African trade. Since the domestic trade had no legislative strictures 
associated with it, the implication was that it was not off limits for Methodists.91 Two 
years later the Conference decided the rule was “ambiguous” and was “liable to be 
construed as antagonistic to the institution o f slavery.” Since the church had no right to 
“meddle” with slavery, the rule was expunged. The general attitude o f the Methodist 
Church towards the slave trade went from antagonism, to tepid opposition, to 
noninterference, to support.92
By 1840 most evangelical churches came to accept the slave trade as a regular 
and necessary part o f southern society. In the 1820s it was still possible to think that 
slavery might just someday go away, and options such as colonization were still 
seriously discussed. Once colonization was proved impractical, most people realized 
that there was no quick resolution o f the problem and “a marked change in public
91 Charles Elliott, History o f the Great Secession from the Methodist Episcopal 
Church in the Year 1845 (Cincinnati, 1855), p. 824; Takaki, Pro-Slavery Crusade, p.
139; Swaney, Episcopal Methodism, pp. 246-47.
Q9 Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, p. 204; Takaki, Pro-Slavery Crusade, p.
136.
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opinion on the subject o f slavery took place in the South. All doubt as to the lawfulness 
of the institution, under existing circumstances, was banished from the public mind,” 
according to the Reverend Jeremiah Jeter. He noticed that southern evangelicals no 
longer questioned the permanence of slavery, but actively worked to defend it. By the 
same token, they dropped any opposition to interstate slave trade and some even 
defended it. Evangelicals, moreover, became silent when it came to denouncing the 
trade as encouraging a love o f  money. They could do so by excusing the motives o f  
slaveholders. As we shall see, it came to be generally accepted in the South that slave 
traders, or at least traders o f a specific type, were to blame for speculation and not the 
owner. An emerging belief system exonerated owners for any culpability in selling 
their slaves to speculators. With masters no longer responsible for the slave trade’s 
abuses, the church did not have to hold them accountable for speculation.93
The active defense o f the slave trade is epitomized in the writing o f Iverson 
Brookes. He realized that the interstate slave trade was integral to the South and must 
be defended from abolitionist attacks. Brookes saw through the abolitionists’ plans.
They wanted to exclude slavery from the territories and prevent the “domestic 
interchange” o f slaves in the District of Columbia. The South cannot “yield tamely” to 
the exclusion o f  slaves in the territory because a prohibition of all “domestic 
interchange” would follow. Manumission was next, and then perhaps the division o f 
“our other property.” Clearly Brookes felt threatened by the increasingly hostile tone o f 
the abolitionists, but he still hesitated to use the words “slave trade.” That he used a
93 Jeter, Recollections, p. 68 (quotation); Loveland, Southern Evangelicals, p.
187.
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euphemism for it indicates that there was a recognition that the slave trade was an 
objectionable part o f slavery even while it was accepted as good and necessary.94
As the church became the vanguard of the proslavery movement, it was 
necessary to prevent any quibbling over the problems concerning the interstate trade. 
Slavery in all its forms must be protected, and that meant the church must drop any 
qualms it had concerning the buying and selling o f slaves. The churches increasingly 
looked at slavery itself as a  civil matter and separated it from the spiritual realm. 
Methodists, for instance, modified their views so that the church should not interfere 
with civil relations, thus ensuring that the presence o f  slavery was no longer open for 
debate.95 The separation o f the sacred from the secular meant an acceptance of the 
slave trade and the belief that concerns about speculative activity were misguided.
Once the southern churches dropped all effective resistance to speculation, the slave lost 
his most influential advocate. Individual masters were less likely to be held accountable 
for the ravages of the slave trade because doing so would open up the entire system for 
criticism. As abolitionist pressure on the South increased, evangelicals ceased their 
criticism o f slavery since such attacks could be construed as disloyal. The church fell 
silent on the issue of speculation, and like much o f the rest o f southern society, looked 
for some other way to explain the interstate slave trade.
94 Iverson L. Brookes, A Defence o f the South against the Reproaches and 
Incroachments o f the North (Hamburg, S.C., 1850), p. 6.
95 Mathews, Slavery and Methodism , pp. 238-39.
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Chapter Six
Edward Stone was one o f Kentucky’s early speculators, using his house in Paris 
as a base o f operations for the slave trade by at least 1816. He normally bought a group 
of slaves in Maryland, to which he added more as he marched westward.1 Stone 
became notorious in Kentucky for his shenanigans. Sometimes he forced his slaves to 
carry an American flag as they marched from Paris to an embarkation point on the Ohio 
River. Once, when a female slave refused to go with him, he struck her over the head 
with the butt o f  his whip, tied her up, and carried her off.2 Stone was also known to 
steal slaves and once used a hatchet during an attack on his neighbor.3
In 1826 Stone and his nephew Howard made their usual purchase of 
bondservants. They and their two assistants, David Cobb and James Gray, loaded the 
seventy-five slaves on a flatboat. A passenger named Davis o f Natchez boarded at
1 J. Winston Coleman, Jr., Slavery Times in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, 1940), p.
144; Frederick A. Wallis and Hambleton Tapp, eds., A Sesquicentennial History o f 
Kentucky, 4 vols. (Hopkinsville, Ken., 1945), 1:416. Notice that Stone bought slaves in 
Maryland is found in Western Luminary, 27 Sept. 1826, p. 100; and Lexington 
Kentucky Reporter, 25 Sept. 1826. Stone’s home, “The Grange,” still exists (Lexington 
Herald-Leader, 28 Nov. 1993; Beth L. Savage, ed. African American Historic Places 
(Washington, 1994), p. 231).
2 Western Luminary, 4  Oct. 1826, p. 108; Undated Paris, Kentucky Western 
Citizen, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, Nov. 1822, p. 59. There is a 
woodcut of the slaves carrying the flag in the January and February 1823 issues o f the 
Genius o f Universal Emancipation.
3 Montjoy v. Stone, 22 Apr. 1822, Box 115, Record Group 530; Roe v. Stone, 
Aug. 1822, Box 121, Record Group 562; Mallory v. Stone, 28 June 1824, Box 28, 
Record Group 599, Bourbon County Circuit Court Manuscripts, Kentucky State 
Archives, Frankfort, Kentucky.
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Louisville. As the boat drifted down the river, the slaves made plans to take matters 
into their own hands. On Sunday morning, September 17, about one hundred miles past 
Louisville, the slaves “rose upon the white men...and murdered the whole.”4 Howard 
Stone, Edward Stone, Gray, and Cobb were at breakfast in the cabin when the 
bondservants took billets of wood and bludgeoned them to death. Davis swam to shore 
during the melee, but was captured and killed. The slaves then weighted the five bodies 
with stones and dropped them in the river. They took two thousand dollars in specie 
from the boat before sinking it near the Indiana shore. After concealing the evidence, 
about twenty o f  the slaves, including those involved in the killings, immediately took 
off on their own. The other fifty-six slaves remained in a group and were not able to get 
far from the boat before being arrested. Within a few days, all o f  the money was 
recovered and all but one or two o f the slaves were captured and conveyed to 
Hardinsburgh, Kentucky.5
4 Louisville Gazette, 22 Sept. 1826, as quoted in Genius o f  Universal 
Emancipation, 14 Oct. 1826, p. 33. The event’s description is taken from this source 
and the following: Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 29 Sept, 6 Oct., 27 Oct. 1826; 
Lexington Kentucky Reporter, 25 Sept., 2 Oct., 9 Oct. 1826; Woodville Republican, 14 
Oct. 1826; New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 24 Oct. 1826; Huntsville Southern 
Recorder, 24 Oct. 1826; Niles’ Weekly Register, 14 Oct. 1826, pp. 104-5; Genius o f 
Universal Emancipation, 26 Dec. 1826, p. 95; Western Luminary, 27 Sept., p. 100; 4 
Oct. 1826, p. 108; and.Christian Advocate, 14 Oct. 1826. The account in Coleman, 
Slavery Times in Kentucky, pp. 173-76 differs slightly from this one.
5 In the wake o f  the attack, newspapers reassured a nervous public that all was 
well and “the plot was laid by a few” slaves. The others were “drawn into it with 
serious reluctance.” Lest citizens be alarmed, some of the slaves “defended their 
masters with all the means in their power.” A “yellow boy” named Lewis supposedly 
defended Stone to the end and received his freedom and a small tract o f  land with a 
cabin near Stone’s home (Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 27 Oct.. 29 Sept. 1826; 
Coleman, Slavery Times in Kentucky, p. 175).
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The trial was swift and sure. The Commonwealth o f Kentucky charged eleven 
o f the slaves with the crime and arraigned them on October 17. The bondservants 
pleaded not guilty and the next day Jo White, Dick Smothers, Reizin Johnston, Stephen, 
and Wesley were convicted of murdering James Gray, and Edward and Howard Stone. 
The other six slaves were strongly suspected of complicity in the murder but were 
acquitted. Three days later the judge sentenced the five men “to be hanged by the neck 
until dead.” They met their fate on the gallows on November 29, 1826. As for the rest 
o f the slaves in Stone’s coffle, forty-seven o f them wrere sold for transportation out of 
the state, while the rest remained in Kentucky, presumably to be sold, as well.6
Even though acquiescence in the interstate slave trade was the rule, as the 
example o f the slaves in Stone’s coffle suggests, not all bondservants consented to 
forcible deportation. Many fought back with desperate measures—rebellion, murder, 
suicide, or flight. Others chose more subtle methods— influencing a sale or persuading 
someone not to purchase them. The emotional nature o f  slave sales created conditions 
where slaves were more likely to challenge white oppression. Having suddenly to leave 
friends, family, and familiar surroundings could be overwhelming and lead to 
precipitous decisions. These choices, in a  general sense, eroded the credibility o f 
speculators because it seemed as if they could not control their slaves.7 Masters valued
6 Breckenridge Circuit Court Order Book 7, pp. 183,194, 219, Kentucky State 
Archives; N iles’ Weekly Register, 18 Nov. 1826, p. 192.
7 For two other works that deal with resistance to the slave trade, but place it in a 
different context, see Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,” pp. 211-51; and Walter Livezey 
Johnson, “Masters and Slaves in the Market: Slavery and the New Orleans Trade, 1804- 
1864,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1995.
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control in the relationships with their slaves and used coercive measures to force 
compliance. When bondservants engaged in active resistance to a sale, however, 
reports o f their activities fed the underlying fear o f a slave revolt. Traders, of course, 
responded to slave activity by taking extra precautions in the sale and transportation o f 
bondservants. More importantly, though, they reacted to doubts about the trade’s 
efficacy. Speculators employed various means to counteract a negative public 
perception of the interstate slave trade while simultaneously separating themselves from 
the offensive portions o f speculation. Traders carefully cultivated the idea that it was 
possible to separate speculation from the men who engaged in it. They successfully 
created the idea that there were different types of traders who had distinct places in 
southern society. As a result, southerners could blame a lowly class o f itinerant traders 
for slavery’s abuses while fully accepting the activities o f prosperous speculators.
The slave trade, although a means o f redistributing the South’s labor force, also 
created conditions where slaves were more likely to resist servitude. Speculators 
usually chose slaves who had the potential to be the best laborers. They used highly 
selective purchasing practices that might have made efficient use o f labor but were 
destructive of slave marriages and families. Traders tended to purchase young male 
slaves for the Louisiana market (because o f sugar cane’s influence), and female slaves 
of proven fertility. In the nineteenth century, it is estimated that over half o f all the 
slaves in the Upper South were separated from a parent or child because o f forcible 
separation (the slave trade or migration).8 John Brown, for instance, remembered how
8 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 146-54.
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his mother begged the speculator to let her kiss her son one last time.9 Charles Ball’s 
last memory of his mother was her sobbing and beating the shoulders o f the speculator 
who had just purchased him. The separation o f child from parent was just the start. 
Forcible separation also destroyed approximately one-third o f all slave marriages in the 
Upper South.10 For Moses Grandy, the slave trade ruined his life. He tried to  speak to 
his wife while a speculator carried her away, but the trader used a pistol to keep Grandy 
at a distance. Grandy later confided that he could have said very little anyway because 
his heart was broken. ‘T have never seen or heard from her from that day to this,” he 
lamented, “I loved her as I love my life.” 11
In addition to being separated from their families, slaves in the Upper South 
dreaded the prospect of leaving behind everything they knew. Maryland slaves of the 
1820s viewed their removal to Georgia or New Orleans as a virtual death sentence. 
James Williams, a slave who lived in Powhatan County, Virginia, before escaping, 
knew that slaves feared the power o f their masters to sell them. He wrote that it was 
“an awful thing to a Virginia slaves to be sold for the Alabama and Mississippi 
country.” 12 Slaves’ aversion to the interstate trade was so great that some masters used
9 Boney, ed., Slave Life in Georgia, p. 15.
10 Ball, Slavery in the United States, p. 11 (quotation); Tadman, Speculators and 
Slaves, pp. 169-77.
11 Moses Grandy, Narrative o f the Life ofMoses Grandy, Late a Slave in the 
United States o f America (Boston, 1844), p. 11.
12 Williams, Narrative o f James Williams, p. 32 (quotation); T. Stephen 
Whitman, The Price o f Freedom: Slavery and Manumission in Baltimore and  Early 
National Maryland (Lexington, Ken., 1997), p. 75.
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the threat o f  sale to Georgia as a way o f  intimidating slaves into changing their conduct.
Rumors o f harsh conditions in Georgia and Louisiana swirled through the quarters.
Frederick Douglass remembered how slaves were scared o f being sold to a trader who
would carry them to Georgia.13 Slaves heard stories o f  having to march barefoot for
hundreds o f miles with a minimum of food and clothing. One recalled that
bondservants in coffles went “bare-headed and bare-footed, with any rag they can
themselves find wrapped around their bodies.”14 The words o f one song testify to
speculation’s threat:
Mammy, is 01’ Massa gwin’er sell us tomorrow?
Yes, my chile.
Whar he gwin’er sell us?
Way down South in Georgia.15
It was too much for many slaves to bear; they wept bitterly but found no solace. Henry
Box Brown explained the “frantic screams” and “scalding tears” associated with
auctions and coffles. For Brown it was as simple as the declaration that slaves have
feelings and knew too well the permanence of family separations.16
Twentieth century observers tend to think o f  the whip as emblematic o f
slavery’s harshness, but the lash “was not the ultimate sanction of the master’s
authority.” Sale or even the threat o f sale “may have been the keystone o f  coercive
13 Torrey, Portraiture o f Domestic Slavery, p. 61; Preston, Young Frederick 
Douglass, p. 76.
14 Blassingame, ed., Slave Testimony, p. 138.
15 Lawrence Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American 
Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (New York, 1977), p. 15
16 [Henry Box Brown], Narrative o f Henry Box Brown (Boston, 1849), p. 31.
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slave control.” A master’s ability to separate slaves irrevocably from their families and 
loved ones was a type o f punishment that inflicted mental and spiritual anguish far in 
excess o f  the physical pain produced by the whip. The sale o f disobedient slaves was 
the most powerful long-term technique o f  discipline because bondservants feared the 
threat o f  sale more than any other punishment.17 At first glance, it appears that owners 
pursued two seemingly contradictory ideas: supporting the slave trade and promoting 
strong slave families. The concepts, however, could be used to accomplish the same 
end—control over slaves. An owner who encouraged fam ily development could 
suddenly revoke that “privilege” and use it as leverage. In this way, the slave family 
became one o f the owner’s most effective tools in maintaining  effective discipline of his 
slaves. Charles Manigault, a South Carolina planter, established sale as the highest rung 
on his ladder o f discipline. He first dealt with recalcitrant slaves by tying them up. If 
that failed, time in the Savannah jail was next. Barring any improvement, the next step 
was solitary confinement. The last option was sale. Manigault wrote about one 
particularly problematic slave that “if he dont change for the better, I’ll sell him to a 
slave trader who will send him to New Orleans, where I have already sent several of the 
gang for their misconduct, or their running  away for no cause.”18 Sale was a decisive 
way to get rid o f difficult slaves. John Knight was tired o f dealing with his slave James
17 George M. Fredrickson, “Masters and Mudsills: The Role of Race in the 
Planter Ideology of South Carolina,” South Atlantic Urban Studies, 2 (1978): 40 
(quotation); Norrece T. Jones, Jr., Bom a Child o f Freedom yet a Slave: Mechanisms o f  
Control and Strategies o f Resistance in Antebellum South Carolina (Hanover, N. H.: 
1990), pp. 3, 37-38.
1 ft Charles Manigault, as quoted in William Dusinberre, Them Dark Days: 
Slavery in the American Rice Swamps (New York, 1996), p. 126.
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Allen, who had once been free. Knight described Allen as a “troublesome” slave who 
would “infect the rest [of the slaves] with discontent and insubordination.”19 He sold 
the man rather than risk further trouble.
The sale of one slave would often be enough of an example to influence the 
behavior o f others. Not only did the sale or threat of sale have an impact on the slave 
who was being disciplined, but it also affected the other slaves in the community. 
Owners understood very well the dramatic impact that sales had upon the slaves they 
owned. John Haywood wrote that one of his slave women was becoming “discontented 
and possible dissatisfied.” She was “unwilling to work,” an attitude he found “trifling” 
and “useless.” He could not tolerate her “hurtful” example because it enabled others to 
“excuse themselves from work and to be idle and complaining.” Haywood, who 
purchased the woman at a court sale, quickly sold her in order to be rid o f the headache 
and to ward off any others who might try to shirk their duties. It became the “frequent 
custom” in the Chesapeake area for owners to try to reform their “bad slaves” by 
“terrifying them with threats of selling them for the Georgia market, or ‘to Carolina’ 
them.”20
Speculators, probably more than most, realized they dealt with a potentially 
volatile slave population and took steps to prevent resistance. A common method was 
surprise. Traders and masters often worked together to make sure slaves had no time to 
consider how to thwart a sale. An Alabama planter wrote his agent to use “surprize &
19 John Knight to Beall, 7 July 1844, John Knight Papers.
John Haywood to Mrs. Brickell, 25 Apr. 1815, Ernest Haywood Papers (first 
quotation); Torrey, Portraiture o f Domestic Slavery, p. 61 (second quotation).
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secrecy” lest the slave run away. Reuben Madison was sold so suddenly that he had no 
chance to say goodbye to his wife.21 Once traders took possession o f slaves, they used 
numerous measures to reduce the chance o f outright revolt and force compliance. The 
most obvious was physical punishment. Traders who were dissatisfied with their slaves 
could flog them, trying to beat them into “looking bright.”22 In the coastwise trade, 
speculators segregated slaves by sex, prohibited males from seeing the females at night, 
and confined all slaves in the ship’s hold at night. During the day bondservants 
normally roamed the deck, lest they become too resentful o f being confined in close 
quarters. Should they prove to be unmanageable, they could be bolted to the deck.2j
For those slaves forced to march in coffles, some traders tried to lift the spirits o f 
their bondservants, and thus reduce the risk o f resistance, by forcing them to sing, 
dance, or listen to an instrument.24 Music was not usually sufficient, so traders 
normally used chains to keep slaves from fleeing the coffle, fighting one another, or 
killing the slave trader. Females, children, and older slaves usually were not shackled 
since they were less likely to run away. Male slaves, especially those who had just been 
forcibly separated from their families, were more likely to feel that they had nothing to 
lose in an escape attempt. The threat o f  a beating or even death was preferable to
21 Walter Woodyard to Dear Sir, 22 Aug. 1830, as quoted in Deyle, “Domestic 
Slave Trade,” p. 219 (quotation); Blassingame, ed., Slave Testimony, p. 185.
22 Brown, Slave Life in Georgia, pp. 98, 115-16 (quotation); Blassingame, ed., 
Slave Testimony, pp. 175, 180.
23 N iles’ National Register, 22 Jan. 1842, pp. 323-26.
24 Southern Agriculturist, 9 (1836): 70-75; Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,” p.
102.
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submission for these slaves. Leg irons and handcuffs were a  means of discipline that 
was based on experience. Similarly, traders normally did not permit slaves to speak to 
one another unless heard by one of the white escorts. Speculators did not want slaves 
encouraging one another to resort to desperate measures. Others used bribes to cajole 
cooperation from their slaves. Speculator Obadiah Fields recorded that “it was 
understood that I should give the negroes a Present if they would try to get homes and 
not do any thing against the intrust of their sales.”25
Slaves resisted traders often enough that the threat o f rebellion was omnipresent 
in coffles. Some bondservants just wanted to escape and did not contemplate further 
violence. Slaves encamped near Raleigh, for instance, tried to flee before being secured 
for the night. One slave used a stone to knock the speculator to the ground while five 
others ran away.26 Speculators named Whitfield and Tompkins traveled through North 
Carolina with a coffle o f seventeen bondservants. Near the Chowan River, six armed 
runaway slaves attacked the group and drove off the speculators. Two of the slaves in 
the coffle joined the band while the others fled.27 Similarly, slaves held in the 
Alexandria slave pens rioted in 1825. Their anger “was directed at the dealers in 
slaves” and it took “much scuffling” with police officers to restore order.28 Other
25 List o f Slave Sales, 11 Feb. 1828, Obadiah Fields Papers, Duke.
26 Unidentified Raleigh newspaper, as quoted in Western Luminary, 9 Nov.
1825, p. 279.
27 Lexington (Virginia) Intelligencer, 29 May 1824.
28 Washington National Gazette, 6 Aug. 1825, as quoted in Western Luminary, 
24 Aug. 1825, p. 110.
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bondservants sought a more direct form o f revenge and killed their oppressors. In 1799 
members o f a slave gang killed a man named Speers, although it is unclear whether or 
not he was a trader.29 A slave in Cumberland County, Virginia, shot the man who 
bought his wife and children. The bondservant carefully planned the attack, lying in 
wait for some time before he “lodged the contents o f a  musket in the side o f the 
unfortunate Mr. Polling.” Authorities arrested the man and put him on trial.30
Several high profile attacks on slave traders occurred between 1826 and 1829. 
Edward Stone met an untimely end in 1826, but there was another widely publicized 
uprising the same year. Austin Woolfolk put twenty-nine Maryland slaves on board the 
Decatur, a ship scheduled to sail from Baltimore to New Orleans. Somewhere off the 
coast of Georgia the slaves mutinied, threw the captain and the mate overboard, and 
steered the ship towards Haiti. The Constitution overtook the Decatur and took 
seventeen slaves off o f it, as many as could be safely transferred. Three days later the 
Rooke found the Decatur and escorted it to New York. One slave, William Bowser, 
stood trial in that city for mutiny and murder. After his conviction, Bowser made a 
farewell speech from the gallows on Ellis Island where he reputedly addressed Austin 
Woolfolk. Bowser forgave Woolfolk and said he hoped to see the speculator in heaven. 
Woolfolk supposedly answered with an angry profanity and muttered that Bowser “was 
now going to get what he deserved, and he was glad o f it.”31
29 Phillips, ed., Plantation and Frontier Documents, pp. 70-71.
30 [Blane], Excursion through the United States and Canada, pp. 226-27.
31 Undated New York Christian Inquirer as quoted in Genius o f  Universal 
Emancipation, 2 Jan. 1827, pp. 109-10 (quotation); Niles ’ Weekly Register, 20 May
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Three years later, slaves in the schooner Lafayette revolted and nearly took over 
the ship. It took the crew “considerable difficulty” to bolt the slaves to the deck until 
the ship docked in New Orleans, where one hundred o f the bondservants were 
arrested.32 That same year, Henry Gordon and two assistants escorted a coffle o f  about 
ninety slaves. Gordon, a speculator, had purchased the bondservants in Maryland and 
was on his way to Mississippi. As the coffle passed near Greenupsburg, Kentucky, one 
o f the slaves used a  file to free himself and the others around him, although they 
pretended to be in chains. On August 14, 1829, two o f them dropped their shackles and 
started fighting. Just as one of the assistants rushed in with a whip to break up the 
altercation, the other slaves broke free. A bondservant bludgeoned one assistant to 
death while another slave shot the other escort. Next they turned their attention on 
Gordon. One rebel held the trader while another shot him twice, both bullets grazing 
his head. Having failed to execute the speculator, the slaves clubbed him several times 
and left him for dead. They took $2,400 from Gordon’s trunk and rifled through his 
other possessions. During the looting, a female slave helped the trader mount his horse 
and flee. One o f the slaves pursued the man, but was unable to overtake him Gordon 
soon reached a plantation where he alerted the neighborhood to the danger.33
1826, p. 262; Merton L. Dillon, Benjamin Lundy and the Struggle fo r  Negro Freedom 
(Urbana, 1966), p. 118.
32 Niles’ Weekly Register, 9 Sept. 1830, p. 328 (quotation); Genius o f Universal 
Emancipation, 1 Jan. 1830, p. 131.
33 Lexington Kentucky Reporter, 9 Sept. 1829 as quoted in Coleman Papers; 
N iles’ Weekly Register, 5 Sept. 1829, pp. 18-19; Coleman, Slavery Times in Kentucky, 
pp. 176-78.
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A posse soon captured all o f  the slaves. Authorities arraigned seven of them on 
October 6 and a jury convicted six o f  them the next day. On November 20, the sheriff 
hanged five o f them. Before the sentence was carried out, one of the men was said to 
have exclaimed, “death—death at any time, in preference to slavery.” Dinah, the other 
slave, was found to be “pregnant and quick with child” and asked her sentenced be 
suspended until she could deliver the baby. The court granted her wish and waited until 
May 25, 1830 to execute her.34 There is no record o f what happened to Dinah’s child or 
the other slaves in the coffle, but presumably they all were subject to Gordon’s wishes 
since he had purchased them.35
The next year near Prince Edward Courthouse, Virginia, slaves murdered traders 
Jesse and John Kirby o f  Georgia. At least two bondservants attacked the men, cutting 
their throats and leaving one’s head “cleft open with an axe.” Seven o f  them fled with 
$3,000 o f the speculators’ money.36 The rash of uprisings by slaves involved in the 
interstate trade died down in the 1830s, but one final event happened in late 1841.37
34 N iles’ Weekly Register, 26 Dec. 1829, p. 277 (first quotation); Greenup 
County Circuit Court, Order Book H, October Term, 1829, pp. 158, 184-85,196-97 
(second quotation), April Term, 1830, p. 259, Kentucky State Library.
35 David Walker mentioned the incident in his work and called the woman 
“deceitful and ignorant” (Herbert Aptheker, ed., ‘One Continual Cry, ’: David Walker’s 
Appeal to the Colored Citizens o f the World. 1829-1830 (New York, 1965), pp. 34-35. 
See also Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the 
Problem o f  Antebellum Slave Resistance (University Park, Penn., 1997), pp. 218-20).
36 Undated Farmville Chronicle, as quoted in Liberator, 10 May 1831, p. 74.
37 It could be, too, that incidents involving resistance against the interstate trade 
remained fairly constant. The reporting o f them may have been silenced because of the 
perception that abolitionists would use such events as evidence of slavery’s brutality.
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The Creole, a brig making its way from Richmond to New Orleans, carried one hundred 
and thirty five slaves owned by three different traders. The male slaves slept in the 
forward hold, while all but six o f the women were confined aft. Those women were 
forced to stay in the cabin with the white crew and passengers. On November 7, 1841, 
a noisy disturbance in the hold broke out. When a crew member went to investigate, 
Madison Washington, a slave who had briefly escaped to freedom, rushed the hatch and 
led the slaves to the deck. They nearly decapitated one o f  the crew with a bowie knife 
and threw the man overboard. The rebels took the remainder o f the crew hostage after 
badly injuring two of them in hand-to-hand fighting. Nineteen slaves, under 
Washington’s leadership, took control o f the ship and steered a course for the Bahamas. 
In two days the vessel reached Nassau and after much debate, the British allowed the 
slaves to remain on the island.38 These unusual but memorable incidents reinforced the 
presumption that the slave trade could suddenly become extremely violent. While few 
slaves resorted to such drastic measures, those who did so became examples for 
southerners who alleged that speculators trafficked in dangerous or rebellious slaves. 
Northerners, particularly those who opposed slavery, also used such incidents as proof 
of slavery’s barbarity.
Slaves used other methods to resist the trade. Some refused to submit to a sale 
and killed or maimed themselves or their family members. A Virginia slave who was
38 Niles ’ National Register, 22 Jan. 1842, pp. 323-26; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune, 24 Mar. 1842; Edward D. Jervey and C. Harold Huber, “The Creole Affair,” 
Journal o f  Negro History, 65 (1980): 196-211; Howard Jones, “The Peculiar Institution 
and National Honor: The Case of the Creole Slave Revolt,” Civil War History, 21 
(1975): 28-50. An interview with Washington is found in Blassingame, ed., Slave 
Testimony, pp. 217-25.
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sold “down the river” cut his throat instead o f consenting to his sale.39 In Loudoun 
County, Virginia, a slave owner told how one o f his neighbors sold a slave family to a 
speculator. The owner sent the bondservants to a blacksmith’s shop on the pretense of 
running an errand, but had arranged for the trader to take possession o f them at the 
shop. Although the speculator was able to capture the slaves, one o f  them committed 
suicide upon learning his fate.40 A visitor to Virginia surmised that enough slaves there 
preferred to “suffer death than be separated from the objects o f their affection” to 
concern slave owners 41 In Baltimore, a slave cut his throat in public view on a wharf 
as he was boarding a ship for New Orleans, while a  woman in Snow Hill, Maryland, 
killed her child and then herself when learning o f her sale.42 William Wells Brown 
described how a woman, after being taken from husband and children, and “having no 
desire to live without them, in the agony of her soul jumped overboard, and drowned 
herself.”43
Suicide and self-mutilation were unusual responses to a stressful situation. Most 
slaves, however, chose an alternate way of expressing their hostility to the interstate 
slave trade. One o f the most common methods was running away once the slave
39 Abolitionist Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine, June 1822, p. 24.
40 Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 29 Mar. 1828, p. 75.
41 Abdy, Journal o f a Residence, 3: 350 (quotation); Hodgson, Remarks during a 
Journey, p. 179.
42 Niles’ Weekly Register, 21 July 1821, p. 324.
43 Brown, Narrative o f  William Wells Brown, p. 40. Numerous other instances 
o f violent slave resistance are reprinted in Liberator, 7 June 1834, p. 90.
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learned of the sale. A Missouri slaveholder believed that “nothing but the fear of being 
sent to New Orleans” induced his slave to run away. When David Holmes learned o f  
his impending sale, he asked for advice from other slaves and used the knowledge to 
escape. Moses Grandy’s mother hid her children in the woods “to prevent master from 
selling us.”44 Other bondservants ran away when they thought a sale was imminent. 
Owners who feared that their slaves might take flight might sell them to a friend or 
neighbor rather than a slave trader. Benjamin Brand, for instance, refused to sell his 
slaves to a speculator because of the effect it would have on his other slaves. Even 
though he “overbid” to buy the bondservants, he offered them to a friend at cost. He 
knew that a slaveholder’s happiness “in great measure” depended “on the good 
character and disposition of his slaves.” Brand feared the rest of his slaves would resent 
the sale o f their fam ily and friends to a speculator. “I had much rather sell to you than 
let them go out o f  state,” he informed his colleague, so that the bondservants would 
remain in the area and pacify his remaining  slaves. Owners in Maryland were known to 
sell slaves at a private sale rather than use a  trader. Although the cash gain was lower, 
bondservants were less likely to run away when they heard of the sale. Masters, 
whether they used the interstate slave trade for punishment or avoided it for
44 St. Louis Missouri Gazette & Public Advertiser, 29 Mar. 1820, as quoted in 
Avarh Strickland, “Aspects o f Slavery in Missouri, 1821,” Missouri Historical Review 
65 (1971): 525 (first quotation); Grandy, Narrative o f the Life, p. 5 (second quotation). 
For more examples o f slaves who ran away when threatened with sale, see Moses 
Roper, A Narrative o f the Adventures and Escape o f Moses Roper, from  American 
Slavery (1838; reprint, New York, 1970), pp. 10-11; and Blassingame, ed., Slave 
Testimony, pp. 160,252-53, 297-98 303-304.
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humanitarian reasons, knew its power in slaves’ lives.45 David Smith, a slave in 
Baltimore, used a different method to resist his sale. He prayed. Smith figured that if 
God delivered him “ftom  the corrupt influence of the world and the power of Satan,” 
then God could deliver Smith from the speculator. His prayers were answered when his 
sister-in-law purchased Smith and manumitted him.46 Other slaves petitioned local 
planters to buy them so that they would not fell into the hands of slave traders.47
Those slaves who protested their sale with suicide, flight, or even tears and 
screams influenced how others thought about the slave trade. In some cases, slaves 
were able to use the weight o f negative public opinion or the implied threat of 
intractability to alter their situation. A Richmond trader complained tha t‘T did intend 
to leave Nancy’s child but she made such a damned fiiss I had to let her take it.”48 The 
speculator might have wished to avoid making a public spectacle of the woman’s sale 
and gave into her wishes so that she would be quiet. He may have also weighed the 
consequences of having a slave who was more trouble than she was worth. Other slaves 
unintentionally affected how outsiders viewed speculation. A slave trader purchased a 
young woman in Baltimore and prepared to put her on board a vessel for shipment to 
New Orleans. The woman carried a young child who had not been sold with her.
45 Benjamin Brand to Martin Dawson, 17 Mar. 1819, Benjamin Brand Papers, 
Virginia Historical Society (quotations); Whitman, Price o f Freedom, p. 77; Phillips, 
Freedom’s Port, pp. 45-54.
46 Raboteau, Slave Religion, p. 311.
47 Williams, Narrative o f James Williams, p. 31.
48 John W. Pittman to John B. Williamson, 26 May 1835, as quoted in Deyle, 
“Domestic Slave Trade, p. 231.
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“When they reached the wharf she sat down, unconscious o f everything but the 
presence of her infant, upon whose face she continued to gaze, in apparent agony, while 
affording it nourishment for the last time from her breast.” When it came time to 
depart, her former master took the infant while the mother poured forth with “the most 
agonizing cries.” The bystanders were “deeply affected with pity for her” but realized 
there was no remedy. John Randolph had a  similar experience. He said the greatest 
orator he ever heard was a woman. “She was a slave. She was a mother, and her 
rostrum was the auction block.”49
A more subtle form o f resistance entailed slaves trying to shape the nature of 
their own sales. Bondservants in Charleston, for instance, contradicted an auctioneer’s 
description of them, protesting that they were not “likely” or “fine” but had assorted 
ailments instead. They did so, thought an observer, in order to lower the expectations o f 
their buyers. ‘Tf sold at a high price, the negro knows he must make himself worth that 
price to his master by hard labor; if  on the contrary, at a low price, he can afford to be 
idle, and his master will not complain.” One slave in Maryland was “so afraid of being 
sold to some Georgian and took it in her head to make herself look bad. Finally, she 
made so many fine promises that she persuaded Ben Lowndes [a local resident] to buy 
her.”50 Even slaves in the pens o f the Lower South shaped the nature o f  their sales. 
Traders went to great lengths to make sure their bondservants looked happy, since
49 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 106 (first three quotations); Kirk, John 
Randolph o f Roanoke, p. 147 (final quotation).
50 N. S. Dodge, “A Charleston Vendue in 1842,” Galaxy Magazine, (1869): 121 
(first quotation); Margaret Law Calicott, ed., Mistress o f Riversdale: The Plantation 
Letters o f Rosalie Stier Calvert 1795-1821 (Baltimore, 1991), p. 55 (second quotation).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
284
prospective buyers shied away from purchasing surly slaves. Theophilus Freeman had 
his assistant play music for his bondservants so they would dance and look happy. 
William Wells Brown, an assistant to a trader, forced the slaves in a New Orleans pen to 
dance, jump, and sing. Even though some o f the bondservants had tears running down 
their cheeks, the trader wanted to “make them appear cheerful and happy.”51
Just as prospective buyers examined slaves, the slaves sized up potential buyers. 
Many slaves contradicted the speculator’s instructions to look happy and content. One 
slave told to a potential purchaser that “You may buy me, for power is in your hands: — 
but I will never work for you.” John Parker explained that ‘1 made up my mind I was 
going to select my owner so when any one came to inspect me I did not like, I answered 
all questions with a ‘yes’ and made myself disagreeablef.] So farr as I was concerned 
the game was on, and I began to play it.”52 John Brown spent three months in a New 
Orleans slave pen. He quickly learned how slaves influenced their sales. Although 
slaves might be “physically faultless,” they could lower their value with “a sour look, or 
a dull, vacant stare, or a general dullness of demeanour.” These actions certainly 
influenced sales. David Campbell, looking for some slaves to buy, combed through 
speculators’ jails in New Orleans. He found an interesting slave, but declined to buy
51 Brown, Narrative o f  William Wells Brown, p. 46 (quotation); Brown, Slave 
Life in Georgia, p. 113.
52 Abdy, Journal o f  a  Residence, 3: 350 (first quotation); John Parker, as quoted 
in Leslie H. Owens, This Species o f  Property: Slave Life and Culture in the Old South 
(New York, 1976), p. 188 (second quotation). Abdy also reported that another slave 
said, “Buy me if  you please; but I tell you openly, if I become your slave, I will cut your 
throat the first opportunity.” (Abdy, Journal o f  a Residence, 3: 350).
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the man. “He seemed not unwilling for me to purchase him,” Campbell explained to his 
wife, “but I apprehended he would immediately run away.”53
Slaves also resisted by communicating their discontent to visitors. Ethan Allen 
Andrews toured the South to gain first-hand knowledge of slavery and the slave trade. 
He made sure to stop in Alexandria, Virginia, and visit the pen o f the renowned 
Franklin and Armfield. After being entertained by the firm’s junior partner, Andrews 
was escorted into the slave pen itself. There he saw the cells that housed the slaves. As 
Andrews waited, one of the firm’s members forced the slaves out o f  their rooms and 
lined them up in the central courtyard. As the inspection progressed, with the males on 
one side and the females on the other, Armfield “was expatiating on their happy 
condition, when compared with that in which they had lived before they came to this 
place.” The monologue, Andrews concluded, was “apparently intended for the joint 
benefit of the slaves and their northern visiter.” He remained unconvinced after seeing 
a young slave with “an interesting and intelligent countenance.” Whenever “the keeper 
turned away his face, he [the slave] shook his head, and seemed desirous o f having me 
understand, that he did not feel any such happiness as was described, and that he 
dissented from the representation made o f his condition.”54
These slaves, and countless others like them, resisted slavery in a multitude of 
ways, from extreme violence to subtle psychological ploys. Even though slave 
resistance comprised an internal threat to the domestic slave trade, the efforts o f the
53 Brown, Slave Life in Georgia, p. 98 (first and second quotations); David 
Campbell to Mary Campbell, 14 Feb. 1823, as quoted in Johnson, “Masters and 
Slaves,” p. 182 (third quotation).
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bondservants were not sufficient to halt an increasing acceptance o f speculation. Slave 
attacks on traders and the mutinies on the seas did not occur with enough consistency to 
pose a real danger to slaveholders. Rebellion was a constant, underlying fear in the 
South, and resistance to slave traders was just part o f  the overall effort of slaves to test 
the limits o f their enslavement As we have seen, owners in the Upper South often 
viewed the internal slave trade as a public good since masters could dispose of 
unwanted slaves. The Lower South eventually was able to accept the massive 
importation o f slaves, as long as enough safeguards were in place to control the location 
o f sales and legislatures made half-hearted efforts to prevent the entry o f criminal 
slaves. Masters, at times, perceived bondservants as an internal threat to the institution 
o f slavery but were generally confident enough to believe they were in control. Less 
drastic acts o f resistance were equally ineffective in persuading southern citizens that 
speculation should be abolished or even regulated. The constant exposure to the trade, 
in part, dulled consciences.
Although bondservants had limited impact on how southerners perceived the 
interstate slave trade, speculators were just the opposite. They ably facilitated the 
transition of the slave trade from something that was dubious to its central place in 
southern society. Speculators worked to overcome negative associations with the brutal 
elements o f the trade—coffles, chains, jails, and armed guards. Northerners and 
foreigners visiting the South had extreme and negative reactions to such sights, and, as 
we have seen, some southerners were disgusted, as well. The slave trade was not just a 
matter o f speculators making unreasonable demands upon slaves. Traders had to make
54 Ethan A. Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 136-38, quotation on p. 138.
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some compromises with slaves—give them inducements to behave properly, for 
instance—but they also made crucial changes to their business so it would be more 
palatable for southerners. In essence, they tried to convince a skeptical public that the 
slave trade was beneficial to the South and that slaves were grateful for its existence. 
They systematized and regularized speculation even while softening some o f its harsh 
features. Traders established routines and practices for the interstate slave trade that 
made it a normal and accepted feature in much of the South.
The establishment of permanent headquarters was one o f speculators’ early 
innovations. Private jails provided a  measure of discretion and control for traders.
They no longer had to rent space in taverns or city jails, a particularly odious practice in 
the Upper South. Slaves could wait for weeks in crowded jails, drawing significant 
protest from local citizens. The Grand Jury of Baltimore described the conditions in 
that city’s public jail. Slaves were “crowded together, male and female in one common 
dungeon, there being loaded with irons, confined in their filth together.” Such cruelty 
was “abhorrent to every principle o f  humanity” and “disgraceful to any civilized 
community.”55 Traders used their own jails to avoid such criticism. Because slave pens 
were an eyesore, the first ones were usually on the edge of town or outside the city 
limits so that they would draw a m inimum o f complaints.56
55 July Term o f the Grand Jury o f Baltimore, 1816, Select Committee... on the 
Illegal Traffic in Slaves. For similar protests, see undated Baltimore American, as 
quoted in the Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1822, pp. 441-42; and Bancroft, 
Slave Trading, pp. 23-24.
56 That slave pens were on the edges of town, see pp. 48-49 of this study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
The advantages o f having a permanent headquarters were numerous, but one of 
the most important was that it was a sign o f  good faith. Setting up a depot for the 
collection o f slaves meant that traders could be easily located. Those who established 
jails signaled their intentions to be a consistent part o f the community. Austin Woolfolk 
was apparently one of the first traders to use a permanent slave pen. He set up a private 
jail in Baltimore to hold his slaves until he was ready to ship them to New Orleans. In 
1823 Woolfolk established a private jail at his residence near the Three Ton Tavern on 
Pratt Street in Baltimore.57 Other speculators, too, incorporated private pens into their 
operations and slave jails became a consistent feature in the larger towns o f the Upper 
South. By 1830 slave pens had gained enough notoriety that they became a tourist 
attraction for curious foreigners and opponents o f slavery who wanted to examine them 
firsthand.58
The movement of slaves out of public places and into private jails enabled 
speculators to conceal the worst sights and glaring abuses o f  the slave trade, thus 
making it more palatable to southerners. Private pens allowed traders to move their 
coffles at night, since they were not dependent on the schedule o f the local sheriff.
Many speculators made it a habit to start their southward trek long after most people 
were in bed. Woolfolk, who transported most of his slaves in the coastwise trade,
57 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 80; Baltimore American, 11 Aug., 12 
Dec. 1823, 9 Apr. 1824.
58 Visits to Franklin or Armfield’s slave jail in Alexandria, for instance, are 
found in Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1834, pp. 39-40; Abdy, Journal o f a 
Residence, 2: 179-80; Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, pp. 135-143; and Joseph Sturge, 
A Visit to the United States in 1841 (London, 1842), p. 85.
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waited until after dusk to move his bondservants from his pen to the ship. He kept his 
slaves in his jail until he had enough for a shipment and then brought them to the vessel 
in a group. Woolfolk did so “usually at night” so that Baltimore’s residents would not 
be exposed to the horror of coffles.59 He was not the only trader to hide the seamier 
side of speculation. The other Baltimore traders did their work so well that, according 
to a group opposed to slavery, it was difficult to obtain “details” o f the domestic slave 
trade. Its “operations are in some degree concealed from the public eye. The trade is 
not a clandestine one, but being offensive to the feelings of a large portion of the 
community, it is in great measure withdrawn from public observation.” Likewise, in the 
nation’s capital speculation was often concealed from the public. J. M. McKim visited 
slave jails in the District of Columbia and found out to his “horror” that the slaves were 
“awakened at night to set out on their southern journey.” McKim thought this fact 
“curious” and could not account for it.60 Theodore Parker, in an article that castigated 
the slave trade, wrote that droves o f  slaves were a common sight in the city’s streets. 
Joseph Allen disagreed. The long-time resident o f Washington informed Parker that 
some people lived in the city for thirty or forty years without seeing one coffle.61 That
59 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 80 (quotation); Genius o f  Universal 
Emancipation, 2 Jan. 1827, p. 109; Liberator, 5 Mar. 1836, p. 61.
60 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 80 (first and second quotations);
Liberator, 20 Apr. 1838 (remaining quotations, emphasis in original). One slave 
recalled that traders in St. Louis drove their slaves to the boats at four o ’clock Sunday 
morning because “Public sentiment eventually turned against that sort o f thing” and 
“nobody was stirring” at that time o f day (Blassingame, ed., Slave Testimony, p. 504). 
This proclivity to nighttime activity also made it difficult to estimate the trade’s volume.
61 Joseph Allen to Theodore Parker, 25 Jan. 1848, Theodore Parker Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.
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Allen could report that District residents were spared the sight o f  coffles is testament to 
traders’ stealth. This movement of slaves at night could be a boon to those speculators 
who sold persons who had been kidnapped. These traders “hurried [free persons] off in 
the night” in the midst of slave coffles so that the victims could not protest to any 
spectators.62
Just as traders hid the objectionable sight o f coffles from the public, they also 
tried to dissociate themselves from competitors who engaged in questionable business 
practices. Woolfolk worked hard to establish a reputation for fair business dealings. A 
critic o f slavery admitted that Woolfolk conducted himself so that there was “never any 
suspicion o f unfairness” in his mode o f acquiring slaves.63 Men who stayed in the trade 
for any length o f time knew that they could not get away with shady dealings for long. 
Bacon Tait, an established speculator, advised George Kephart, who was just entering 
the business as one of Franklin and Armfield’s agents, that “Trash and defective” slaves 
were “never permanently profitable.” Tait drew a sharp contrast between short-term 
profits and long-term results. In advising Kephart to avoid questionable slaves, he 
noted that even if they are “frequently sold at a profit for the time being,” such “sales 
often recoil upon the vendor, with detriment more than counter-balancing such profit.”64
62 Deposition of Francis Scott Key, 22 Apr. 1816, Select Committee... on the 
Illegal Traffic in Slaves. Jesse Torrey, when gathering information for his book, 
questioned slaves in coffles while they marched through the streets of Washington. One 
prisoner said the slave trader beat him for saying he was free. Torrey’s actions, and 
those o f other abolitionists, were another reason traders shielded their coffles from 
public view (Jesse Torrey to John Randolph, 29 Apr. 1816, Ibid.).
63 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 80.
64 Conway, Testimonies Concerning Slavery, p. 22.
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Equally important for increasing slave trading’s acceptance was educating the 
public about its utility. The steady stream of visitors to Franklin and Armfield’s pen in 
Alexandria provided the firm with the opportunity to proselytize the unbeliever. Since 
Franklin handled business in New Orleans and Natchez, Armfield did most o f the 
entertaining in Alexandria. He never missed an opportunity to instruct his guests on 
speculation’s goodness and was the perfect advocate for the interstate slave trade. 
Armfield used his “fine personal appearance” and “engaging and graceful manners” to 
win over skeptics.65 Visitors to the firm’s slave pen in Alexandria were treated to a 
spectacle unlike anything they associated with a slave jail. The serious and the curious 
waited in a “well-furnished room” where they could sip wine.66 After a few 
pleasantries, which one guest thought was a way to buy time for workers to clean up the 
facility, visitors entered the jail itself where numerous rooms held the slaves. All the 
rooms were clean and had fires to warm the slaves. Armfield’s intent was to 
demonstrate how humane the slave trade could be and that speculators were unlike their 
reputation. He strove to persuade skeptics that he, and by implication, other traders 
treated slaves with a modicum o f decency. Franklin rivaled his junior partner in 
presenting the best possible interpretation of a dreadful business. A visitor to Franklin’s 
office in Natchez could not quite comprehend what he saw. He described the slave
65 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 136.
66 Abdy, Journal o f a Residence, 2:179. Serving wine might have been 
commonplace. Walker, a slave trader who transported slaves from St. Louis to New 
Orleans, “kept wines in his room, for the accommodation of those who called to 
negotiate with bim for the purchase o f slaves.” (Brown, Narrative o f William Wells 
Brown, p. 53). The wine was probably used as a lubricant to separate purchasers from 
their money.
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trader as a “man o f gentlemanly address.” Franklin and the city’s other slave traders 
were “not the ferocious, Captain Kidd looking fellows” he had imagined.67
While visitors sat in the parlors of slave pens and sipped wine, the speculators 
had ample opportunity to review the benefits o f their business. Traders actively sought 
to repair their damaged reputations. One strategy was to promote the idea that they did 
the South a favor by removing some troublesome slaves. Such an idea had its limits, of 
course, since these slaves had to go somewhere and those stales that imported them 
sometimes felt as though they were dumping grounds for malcontents.68 Woolfolk, for 
instance, “talks much (and procures others to talk for him) of the propriety of removing 
the ‘bad’ slaves” from Maryland.69 His public relations offensive apparently won at 
least one convert, as an incident with Benjamin Lundy demonstrates. Lundy, an 
agitator for the abolition of slavery, published one o f the earliest periodicals dedicated 
to the overthrow of the peculiar institution, the Genius o f Universal Emancipation. 
Although he began publication in Greenville, Tennessee, he moved his operation to 
Baltimore to expand his readership and influence. Once in Baltimore, Lundy came 
across Woolfolk and was chagrined at the quick growth o f his slave trading operations. 
Lundy was not convinced by the trader’s talk and blasted him as a “monster in human 
shape” and a “soul seller.” The thin-skinned Woolfolk detested the descriptions 
because, besides being personal insults, they associated him with the worst portions of
67 Ingraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2: 245.
68 For more on the efforts o f the Lower South to cope with the slave trade 
through the use o f importation bans, see Chapter Four of this study.
69 Genius o f Universal Emancipation, 26 Aug. 1826, p. 406.
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the trade. When the two men met on a Baltimore street in 1827, their encounter quickly 
degenerated into an argument and a shoving match. Woolfolk threw the much smaller 
Lundy to the ground and beat him about the head before several bystanders intervened. 
Lundy charged Woolfolk with assault, to which the trader pleaded guilty. The judge 
found Lundy’s extreme rhetoric distasteful and ruled that he provoked Woolfolk with 
abusive language. In issuing a one dollar fine, the judge called the interstate slave trade 
an economic benefit to Maryland that “removed a great m any rogues and vagabonds 
who were a nuisance in the state.”70
Even as Woolfolk aggressively defended himself, Armfield calmly handled all 
challenges to his character and business practices. An English visitor, concerned about 
the mistreatment and physical abuse o f slaves, bluntly asked about the methods of 
discipline employed in the jail. Armfield assured him that there was no dungeon or 
thumbscrews in his slave pen.71 Likewise, Slatter, when challenged about the evil 
consequences o f the slave trade, replied that the law permitted speculation. He added 
that he was willing “to have the system abolished” if suitably compensated for his loss. 
Besides, Slatter, concluded correctly, “dealing in slaves was not worse than
70 Ibid., 20 Jan., pp. 25-26, 24 Feb., pp. 142-43, 31 Mar. 1827, p. 174; Dillon, 
Benjamin Lundy, pp. 104-20; Henry Mayer, A ll on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison & the 
Abolition o f Slavery (New York, 1998), p. 76; Calderhead, “Role o f the Professional 
Slave Trader,” pp. 205-6. The judge specifically defined the terms “slave trader” and 
“soul seller” as offensive.
71 Abdy, Journal o f  a Residence, 2: 180. Although Armfield may have 
answered the question literally, it is clear that slave traders used various methods o f 
physical punishment to coerce slaves (Fredrika Bremer, Homes o f  the New World: 
Impressions o f  America, translated by Mary Howitt, 2 voL (New York, 1854), 2: 533- 
35.
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slaveholding.”72 These traders were able to present the slave trade in a  positive light. 
Rather than being roughnecks on horseback who escorted gangs of shackled slaves, 
they were sophisticated professionals who performed a vital service.
The context in which a person encountered a slave trader, moreover, made a 
difference. George Featherstonhaugh traveled across the United States and met a man 
he described as using a “farrago o f  bad grammar.” The individual was a “compound of 
everything vulgar and revolting, and totally without education.” When the man left, 
Featherstonhaugh asked his stagecoach driver about the barbarian. The driver 
responded that it was John Armfield, the celebrated slave trader. Featherstonhaugh 
concluded that Armfield’s “abominable vocation” was the key to his manners and 
expressions.73 His extremely negative portrayal o f Armfield was in stark contrast to the 
impressions o f  the visitors to Franklin and Armfield’s slave pen. Featherstonhaugh had 
recently encountered his first slave coffle and was certainly no friend o f slavery. Many 
of those who praised Armfield, however, were also abolitionists who had no reason to 
find good qualities in the man. The primary difference was the context in which 
Armfield appeared. In his slave pen he was able to pose as a charming and suave 
gentleman. On the road, since Featherstonhaugh immediately associated Armfield with 
a slave coffle, he seemed to be rude, uncivilized, and totally devoid o f all honor. As we 
have seen, the larger traders employed agents to handle the nastier portions of the 
business. In doing so, men like Woolfolk, Franklin, and Armfield could appear to be
72 Sturge, Visit to the United States, pp. 31-32. Sturge misspelled the trader’s 
name “Slaughter.”
73 Featherstonhaugh, Excursion through the Slave States, p. 46.
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untainted by the trade’s excesses. Agents, while necessary for business, also served as a 
layer of protection from specific objections to the trade.74
Theodore Dwight Weld was one person who looked at slavery from the outside 
and was perceptive enough to realize that there was a gulf between an established slave 
trader and one who was an agent or an itinerant dealer. Weld mocked this idea, though, 
for he thought slavery indelibly stained all who touched it. He noticed how “some 
‘gentleman o f property and standing’ and of a ‘good family’ embarks in a negro 
speculation, and employs a dozen ‘soul drivers’ to traverse the upper country, and drive 
to the south coffles of slaves.” Even though such a person might expend hundreds of 
thousands o f dollars he did not “lose caste.” Weld listed several prominent southerners 
connected with the slave trade, noting that a member of the Kentucky Senate 
accompanied a coffle, “Not as the driver, for that would be vulgar drudgery, beneath a 
gentleman, but as a nabob in state, ordering his understrappers.” Weld sarcastically 
added that the “wholesale soul-seller doubtless despises the retail ‘soul-drivers’ who 
give him their custom”75 Even though Weld mocked the idea that there was any 
difference between slave traders, he recognized that many southerners ascribed to the 
belief. He was familiar enough with slavery to know that speculators used various 
methods to put some distance between themselves and the trade.76
74 Armfield was probably less circumspect about his behavior out on the road 
because he assumed he was not influencing an opponent of slavery
75 Weld, American Slavery as It Is, p. 174. Emphasis in original.
76 Evans, “Domestic Slave Trade,” pp. 329-37 divides traders into three 
economic classes based on the volume of their business. He makes no distinctions, 
however, between itinerant traders, agents, and established speculators.
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Weld elaborated on his theory a few years later when he collaborated with 
James Thome on another attack on slavery. This time he pointed out the difference 
between soul-drivers, slave traders, and speculators. Weld placed them into two 
classes, one o f which had the large “factories” in Alexandria, Baltimore, Norfolk, 
Richmond, and Petersburg- Traders who stayed at their headquarters and sent out 
agents to gather slaves could put a kindly facade on their involvement in the inhuman 
portions o f speculation. These men of large capital “conduct the traffic on the broadest 
scale. They hold an honorable rank among the heavy capitalists and extensive 
merchants o f  our southern cities, and move in the highest social circles.” The other 
class of slave traders consisted of the “agents and pimps” o f the first group. They were 
“constantly scouring the breeding states” for slaves to put on ships or in coffles. Those 
who bought up “small gangs and drive their own coffles” were also in this category.
Such men were “doubtless horribly base wretches of vile origin, and viler lives.”77 
Speculators like Franklin, Armfield, and Woolfolk could be accepted in southern 
society because they did not appear to be slave traders. They seemed to be 
professionals who merely facilitated the transfer o f slaves from one individual to 
another. It was the use o f agents or employees o f such men who suffered the indignities 
associated with being labeled a trader.
Besides conducting a public relations campaign and using agents as a buffer 
from criticism, the large traders also tried to distance themselves from the illegal
77 Weld and Thome, Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, pp. 67-68. The 
relationship between a slave trader and his agent is found in Edmund L. Drago, ed., 
Broke by the War: Letters o f  a Slave Trader (Columbia, S. C., 1991).
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kidnapping o f slaves. Joshua Leavitt, who campaigned actively against slavery, visited 
Franklin and Armfield’s pen in an effort to study the slave trade firsthand. He asked 
Armfield if  any slaves were kidnapped. Leavitt likely hoped to amass ammunition for 
use in attacking slavery and the interstate trade. Armfield was too clever to foil into the 
trap, so he did not deny that abductions happened. He quickly pointed out that every 
business was “cursed with mean fellows,” subtly distancing himself from the illegal 
portion o f the trade. Armfield went on to assure his visitor that he had done “all in his 
power to prevent such things.” He explained that he and Franklin conducted their 
business affairs “in such a way that gentlemen who traded with their house should 
always know whom they dealt with.” Leavitt then tried to ambush Armfield by 
producing evidence that two men on one o f the firm’s ships had been sold improperly. 
Although he must have been shocked, Armfield kept his composure. Such a 
predicament might have undermined the trader’s claim to strict business practices 
against buying kidnapped slaves. In looking closely at the matter, Armfield admitted a 
mistake in the purchase o f the men, took them off the ship, and sent them back to 
Maryland. Leavitt may have found evidence for his accusations, but Armfield 
successfully defended his personal probity. The speculator was willing to sacrifice the 
profit on two men to preserve the firm’s reputation.78
Armfield was not the only slave trader who claimed he prevented the kidnapping 
o f slaves. Woolfolk reputedly turned in traders who bought kidnapped slaves.79 Two
78 Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1834, pp. 39-41.
79 Ibid., 26 Aug. 1826, p. 406.
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visitors to Hope Slatter’s slave pen in Baltimore brought an individual “who has often 
been engaged in preventing negroes from being illegally enslaved.” Slatter heartily 
endorsed the man’s activities. The guests then confronted Slatter about two o f his 
slaves who were actually free men. When challenged about their status, he swore out a 
complaint against the sellers and had the men released. Slatter, being a  savvy 
businessman, hoped to insulate himself from the suspicion of illegal activity while also 
trying to get his money back from a fraudulent sale.80 James McFall tried to separate 
himself from any association with the kidnapping trade when he advertised that all his 
sales were “executed conformable to law, accompanied with legal vouchers, 
guarantees, & c” Likewise, Samuel Dawson would buy only slaves o f  “sound Property 
and good titles.”81 Advertisements o f this nature served two purposes. They deterred 
shady transactions even while being an effective means o f public relations. Whether or 
not speculators actually intended to adhere to their promises was questionable. They 
did, however, want to convince a  skeptical public that they would.
Another way traders restored their tarnished image was to pretend to keep slave 
families together. Armfield patiently explained to his guests that his firm went to great 
pains to prevent family separations. Slatter also tried to convince people that he did not 
break families apart. He made the fanciful claim that slaves came to him and asked to
80 Sturge, Visit to the United States, p. 31 (quotation); Undated Baltimore Sun, 
as quoted in Liberator, 17 Nov. 1837, p. 185.
81 New Orleans Louisiana Advertiser, 10 Jan. 1834 (first quotation, emphasis in 
original); Fredericksburg Virginia Herald, 19 Apr. 1826 (second quotation). See also 
the advertisements o f Davis and Kincaid (Washington Z>a/(y National Intelligencer, 7 
May 1816) and Joseph Meek (Baltimore American, 14 June 1825).
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be purchased so that they could go to a good master who would respect the integrity of 
their family. Slatter told visitors that slaves in his care were “treated kindly.”82 Stories 
circulated that Woolfolk’s slaves gathered around him in a display o f affection “and 
even the little children manifest the most eager solicitude to share in his affections.” 
Such an attitude on the part o f slaves would have shocked Frederick Douglass had it 
been true. He equated all slave traders with the name Woolfolk and being sold to 
Woolfolk was equivalent to a death sentence.83
Although much o f traders’ pontifications were probably not based on reality, it 
appears that Franklin and Armfield changed their buying practices. Statistical evidence 
shows that Armfield, who handled the purchases in Alexandria, bought more slaves in 
family units after 1834. The percentage of slaves in family units rose from just over 
seven percent in 1828-29 to nearly ten times that figure in 1835.84 Armfield explained 
the reasons for the change to Leavitt. The speculator said he recently purchased about 
twenty children who were under ten years o f age. He bought them all from one estate 
and pledged to keep them together. Armfield tried to convince his visitor “they were
82 Sturge, Visit to the United States, p. 31 (quotation); Andrews, Domestic Slave- 
Trade, p. 139.
83 Andrews, Domestic Slave-Trade, p. 81 (quotation); Preston, Young Frederick 
Douglass, p. 76.
84 Sweig, “Northern Virginia Slavery,” pp. 220-23; Donald M. Sweig, 
“Reassessing the Human Dimensions of the Interstate Slave Trade,” Prologue, 12 
(1980): 5-21. The actual figures are 1828-29: 7.26%; 1832-33:13.5%; 1835: 69%; 
1836: 49%. Although it is true the percentage o f  family slaves decreased in 1836, 
Armfield’s purchasing pattern was still significantly different than six years previous. 
That he and Franklin sold the business in 1836 may have accounted for some o f  the 
change.
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more valuable in consequence of their being acquainted., and would fetch a higher price 
in market to sell them all together.” In reality, the value of slaves dropped if they were 
sold in family units because purchasers frequently had to buy slaves they did not want 
and were able to negotiate a lower price.85 Thus, on the face o f  it, Armfield was 
deceiving his visitor. He recognized the long-term benefit of persuading the public o f 
his good intentions. Once word spread that Franklin and Armfield bought slave 
families, they would be in a better position to bargain with planters who were reluctant 
to part with their slaves for fear they were exiling the bondservants to a fate worse than 
death. Armfield told Leavitt he “never” sold slaves “so as to separate husband and 
wife, or mother and child.” He neglected to mention that his partner normally handled 
the sales, so the number of slaves he actually sold was negligible. Armfield, as the 
director o f the firm’s slave buying efforts in the Chesapeake, was able to put enough 
distance between himself and speculation that his reputation remained intact. His firm’s 
shift to the purchase o f slaves in family units was intended, moreover, to forestall 
abolitionist criticism o f the slave trade in general and disapproval o f  their operations in 
particular. Abolitionists seized upon the ravages to the slave family as indicative o f 
slavery’s brutality. Armfield responded by deliberately changing tactics in an effort to 
squelch such protests.86
85 Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1834, p. 39 (quotation); Tadman, 
Speculators and Slaves, pp. 52-55.
86 Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Mar. 1834, p. 39. What was true for 
Armfield held for the rest o f the trade, as well. Even though a trader bought slaves in 
family units there was no guarantee he would sell them in the same fashion. The 
subject o f abolitionist criticism o f the interstate slave trade will be addressed in the next 
chapter.
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Traders like Armfield worked hard to dissociate themselves from their 
reputation for destroying slave families. In the process they de-emphasized the 
speculative aspects o f  the slave trade. For instance, an anonymous advertiser in a 
Richmond paper promised to pay a higher price fi>r slaves “that have been raised 
together on one farm, as they are not wanted for speculation.”87 The intention here was 
to spend a little more money to buy slaves in families and keep them together rather 
than use them for speculative gain. Traders tried to tap into this sentiment. Edwin Lee, 
a well-known trader in Norfolk, advertised that he wanted to buy ten to fifteen “likely 
young NEGROES, o f  good character” for an estate in the Southwest.88 Abner Robinson 
tried the same tactic, advertising in Richmond for forty to sixty slaves. They were for a 
New Orleans resident who wanted them “for his own use,” with Robinson adding that 
“Satisfactory assurance can be given, that they will not be bought for re-sale.”89 This 
strategy o f arranging sales for a specific buyer, whether it be genuine or not, enabled 
speculators to pose as brokers. The very fact that traders mentioned the particular 
circumstances surrounding a purchase such as this indicates that they assumed it would 
give them an edge in the highly competitive world o f slave buying. Instead o f wantonly 
purchasing slaves, they could be viewed as arranging a sale with the goal of satisfying a 
specific individual rather than speculating on the price of bondservants. Traders who 
used this tactic hoped that owners who might not normally deal with them would be
87 Richmond Enquirer, 12 July 1825.
88 Norfolk American Beacon, 30 Mar. 1820. Lee had a similar advertisement in 
the 8 Jan. 1820 issue o f the same paper.
89 Richmond Enquirer, 10 Dec. 1831.
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persuaded to part with their slaves if they knew the bondservants were going to a 
specific owner rather than out on the speculative market.90
Slave traders went to extreme lengths to prove they did not separate families. 
When Joseph Ingraham visited a slave pen in Natchez, a planter offered a high price for 
a slave girl but did not want to purchase her sister. The trader refused to make the sale 
because, as he explained, “they are much attached to each other, and when their mother 
died I promised her I would not part them.”91 It is likely the speculator was playing the 
part of a benevolent despot rather than truly seeking to honor a pledge he made to the 
mother. The thought o f a trader actually refusing money because of a promise made to 
a deceased slave was ludicrous. What was most important to him in this instance was 
the appearance of preserving families- He probably hoped his visitor would make 
favorable comments about the slave market. Once the northern visitor left, there would 
be ample time to find buyers for the two girls. Some traders seemed to have sensed that 
they could not convince a skeptical public they kept families together. One left himself 
a way out o f his contention that he preserved slave ties. He often severed family ties 
because “his business is to purchase, and he must take such as are in the market!” In
* 0 7other words, forces beyond his control were to blame for family separations.
90 For more examples, see Baltimore American, 12 Sept. 1815, 20 Feb., 7 Sept.,
9 Sept., 25 Sept. 1822, 9 Nov. 1824; Easton Republican Star, 18 May 1824; and 
Princess Anne Village Herald, 14 Sept. 1830, as quoted in Bancroft, Slave Trading, p. 
32.
91 Tngraham, South-West by a Yankee, 2: 203. The incident was also recounted 
in Winfield H. Collins, The Domestic Slave Trade o f the Southern States (New York, 
1904), p. 104.
92 Liberator, 5 Mar. 1836, p. 39.
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Traders like Armfield, Franklin, Woolfolk, and Slatter tried to put the best face 
possible on a sickening business. Slatter, for instance, bragged that he “frequently” left 
his slave pen for weeks under the care o f his head slave, whose wife Slatter liberated 
some years earlier. The trader promised the same favor for the man if  he conducted 
himself welL93 One writer grew so weary o f speculators proclaiming their virtue that he 
mocked their false sensitivity to the slaves. When he read that a man sent $16,000 
worth o f slaves to Liberia he could hardly believe his eyes. “Were I not informed o f  its 
authenticity, I should fancy that this story was fabricated by some pious negro-seller on 
[the] James River.” It was there, he said sarcastically, that “humane breeders” send 
“eight thousand black cattle” annually out of the state.94 Lundy, too, commented on the 
pervasiveness of the slave traders’ posturing. In examining Woolfolk’s tactics he 
deduced that “the current o f  public sentiment is settling strongly against a toleration o f 
the abominable business in which he is engaged, and that a great majority o f the 
Balitmoreans look upon it with horror.” Woolfolk, though, deliberately put on “the 
guise o f humanity” and pretended to be “a great stickler for fair and legal dealing.”
Some of his tricks included turning in kidnappers, courting the favor o f slavery 
opponents, and treating his “stall-fed’’ slaves “pretty well.” By these means, “he 
effectually dupes many unsuspecting persons.” 95 On another occasion, Lundy deplored
93 Sturge, Visit to the United States, p. 31.
94 Western Luminary, 19 Jan. 1831, p. 322.
95 Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 26 Aug. 1826, p. 406 (quotations, 
emphasis in original); Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, pp. 34-54.
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Woolfolk’s “despicable canting” and mocked the speculator’s “sham 4 humanity'”96 
Woolfolk and other slave traders realized that since they were in an objectionable 
business, and one that relied on the good faith o f the seller for high profits, they must 
work for the esteem o f  the community. By turning in kidnappers, traders separated 
themselves from illegal activity and, by extension, established their personal honesty.
A few noteworthy and well publicized incidents went a long way towards reducing 
hostility towards the trade.
Despite the efforts o f speculators, being labeled a slave trader was still a 
powerful insult. The term “slave trader” and “soul seller” were associated with the 
objectionable aspects o f the trade closely enough that members o f polite society did not 
want to endure such abuse. That idea gained influence in the campaign preceding the 
presidential election o f 1828. The widening circle o f eligible voters opened the door to 
more sensational methods o f influencing public opinion. Instead o f addressing genteel 
arguments to a few voters, newspaper editors made wide ranging ad hominem 
arguments to stir up interest in the election. That year’s contest proved to be one o f the 
dirtiest on record, with Andrew Jackson’s supporters accusing John Quincy Adams o f 
installing a billiard table in the White House, being an aristocrat, and pimping for the 
Russian tsar. Adams’s supporters responded by calling Jackson a “vain ignorant old 
man, a duellist, murderer, traitor, or traitor’s traitor, cruel negro-trader, villainous 
intriguer, liar, scoundrel, blasphemer, + what not.”97
96 Genius o f Universal Emancipation, 2 Jan. 1827, p. 109. Emphasis in original.
97 A  W. Putnam to Peter Force, 14 Sept 1828, in Emil Edward Huija 
Collection, Peter Force Materials, Box 8, Folder 25, Tennessee State Library and
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It was Andrew Erwin, a  long-time opponent of Jackson, who accused Old 
Hickory o f being a slave trader. Erwin teamed with Boyd McNairy to charge Jackson 
with “buying and selling slaves for profit” in 1811.98 The circumstances surrounding 
the incident are murky, but what is clear is that Jackson entered into a partnership with 
Horace Green and Joseph Coleman. The three men intended to make some quick 
money by transporting commodities from Nashville to Natchez. In 1810 they profited 
from the sale o f cotton and tobacco and then bought slaves from Richard Epperson the 
next year.99 This transaction only came to light because McNairy, a candidate for 
elector in Tennessee, acquired several o f Jackson’s bank books and released their 
contents. These documents revealed that Coleman, Green, and Jackson paid $10,500 
for the slaves, $2,050 of which was paid immediately with $4,000 payable in two six- 
month installments. The crux o f the dispute centered around the precise nature of 
Jackson’s involvement in the speculation. His defenders claimed he had no knowledge 
o f the slave purchase, never intended to speculate on any bondservants, and served only 
as security in case Coleman and Green defaulted on their payments. They pointed to 
the feet that he was listed last in paperwork as proof of his tertiary involvement.
Archives. For background on the election, see Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and 
the Coarse o f American Freedom, 1822-1832 (New York, 1981), pp. 116-42; Sellers, 
Market Revolution, p. 298; and Norma Basch, “Marriage, Morals, and Politics in the 
Election o f 1828,” Journal o f American History, 80 (1993): 890-918.
98 National Journal, May 1828, as quoted in Abdy, Journal o f a Residence, 2: 
153-54. Abdy also quoted a similar charge printed in the Nashville Banner. Erwin 
claimed he was only responding in kind to “an unprovoked and villainous attack” made 
against him and his son for smuggling slaves into Georgia and then pequring 
themselves in a cover-up (National Banner and Nashville Whig, 25 July 1828).
99 The sources also use the spellings “Greene” and “Apperson.”
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Jackson’s opponents scoffed at that defense. They accused him o f buying out the 
interest o f Coleman and Green so that he could take sole possession o f  the slaves and 
pocket all the profits. In either case, Jackson became responsible for the entire debt.
He traveled to “the lower country” to get the slaves and brought them back to Nashville 
so that he could pay o ff the loan.100
The charges and counter-charges slowly made their way into the publications o f 
the day and the rhetoric portrayed slave traders in a revealing light. Jackson’s 
opponents felt that his actions disqualified him from the nation’s highest office. Erwin 
accused Jackson of dissembling in an attempt to avoid being imputed “the character o f a 
negro trader.” He connected speculation in slaves with other immoral activities such as 
slander, hypocritical behavior, disrespect for the law, torture of slaves, and 
prevarication.101 In appealing to the “public morals” o f the nation, the Frederick, 
Maryland, Political Examiner felt Jackson “disgraced himself’ because he was seen 
with a “drove o f negroes.” Any man who would “trade in human flesh  for gain” could
100 The information for this and following paragraphs is taken from [Andrew 
Erwin], A B rief Account o f General Jackson’s Dealings in Negroes, in a Series o f 
Letters and Documents by his own Neighbors (n.p., n.d.); [Andrew Erwin], General 
Jackson’s Negro Speculations, and his traffics in Human Flesh, examined and 
established by Positive P roof (n.p., n.d.); [Andrew Erwin], Supplement to Andrew 
Jackson’s Negro Speculations (n.p., n.d.); National Banner and Nashville Whig, 5 Aug. 
1828 (quotation); Nashville Republican and State Gazette, 8 Aug. 1828; Remini, 
Andrew Jackson and the Course o f  American Empire, pp. 162-64; and James Parton, 
Life o f  Andrew Jackson (Boston, 1866) 1:353-60.
101 [Erwin], B rief Account, pp. 15-18, (quotation on p. 17); [Erwin], Supplement,
pp. 1-8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
307
not be trusted.102 It was the deliberate speculation that was so objectionable. I f  Jackson 
would exploit the slaves without a second thought, then he was unfit to govern. These 
charges were closely related to the belief that Jackson was a tyrant who could not be 
trusted with the reins o f government. His activities towards his slaves were 
reprehensible and led him to believe he could do as he pleased without fear of 
consequence. The cover o f Erwin’s pamphlet made this idea explicit. It showed 
Jackson, in his military uniform beating a slave with a stick, while other slaves were 
being led away in a coffle.103
Jackson’s defenders were dismayed that he was becoming known as a “negro 
trader.” The charge was an “infamous falsehood” and an “odious” accusation made for 
purely political purposes, according to the Nashville Republican and State Gazette. 
Jackson had no choice but to go to Natchez to get the slaves because, being an 
honorable man, he wanted to pay his debts. He did so out o f compulsion and “not with 
a view ofprofit.”104 The paper made a distinction that most southerners would have 
understood: Jackson did not act from motives o f profit, but rather he defended his 
reputation and his honor. The difference between a private citizen and a slave trader 
was that the former could claim to act out of just motives whereas the latter was acting 
from selfishness and the love of money. “Wilberforce” made this distinction even
102 Undated Frederick, Maryland, Political Examiner, as reprinted in Genius o f  
Universal Emancipation, 21 June 1828, p. 139. Emphasis in original.
103 [Erwin], B rief Account, cover. Erwin also charged Jackson and his nephew 
Andrew Hutchins with selling a slave boy in the “lower country” in 1805 (Ibid., pp. 16- 
17).
104 Nashville Republican and State Gazette, 8 Aug. 1828. Emphasis in original.
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clearer in his defense of Jackson. He noted that the “serious” charge o f slave trading 
came late in the election so that a  full refutation o f it would be difficult- This accusation 
was “justly odious” and entailed more than the “mere owning and employing o f slaves.” 
Anyone who would destroy bondservants’ lives in order to profit from the master-slave 
relationship was a “monster in human shape.”105 Jackson, whose slaves “venerated and 
almost idolized” him, never “made it his business to deal personally in negroes for his 
own individual profit.” Instead o f selling the slaves in a “distant market,” Jackson 
brought them back to Nashville where they “would be more kindly treated.”
Wilberforce thought the slaves would eventually be sold, it was just a matter o f 
“whether they should be bought by those who would treat them kindly, or be left to the 
mercy of some professed and hardened dealer in human flesh.”106 Jackson, in other 
words, was doing the slaves a  favor by shielding them from the whims of speculation. 
Wilberforce successfully used the stereotype of the trader to defend Jackson by turning 
the argument inside out. If  Old Hickory intended to speculate in slaves, then he would 
have kept them in Natchez and sold them there. That Jackson escorted the bondservants 
back to Nashville was convincing evidence that he spared them from the degradation of 
the slave market and that he acted from pure motives. Instead of being the wicked slave 
trader, Jackson was a hero because he rescued the bondservants from being sold down 
the river.
105 National Banner and Nashville Whig, 5 Aug. 1828. Wilberforce borrowed 
Lundy’s characterization of Woolfolk.
106 Ibid. Other writers defended Jackson in the Lexington Kentucky Gazette, 29 
Aug., 7 Nov. 1828; and Lexington Kentucky Reporter, 1 Oct. 1828.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
309
Most people sided with Wilberforce. In a particularly nasty campaign, it was 
easy to spot the political attacks. Most voters realized that Erwin timed his attack to 
coincide with the Kentucky elections and intended to injure Jackson’s reputation. Old 
Hickory did not become known as a slave trader because most people thought he was 
selling the slaves from personal rather than speculative motives. It made no sense for a 
professional slave trader to bring the slaves from Natchez to Nashville. Had Jackson 
wanted to obtain the best price for the slaves, he would have sold them in Natchez.107 
One of Jackson’s strong supporters in Mississippi wrote his colleague in Washington 
that those with “reasonable minds” knew that there was not enough evidence to make 
the allegations stick. “[P]roof after proof; unimpeachable witnesses, his letters, books 
&c., &c.” will make sure that the charge will have “no effect here"  He acknowledged, 
however, that the accusations “must strike a death blow to his prospects among the
107 Raleigh Star and North Carolina State Gazette, 4 Sept. 1828; Natchez Ariel, 
10 May 1828. The latter publication asserted that it was Jackson’s violent and arbitrary 
nature rather than the bogus charge of slave trading that should disqualify him from the 
presidency. The Woodville Republican, 28 Oct. 1828, reprinted an editorial about the 
charges against Jackson. ‘“Mr. Clay, Mr. Clay,’ cries out two fisted Uncle Toby, 
‘Jackson’s a coming — Jackson’s a coming.’ ‘Well then,’ says C lay,i anti-tar i f f  him  in 
the Journal.’ ‘I have, but he wont stay anti-tariffed.’ ‘Mr. Clay, Mr. Clay,’ bawls out 
Alderman Binns, ‘the old farmer’s a coming -  a coming.’ ‘Well then,’ says Harry,
‘coffin hand-bill him.’ ‘I have,’ says Binns, ‘but he wont stay coffin hand-billed.'' ‘Mr. 
Adams, Mr. Adams,’ says John H. Pleasants, ‘the Hero’s a coming — actually coming.’ 
‘Well then,’ says Mr. Adams, iBurr him and traitor him.’ ‘I have; but he wont stay 
Burred nor traitored.’ Mr. Clay, Mr. Clay,’ says Charles Hammond, ‘Jackson is 
coming.’ ‘Well,’ says Clay, ‘prove him an adulterer and negro trader.’ ‘I have,’ says 
Charles, ‘but he wont stay an adulterer, nor a negro trader.’ ‘Mr. Clay,’ bawls out the 
full Adams slandering chorus, ‘we have called Jackson a tyrant, a murderer, an 
adulterer, a traitor, an ignoramus, a fool, a crook back, a retense, &c. &c. &c. but he 
wont stay any o f  those names.’ ‘He wont!’ says Clay, ‘why then I shan’t stay at 
Washington — that’s all. Uncle Toby, pack up my cards and pistols and let us be off.
We have been long enough here.’” Emphasis in original
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religious, moral & respectable & intelligent people of the northern states.”108 He might 
have added that the people o f the northern states were not able to understand the fine 
distinctions between a private citizen selling a slave and a  speculator who made his 
living from such transactions. They assumed that all traders lived up to their 
reputations and only a reprobate would sell slaves for gain.
Jackson’s connection to the slave trade lingered in the North well after his death 
and the question of whether he could be considered a speculator affords an opportunity 
to give depth to an analysis o f  the slave trader’s place in southern society. Theodore 
Parker, in reading two antislavery publications, noticed the allegations against Jackson- 
One boldly proclaimed that it was “well known” that Jackson was a “soul driver” and 
that he escorted a coffle o f  slaves to Louisiana for sale.109 Parker accepted the 
accusations at face value and wrote a letter accusing Jackson o f  being a slave trader.
The issue quickly became the topic of a public dispute.110 Parker, realizing  that his 
reputation was at stake, fired off a letter to James Bimey, a former slaveholder who 
moved North and became a  dedicated abolitionist. He wanted to know specifically if 
Jackson ever sold a slave, if  he had engaged in the slave trade, and if he brought a cofile 
o f slaves to Louisiana.111 Bimey, choosing his words carefully, did not defend
108 A. W. Putnam to Peter Force, 14 Sept 1828, in Emil Edward Huija 
Collection, Peter Force Materials, Box 28, Folder 25. Emphasis in original.
109 Weld, American Slavery as It Is, p. 174 (quotation); Weld and Thome,
Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, p. 68.
110 Boston Post, 14 June 1848.
111 Theodore Parker to James Bimey, 17 June 1848, Theodore Parker Papers.
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Jackson’s actions but could not describe Old Hickory as a slave trader. All people o f 
influence in the South were slaveholders or came from slaveholding families and, as a 
consequence, all have sold, exchanged, or bought slaves, Bimey explained. Jackson 
was no exception, and the fact that he had less slaves at his death than might be 
expected, demonstrates that he sold some o f  them. Even though Jackson sold slaves, 
Bimey felt that calling him a slave trader “according to slave-holding idiom” would be 
using the term “improperly.” However, “were I to say of him, that he dealt in slaves, 
without any conscientious restraint, whenever he chose -  or that he was an occasional 
slave dealer, I should not regard myself as departing more from the truth.”112
Bimey used his musings about Jackson to instruct Parker on the place o f the 
slave trade in southern society. In reflecting on his life there twenty years earlier,
Bimey admitted that it was “a difficult matter” for someone who had not lived in the 
South to “come precisely at what is meant there by Slave-dealer or Slave-trader.”
There was a “discernible difference” between the two, with the latter being “more 
obnoxious.” It was the slave trader who had “no other business by which he makes his 
living than buying up slaves to sell again.” He should not be confused with a 
“reputable” southerner who “occasionally” sold a slave for the highest price. Such a 
person had “another occupation by which he may be described -  an occupation that is 
really primary, or which is so managed that it should seem so — his slave dealing being 
but subordinate or secondary.” He would not be confused with a slave trader, “a word
112 James Bimey to Theodore Parker, 5 July 1848, Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
The quotations from Bimey in the following paragraphs are from this letter and all 
emphases are in the original.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
312
of no small reproach at the South.” To make his point as clearly as possible, Bimey 
borrowed the example o f gambling. A  man with a reputable calling may gamble and 
not be called a gambler, unlike the man who made gambling the basis o f  his livelihood. 
Just like the distinction between a slave dealer and a slave trader, the line was often 
indistinct. The point, however, was that an arbitrary distinction between different types 
of speculators emerged simultaneously with the growth o f the interstate slave trade. 
Even while their actions may not have been appreciably different, the perceptions of 
them became separate. Southerners wanted to believe that there was a small group of 
itinerant traders who created most of the difficulties. It was this type o f speculator, 
most thought, who destroyed slave families, escorted coffles, sold diseased slaves, and 
concealed the flaws o f bondservants. They were the “slave-dealers.” All others who 
bought or sold slaves, even if they did so on a full-time basis, were innocent. That is 
how someone like Isaac Franklin avoided being classed as a  slave trader. Speculators 
successfully separated the negative perceptions o f slave trading from their business.
Bacon Tait, who operated a slave jail in Richmond, understood the fine 
distinctions Bimey tried to explain to Parker. Tait wanted to quit the “negroe trade” and 
start a “negro auction & commission business.” Buying and selling slaves on 
commission appealed to him because it could be conducted “with perfect fairness.”
Once his slave auction was well established, he could phase it out and sell other 
goods.113 In this way, Tait could slowly disconnect himself from the speculative 
aspects o f the slave trade. The prejudice Tait strove to avoid was long-lasting.
113 Bacon Tait to Rice C. Ballard, 14 Jan. (quotations), 31 Jan. 1838, Ballard 
Papers. Nothing ever came of Tait’s plans.
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Speculators’ desire to distance themselves from speculation was reflected by the 
letterhead o f Pulliam and Company, well-known Richmond slave traders. On a letter 
describing the Richmond slave market, was the heading “Auctioneers for the Sale o f  
Negroes, Have no connection with the Negro Trade THEY SELL ONLY ON 
COMMISSION.” 114 In disassociating themselves from speculation, traders hoped to 
prove their good intentions. They did not want to be known as men who profited from 
the pain o f slaves nor did they want the reputation o f  profit-takers. Slave traders 
refused to admit that their profession was based on misery and money.
Being called a slave trader was something most southern citizens wished to 
avoid. David Settle Reid became the target o f a political attack while serving as United 
States Congressman. Reid, who had served earlier as a state representative, was 
running for governor o f North Carolina. The local paper in Craven County, the 
Newbemian, castigated Reid for voting for the Wilmot Proviso, opposing internal 
improvements, and being a slave trader. It wondered whether Democrats in the area 
were “snowed under” by “their Wilmot Proviso, anti-Newbem Railroad, negro-trading 
candidate.”115 Reid’s brother-in-law, Samuel F. Adams, moved quickly to minimize the 
damage. He confronted the newspaper’s editor and “asked what Col Reid’s friends 
were to understand he meant by negro-trading candidate.” The editor “seemed much 
excited and greatly agitated.” He apologized profusely and explained that some o f  his
114 Pulliam and Company letter, 15 Nov. 1860, Negro Collection, Duke.
Emphasis in original. For more on Pulliam’s operations, see Bancroft, Slave Trading in 
the Old South, p. 52
115 New Bern (North Carolina) Newbemian, 9 July 1850.
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political friends supplied the erroneous information. The editor said it was “known to 
everyone” that Reid had a brother in eastern North Carolina who bought slaves “on 
speculation.” He just assumed Reid was part o f  the business and promised to print a 
retraction in the paper’s next issue. “So much for that thrashing machine,” Adams told 
Reid proudly.116 The Newbemian’s editor printed an apology the next week. He 
explained it was a “common rumor” that Reid “had been, and was at the time, 
concerned in buying and selling negroes for profit. We meant by negro-trading—negro 
speculation o f course.” Again, the paper carefully distinguished between different types 
of slave sales and implied that “negro speculation” was a worse type than the mere 
selling o f slaves. The editor retracted the charge and any implications it might carry.117
There were other indications that southerners consciously or unconsciously 
distinguished between different types o f slave traders. The writer who described 
“genuine negro speculators” as “depraved” made the subtle distinction that there were 
those who might sell slaves but were not actually speculators. These latter traders were 
not depraved because profits did not motivate them. A visitor to the South learned that 
“negro trader[s]” of the “better sort” did not accompany coffles but sent their agents or 
factors instead. Slaves must be sold, and it was better to deal with these men who were
116 Samuel F. Adams to David Settle Reid, 11 July 1850, David Settle Reid 
Papers, North Carolina Division of Archives and History. Tadman asserts that Reid 
was involved with Adams in a slave trading partnership, describing Adams as Reid’s 
nephew (Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, pp. 199-200).
117 New Bern (North Carolina) Newbemian, 16 July 1850. The editor could not 
help but slip in another jab during the apology. He quickly added that “there is not the 
least necessity for making any charge, that is not strictly true, as Mr. Reid has political 
sins enough to answer for before the people, without his being burdened with charges 
that are not sustained by facts.” Emphasis in original.
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“not all o f  the vilest sort.”118 Even religious publications sanctioned the division o f 
traders into different classes. The Baptist Herald, in dodging the question o f whether 
slave trading was scriptural, thought that many Baptists acted as general auctioneers and 
agents, in which capacity they had to “dispose” o f slaves. Even if  they derived a profit 
from such sales, “they cannot be classed with professed negro-traders, who buy with a 
view to carry off those they purchase to the best market, though families may thereby be 
separated, and the slaves be transferred to brutal masters and to deadly climates.” 119
As the Herald's words suggest, perceptions o f the interstate slave trade changed 
during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Speculators effectively 
countered bondservants’ efforts to test the limits o f slavery and undermine white 
authority. In the same way they asserted control over slave coffles, traders successfully 
uncoupled their activities from the more objectionable features o f their business. They 
made their activities more palatable by concealing the offensive portions of the trade— 
coffles, kidnapping, and the separation o f  slave families. Traders also persistently 
lobbied to convince southern citizens that they merely facilitated slave sales rather than 
profited from them. As a result, the outrage over speculative activities declined since 
the trade came to be seen as less about profit at slaves’ expense and more about 
providing a service to slaveholders. Speculators reinforced this idea by cultivating the 
notion that there were different types o f  slave traders and that established speculators 
could be trusted while itinerant traders could not. In short, speculators succeeded in
118 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 13 Oct. 1818 (first and second quotations); 
Adams, South-side View o f Slavery, p. 79 (remaining quotations).
119 Religious Herald, 27 Mar. 1848.
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shaping southern attitudes toward their profession. They did so during a rapid 
expansion o f  the interstate slave trade. Slave sales were more common and more 
frequent exposure to slave auctions and coffles inured southerners to the suffering o f 
bondservants. A mounting external threat, moreover, solidified this new attitude and 
gave rise to the ultimate justification for speculators’ existence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Seven
On January 6,1829, Charles Miner took the floor of the House of 
Representatives and unleashed a withering attack that laid out the case for federal 
regulation o f the District of Columbia’s slave trade. In asking for a congressional 
investigation o f  the business, Miner made several damaging charges. He alleged that 
speculators had made the district “their head-quarters,” public prisons had become part 
o f the trade, some federal employees had derived benefits from speculation, “private 
and secret prisons” existed in the District, kidnapping was rampant, and “anguish and 
despair” were the hallmarks o f  the cruel traffic. He thought that the District had 
legislation less favorable to slaves than could be found in Maryland and Virginia even 
though the federal government could intervene and abolish the traffic. Even worse, 
Miner complained, was that the federal government served as an accomplice to 
“injustices and cruelty, scarcely exceeded on the coast of Africa.”1 Miner bolstered his 
argument by using several dramatic illustration that presented slaves as persons and 
insinuated that southerners treated bondservants as articles of commerce. He described 
how he witnessed a woman, “more heart-broken than any creature I had ever seen,” sold 
from her family because she was “no longer profitable as a breeder.” He also went into
1 Register o f Debates, Twentieth Congress, Second Session, pp. 167, 175-80. 
The debate, and the fight over Miner’s preamble, can be followed in N iles’ Weekly 
Register, 10 Jan., pp. 327-28, 17 Jan., pp. 340-41, 7 Feb. 1829, p. 396; and Washington 
Daily National Intelligencer, 7 Feb. 1829. Miner alleged that 452 slaves were held in 
the local jail from 1824 to 1828 (1824: 81; 1825:124; 1826-27: 156; 1828: 91). It is 
impossible to check the figures for accuracy, but they do reflect the slave trade’s growth 
in the 1820s. Miner also alleged the following numbers of runaway slaves were held in 
the jail: 1824: 52; 1825: 58; 1826-27: 101; 1828: 79.
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great detail how a black man was imprisoned for four hundred and five days, only being 
released when “vermin, disease, and misery” rendered him unfit for sale. Miner read a 
castigation of the trade from an 1802 Alexandria grand jury, recapped John Randolph’s 
speech of thirteen years earlier, quoted excerpts from the Alexandria Phenix Gazette, 
cited advertisements for the slave trade, and described the interior o f an Alexandria 
slave pen. In accusing his colleagues o f sanctioning the evil with their inaction, he 
wondered, “If  you take no steps to correct it, does not your silence imply acquiescence, 
if  not approbation?” Miner then laid bare the real reason for his resolution. “Sooner or 
later,” he predicted, slavery “must become the subject o f our legislation.” Miner 
deliberately used the interstate slave trade to demonstrate slavery’s evils, shame 
southern slave owners, and prod his fellow congressmen into passing legislation that 
would restrict slavery’s growth.2
Southerners must have found it hard to sit through Miner’s brutal attack, and the 
effect of his speech was electrifying. One newspaper judged that “Mr. Miner has 
produced the greatest excitement with which we have been visited this session.. .There 
are spirits in this house which catch and explode whenever that subject [i.e., slavery] is 
touched.”3 Miner’s speech was particularly odious because he lectured his southern 
colleagues that he had visited “your prisons and other scenes of wretchedness.” In 
making this pointed reference, Miner attacked slaveholders in particular and all
2 The grand jury statement is discussed in pp. 110-11 of this study, while 
Randolph’s speech is found in pp. 133-38. Miner read from the 22 June 1827 issue of 
the Alexandria Phenix Gazette.
3 Clipping o f  Washington United States Gazette, 8 Jan. 1829, John Agg Papers,
Duke.
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southerners in general.4 This tactic o f  specifically indicting southerners was certain to 
provoke a response. The interstate slave trade was merely, for Miner, an effective way 
to dramatize the general evil that slavery produced. He called for a reform not only of 
the interstate trade, but of southern society through the abolition o f slavery.5
The southern response to Miner’s speech was quite different from earlier 
Congressional discussions of the interstate slave trade, where southerners either ignored 
similar charges or asserted the rights o f migrants to bring slaves across state boundaries. 
John C. Weems o f  Maryland took responsibility for correcting Miner’s “mistaken zeal” 
that had suppressed his “usual good judgment.” Weems’s rebuttal was a turning point 
because he responded with the first known public defense of the interstate slave trade by 
a  citizen of the Upper South. His answer to Miner was a precursor o f the arguments 
southerners would use throughout the 1830s and beyond in their defense o f the 
interstate slave trade and of slavery. Weems carefully explained that slavery was a 
benign institution where masters rarely sold their slaves. On such occasions, 
slaveholders were not to blame. Weems used the circumstances surrounding the recent 
sale o f a woman and her children to demonstrate his point. A free black man bought his 
family on credit but could not pay off the loan. The creditor did all he could, but had to 
sell the family to satisfy the obligation. Weems insinuated that market forces were to
4 Register o f  Debates, p. 176. Emphasis added.
5 The persistent use o f the interstate slave trade as a means to attack slavery is 
demonstrated in Lightner, “Door to the Slave Bastille,” pp. 235-52; Lightner, “Interstate 
Slave Trade in Antislavery Politics,” pp. 119-36; and Deyle, “Domestic Slave Trade,” 
pp. 144-210. Neither Lightner nor Deyle discuss Miner’s speech or the subsequent 
debate.
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blame in such cases, especially since he personally intervened to prevent the sale. 
Nothing could be done, so the woman and children were sold to Georgia. This story 
had a happy ending, according to Weems. The woman wrote her spouse that she 
belonged to a “good and humane” master and was “as happily situated as she had ever 
been, save the separation from her husband.” Even when slaves happened to be sold 
south, their condition was improved. The gist o f  Weems’s speech was that separation 
o f families was unusual and that in the rare cases where it happened, the slaves were 
usually better off. He was politely telling outsiders that they should not try to fix 
something that was not broken.6
Weems went further, however. He related the story of a colleague in Congress 
who wanted to buy several families o f  slaves for his sugar plantation, provided, o f 
course, they were willing to move. Weems approached his brother, whose “kind 
treatment” of his slaves and low prices for crops had brought him to the point o f selling 
his land because he “could not bear the idea of selling his slaves.” Weems persuaded 
his brother to sell twenty slaves in families. When he asked the bondservants for their 
permission, they “put up their thanks to God” even though they hated to leave their 
master. On the sale day, the slaves left “most cheerfully and happily.” Weems’s 
brother felt the opposite emotions. “He never recovered his feelings” and died a short 
time later, presumably o f  a broken heart. Weems explained that he took so much time 
clarifying this situation because he resented Miner’s personal attacks. Slavery, if fully 
examined., was not objectionable. Moreover, Weems continued, the Bible supported
6 Register o f  Debates, pp. 182-83 (quotations); Washington Daily National 
Intelligencer, 23 Apr. 1829.
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slavery. He cited the curse of Ham, the fact that Old Testament patriarchs owned 
slaves, and Paul’s admonition to Philemon to have mercy on a bondservant. Since 
slavery was part o f the social fabric in both the Old Testament and the New Testament, 
Weems could not understand why his colleagues questioned it.7
Weems finished his rebuttal by defending slave traders. There might be “some 
truth” to Miner’s description o f the “dealers in human flesh,” but not much. Speculators 
were “very useful citizens” because they purchased convict slaves and felonious free 
men and housed them in jail before starting south. Weems would rather see slaves in 
local jails than to have “worse than wild beasts of the forest, let loose amongst us.”
Lest representatives from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama become alarmed,
Weems was certain that the slave trade rehabilitated its participants. When they “see 
before them no possible chance o f escape, they become more than usually valuable” and 
turn into “the most sprightly fellows.” Weems drew upon the stereotype of slave 
traders in his lengthy response. He discounted any widespread denunciation of slave 
families and denied that money motivated speculators. Instead of being detrimental to 
the South as Miner alleged, the slave trade was beneficial.8
When Weems finished, Richard H. Wilde tried to end the discussion by moving 
the previous question. Moderate Ichabod Bartlett wanted to soothe matters and 
suggested Miner withdraw his preamble, which was the chief cause o f  trouble. When 
Miner declined, Mark Alexander moved to table the resolutions. His motion failed one
7 Ibid. pp. 183-85.
8 Ibid. p. 186.
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hundred seven to sixty-six. Even though the House agreed to move ahead, it did so 
cautiously. A subsequent vote to adopt the preamble lost by an even more lopsided 
margin.9 The House postponed any action on the matter by creating a committee to 
“inquire into the slave trade as it exists in, and is carried through, the District.” This 
resolution carried on the strength o f northern representatives, although eighteen 
southerners voted for it. All o f these men, however, came from the slave exporting 
states o f Maryland (5), Delaware (1), Virginia (4), North Carolina (3), Tennessee (1), 
and Kentucky (4).10 A third resolution, to inquire into gradual abolition in the District 
of Columbia, failed one hundred fourteen to sixty-six. Only eleven representatives of 
slaveholding states, all o f  them slave exporting states, sided with northern 
representatives in this vote. The willingness o f Upper South Congressmen to question 
the interstate slave trade or slavery was fading.11
The Committee on the District o f  Columbia reported its findings on the slave 
trade about a month later. Southerners controlled the committee and shaped the report 
to their liking. In a masterful stroke of disingenuous language, the committee felt that
9 Ibid., pp. 191-92. The vote was 141-36. This and the subsequent votes’ 
registers are found in Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 10 Jan. 1829. 
Representatives from Connecticut (3), Indiana (1), Massachusetts (2), New Hampshire 
(1), New Jersey (3), New York (5), Ohio (11), Pennsylvania (8), Rhode Island (1), and 
Vermont (1) voted for the bill. The paper, in its story said thirty-seven members voted 
for the preamble, but listed only thirty-six names in the voting summary.
10 The representatives were Armstrong, Barney, Blair, Buckner, Chambers, 
Culpeper, Daniel, Johns, Leffler, Letcher, Little, Maxwell, Mercer, Sheppard 
Washington, Weems, Williams, and Wilson. The total was 120-59.
11 The vote by state was Maryland (2), Delaware (1), Virginia (2), North 
Carolina (2), Kentucky (3), and Tennessee (1).
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the “situation” o f  slaves who were sold from Washington was “considerably mitigated 
by being transported to a more genial and bountiful clime.” Even though “violence may 
sometimes be done to their feelings,” the laws o f  society could not be avoided. It 
should be o f some consolation “to those who are interested in their [slaves’] behalf to 
know that their condition is more frequently bettered and their minds happier by the 
change.”12
The debates surrounding Miner’s proposal show that residents o f the Upper 
South had changed their attitude about the interstate slave trade. Where they once 
ignored or questioned its harmful effects, they now explained and justified the trade’s 
presence. Virginia decisively rejected a proposal to emancipate and deport its slaves, 
while colonization itself became a dead issue in the rest o f the South. With no 
foreseeable solution to the problem of “excess” bondservants, the interstate slave trade 
became a more attractive option. Northerners, furthermore, began calling on the South 
to abolish slavery. They used the interstate slave trade as a powerful illustration o f the 
institution’s evil effects. With slavery penned in and under attack, southerners chose to 
defend it without reservation. Thus, they had to find somehow to justify or explain 
away the interstate slave trade. They employed various methods, but the eventual result 
was a stereotype o f  itinerant slave traders, slaves, owners, and abolitionists. Speculators 
became scapegoats and were an effective way to protect slavery. Southerners, in effect,
12 Washington National Intelligencer, 7 Feb. 1829 (quotations); Jay, 
Miscellaneous Writings, p. 54; Weld and Thome, Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, 
p. 211. There were two representatives from Virginia (Alexander, Ailen), and 
Maryland (Washington, Weems), and one each from Pennsylvania (Kremer), 
Massachusetts (Vamum), and Connecticut (Ingersoll).
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had to deny the reality o f the interstate slave trade before they could folly accept 
slavery.
Amid this climate o f shifting beliefs, and in the wake o f  the Nat Turner 
rebellion, Virginia embarked on a public debate over the future o f slavery in that state. 
Since the Old Dominion easily had the most slaves amongst the states that were net 
exporters o f  bondservants, the debates had enormous significance for the future o f the 
interstate slave trade. Should the legislature decide to end slavery in Virginia, the 
number o f  slaves available for sale would plummet. The majority o f bondservants in 
the slave markets o f the Lower South came from Virginia, and their absence would 
have drastically driven up prices. These facts were not lost on the debate’s participants, 
and the interstate slave trade was an important part of the discussion. Delegates who 
favored some type of gradual emancipation usually linked their schemes to a plan of 
colonization. They realized that colonization and the interstate slave trade worked at 
cross purposes, so the debates inextricably linked the two. Supporters o f colonization 
joined with opponents o f slavery to show why the peculiar institution itself needed to be 
slowly snuffed out. Their efforts came to naught, and what the discussion convincingly 
demonstrated was slavery’s entrenched position and how ineffectual were those who 
desired to rid the state o f the peculiar institution. Moreover, it underscored the need to 
do something with Virginia’s slaves and with the lack o f change came a renewed 
support o f the interstate slave trade.13
13 Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution', Joseph C. Robert, The Road from  
Monticello: A Study o f the Virginia Slavery Debate o f1832 (D urham, N. C., 1941). The 
interstate slave trade, it can be argued, made it possible to discuss publicly various plans 
for gradual abolition since it denuded the state o f  slaves. It was only because the
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Thomas Jefferson Randolph proposed that all slaves bom on or after July 4,
1840 become state property, males at age twenty-one, and females at age eighteen. He 
called for a statewide referendum on the matter and his plan became the fulcrum of the 
debate. Until they reached maturity, the bondservants would work for pay in order to 
defray the cost of shipping them to Africa. Like most o f the proponents o f 
emancipation, Randolph realized speculation’s significance for Virginia. He knew that 
a robust slave market increased prices and decreased the opportunity for colonization.
As a consequence, he attacked the slave trade in the hopes o f  shaming his colleagues 
into listening to his proposals. Randolph accused Virginia slaveholders of converting 
the state into a “grand menagerie” where slaves were “reared for the market, like oxen, 
for the shambles.” He hated how the “ties o f  father, mother, husband, and child” were 
broken when masters sold their slaves to “cruel taskmasters.”14 Randolph drew upon 
personal experience in preparing his remarks. He assumed the debts of his grandfather, 
Thomas Jefferson, and promised to pay o ff all creditors. Part o f that process involved 
selling slaves, which he described as a “sad scene.” Although he tried his best to keep 
families together, the episode confirmed Randolph’s disgust with the bitter fruit of 
slavery.15
percentage of bondservants was decreasing that Virginia could consider abolishing 
slavery altogether.
14 Randolph, as quoted in Robert, Roadfrom Monticello, p. 97. Slavery’s 
opponents made frequent use o f his remarks (Harriet Beecher Stowe, The Key to Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1854; reprint, Salem, N. H., 1987), p. 291; Weld and Thome, Slavery and 
the Internal Slave Trade, p. 66; Jay, Miscellaneous Writings, pp. 264-65).
15 Randolph, as quoted in Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, p. 132.
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Most who sided with Randolph made special note o f how slave trading 
corrupted Virginians. Their primary line of reasoning was that speculation degraded all 
who were involved in the transaction. While the slave obviously felt the sting o f  the 
trade most keenly, the master who willingly sold his bondservants neglected his 
obligation to protect his slaves as he stooped to petty motives o f  financial gain. Friends 
and fees o f emancipation recognized that one function o f the trade was to inflate the 
price of slaves and prop up the domestic institution in the state. Thomas Marshall, who 
favored gradual abolition, made this connection during a speech in which he advocated 
the sale o f the state’s public land to raise money for colonization. His scheme would 
never work, he admitted, if masters continued to sell slaves for gain. While humanity 
might prevent some masters from “selling to the traders who purchase for the southern 
markets,” enough other slaveholders did not restrain themselves and, as a result, drove 
up the prices o f slaves. The greed o f these masters was sufficient to make colonization 
too expensive and unworkable. Many owners would not give away their slaves or sell 
them to a neighbor at a reduced price, Marshall said, for fear that they would end up 
being sold to the Deep South. Even if  a slaveholder acted from pure motives, his good 
deeds might be negated by his neighbor. This tension between humanity and commerce 
wrecked the chances o f colonization.16
Slavery’s defenders also recognized the interstate slave trade’s importance. 
William O. Goode fought against any attempt to speed Virginia towards free soil, but
16 Thomas Marshall, The Speech o f Thomas Marshall in the House o f Delegates 
o f Virginia, on the Abolition o f Slavery (Richmond, 1832), p. 10. Others who spoke 
against the trade were Philip A. Boling and William H. Brodnax (Freehling, Drift 
Toward Dissolution, pp. 140-43, 185).
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recognized that slavery naturally flowed to where it was most useful. In this fashion, 
the northern states had already rid themselves o f the peculiar institution and Virginia 
would probably follow their course. “Natural causes,” he explained, would accomplish 
a peaceful “removal o f  slavery from Virginia.” He concluded there was no reason to 
entertain such foolish notions as gradual emancipation or colonization. In other words, 
Goode counted on the domestic slave trade to rid Virginia o f slaves.17 James H.
Gholson had a similar opinion. He reasoned that Virginia’s slaves constituted the 
“largest portion o f our wealth” and that their value “was regulated by the demand for it 
[i.e. slave labor] in the western markets.” Gholson reminded his listeners that “any 
measures which should close the markets against us, would essentially impair our 
wealth and prosperity.” The slave trade, in other words, was a vital part of Virginia’s 
economy.18
The proponents and opponents o f colonization had similar assumptions.19 Most 
delegates realized that the operation of the interstate slave trade was in direct 
contravention to any plan o f gradual emancipation or colonization. The high price of 
slaves deterred owners from freeing their bondservants; it was difficult to pass up the 
financial windfall that could be found in the sale o f  a  slave’s body. In a similar fashion, 
the state government could hardly expect to raise enough money to pay prices that were 
artificially raised by the slave market. The state, in theory, had the option o f legally
17 Richmond Constitutional Whig, 28 Mar. 1832, as quoted in Freehling, Drift 
Toward Dissolution, p. 155.
18 Gholson, as quoted in Robert, Roadfrom Monticello, p. 68.
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prohibiting the sale o f  slaves to southern states, but such an idea was unthinkable. That 
course o f action would have given too much power to the government and eroded the 
rights o f the slaveholder. A thriving slave market ruined colonization’s chances to 
succeed.
Thomas R. Dew reiterated these ideas in his commentary on the Virginia 
Debates. Dew’s writing was emblematic o f the shift to a more aggressive defense of 
slavery throughout the South. His arguments have become quite familiar., but in his 
defense o f slavery he also analyzed the slave trade. He mocked the idea o f  colonization 
by pointing out the folly o f the state government trying to “overbid the Southern 
seeker.” Dew thought Virginia would, given enough time, become a free state. Slaves 
would go further south, with white laborers naturally filling the void. He went further, 
though, and turned colonization on its head. Instead of ridding Virginia o f  slaves, 
colonization would augment their numbers by cutting off the flow to southern markets. 
Dew did not have to add that an excess of slaves invited a race war. Although his 
reasoning in this regard was faulty, since slaves would have continued to go south 
rather than become a burden to their owners. Dew’s implicit threat o f a rebellion was 
calculated to undercut any vestige of support for colonization. He even reiterated the 
Biblical justification for the slave trade. Though he condemned the sale o f  Joseph into 
slavery, “the practice o f  buying and selling slaves seems to be justified” in the rest of 
scripture. Dew carefully examined his Bible and learned that Jews bought foreigners 
and fathers sold their daughters into slavery. Other cultures, including the Irish,
19 The same could be said for most o f the delegates (Freehling, D rift Toward 
Dissolution, pp. 166-69,202-8).
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Africans, and Indians sold their kin into slavery, so the institution was common to man 
and was therefore normal. The reasons more people did not sell themselves into 
slavery, according to Dew, were that the law forbade it or they could locate no 
purchasers. He concluded that bargain and sale were legitimate parts o f slavery and 
natural consequences o f the master-slave relationship. Thus, according to Dew, the 
slave trade was not only beneficial for Virginia, it was pleasant for the slave.20
Hoping to repair the damage caused by Dew’s argument, the American 
Colonization Society selected Jesse B. Harrison to draft a rebuttal. His response 
showed the futility o f colonization and emancipation in the face o f a  surging slave 
market. Like Dew, Harrison thought Virginia would eventually become a free state.
He believed, however, that the process should be accelerated before slavery inflicted 
any more damage. Harrison was quick to correct what he saw as Dew’s misguided 
view o f the slave trade. He drew a direct parallel between the African trade and the 
internal trade and wisely pointed out that if  Virginians needed to sell their slaves to 
stave off economic need, then the state was in dire straits. A reliance on the 
“contaminated” internal trade illustrated the “degradation to which slavery may reduce 
its supporters!” Harrison invoked the names of Washington and Jefferson in order to 
shame any who bought or sold slaves for profit, noting that speculation in slaves was a 
source o f “impure wealth” which must be resisted.21 His argumentation illustrated the 
weakness o f those who disliked the internal trade: they could do little to change the
20 Dew, “Review of the Debate,” pp. 317 (first quotation), 318-22, 359 (second 
quotation); Faust,ed., Ideology o f  Slavery, p. 31.
21 [Harrison], Review o f the Slave Question, pp. 17, 32-33.
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Moral suasion was one method o f  trying to counter the growth o f  the trade, but there 
was no effective organization to channel the energies of those who wanted to end 
speculation. The best they could do was to illustrate the essential humanity of the 
slaves in order to convince others not to treat them as beasts. Moralizing proved 
ineffective in blunting the force o f  economic considerations.
The discussion about gradually ending slavery in Virginia went nowhere. It 
was simply too difficult to find a satisfying political solution to remove something that 
was an integral part o f the society. Talk of colonization continued, but the idea had no 
chance of succeeding once the legislature refused to formally endorse or fund a 
program. “ASHMUN,” writing in the Petersburg Times, conceded that public opinion 
about colonization was fluctuating in the wake o f the Nat Turner revolt. While 
moderately in favor o f the state buying slaves and shipping them to Africa, Ashumn 
pointed out that the interstate trade, ‘Tainful as it is,” accomplished the same purpose at 
no price to the state. Echoing the ideas of Harrison and Dew, he realized that the state 
could not compete with the slave trade and bluntly concluded, “Virginia cannot stop 
it.”22 Others even taunted the colonization movement by accusing it o f raising the price 
o f slaves. One writer, calling himself “ANTI-ABOLITIONIST,” argued that slave 
prices increased rapidly despite the “ravages” of cholera. High prices would not 
encourage emancipation or colonization, and the only way to rid the state o f slavery was 
to make slave labor less valuable, which would invite slaveholders to give up a useless
22 Undated Petersburg Times, as quoted in Western Luminary, 11 Jan. 1832. 
Jehudi Ashmun was a fund-raiser and spokesman for the American Colonization 
Society who also served in Liberia as a colonial agent and died there in 1828 
(Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 73-74, 88-91, 150-62).
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investment. He did not see such a scenario happening any time soon.23 It was painfully 
clear to colonization’s supporters that the operation o f the interstate slave trade inflated 
prices at a time when a drop in the cost of slaves was necessary for any colonization 
scheme to work. With slave prices rising in the late 1820s and beyond, the cost of 
purchasing and deporting slaves became prohibitive.24
Once Virginia squelched the program o f state-sponsored colonization, it became 
apparent that the states would not be willing or able to coordinate and fund any 
colonization efforts. The A.C.S. looked to the federal government as the only viable 
alternative and stepped up its campaign to secure federal funds. Colonization adherents 
wanted to use the proceeds from the sale of public land to pay for buying and shipping 
slaves, but they only steered the organization in an anti-slavery direction. Democrats 
and Southerners were loathe to do anything that gave Washington any more power than 
it needed, especially when it came to the sensitive issue of slavery. Andrew Jackson’s 
veto of the Distribution Bill in 1833, a measure that would have funded colonization 
with money from public land sales, effectively neutered the organization.
23 Richmond Enquirer, 17 Sept. 1833.
24 After bottoming out in 1818, slave prices rose during the next nineteen years 
until their collapse in the panic o f  1837. There does not appear to be a direct connection 
between the price o f slaves and the number of slaves colonized. Freudenberger and 
Pritchett, “The Domestic United States Slave Trade,” p. 457, have slave prices while 
Staudenraus, American Colonization Movement, p. 251, has the number o f slaves sent to 
Africa by the A.C.S.
25 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 184-87. As colonization 
became linked to the removal of slaves with federal funds, critics in the Lower South 
castigated the A.C.S. as a tool o f  abolitionists. They were concerned that removal o f all 
the slaves would cause the southern economy to collapse. An unstated concern was that 
the A.C.S. would serve as a competitor to the supply o f slaves and raise prices.
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Colonization, more of a sentiment than a  solution, faltered in the face o f reality. 
It offered comfort that somehow slavery could be removed without disturbing society or 
making sacrifices. Those who adhered to its precepts underestimated how deeply 
slavery had become enmeshed in the culture; they offered a simple solution to a 
complex problem. Colonization, moreover, could not compete with the slave markets 
o f the Lower South. In the twenty-five years after its formation in 1816, the A.C.S. sent 
just over 3,800 slaves to Africa, or about one hundred and fifty per year. State 
organizations probably doubled this total, but their combined efforts did not make a 
dent in the slave population. The interstate trade for outstripped these numbers. The 
largest drawback o f the trade was its methods, because most southerners envisioned a 
milder way to remove slaves. As speculation became more accepted, Upper South 
residents could abandon their commitment to colonization and rest easy that the trade 
reduced the slave population.26
Besides the competition with the slave market, colonization was becoming an 
anachronism. It was a moderate solution at a time when moderation was evaporating. 
The A.C.S. tried to find a middle way between the extremes o f unimpeded slavery and 
abolition, but could not. Southerners were less likely to be introspective as they faced
Furthermore, as slaves left the country, those who remained would become strident 
about asserting claims to freedom. Most citizens o f the Deep South refused to have any 
contact with an organization they saw as a threat to slavery (Fredrickson, Black Image 
in the White Mind, pp. 25-26).
26 The national total is calculated from Staudenraus, American Colonization 
Movement, p. 251. For the totals o f  the state organizations from 1820 to 1856, see T. 
Michael Miller, ‘“ Out o f Bondage:’ A History o f  the Alexandria Colonization Society,” 
Alexandria History, 7 (1987): 27. The national organization colonized few slaves in the 
1840s, but the next decade saw more activity. It was active as late as 1899.
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the harsh glare o f abolitionist assaults in the 1830s and beyond. The Upper South, a 
bastion o f  support for colonization, was less inclined to consider the idea when 
speculation siphoned off many of its slaves. In this sense, the interstate slave trade 
fulfilled one of the major functions o f the American Colonization Society—removing 
slaves. It had the added bonus of being more remunerative to masters than colonization.
I f  citizens o f the Upper South were still divided over the efficacy o f  speculation 
when support for colonization evaporated, an outside threat dispelled most o f their 
doubts. The interstate slave trade, in fact, was one o f the easiest points o f attack for 
slavery’s opponents but those assaults prompted doubters to rally to the trade’s defense. 
Abolitionists portrayed slavery in the worst possible light, and a natural way to do that 
was to provide information about the slave trade. Lurid stories detailing the trade’s 
abuses became a focal point o f the radical abolitionist campaign to annihilate slavery. 
Speculation was a convenient target because it destroyed slave families and implied that 
masters let personal profit triumph over concern for slaves. Publications such as the 
Genius o f Universal Emancipation, Freedom’s Journal, and the Liberator regularly 
contained stories on the trade, reprinted advertisements o f  slave sales, and included 
harsh editorials about the buying and selling o f human beings. The Liberator, for 
instance, printed the woodcut of a slave sale on its masthead and had a regular feature 
entitled the “Black List” that featured the slave trade’s abuses. From its inception, the 
American Anti-Slavery Society called for Congressional action to end to the trade. 
Prominent abolitionists like William Jay, Henry B. Stanton, Alvan Stewart, Benjamin 
Lundy, and William Lloyd Garrison all were vocal about the need to put a stop to the
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trade.27 The torrent o f abuse directed towards commerce in slaves was so great that 
even a casual visitor to the United States noticed that “the slave-trade is now become 
more than formerly a subject o f discussion.”28
One o f  the abolitionists’ first tactics was to flood Congress with petitions to 
terminate the interstate slave trade and abolish slavery. Although most o f  them focused 
on the District of Columbia, by 1837 the House o f Representatives received petitions 
signed by 23,405 people that called for an end to the interstate trade 29 Perceptive 
northerners realized that the slave trade was vital to slavery’s existence because it kept 
bondservants valuable in the Upper South and supplied the labor demand for the Lower 
South.30 They attacked the slave trade as being brutal, transforming humans into 
property, operating contrary to God’s law, and fostering greed by encouraging slave 
holders to sell their slaves for high prices. In essence, they repeated all o f the 
misgivings that Upper South residents had in the 1820s. The abolitionists’ tone, 
however, was different than that o f Upper South residents. Opponents o f slavery were
27 Mayer, All on Fire, p. 75; Lightner, “Door to the Slave Bastille,” pp. 235-52; 
Lightner, “Interstate Slave Trade in Antislavery Politics,” pp. 119-36; Deyle, “Domestic 
Slave Trade,” pp. 144-210.
28 C. D. Arfwedson, The United States and Canada, in 1832, 1833, and 1834, 2 
vol. (London, 1834), 1: 352. The abolitionists’ switch to immediatism and more 
provocative tactics may be seen in Dillon, Slavery Attacked, pp. 162-200; James Brewer 
Stewart, Holy Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery (New York, 1976), pp. 
33-73; and Betram Wyatt-Brown, Lewis Tappan and the Evangelical War Against 
Slavery (Cleveland, 1969), pp. 98-125.
29 Liberator, 23 June 1837, p. 102.
30 Lightner, “Door to the Slave Bastille,” pp. 243-44; Deyle, “Domestic Slave 
Trade,” pp. 182-85.
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more willing to attack slavery in specific detail rather than general terms. Instead of 
condemning slavery in the abstract, abolitionists seized upon vivid accounts o f  beatings, 
murders, mutilations, escapes, and auctions as the most effective way to illustrate the 
horrors o f the peculiar institution. Their critique of slavery brought criticism o f slave 
owners to a personal leveL Masters were no longer the victims o f an unfortunate labor 
system, but were active participants in an evil and exploitative regime. Those 
southerners who did nothing to eradicate slavery were equally culpable.
Southerners, however, did not allow the consistent and growing criticism o f 
slavery pass without a response. The growth o f an external threat to slavery that was 
vocal and personal triggered an aggressive defense of the peculiar institution. In public 
debates and official pronouncements slavery was less and less an evil, but was more and 
more a positive good. Instead o f being a benighted institution that hindered southern 
development, it was superior to the North’s grimy capitalism Southern politicians 
outdid themselves to prove their loyalty to slavery.31 Not only did southerners rally 
around slavery, but they also defended speculation in slaves. The Deep South had long 
been aware o f its dependence on the interstate slave trade, but it took several years for 
the Upper South to swing around to a defense o f  the trade. A recognition o f  the trade’s 
necessity helped bring uniformity to southern opinions about slavery.
The simplest way to defend the interstate slave trade was to minimize its 
importance. If  southerners could make the argument that speculation was o f  little 
consequence for the South, then they would effectively counter claims that masters
31 This idea is most forcefully argued in William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and 
the Politics o f Slavery 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), especially pp. 58-69.
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exploited their slaves. Thomas Cooper, for instance, foamed his defense of slavery 
around six assertions about the peculiar institution. One o f the charges described the 
trade as cruel, tyrannical, and unjust because it meted out punishment, separated 
husbands and wives, and prohibited education.32 Cooper carefully rebutted each o f  the 
accusations. He suggested that separation o f families occurred in every country and in 
every time, so the trade could not be singled out for causing wanton cruelty. In the 
South, he claimed, such a thing “may occur occasionally., .but, for the most part, 
husbands and wives are not parted.” I f  on the odd chance, slaves happened to be sold, 
“in nine cases out o f  ten” a neighbor purchased them. Separation occurred as often in 
whites as in blacks, so “the evil is so rare, that none such [regulation] has yet been 
made.” Even if  slaves were separated from their families, “the very slight bonds o f 
concubinage” meant that they were hardly bothered. Cooper was confident in the 
slaveholders’ ability to gradually “check the evils attendant on our system, and, for our 
own sakes, to ameliorate the condition of our slave.”33 In other words, the slave trade 
was so rare that northerners need not waste their time trying to reform it. The 
Charleston Patriot echoed this idea. Any sound or fury about the trade signified 
nothing, since the debate about the interstate trade was based on “the false philanthropy 
or mawkish sensibility o f the abolitionists” and not on a realistic appraisal o f the
32 Southern Literary Journal, Nov. 1835, pp. 188-93. The other five charges 
were: slavery was inconsistent with the laws of God, it violated the rights of man, it 
contravened the Declaration o f Independence, natural law did not allow slavery, and the 
North was flourishing more than the South. The index attributed the article to Cooper 
(p- iv).
33 Ibid., p. 190
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words, were overwrought about something o f  minor importance and should drop the 
matter.34
The real danger o f this outside interference, many southerners felt, was that it 
corrupted the relationship between master and slave. It was no small stretch for 
southerners to read abolitionist rhetoric about the necessity to end slavery and then 
assume that slaves imbibed such notions. How slaves could incorporate these ideas, 
since most could not read and did not have contact with northerners, usually went 
unexplained. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, Governor A. B. Roman of Louisiana issued 
a call for legislation prohibiting interstate slave traders from bringing bondservants into 
the state. He warned the legislature that “[cjonspiracies o f slaves, instigated, most 
probably, by imprudent propagandists and the false philanthropy of a certain class of 
persons styling themselves as the friends of the blacks, and who in reality are then- 
greatest enemies, have been plotted in several states of the Union.” In calling for an end 
to the interstate trade in his state, Roman blamed abolitionists for inciting Virginia 
slaves to revolt.35 Cooper also blamed abolitionists for degrading the master-slave 
relationship because they “render it necessary to draw the cords o f subjugation tighter 
instead of relaxing them.”36
34 Undated Charleston Patriot, as quoted in Niles ’ Weekly Register, 19 Sept.
1835.
35 New Orleans Louisiana Courier, 16 Nov. 1831 (quotation); Louisiana Senate 
Journal, Extra tenth session (New Orleans, 1832), p. 1.
36 Southern Literary Journal, Nov. 1835, p. 190.
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Not only were attacks on the interstate slave trade undermining the master-slave 
relationship, they were part o f  a broad conspiracy to destroy the South. Abolitionists 
were rash and dangerous, according to one southern newspaper. It protested that the 
South did not “create slavery” but inherited it from England. The “cupidity o f  the Slave 
dealers of the North, contributed to fasten it upon us.” Although the South may not like 
slavery, it was so “interwoven with our habits, that immediate abolition would tear up 
the foundation o f society.”37 Citizens of the northern and western states were trying “to 
produce a direct interference with the slave property of the southern and south western 
states.” Even though abolitionists sent “seditious and incendiary doctrines” through the 
mail, the “fanatics do not stop here.” They were trying to assert the right o f  the federal 
government to “interfere with our property.” This meddling took several forms, 
including emancipation in the District of Columbia or the territories, and inhibiting the 
“transportation o f slaves, as such, from one state to another.” 38 Defense o f  the slave 
trade, then, was integral to an overall justification o f slavery.
This aggressive position made itself felt in the halls o f Congress. Northern 
congressmen became more assertive in their efforts to shame southerners into admitting 
the evil effects o f the interstate trade. Southerners, in turn, were increasingly outspoken 
about resisting any and all attempts to use the trade as a way to attack slavery. Miner’s 
speech was an early salvo, but northern assaults became more frequent in the 1830s.
The trade in the District of Columbia was a favorite target because it made for good
37 Huntsville Southern Advocate, 10 Sept 1833.
38 Woodville Republican, 9 Jan. 1836.
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press back home and it could plausibly be argued that the federal government had the 
authority to intervene in Washington’s affairs. In 1835, for instance, northern 
representatives from Maine, Massachusetts, and New York introduced petitions to 
abolish slavery in the District o f Columbia.39 One of their tactics was reading local 
slave traders’ advertisements in the hopes o f shaming southerners into admitting the 
wretchedness o f slavery. The tactic failed. Henry Wise o f  Virginia responded in the 
hopes o f quenching the “spirits o f both extremes of fanaticism and of disorganization.” 
He sarcastically said he was sorry that northerners were shocked when they saw 
advertisements, even though “their fathers did more than any other people o f the 
colonies to establish slavery amongst us.” The obnoxious advertisements could not be 
silenced since the buying and selling o f slaves was too important to slavery. Wise 
pointed out that slavery was “interwoven with our very political existence.” He could 
have added that the interstate slave trade was part of the fabric as welL Wise was 
effective in his rebuttal, as a vote o f one hundred thirty-nine to sixty-three tabled the 
measure.40 Southerners were growing strong in their belief that interference with 
slavery in the District o f Columbia would lead to widespread regulation o f the interstate
39 Register o f Debates in Congress, Twenty-Third Congress, Second Session, 
Part Two, 16 Feb. 1835 (Washington, 1830), pp. 1392-93. This heated discussion came 
two weeks after John Dickson o f New York introduced several petitions asking for the 
abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the District o f Columbia Southerners 
promptly tabled the measure (Register o f Debates, Twenty-Third Congress, Second 
Session, Part One, 2 Feb. 1835, pp. 1131-33).
40 Register o f  Debates, Twenty-Third Congress, Second Session, 16 Feb. 1835, 
pp. 1398 (first quotation), 1399 (second and third quotations); Washington Daily 
National Intelligencer, 10 Feb. 1835. Vote on p. 1401.
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slave trade. The South could not yield to either measure since the final result would be 
slavery’s end.41
Two years later, in the Senate, Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey tried to find 
some o f the shrinking middle ground during another debate on ending slavery in the 
District o f Columbia. Northern petitions variously asked for the abolition of slavery in 
the Washington or the end of the slave trade there. Southard made a  distinction 
between the two when he called for an end to the slave trade in the District but denied 
that he wanted to touch slavery itself. He explicitly disavowed the right of the federal 
government to interfere with slavery.42 William C. Preston of South Carolina 
vigorously opposed Southard’s proposal. Preston called the separation of the slave 
trade from slavery “a distinction without a  difference” and objected to all interference in 
the matter. Southerners were “sore on the subject” and their “nerves were irritated” by 
the “violent and incessant attacks.” Propositions to “meddle with the slave trade in the 
District were but an entering wedge” to destroying slavery, according to Preston. The 
South Carolinian was irritated that southerners were assumed to be transgressors o f 
God’s laws who lived in vice and wickedness.43 When Preston finished his outburst, 
Southard continued and clarify his position. He was not an abolitionist and was not 
condemning the South or southerners. He merely joined “distinguished Southern
41 Undated Richmond Enquirer, as quoted in undated Columbia (South Carolina) 
Times, as quoted in Liberator, 21 Feb. 1835.
42 Register o f Debates, Twenty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Part One, 6 
Feb. 1837, p. 712
43 Ibid., p. 713. The quotations for the remainder of this paragraph are taken 
from this page.
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gentlemen” in opposing the character o f  the trade in the District. All Southard asked 
was for a distinction to be made between the abolition o f  slavery in Washington and the 
“suppression o f crimes and enormities in the traffic in slaves.” Preston could not keep 
quiet. He admitted that “Southern gentlemen, especially Mr. Randolph, had taken the 
ground adverted to,” but times had changed. “The country,” he explained, “had not 
then been filled with abolition principles.” What might have been done safely then was 
dangerous now, because to touch slavery in the District was to affect the entire South 
“immediately.” Petitions were exaggerated for effect, “with a view to rouse the feelings 
of the community, and inflame the fanaticism” of northerners. Preston had no doubt 
that if Randolph was present, “he would be the very last man to advocate a tampering 
with this subject.”
Alfred Cuthbert of Georgia continued to fend off the attacks. He felt that if 
“Congress could touch the smallest mite connected with the entire subject” o f  slavery 
the result would send “a thrill of dread and horror through all the South.” Even the 
smallest concession would be seized by the abolitionists as a triumph. William C. Rives 
said he witnessed the whole discussion with “pain and mortification.” There was no 
justification for the view that Congress could regulate the internal slave trade. The 
Virginian contended that “the gratuitous exhibitions o f  these horrid pictures o f misery” 
had no basis in fact. He thought the petitioners, and those senators who listened to 
them, were just trying to stir up trouble.44 John Calhoun then asserted that slavery was 
a “great good.” The Senate made no progress and voted to table the petition along a
44 Ibid., pp. 715 (first quotation), 717 (subsequent quotations).
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sectional vote.45 One speculator knew that southerners would not allow anything to 
happen that would jeopardize his livelihood. “This abolitionist petitioning,” he told a 
northerner, “is just an attempt to join church and state.” He thought it would “blow 
over” soon. The man, who refused to describe himself as a slave trader, noted that “the 
slave-traders tell us they don’t care a d— for it—they ain’t afraid o f it.”46
As this speculator knew, the southern position had emerged with great clarity 
and increasing unity across the South. Twenty years earlier congressmen representing 
the Upper South were wary o f supporting the domestic trade because of its troublesome 
aspects. By the mid 1830s, they were willing to accept it as fundamental to their 
society. In doing so, they denied the validity of earlier southern questions about 
speculation. Southerners were convinced that times had changed and that northerners 
were now going to hammer away at the slave trade in order to undermine slavery’s 
support James Bimey, who moved out o f the South to oppose slavery, thought that 
abolitionists had a “very injurious” effect in the South. They furnished “a kind of 
justification o f slavery itself to the Southern slaveholders.”47 Southerners assumed that 
any attempt to meddle with the buying and selling o f  bondservants, even in the District 
o f Columbia, was the first step on the road to abolition. The slave trade, then, had to be 
protected and southerners rallied to resist federal interference with slavery. One 
southern newspaper wondered how anyone could support Martin Van Buren after one
45 Ibid., pp. 719 (quotation), 723.
46 Liberator, 20 Apr. 1838, p. 61.
47 Dwight L. Dumond, ed., Letters o f James Gillespie Bimey 1831-1857 (New 
York, 1938), 1: 90.
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of his papers attacked the Washington trade. It pointed out that the South could not 
afford to lose too many political battles and still hope to protect servitude.48 A 
European visitor realized what was at stake. He thought that all southerners had “an 
interest in protecting this infernal trade of slave-driving” because the expansion—and 
the future—of their society depended on it. Those who wanted to preserve slavery had 
to be willing to defend all o f  its aspects, even something as ugly as the interstate slave 
trade. They were willing to justify speculation’s horrible features in order to erect a 
comprehensive defense o f their peculiar institution. As southerners did so, especially in 
the Upper South, they modified their beliefs about slavery. It no longer had any flaws 
because admitting weakness would open the door to even more northern denunciation. 
All negative aspects o f slavery had to be blamed on those who were outside the 
mainstream o f society.49
Indeed, it was increasingly difficult to defend slavery and maintain an 
opposition to the slave trade. The Western Luminary, in deploring masters who sold 
their slaves to speculators, did not want level indiscriminate accusations. Some o f the 
“best citizens” o f the South held slaves, but did so in accordance with the “principle o f 
humanity and justice.” These owners showed that it was not necessary to deal with 
slave traders. The paper also made it clear it was not in league with abolitionists. ‘Tar 
be it from us to assert in the language of a certain class in some section o f our country,” 
the Luminary explained, “that human beings can never under any circumstances
48 Wooctville Republican, 9 Mar. 1839.
49 Featherstonhaugh, Excursion through the Slave States, p. 37.
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whatever, be held to bondage.” The chorus o f extremism drowned out voices o f 
moderation like this one.50
More typical was the position of William Haile, who ran for state representative 
in Mississippi on an openly anti-abolitionist platform. He realized that it was useless to 
differentiate between slavery and the slave trade. Haile accused seminaries and anti­
slavery societies o f  conspiring to “destroy the domestic institutions o f the South.” 
Campaigning in the aftermath o f  the Turner revolt, Haile pledged to keep Mississippi 
open to all slave importation. He ticked off a number o f reasons why a  law restricting 
the entry of slaves should be opposed: it would only help the large slaveholder, it would 
be evaded, a similar law in Louisiana failed, it would reduce immigration, and too many 
legal restraints demoralize a community. Haile thought that as “long as slavery is 
recognized, it cannot be restrained without a violation of right.” Interference with the 
slave trade was the first step to limiting the rights of slaveholders, according to this 
view.51
Defenders o f the slave trade used tactics beside just blaming abolitionists for the 
interstate slave trade. Another popular defense was claiming that speculation’s effects 
were exaggerated. If  apologists for the slave trade could demonstrate that it was of 
relatively minor importance in the South, then they would effectively rebut 
abolitionists’ claims of cruelty. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, speaking in South 
Carolina, recognized this essential point. He knew that outsiders described the slave
50 Western Luminary, 23 Nov. 1831.
51 Woodville Republican, 10 Oct. 1833.
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trade as “an outrage on humanity-” They were wrong. The sale o f  slaves was “often 
attended with beneficial effects” and the “improvement of their condition is the 
probable consequence.” In Pinckney’s view, the “separation o f near relatives seldom 
takes place except by their own desire.” In those rare cases where slaves were forced 
apart, they were better off than the working class o f  the North, who “often encounter 
more real perils and hardships, than are to be found in the romantic catalogue of the 
horrors of slavery.”52 Judge Harper covered much the same ground in his four part 
defense of slavery. The second installment o f the series concerned itself mostly with 
disproving the alleged evils o f  slavery. Harper trotted out a list o f  crimes committed 
against slaves: no legal protection, excessive labor, cruel punishment, no opportunity 
for moral or intellectual advancement, marriage was essentially equivalent to 
concubinage, and families were tom  apart. He then proceeded to disprove each 
assertion Most of the charges were distorted, he thought, especially since worse things 
happened in a free society. The relation of the master to the slave was naturally one o f 
kindness, so there was more tenderness than brutality. Harper did admit that slaves 
were “liable” to be sold, but charged that free laborers were separated from their 
families more frequently. Besides, Harper continued, the “native character and 
temperament” o f bondservants made the separation “much less severely felt.” Harper’s 
awkward defense o f  the slave trade was really not much of a defense at all. Things in
Genius o f  Universal Emancipation, 6 Sept. 1829, p. 66 (quotations); Mathews, 
Religion in the Old South, p. 72. Pinckney also gave advice for slaveholders. He 
thought masters needed to improve the religious state o f their slaves in order to gain the 
“advantage in argument over...our Northern Brethren.”
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the North were worse, he argued, so northerners should focus their crusading energies 
on themselves rather than torturing the South.53
Central to this forceful defense o f the slave trade and, by extension, slavery, was 
the issue of whether the movement o f bondservants was subject to the interstate 
commerce clause o f  the Constitution. Northerners who wanted to regulate the trade 
insisted that the federal government could legislate the matter. Southerners admitted no 
such thing because they wanted no interference in the master-slave relationship. It was 
a delicate subject. The justification o f slave sales hinged upon the assumption that 
slaves were property. The Constitution, however, gave the federal government the 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Southerners were trying to have it both ways 
in denying and affirming the property nature o f  slave ownership. This dual approach to 
property rights helps explain the peculiar southern stance on the interstate slave trade 
and on speculators. One newspaper admitted as such when it admitted that slaves were 
“in the nature o f commodities” but argued that they should not be regulated because the 
rights of ownership supersede any commercial implications. Constitutional issues 
aside, selling slaves for “removal” to the Southwest was “connected with the wealth and 
prosperity of the entire south.” Impeding this movement would hinder “the consequent 
increase of wealth [and] important elements o f political power.” The slave trade was 
vital to expansion, which was essential for the maintenance o f slavery.54
53 “Judge Harper’s Memoir on Slavery,” Southern Literary Journal, Feb. 1838:
81-97.
54 Undated Charleston Patriot, as quoted in N iles ' Weekly Register, 19 Sept. 
1835, p. 39.
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Southerners asserted, moreover, that most bondservants willingly took part in 
the interstate slave trade. This notion not only put masters’ motives and actions in the 
best possible light, but also presented the elaborate system of interstate trading as a 
voluntary migration o f  slaves. Two ideas were at work here. First, the emphasis on 
migration countered the abolitionist attack on slavery’s cruelty. I f  slaves were 
voluntary participants in the trade, then exposes revealing speculators’ cruelty were 
shams. There was no reason to question slavery because if the most objectionable 
aspect was acceptable, then the whole system was benign. Secondly, if slaves willingly 
moved to new territory, then they could not be articles of commerce. There was no 
need to abolish or regulate the interstate slave trade because the bondservants moved 
voluntarily, were well-treated, and experienced improved material conditions as a result 
o f sale.
The thorny issue of regulating interstate commerce came to a head in a Supreme 
Court case. As we have seen, Mississippi was in the unenviable position of 
constitutionally prohibiting the interstate slave trade even while taxing it. Governor 
Charles Lynch warned the legislature in 1837 that this contradictory position “opens the 
door to litigation.” Besides forestalling lawsuits, Lynch hoped to steady a shaky 
economy by keeping money in Mississippi. The legislature responded by passing a bill 
that imposed penalties on those who imported slaves. It also declared all notes 
subsequently arising from the trade to be null and void.55 The legislature acted too late,
55 Woodville Republican, 21 Jan. 1837 (quotation); Richmond Enquirer, 16 May, 
19 May 1837; Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 167; Drake, “Constitutional 
Development in Mississippi,” pp. 182-83. Vidalia, Louisiana, just across the river from
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since the damage was already done. When the panic o f  1837 hit with full force, 
creditors scrambled to collect debts. Slave traders were one o f the hardest hit groups 
because they held promissory notes that now had little or no chance o f being paid. 
Speculators tried to force payment, but Mississippi’s high court ruled that state citizens 
could not collect money from fellow residents.56
An earlier decision in federal court took a similar position. In Hickman v. Rose, 
a federal court ruled that all contracts for the sale o f  slaves in Mississippi since May of 
1833 were illegal, and thus null and void.57 Bacon Tait, a slave trader in Richmond, 
feared for his financial future. Inability to collect his notes would make it difficult to 
secure financing for the next slave trading season. He also wondered what would 
happen to the country. Tait thought the court’s decision would “accelerate the crisis 
between the North & the South which has been so long anticipated and most probably 
will produce a dissolution of the Union.” The federal government, in his opinion, was
Natchez, became a popular site for slave purchases since Mississippi residents could 
bring slaves into the state for their own use.
56 Bacon Tait to Rice C. Ballard, 14 Oct. 1840, Ballard Papers; Meredith Lang, 
Defender o f the Faith: The High Court o f Mississippi, 1817-1875 (Jackson, Miss.: 
1977), pp. 54-55; Helen T. Catterall, ed., Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery 
and the Negro, 5 voL (Washington, 1926), 3:289-90. Two cases, Green v. Robinson 
and Glidewell v. Hite, affirmed this decision. These decisions prompted Isaac Franklin 
to change his residency. He briefly established it as Louisiana so he could sue for debts, 
but in so doing gave his wife a foothold in her 1850 suit for possession of his estate.
She argued that Franklin was not a citizen o f Tennessee, so she should retain possession 
o f their house in Sumner County, contrary to Franklin’s will (Succession ofIsaac 
Franklin, pp. 255-56).
57 Niles’ Weekly Register, 1 Feb. 1840, p. 368; Undated Newark Sentinel, as 
quoted in Liberator, 3 Jan. 1840, p. 2.
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“subservient to non-slaveholders since it could now rule slaves are not property.”5* 
These cases had enormous significance for the Mississippi economy and for the rest of 
the South, as well. Should the courts rule against them, then slave traders may just as 
well write off all o f their debts in Mississippi. A negative ruling had the potential of 
destroying many speculators and crippling even more. A Natchez newspaper estimated 
that nearly ten thousand slaves were sold in Mississippi in the twelve months after 
November 1, 1835. Their value was at least ten million dollars.59
The speculators, however, were not willing to casually write o f  their debts; they 
went to court. Robert Slaughter imported slaves into Mississippi in 1836 and sold them 
for notes totaling $7,000. He sued when he could not collect. This case, Groves v. 
Slaughter, became a collaborative effort on the part o f several traders to recover their 
money.60 Besides Walter Jones, the traders hired the “Ajax and Achilles o f the bar,”
58 Bacon Tait to Thomas Boudar, 1 Jan. 1840, Bacon Tait to Rice C. Ballard, 3 
Jan. 1840 (quotations, emphasis in original), Ballard Papers.
59 Undated Natchez Courier, as quoted in Liberator, 12 May 1837, p. 78. The 
same issue quoted the opinion of an unidentified New Orleans paper that the potential 
loss by depreciation of slave property could bankrupt the state. Henry Clay, while 
arguing the case before the Supreme Court, said it involved three million dollars 
(Groves, et al. v. Slaughter, 40 U. S. (15 Peters), p. 481).
60 Background for the case can be found in Boston Massachusetts Spy, 24 Feb. 
1841, clipping in Carl Swisher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Charles 
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 3 voL (Boston, 1922), 2:342-46; 
Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter, eds., A History o f the South, vol. 5, 
Charles Sydnor, The Development o f Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Baton Rouge, 
1948), pp. 246-47; Paul A. Freund, ed., The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History o f 
the Supreme Court, vol. 5, Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-64 (New York, 
1974), pp. 365-69; and Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, pp. 165-68. That several traders 
participated in the suit is clear (Bacon Tait to Rice C. Ballard, 9 May 1841, Ballard 
Papers).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
350
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.61 United States Attorney General Henry D. Gilpin and 
Mississippi Senator Robert J. Walker opposed Clay, Webster, and Jones. On February 
12,1841 the week-long case commenced. Since it involved “most important 
consequences and some millions of dollars o f property,” not to mention the presence of 
such prominent attorneys, it “excited general interest” around the country. Crowds, 
which included a “large proportion of well-dressed ladies,” packed the courtroom to 
hear the “great display o f argument and eloquence.” The case’s surprising length 
pushed back the starting date for the celebrated Amistad case, next on the court’s 
docket.62
The court had a number of issues to decide. Most obviously, it had to rule 
whether the Mississippi constitution was a ban in and o f  itself or whether it needed 
prohibitory legislation to become effective. John Quincy Adams, who listened to the 
case while preparing to argue for the Amistad slaves, thought the Groves case turned on 
“whether a State of the Union can constitutionally prohibit the importation within her 
borders o f slaves as merchandise.”63 Southerners extended the issue even further and 
saw the case as a test of state sovereignty. One newspaper feared for the future should 
the court rule against state authority. In that case, states could no longer protect
61 Groves v. Slaughter, pp. 449-517, i-lxxxviii (quotation on p. 477).
62 Undated Baltimore American, as quoted in Washington Niles ’ National 
Register, 20 Feb. 1841, p. 400 (first quotation); Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary o f Philip 
Hone, 1828-1851, 2 vol. (New York, 1927), 19 Feb. 1841,2:523 (second quotation); 
Charleston Southern Patriot, 4 Mar. 1841 (third quotation).
63 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs o f John Quincy Adams, Comprising 
Portions o f  his Diary from  1795 to 1848, 12 vol. (Philadelphia, 1876), 19 Feb. 1841, 10: 
427.
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themselves against “the fell abolitionists...whose fanaticism would provoke every 
species o f excess against our laws and institutions.”64 The court also had to address the 
question o f  whether slaves were persons or were articles o f  commerce. This area could 
cause enormous difficulties. Should the court rule that slaves were not articles o f 
commerce, then it could be argued that bondservants were persons and the interstate 
slave trade infringed on their constitutional rights.65 If  the court ruled that slaves were 
property, then it could deem that they were subject to the interstate commerce clause. 
Southerners had reason to fear such a decision. Abolitionists had already signaled their 
intentions to oppose the interstate slave trade whenever possible, and a ruling favorable 
to them would probably unleash a renewed attempt to regulate the trade to the point o f 
extinction. The Richmond Enquirer sensed the danger. It felt the case involved the 
“right claimed by Abolitionists, for Congress to prohibit the transportation o f  slaves 
from State to State.”66
Once the case began, Clay, Webster, and Jones argued that Mississippi’s 
constitutional clause was no prohibition in itself being merely a suggestion rather than 
a directive. Since it was not a prohibition, purchasers could not contest sales on the 
grounds of illegality. Clay forcefully argued that “no one questioned the right to 
introduce slaves for sale” after the constitution took effect. It was only during difficult 
economic times that it became convenient to avoid debt because hard-pressed
64 Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 26 Jan. 1841.
65 The Groves case anticipated many o f the same issues as the Dred Scott case, 
especially whether or not slaves were persons, or at least had the rights o f citizens.
66 Richmond Enquirer, 9 Apr. 1841.
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Mississippi residents would be less willing to honor such contracts.67 More 
importantly, Clay accused the plaintiffs o f being on the “abolition side o f  the question” 
when it came to the regulation o f interstate commerce. He tried to establish that 
Mississippi’s prohibitory clause superseded the United States Constitution. 
“Regulation,” in Clay’s words, “implies continued existence.” The abolitionists were 
trying to “prevent the exercise o f this commerce. This is a violation of the right o f 
Congress under the Constitution.” Although Clay argued that Mississippi’s constitution 
was not effective in this case, he felt compelled to prevent the possibility o f the federal 
government asserting its authority in this area. He flatly stated that “to deny the 
introduction o f  slaves, as merchandise, into a state, from another state, is an interference 
with the Constitution of the United States.”68 Clay’s argument was “splendid,” 
according to one observer. “He connected it a  little with the popular topic o f abolition, 
intimating that his view o f the question was the anti-abolition view.”69 Webster took a 
slightly different tack. He did not uphold Clay’s view but carefully separated slavery 
and the slave trade. Webster argued that the United States Constitution “recognizes 
slaves as property,” but Congress had the “power and duty to regulate commerce 
between the states.” It could not, though, interfere with state regulations as to slavery.70 
The statements o f these eminent statesmen show just how far apart the North and the
67 Groves v. Slaughter, p. 482.
68 Ibid., pp. 488 (first quotation), 489 (second quotation).
69 Charleston Southern Patriot, 4 Mar. 1841.
70 Groves v. Slaughter, p. 495.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
353
South were by 1841. Clay described slave trading as a constitutional right while 
Webster felt the federal government could regulate speculation.
Walker swept past these considerations in his rebuttal, a statement that ably 
elucidated the aggressive southern defense o f the interstate slave trade. His argument, 
which was too lengthy to include in the case description, endeavored to prove that 
interstate commerce in slaves was purely a state issue even while establishing that 
bondservants were property. Walker combined legal reasoning, political argumentation, 
and emotional appeals into an effective statement o f why the interstate trade must 
remain a state issue and not a federal one.71 He quickly clarified why a southern state 
would prohibit something it desperately wanted to preserve. It was, Walker explained, 
a matter of self defense. He claimed that the “unscrupulous negro-trader” was 
responsible for “the introduction of slaves from abroad o f depraved character.” Such 
men “have offended against the majesty o f laws and the sovereignty o f the people of 
Mississippi; they have put in jeopardy the lives o f our citizens, disregarded our cardinal 
policy, and trampled under their feet the sacred prohibitory enactments o f the 
constitution.” The state and not the federal government, he explained, was in the best
71 The publisher printed Walker's argument in an appendix. His position came 
directly from the Mississippi Supreme Court judge’s ruling. That Walker made 
political appeals is inferred from the situation in Mississippi- The Democrats urged 
Walker to run for Senator in 1839 and much o f the campaign involved the national 
bank. His attack on banks as being heartless in the Groves case fits neatly with his 
pronouncements during the campaign. The feet that he was indebted for several 
hundred thousand dollars because o f slave purchases also influenced his statements 
(Groves v. Slaughter, p. ix; James P. Shenton, Robert John Walker: A Politician from  
Jackson to Lincoln (New York, 1961), pp. 27-30; Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, p. 
166).
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position to decide how to deal with such evil. In this explanation, Walker relied on the 
stereotype o f  itinerant traders that had become widespread in the South.72
Lest northerners use this argument as a  means to indict southerners for allowing 
speculators to run rampant, Walker carefully explained why the slave trade existed. 
Significant numbers o f slaves in the Upper South had been “indoctrinated for years on 
the principles o f abolition, surrounded with its teachers and stimulated by revenge, to 
diffuse their emancipating creed among our slave population; to render them forever 
dangerous, worthless, sullen and discontented, and to excite successive insurrection 
from time to time within our limits.” Such slaves spread their deadly creed to others, 
forcing owners to sell rebellious bondservants to traders. According to Walker, the 
primary reason that the South tolerated speculators was that they were necessary to 
defuse the instability caused by abolitionists. The South was “united,” he said, in 
“abolishing as states the inter-state slave trade.” Should the abolitionists cease their 
agitation, then the interstate slave trade would hardly be necessary. Walker repeated 
one of the key components o f the slave trade defense: masters were not to blame for the 
interstate slave trade. Speculators, even though reduced to a stereotype, were not at 
fault either. It was the abolitionists who caused the South’s problems. The southern 
argument in favor of the interstate trade had come full circle. In the eighteenth century 
the South blamed England for foisting slavery upon the colonies. By 1840 the South 
blamed northern agitators for one of slavery’s worst features.73
TO Groves v. Slaughter, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
73 Ibid., pp. lv (second quotation), lvi (first quotation). Walker explained that 
slaves contaminated by the “doctrines and principles of abolition” were found in the
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Walker strengthened his position by exploring the master-slave relationship. 
Southerners treated their slaves like persons, he explained, so they had scant inclination 
to use the interstate slave trade. The idea that “slaves are merely chattels and not 
persons” was a “ radical error, and one that has been too long circulated uncontradicted 
by the abolitionists.” Walker explained how the master-slave relationship was 
“reciprocal under the laws of the south; the right o f the master is to the services o f  the 
slave for life, and the right of the slave as secured by law, to humane and proper 
treatment, to comfortable lodging, food and clothing, and to proper care in infancy, 
sickness and old age.”74 His disgust with the description of slaves as “chattel” reflects 
southerners’ dislike for the term, especially because o f its frequent use by abolitionists. 
The argument about whether bondservants were treated like persons or like chattel went 
to the heart o f the slavery controversy since it would be hard to attack a benign type of 
servitude. Southerners did all they could to disprove northern assertions that slaves 
were no more than property.
Slave owners’ aversion to being accused o f treating their slaves like chattel was 
reflected in the opinions o f  John Hartwell Cocke. He held moderate views on slavery
“counties o f Maryland, Virginia and Kentucky, bordering for more than a than a 
thousand miles upon the adjacent states o f Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.” It 
would be “most dangerous to permit slave traders to drive them” to Mississippi (Ibid., 
p. Ivi).
74 Ibid., pp. lv (first quotation), lvi (second quotation). Walker described slavery 
as “a relation o f perpetual pupilage and minority, and o f contented dependence on the 
one hand, and o f guardian care and patriarchal power on the other, a  power essential for 
the welfare o f both parties.” Since southerners treated slaves as persons, he added, it 
would be foolish to contend that bondservants were subject to federal regulation (Ibid., 
p. lv).
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but was perturbed by the agitation over the issue and took it as a personal affront that 
abolitionists described slaves as chatteL Cocke thought that such language demeaned 
and cheapened the master-slave relationship. In an essay entitled “Negroes not 
Chattels,” he argued that using the word chattel to describe slavery was deceptive. 
Cocke thought it an “adroit slander” and an insult, since chattel implied that masters 
cared only for the property rights of their slaves and slighted the Christian belief that 
slaves had souls. He thought the “ultra-abolitionists of the North” were stirring up 
trouble with their insistence that slaves were chattels.75 Walker’s argument echoed 
these thoughts and took them one step further by accusing abolitionists o f treating 
slaves as chattels. Only “that party in the north that demands o f congress to regulate the 
slave trade among the states, not really with a view to prohibit that traffic, for it is 
prohibited by the slave-holding states, but with an ultimate view to emancipation” 
wanted slaves to be considered only to be property.76
Walker’s argumentation reflected the southern mentality that masters did not 
want to admit they thought o f their slaves in commercial terms. The interstate slave 
trade was the epitome of treating slaves in such a fashion since, by its very nature, 
speculation was concerned with the value o f the slave rather than his or her character. 
This notion was the most difficult one for southerners to defend or explain away, 
especially in light o f the abolitionists’ efforts to portray slavery in the worst possible 
way. I f  slaves were not treated as chattel, then congressional authority to regulate
75 John Hartwell Cocke, Sr., “Negroes not Chattels,” Undated essay, Cocke 
Family Papers.
Groves v. Slaughter, p. lv.
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commercial power was inapplicable in this case. For Walker, and others who tried to 
justify the presence of the interstate slave trade, it was essential to defy the very nature 
of the transaction. They blamed all others—banks, debt, abolitionists, the slaves 
themselves—for the slave trade because to admit their own culpability would be to 
undermine the whole basis o f  their society. Owners prided themselves on the 
benevolent care o f their slaves, but speculation contradicted this illusory vision. In 
explaining away the interstate slave trade, and defying its essential commercial nature, 
Walker and other southerners relied on a defense of slavery where owners were 
concerned with the welfare o f their slaves, not profit. I f  others were at fault for the 
trade, then southern qualms about speculation became a non-issue.
Although Walker had fashioned a worthy defense of the slave trade, he spent 
several hours arguing that the federal government had no authority in the matter. He 
did so even though Clay and Webster explicitly made the same point. In harking back 
to John Randolph’s objection to the forty ton rule of the coastwise trade, Walker argued 
that regulation o f the slave trade would give congress the power “/o regulate slavery, 
both in and among the states. It is abolition in its most dangerous form, under the mask 
of a power to regulate commerce.” Walker wanted to make sure the door was shut 
tightly against any federal meddling with slavery. He boldly proclaimed that the power 
to regulate interstate commerce “rests in congress alone” but if that body chose to 
legislate the interstate slave trade “in defiance o f state authority, then indeed, we shall 
have reached a crisis in the abolition controversy, most alarming and momentous.” He 
warned the Supreme Court not to get involved in the question because no one can
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“predict the consequences.”77 The likely result would be federal authority running 
roughshod over state control. Free states might find themselves in the uncomfortable 
position o f  having the federal government make slavery uniform throughout the entire 
country. Although this line o f  reasoning might seem absurd, Walker was trying to scare 
off those who did not want to see the further spread of slavery. He wanted the court to 
consider slavery “the unquestionable power o f a state, and over which congress has no 
control or supervision.”78 He rested his assertions on the bedrock of state authority 
rather than on federal control. In the final analysis, Walker’s defense o f slavery and the 
slave trade encapsulated the essential southern position. He attached protection of the 
slave trade to a vigorous assertion o f states’ rights.79
The court rendered its verdict on the day before it ruled on the Amistad case, and 
both decisions had the potential to cause much friction between slaveholding and free 
states. By a margin of five to two, it upheld the circuit court’s decision and ruled that 
statutory legislation was necessary before the constitutional ban took effect. More 
importantly, and in a major victory for the South, the court specifically directed that
77 Ibid., pp. li. (first quotation, emphasis in original), xlix (subsequent 
quotations).
78 Ibid., p. li. Walker warned that such a power would not only “oppress the 
slave-holding states,” but would “recoil upon the free states with a force and power 
which was little dreamed of by the abolitionists” (Ibid., p. lix).
79 Several years later in the Senate, Florida Senator James Westcott described 
Walker’s statement as “never excelled by any made in that Court for masterly ability, 
profound learning and accomplished eloquence.” (James Westcott, as quoted in Warren, 
Supreme Court, 3:343). John Quincy Adams had a different opinion. He remarked 
that Walker’s argument “sounded to me like the justification for the constitutional 
authority to prohibit it [slavery] in all the States, and for the exercise of it.” (Adams, ed., 
Memoirs o f  John Quincy Adams, 19 Feb. 1841, 10:427).
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Congress possessed no power to regulate the interstate slave trade.80 Three o f the 
justices had slightly different slants on the ruling. In oral comments, John McLean 
thought states could outlaw slavery and prohibit the entry o f bondservants. He flatly 
stated that the “power over slavery belongs to the states respectively. It is local in its 
character, and in its effects.”81 Chief Justice Roger Taney left no doubt as to his 
personal opinion. The power over the interstate slave trade lay “exclusively with the 
several states” and Congress could not affect state action.82 Roger Baldwin, who was 
ardently anti-slavery, could not keep quiet either. He differed from his colleagues in 
believing that “slaves were embraced by the Constitution as the subjects of commerce 
and commercial regulations.” Even so, Baldwin asserted the authority of the states to 
legislate slavery. He agreed with Walker’s contention that federal regulation o f the 
interstate slave trade could eventually have deleterious effects on the free states.83
Bacon Tait rejoiced at the decision. He wrote Ballard that because of the 
decision, “you will ere long be enabled to collect all that is due to you in the S° West.” 
Ballard certainly greeted the news with joy, but was less enthusiastic when he received 
Henry Clay’s bill. Clay, disappointed at not being paid, guaranteed his services. He
80 Groves v. Slaughter, pp. 496-517; Washington Globe, 27 Mar. 1841 clipping 
in Carl Swisher Papers; Swisher, Taney Period, pp. 367-69. Dining the court’s term, 
Justice John Catron became ill and Justice Philip P. Barbour died, so only seven justices 
decided the case.
81 Groves v. Slaughter, pp. 503-8 (quotation on p. 508). McLean added that the 
Constitution considered slaves to be persons even while states could consider them as 
property.
82 Ibid., pp. 508-10 (quotation on p. 508).
83 Ibid., pp. 510-17 (quotation on p. 514).
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told Ballard he would refund the money if  any other case overturned the decision.
When Ballard still refused to pay, Clay successfully sued for four thousand dollars.84 
Tait, the other speculators, and southerners in general had good reason to be happy.
The Groves decision effectively neutralized efforts in Congress to regulate the interstate 
slave trade. The Richmond Enquirer, forgetting that it was a split decision, called for 
abolitionists “who respect the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court” to “abandon so 
much of their petitions as call on Congress to regulate or prohibit the transportation of 
slaves from State to State.” This part of the “Abolition controversy,” the paper felt, had 
been “solemnly settled in favor o f the South.”85 The paper was too optimistic. 
Opponents o f slavery did not abandon the fight, but concentrated their efforts on the 
District o f Columbia. They ultimately succeeded, of course, in having the trade banned 
in the District. Their victory was a hollow one, since most o f the slave sales took place 
in Alexandria anyway. Southerners probably realized they could compromise on the 
District in 1850 since they now had the weight of case law on their side in any debate 
about regulating the interstate trade between the states. Thomas Bayly of Virginia 
summed up the Groves case as discussing “the extent o f the power of Congress over 
what is familiarly called the internal slave trade.” Most agreed, he thought, “the 
decision has tended greatly to put an end to the agitation growing out o f it.”86
84 Henry Clay to Rice C. Ballard, 23 June, 6 July 1841, 4 July 1844, Ballard
Papers.
85 Richmond Enquirer, 9 Apr. 1841.
86 Thomas Bayly, as quoted in Warren, Supreme Court, 3: 341. Southerners 
seemed to be cognizant o f the victory. Carter Harrison o f  Virginia, for instance,
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Although defenders o f the slave trade denied its ubiquity and their own 
culpability, they still needed to explain the presence of slave traders. After all, owners 
who had the best interests o f their slaves at heart presumably would not sell to a 
speculator. Just as the qualms that many southerners had about dealing with traders 
were rapidly disappearing, there was an underlying need to preserve the fiction that 
most owners preferred not to sell their slaves to speculators. Southerners could not 
deny the presence o f traders, so it became com m on to assert that they were rare and had 
contact with a relatively small number of bondservants. Those few speculators who did 
exist, the thinking went, were shunned from polite society and only survived because 
they duped a gullible public into buying their slaves. The argumentation o f a southern 
minister illustrates this change in thinking about slave traders. Dining a debate in 
Cincinnati, N. L. Rice dealt with the issue o f whether the slave trade was sinful. He 
shifted the blame for the trade by asserting that the “multiplication o f slave-gangs” was 
“one of the sad effects o f the doctrine and practice o f abolitionists.” Opponents o f 
slavery frequently deluded slaves into becoming discontented, he explained. Masters 
feared losing their slaves, so they “sell them to the hard-hearted trader.” Rice 
concluded that the speculator was “looked upon by decent men in the slave-holding 
States with disgust.” The trader was a necessary evil who was not a product o f 
slaveholders’ greed but o f northerners’ interference.87
carefully copied a lengthy summary o f the case and tucked it into his diary (Undated 
note in Carter H. Harrison Diary, University o f  Virginia).
87 J. Blanchard and N. L. Rice, A Debate on Slavery held in the City o f  
Cincinnati (Cincinnati, 1846), p. 28.
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Walker, in his argument before the Supreme Court, also relied upon the
stereotype o f  the unscrupulous trader. He said that speculators were engaged in an
inhuman traffic; transporting these slaves in chains from state to state, 
for the sole purpose o f  a sale for profit; desirous o f increasing this profit 
by purchasing the cheapest slaves, which would always be the most 
wicked and dangerous, reckless of the moral qualities and character o f 
the slaves whom they bought, not for their own use, but to sell for 
speculation; tempted to buy the most wicked slaves, because always to 
be purchased at the lowest price, and sold in a distant state at the highest 
price, to those who would be ignorant o f their dangerous character; 
inured as these traders were to scenes o f  wretchedness and cruelty, and 
entirely regardless o f  the means by which they reaped a profit from this 
traffic.88
Blaming the trader was an easy way to avoid responsibility for slavery’s abuses.
The trajectory o f Southern attitudes appeared in the outpouring o f  southern 
literature in rebuttal to Uncle Tom’s Cabin by Harriet Beecher Stowe, a novel that 
accused southern masters o f destroying slaves’ lives by indulging in their own selfish 
desires.89 Stowe’s book, and others like it, indicted every southerner for allowing the 
presence o f slavery and the slave trade, something that systematically destroyed slave 
families and caused untold hardship. Southerners, however, forcefully answered this 
assault on their character. The novels that appeared in response to Uncle Tom ’s Cabin 
defended slavery by explaining away the slave trader. Most o f  the plots in these books 
involved the sale, or near sale, o f bondservants and thus digressed into a discussion of 
speculation’s role in southern society. These stories routinely castigated the trader as an 
inhuman brute who made his money through exploitation o f  not only slaves, but also
88 Groves v. Slaughter, p. lxix.
89 Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life among the Lowly, 2 vol. 
(Boston, 1852).
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unsuspecting whites. The evil speculator separated bondservants from their families 
and took them away from their kind and benevolent masters. In most cases, however, 
the upstanding citizens o f the local community banded together to thwart the destructive 
designs of the traders. Just as importantly, northern fanatics were the cause o f the 
trouble in the first place. Slaves would not dream o f running away because they had it 
so good.90
J. Thornton Randolph, for instance, relied on melodramatic action and turgid 
prose to defend the peculiar institution. His book described the funeral of Mr.
Courtenoy and noted the “loud and long lamentations” o f his slaves when they learned 
o f their master’s death. Soon, the firm of “Skin and Flint” from New York, which had 
long charged “usurious” interest rates to Courtenoy, moved in to collect its share o f the 
estate. Courtenoy’s daughter, Isabel, was so noble, she was willing to take a job to raise 
enough money so that the “helpless” slaves would not be sold away from family 
members. Isabel was certain that her neighbors would not allow the separation o f  slave 
families, something that happened in novels but not “in real life, except in rare cases, or 
where the slave has been guilty o f some misdemeanor, or crime, for which, in the 
North, he would have been imprisoned, perhaps, for life.” Circumstances, o f course, 
work out for Isabel as her neighbors conspired to purchase the slaves. A trader
90 A discussion o f this genre of literature is found in J. B. Tandy, “Pro-Slavery 
Propaganda in American Fiction o f the Fifties,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 21 (1922): 
41-51,170-79; Francis Pendleton Gaines, The Southern Plantation: A Study in the 
Development and the Accuracy o f a Tradition (New York, 1925); Herbert Ross Brown, 
The Sentimental Novel in America 1789-1860 (Durham, N. C., 1940), pp. 241-80;
Tracy, In the M aster’s Eye; and Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, 180-84. None o f 
these works, however, makes the explicit connection between southern fears and 
northern abolitionists.
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appeared at the sale, but “was hustled rather rudely by one or two present, so that, after 
making a few ineffectual bids, he thought it prudent to retire.” Randolph’s book had a 
clear message—the separation o f slave families was a rarity and when it did happen, 
northerners were to blame. The slaves, moreover, were better off than northern 
workers. One o f Randolph’s bondservants was so happy he refused emancipation 
because he could not bear to think of life without his master.91
The “classic in the antebellum genre of trader stereotyping” came from the pen 
of Daniel Hundley.92 Writing during the secession crisis, he detected the presence of 
yankees lurking in the South. Hundley did not identify them by their ancestry or place 
o f residence, but through their characteristics. In Social Relations in our Southern 
States, he noted that a yankee was any “shrewd, sharp, chaffering, oily-tongued, soft- 
sawdering, inquisitive, money-making, money-saving, and money-worshipping 
individual” who was tireless in his pursuit o f riches. The most detestable type o f 
southern yankee, in Hundley’s eyes, was the “Negro Trader,” a man “preeminent in 
villainy and a greedy love of filthy lucre... who is in every respect as unconscionable a 
dog of a Southern Shylock as ever drank raw brandy by the glassful, or chewed Virginia
91 J. Thornton Randolph, The Cabin and Parlor; or, Slaves and Masters 
(Philadelphia, 1852) pp. 21 (first quotation), 33 (second quotation), 34 (third quotation), 
35 (fourth quotation), 39-40 (fifth quotation), 51. Other works that make essentially the 
same argument include Robert Criswell, ‘‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin ” contrasted with 
Buckingham Hall, the Planter’s Home, or a fa ir View o f both Sides o f  the Slavery 
Question (New York: D. Fanshaw, 1852); Mary H. Eastman, Aunt Phillis’s Cabin: or 
Southern Life as It is (Philadelphia: Lippincott and Grambo, 1852); J. W. Page, Uncle 
Robin, in His Cabin in Virginia, and Tom without one in Boston (Richmond, 1853); and 
Mrs. Henry R. Schoolcraft, The Black Gauntlet: A Tale o f Plantation Life in South 
Carolina (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1861).
92 Tadman, Speculators and Slaves, p. 183.
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tobacco, or used New-England cowskins to lacerate the back of a slave.” This 
“miserly” trader was “a coarse ill-bred person, provincial in speech and manners, with a 
cross-looking phiz, a  whiskey-tinctured nose, cold hard-looking eyes, a  dirty tobacco- 
stained mouth, and shabby dress.” Skilled in oaths and blasphemies, the trader’s only 
competitors in depravity were “those infidel socialists, free-lovers, and abolitionists.”93
Hundley admitted that some traders might have been honest when they entered 
the business, but “the natural result o f  their calling seems to be to corrupt them.” A 
trader routinely sold criminal slaves as honest and sick ones as healthy. In order to 
accomplish his purposes, he changed the appearance o f his slaves. This trick was 
accomplished when he “dresses them up in good clothes, makes them comb their kinky 
heads into some appearance o f neatness, mbs oil on their dusky faces to give them a 
sleek healthy color, gives them a dram occasionally to make them sprightly, and teaches 
each one the part he or she has to play.” These activities, coupled with the practice o f 
habitually separating families, did not trouble the trader’s conscience, because “we all 
know how soon familiarity with ignorance and a vicious brutality tarnishes the 
characters o f good men.” Hundley concluded that the continual exposure to the worst 
elements of the slave population dulled any pangs o f guilt a trader may have 
experienced.94
Hundley’s stereotypical description of slave traders drew upon real objections to 
speculators. Traders were guilty o f  changing the appearance of slaves, coaching them
93 Daniel R. Hundley, Social Relations in our Southern States (1860; reprint 
Baton Rouge, 1979), pp. 130-41.
94 Ibid., pp. 140-41.
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on what to say, and being in the business for the purpose o f making money. Hundley, 
of course, exaggerated the crimes of the slave trader for effect. He also created a 
caricature o f the master-slave relationship in his efforts to explain away the speculator. 
One exaggeration could not exist without the other. A realistic portrayal o f the slave 
trader necessitated a realistic assessment o f  slavery, something Hundley could not do.
By making the slave trader the epitome o f evil, Hundley, and the other southerners who 
agreed with him, saw slavery as being without blemish.
Slave owners needed the stereotype o f the evil slave trader, moreover, to 
preserve their way of life. Southerners widely considered it “more humane” to keep 
bondservants’ families together than to wantonly separate them Some owners might 
even have had good intentions when selling an entire family o f slaves to a trader. But, 
as a traveler through the South observed, “such kindnesses are of no avail after the 
victims come into the southern markets” since traders did not hesitate to separate 
families.95 It is unclear how sincere planters were in keeping families together, but even 
those owners who had no compunction about breaking up families did not boast in their 
deeds. Slave owners were quick to assure visitors that they had a “kind feeling” 
towards their “people.” Adverse public opinion, they continued, operated as a 
“powerful check against the parting of kindred.” Others made “Great sacrifices” from a 
sense o f  duty because owners thought it wrong to “abandon” slaves to an unknown 
purchaser.96 Masters hardly had to worry about abandoning their slaves; most received
95 Liberator, 17 May 1834, p.77.
96 Lyell, Second Visit to the United States, 1:209-10.
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ample compensation in their transactions. Southerners were able to convince some 
visitors, and themselves, that they had the best interests o f  their slaves at heart. A 
Philadelphia druggist was not fooled, however. He observed that the slave trade, 
although “frowned upon and called an ‘exceptional case’” was really “an essential and 
integral part of the system.” He thought that in private sales, families were less prone to 
be separated, but public auctions were another story. Callous slave traders found it in 
their interest to buy a whole family at a reduced price and then sell them separately to 
make a greater profit. Such practices were carried on to “an enormous extent” and there 
was no shortage of slave traders combing the countryside in search o f  “articles.” Public 
opinion “may be averse to tearing a husband from his wife, or a mother from her 
children, but it cannot be avoided.”97
The rhetoric o f an evil slave trader enabled southerners to explain a problematic 
aspect o f their society: the cruel treatment o f  slaves. Once speculators were to blame 
for the worst abuses o f slavery, southerners could remain committed to the institution as 
a whole. Certainly masters were just as much to blame for the sale o f  slaves as traders. 
Most southerners, however, preferred not to consider the full consequences o f the 
interstate slave trade because it did not conveniently fit the notions o f  their society. The 
reliance on a class o f evil speculators that the South ritually condemned allowed 
slaveholders to evade blame for splitting up families, punishing slaves, or engaging in 
other objectionable acts that brought grief to their bondservants. The disagreeable 
portions o f slavery that naturally flowed from the institution could be separated from
97 Francis C. Yamall Diary, pp. 14-15, Duke. Emphasis in original.
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the slaveholders and blamed on circumstances beyond the master’s control: itinerant 
traders, northern meddlers, or slave traders. In this way, traders and abolitionists 
became responsible for the worst features o f slavery, thus sparing slaveholders from 
having to shoulder any blame for the negative consequences o f the peculiar institution. 
In the face o f the personal nature o f abolitionist criticism after 1830, southerners had a 
way to avoid personal responsibility. James Stirling, who traveled through the United 
States in the mid-1850s, believed that the interstate trade o f slaves was “a sore subject 
with the defenders o f slavery. It is difficult to weave it handsomely among the 
amenities of the patriarchal institution. They fain would make a scapegoat o f the 
‘Trader,’ and load all the iniquities of the system on his unlucky back.”98 All questions 
about the inhumanity or barbarity o f bondage had a simple answer: abolitionists induced 
slaves to become rebellious, so owners had no choice but to sell them. Traders stepped 
in and took advantage of the situation. As a result, slavery was good, slaveholders acted 
responsibly and with the best interests o f their slaves at heart, and the only unacceptable 
feature of southern society was the slave trader. Since speculators themselves were 
outcasts and devoid o f honor, the argument continued, they remained at the periphery of 
society and were not important.
This stereotypical view o f traders was linked, in southern minds, to northerners. 
Fanatical abolitionists induced slaves to run away, while ruinous economic policies 
caused hardship in the South, thereby necessitating the sale o f bondservants in the first 
place. Southerners redirected abolitionist attacks on the peculiar institution by
98 James Stirling, Letters from  the Slave States (London, 1857), pp. 292-94 
(quotation on p. 292).
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essentially saying northerners caused the worst abuses of slavery. As a result, there was 
no need to reform southern society or interfere with the rights o f  the master to sell his 
bondservants. Constructing a  stereotypical view was one way to hold together a society 
increasingly under siege.
The southern defense o f the interstate slave trade shows just how far southerners 
were w illing to go to deny reality. They reduced the relationship between master and 
slave to a crude caricature, where the slaves were rarely separated from their relatives 
and the masters were more concerned with pleasing their bondservants than with 
financial survival. On the rare occasions where the slave trade intruded on this happy 
existence, it sometimes operated as rehabilitative force on those slaves who deserved to 
be sold because o f their anti-social behavior. Citizens o f the Upper South abandoned 
their initial reservations about the slave trade in favor of a completely unrealistic 
picture. Just as slavery was beneficial to bondservants, all aspects o f the institution had 
to be free from defects, as well. There was no room for the troublesome reality o f the 
interstate slave trade, so southerners substituted an idealized and stylized dream for the 
bitter reality o f whippings, auctions, co£fles, family separations, and personal anguish.
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